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The UK’s 2017 gender pay gap (GPG) reporting regulations furthered the growing pay ‘transparency 
agenda’ as a tool to end pay inequality. Yet, discussing one’s pay remains taboo. British universities 
have faced transparency pressure for years, but higher education’s (HE) GPG and gender/ethnic pay 
gap persist. To explore this puzzle, an original analytical framework is constructed, which builds 
upon Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes. The organisational salary environment (OSE) 
provides this analytical framework, to model the mutually constitutive influence of employer 
strategies, social norms, and employee behaviour on the capacity of pay transparency to reduce pay 
inequality.  
Critical analysis of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ performance inside two British universities 
involves a multi-layered, multi-strategy approach, including secondary earnings data, an original 
social pay comparison survey, semi-structured interviews with remuneration policy shapers, union 
representatives, and academics, alongside organisational pay (and related progression) policies. The 
empirical findings reveal for the first time that professors are 3.6 times more likely to discuss their 
pay than junior academics, whose pay is collectively bargained. The OSE analysis unveils a multi-
dimensional ‘pay transparency’ paradox. There is a silence of transparency; pay transparency 
practices serve to legitimise processes that reinforce pay inequality and to individualise inequality 
concerns as anomalies because of the ‘transparent’ pay practises. The income-talk taboo reinforces 
managerial control, whilst ‘deviant’ social pay comparison is insufficient to overcome inequality-
reinforcing hierarchical power structures. 
This thesis makes several original contributions, including modelling workplace pay transparency 
(mal)function through the OSE, which builds on Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes; 
empirically demonstrating pay discussion patterns and dynamics, filling a gap in the feminist 
sociological GPG literature by interrogating accepted practices and norms to unveil the ‘pay 
transparency’ paradox; and developing policy and pay setting implications to strengthen the pay 
‘transparency agenda’, both within the UK’s HE sector and across the UK.     
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The year 2020 marks 50 years since the hard-won passage of the UK’s Equal Pay Act (EPA)1 1970 and 
45 years since the European Community’s Equal Pay Directive (75/117/EC) designated the principle 
of equal pay for work of equal value (O’Reilly et al., 2015). It has been a century since Part XIII of the 
Treaty of Versailles, which created the International Labour Organization (ILO), first asserted the 
importance of this equal value principle (International Labour Office, 1923). Victory in this battle 
remains elusive, although many researchers have identified drivers of the gender pay gap (GPG). 
Some of the explanations include the differences in human capital (Becker, 1962; Mincer and 
Polachek, 1974; Olson, 2013), employee ‘choices’ about part-time work (Hakim, 1996, 2006; 
Crompton and Harris, 1998; Crompton and Lyonette, 2005), vertical and horizontal occupational 
segregation (Tam, 1997; Blackwell, 2003; Dex, Ward and Joshi, 2008; Perales, 2013), the unequal 
division of household labour (England, 2000, 2005; Budig and England, 2001), and discrimination 
(Bolitzer and Godtland 2012; Healy and Ahamed 2019; Olsen and Walby 2004), particularly where 
differences cannot be explained by other factors through decomposition analysis (Blinder, 1973; 
Oaxaca, 1973). Of course, as even Oaxaca (1973) acknowledged, decomposition may underestimate 
discrimination when factors, such as occupation, may themselves be influenced by discrimination. 
Existing explanations for the GPG will be expanded upon in Chapter 2 and applied to the higher 
education (HE) sector context of this thesis in Chapter 4.  
The need for a novel approach to explain the persistent GPG by interrogating accepted practices and 
settled social norms is long overdue. This thesis will explore pay secrecy and question the degree of 
transparency that pay transparency exercises deliver. Critical analysis will expose the silence of 
transparency—the pressure to shut down or at least isolate individual inequality concerns as 
anomalies because ‘transparent’ pay structures are in place. The focus will be on critically analysing 
the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda2’ in UK HE and the sector’s persistent GPG and 
gender/ethnic pay gap (G/EPG), based on fieldwork that was conducted primarily during the 
2016/17 academic year. This thesis will examine the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ 
inside two university case studies. These performances appear to be efforts to create organisational 
change. The analytical framework developed and applied in this thesis is built on Acker’s (2006a, 
 
1 See Appendix A for a listing of acronyms and glossary of key terms of this thesis. 
2 The Noon Centre for Equality and Diversity in Business (2017) characterised this agenda as flowing from the 
Equality Act 2010, but I use the term more broadly, referring to the multi-layered forces that have pressured 
UK universities to improve pay transparency in the decade leading to 2016/17 (Chapter 4).  
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2006b) inequality regimes, which serve to illuminate interlocking practices and processes to 
conceptualise intersectional inequality inside organisations and explain why organisational change 
efforts to reduce inequality often fail. Change efforts, and resistance to such efforts, often make 
visible the invisible organisational functions that reproduce inequality (Acker, 2006b). Intersectional 
analysis of inequality in this thesis will be applied to gender and ethnicity, and the applicability of 
inequality regimes will be justified in Chapter 2. 
As will emerge from this thesis, equality policy—whether legislative or organisational—may promise 
more than it delivers. As Hoque and Noon (2004) argue, an equality policy without appropriate 
supporting practices is an ‘empty shell.’ Transforming hierarchical power structures, which create 
unequal distributions of pay by gender and ethnicity within the workplace, requires more than 
words in statutes or organisational policies in PDF files. The initial failure of the UK’s EPA 1970 to 
protect equal pay for work of equal value is a prominent example of the limitations of words to 
reform power inequality (Hastings, 2006; Davis, 2019).3 Over the decade leading to 2016/17, multi-
layered forces have created regulative and voluntary pressure on UK universities to become more 
transparent about pay and related progression policies and practices, in an effort to combat the 
persistent GPG.4 These forces include: 
• statute, such as the Public Sector Equality Duty (Brill, 2011);  
• media, such as the Times Higher Education pay survey, which has published mean male and 
female academic salaries by institution annually, since at least 2007 (Fearn and Newman, 
2007);  
 
3 The EPA became statute at the end of a Labour government (Seear, 1971, p. 312). The party affirmed the 
principle of equal pay for equal work in their 1964 election manifesto (Labour Party, 1964), as did the Trades 
Union Congress in a 1965 resolution calling on government to implement its own manifesto (Davis, 2019).3 
Momentum cooled, but was rejuvenated by the 1968 Dagenham Ford women machinists strike. Barbara 
Castle, then-Secretary of State for Employment, promised legislation. Concurrent negotiations for EU 
accession, completed in 1973, provided further pressure since pay equality had been part of the EU/European 
Community Treaty framework since the Treaty of Rome (McCrudden, 1983; Chalmers, Davies and Monti, 
2010). However, the original EPA only protected equal pay for equal work. Implementation was also delayed 
until January 1976. This allowed job re-grading to circumvent the legislative intent to remedy unequal pay by 
creating post-hoc justifications for existing pay differentials between some jobs (Hastings, 2006; Davis, 2019). 
However, in Snoxell v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [1977] IRLR 123 EAT, women argued that they had been victims of 
unfair discrimination when their pay and grading was lowered, while men remained employed doing the same 
job at their old higher rates through a mechanism called red circling. The court dismissed red circling as a 
viable defence against the discrimination claim (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2013).The 
European Court of Justice Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd (1983) decision obliged the UK to protect 
equal pay for work of equal value from 1984 (Byrne, 1984; Szyszczak, 1985; Rubery, 2019).  
4 Emphasis on the G/EPG has grown since this fieldwork was conducted (Croxford, 2018, 2019). 
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• sectoral collective bargaining, which applies to the pay of most academics, except professors 
(JNCHES, 2004; NATFHE, 2005; University and College Union, 2016b);  
• industry norms, such as the Athena SWAN charter (Equality Challenge Unit, 2018a); and  
• the Employment Tribunal system, specifically the decision in the case of Professor EJ Shafer 
v Royal Holloway and Bedford New College in 2011, which identified the lack of 
transparency of professorial pay as an equality concern (Lewis, 2011).  
Even the best laid anti-discrimination statute is only useful if employees have adequate information 
to observe pay disparity when it occurs and possess the power and resources to seek redress, 
including legal remedy where necessary (Lyons, 2012; Alexander, 2015). Indeed, inequality cannot 
be challenged if the pay ‘transparency agenda’ does not make individual pay disparity visible. 
Women cannot challenge pay discrimination or effectively advocate for their worth without 
knowing what others earn (Kim, 2015), particularly given the requirement under UK employment 
law to provide a real comparator in most pay discrimination claims (Gow and Middlemiss, 2012). An 
alternative mechanism through which women could learn about colleagues’ pay is social pay 
comparison; this means discussing pay with co-workers (Burchell and Yagil, 1997). However, little 
remains known about the potential relationship between such pay discussions and wages (Colella et 
al., 2007).  
A pay disparity paradox complicates the study of the relationship between social pay discussions 
and wages. While pay inequality on the macro level is openly reported in official government 
statistics and the national media (Chapter 2), wage inequality that requires individual comparison is 
socially taboo (Fox, 2014). Discussion of individual level pay information, which might potentially 
reveal micro level disparity between colleagues, is often difficult and the information can feel like a 
closely guarded secret. Writing about this final taboo over what people earn, legal scholars suggest, 
at least in the American context, that secrecy preserves power:  
Although it is commonplace for sexual and family dysfunction to be discussed on afternoon 
television, most people still consider asking salary to be rude and intrusive. American 
competitiveness may then be the reason for the strength and longevity of the taboo. 
Information is power; the amount of money a person earns can be a measure of success, 
personal worth and even masculinity. Information about money is especially powerful and 
dangerous. (Levine and Stanchi, 2001, p. 551) 
This macro/micro pay disparity paradox is surprising because of the recognised importance of 
income to individuals. In the global capitalist economy, money is the ticket to much else in life. This 
reality coloured Acker’s (2006a) view that inequality regimes within organisations are typically 
14 
 
stable. The organisational processes that produce and reproduce inequality are stabilised partly by 
the ‘wage dependence’ that most people face, which is “the economic imperative that forces most 
people to work in order to survive” (Acker, 2006a, p. 129). In an interview with Hess (2019) on Equal 
Pay Day, economist Dr Heidi Hartmann observed that differences in pay “affect all your life chances, 
your children’s life chances, your own health, your ability to take care of older parents.” Furthering 
the perception that pay levels are important, universities prominently report their graduates’ 
average pay to attract the next generation of scholars (University College London, 2017).  
This paradox of condemning macro income inequality and mandating meso level GPG reporting, 
juxtaposed with the taboo over individuals discussing and sharing information about their incomes, 
characterises UK society. The headline GPG is widely reported at the macro labour force level. The 
UK’s Office for National Statistics publishes the figure every year based on the Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (Office for National Statistics, 2018b). Macro and meso level discussion of the 
GPG appeals to a communal sense of social justice. Calls to report and narrow the GPG at the meso 
level have emerged from the highest echelons of the UK government. Then-Prime Minister David 
Cameron declared, in an interview with Swinford (2015), that finally requiring large companies to 
report their gender and pay statistics would “cast sunlight on the discrepancies and create the 
pressure we need for change, driving women’s wages up” to ultimately close the pay gap between 
men and women “within a generation.” Although the 2015 Conservative government has been 
credited with promoting the pay ‘transparency agenda’ in the workplace to narrow the GPG, the 
Equality Act 2010 was one of the final achievements of the last Labour government (Hepple, 2010). 
Mandatory GPG reporting is at the centre of the current ‘transparency agenda’ (Noon Centre for 
Equality and Diversity in Business, 2017). However, this Tory-adopted ‘agenda’ has been met with 
scepticism that yet another policy promising equality, although a necessary step, is unlikely to 
deliver widespread changes. In reality, perfunctory pay transparency cannot redress embedded, 
structural workplace inequality (Women’s Equality Party, 2017).  
Woe betides the individual who seeks to discuss micro level inequality. Calling this taboo merely 
‘English’ or ‘British’ culture evades critical analysis of why the taboo exists and its role in preserving 
gender and ethnic pay inequality. Jo Swinson, then-Minister for Women and Equalities, 
acknowledged this taboo in an interview with Pearlman (2013) when she encouraged women to ask 
their male counterparts about their earnings but recognised that “I think there's something very 
British in our culture where we don't talk about money, and I think that is one of the things that 
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holds women back.” In Fox’s (2014, p. 291) handbook of the ‘hidden rules’ of English society, the 
anthropologist calls this tendency the ‘income-talk taboo.’ 
This thesis will highlight the need to critically analyse pay ‘transparency agenda’ performance and 
the income-talk taboo by examining the UK HE sector, which faced pressure from this same ‘agenda’ 
for more than a decade before recent GPG reporting regulations came into effect. The HE sector 
continues nevertheless to struggle with a persistent GPG, vertical segregation, and appallingly low 
representation of Black Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) individuals in the professoriate (McNabb 
and Wass, 1997; Blackaby and Frank, 2000; Blackaby, Booth and Frank, 2005; Bates, Jenkins and 
Pflaeger, 2012; New JNCHES, 2015; P. Miller, 2016; Grove, 2017b; University and College Union, 
2017; AdvanceHE, 2018; Rollock, 2019) (Chapter 4). This raises the question, ‘Why have previous 
efforts to create pay transparency in academia not eliminated pay inequality?’  
Organisational policies—prompted by legislation—to promote equality through transparency have 
previously been probed, specifically in the UK university context. Ahmed (2012) astutely revealed 
the contrast between the stated aims and real outcomes of equality policies against racism in UK 
universities. She showed how universities at best create equality documents instead of doing 
equality work and at worst create equality documents that proactively obscure bad practices to 
manage reputations. Influenced by Ahmed, this thesis will critically analyse the relationship between 
pay ‘transparency agenda’ performance in two university case studies in the South East of England 
and the persistent GPG and G/EPG.   
1.2 Justification for the Research  
The focus in this thesis on the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ in the UK HE sector is 
justified by empirical research gaps at the national and industry level and limitations of predominant 
methodological practice. At the national level, this thesis is justified empirically by the unexplored 
macro/meso versus micro level pay inequality paradox within UK society. This paradox contrasts 
with growing policy rhetoric that positions pay transparency as a valuable tool to combat the GPG. 
At the industry level, this thesis is justified empirically by literature on the persistent gender and 
ethnic inequality in UK academia, which lacks an examination of pay secrecy. This thesis fills a gap at 
the individual and organisational level by exploring the failure of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ to 
remedy this inequality. Predominant pay secrecy research has focused on employer actions and 
interests (Marasi and Bennett, 2016) (Chapter 3). Methodologically, this thesis is justified by 
providing a novel multi-layered, multi-strategy approach to such analysis in order to account for the 
employee perspective.    
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Empirically at the national level, the macro/micro pay inequality paradox means that headline 
statistics on national pay inequality are common in the UK, whilst a taboo hinders discussions of 
individual level pay. If the transparency of inequality from the macro or meso level headline 
government statistics or mandatory GPG reporting highlights a cause for concern, does the income-
talk taboo silence individual inquiry and demands to reform the hierarchical power structures that 
are responsible for the inequality? This paradox is contextualised by the growing international and 
domestic policy rhetoric that encourages (meso) company level aggregate pay transparency as a tool 
to narrow the GPG. The UK’s mandatory GPG reporting regulations came into force in the spring of 
2017 and set a first reporting deadline by the spring of 2018. The regulations followed a number of 
European Union (EU) nations that had legislated to promote pay transparency by protecting 
employees’ rights to discuss their pay (Bierman and Gely, 2004; Colella et al., 2007; Doherty, 2011) 
or by mandating that employers report company GPGs. The 2006 Act on Equal Pay Between Women 
and Men required French companies to report their progress and plans to improve firm level gender 
equality (European Commission, 2014b, p. 19). A 2006 amendment to Denmark’s Equal Pay Act 
required employers of 35 or more employees (including at least 10 male and 10 female staff) to 
provide annual reports of gender-disaggregated wage statistics to their employees or to provide 
clear descriptions of wage-setting practices and an action plan to achieve equal pay (Bennedsen et 
al., 2018). The 2009 Discrimination Act required Swedish employers of 25 or more employees to 
conduct pay surveys every three years in order to identify unfair pay practices and to help create 
equal pay action plans (European Commission, 2014b). This Act was amended to mandate written 
pay audits from January 2017 (Veldman and Timmer, 2017). Since 2012, Belgium has required 
companies to annually report on their gender wage differences, including a detailed gender wage 
analysis for companies that employ 50 or more people. If gaps are revealed, companies must create 
improvement plans. Austria’s National Action Plan has required companies with 150 or more 
employees to publish equal pay reports since 2014 (European Commission, 2014b).   
In 2014, the European Commission (2014a) issued the Commission Recommendation on 
strengthening the principle of equal pay between men and women through transparency, 
encouraging EU member states to adopt a variety of measures to promote pay transparency as one 
of the tactics needed to reduce the GPG. The Recommendation encouraged the implementation of 
pay transparency along four core dimensions, including (i) the right of individual employees to 
request information about pay disaggregated by gender and work of equal value; (ii) an employer 
duty to report the average pay of men and women by job categorisation; (iii) an employer duty to 
conduct equal pay audits; and (iv) the inclusion of equal pay considerations, including equal pay 
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audits, in collective bargaining. Analysis conducted for the European Commission found that by 
September 2016, pay transparency reforms were not widespread across the EU (Veldman and 
Timmer, 2017). The Recommendation left the door open for an EU directive to promote pay 
transparency in member states through binding measures and enforcement. Public consultation on 
such a directive was held in early 2020, and the directive is expected to be adopted by the end of 
2020 (European Commission, 2020). 
In October 2010, the UK’s Equality Act 2010, section 77 had also come into force. It prohibits 
employers from enforcing contractual clauses that ban employees from discussing wages if 
employees suspect illegal discrimination. Pay secrecy clauses were not banned, nor did the 
protection necessarily weaken the income-talk taboo. Section 77 only protects those willing to 
contravene the taboo and keeps the burden for achieving transparency on the employee, who must 
somehow realise that they should suspect discrimination and convince their colleagues (or former 
colleagues) to candidly share income details with them (Doherty, 2011). In April 2014, the 
government intensified this employee burden by abolishing the statutory Equal Pay Questionnaire, 
which had given employees the right to seek information about male comparator pay from their 
employers directly (Trades Union Congress, 2015b; Wild, 2017). 
Section 77 assumes an openness that may not exist, partly due to the taboo, and assumes 
knowledge of employment law by rank-and-file employees. The text has also been criticised for its 
complexity, as it only protects those who share information to determine whether there is pay 
discrimination. It may be difficult for employers to know the motivations of pay disclosures, whilst 
employees may not understand the nuance of legal protection available in the face of clear gagging 
clauses that may appear in their employment contract (Gow and Middlemiss, 2012). A 
representative UK-wide survey by gender equality campaign group, the Fawcett Society, suggests 
that public awareness of employment law detail is weak. The 2018 study revealed that 60% of 
workers did not know about this protection, while 31% believed they were contractually banned 
from discussing their pay (Fawcett Society, 2018). Thus, the statutory language has limitations. 
However, van den Brink et al. (2010, p. 1462) argue that “the articulation of a norm in a policy plan 
is as much a practice as the application of that norm.” Asserting the right to discuss wages in policy 
is a positive step—potentially better than no policy—although the direct impact on gender equality 
may be small. Legislation “may have a symbolic impact and constitute a driving force for gender 
equality standards” (Rubery and Koukiadaki, 2016, p. ix). 
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Pay transparency legislation is driven by a belief that pay transparency narrows the GPG. The 
argument that ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant’ suggests that if employers know that pay is 
transparent then they will be encouraged to make fair remuneration decisions (Eisenberg, 2011; 
Lyons, 2012). If employees have a more accurate picture of what their co-workers earn, especially 
potential comparators, they will learn of discrepancies if or when they do occur. Without knowledge 
of potentially unfair discrepancies, employees cannot seek remedy, such as by raising the issue with 
their line manager, bringing a claim against their employer, or seeking a new employer (Lyons, 
2012). At best, employees may rely on haphazard access to pay information based on social 
networks or accidental discovery (Ramachandran, 2012).  
This thesis is motivated by the case of the American Lilly Ledbetter, which illustrates the equality 
risks of perfunctory pay transparency. The US does not have federal legislation to require meso level 
transparency by private employers reporting their GPG. However, the National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935 bans pay secrecy clauses for some employees (Bierman and Gely, 2004; Colella et al., 2007). 
Yet, awareness of this is low, the legislation does not apply to those with supervisory duties, and 
courts have frequently used loopholes to protect employers. For successful claims, the potential 
remedy is too weak to deter most employers as no damages may be awarded, and employees may 
only receive limited back pay, re-instatement, or an abolition of the discussion ban (National 
Women’s Law Center, 2012; Kulow, 2013).  
Ledbetter worked for Goodyear Tire and Rubber, as the sole female supervisor in her division, for 19 
years. Her employer forbade employees from discussing pay, but in a supervisory role, the federal 
ban on pay secrecy clauses did not protect her. She only learned of the discrepancies that led to her 
discrimination claim after someone anonymously left salary information on her desk (Kim, 2015). 
Partly due to the veil of secrecy over Goodyear pay, whether she experienced illegal discrimination 
was never settled, despite her case reaching the Supreme Court in 2007. The majority opinion 
argued that Ledbetter’s case lacked standing because the alleged discrimination originated with a 
pay decision that was made years before she brought her complaint, which was well beyond the 
180-day statute of limitations. The decision led to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 2009, which 
statutorily restored the previously longstanding legal interpretation that each new payslip following 
a discriminatory action is a new discriminatory act and restarts the clock (Lyons, 2012; Kulow, 2013; 
Kim, 2015). 
The Supreme Court’s re-interpretation was out of step with how employment discrimination 
emerges, which is a process that snowballs subtly over time, in no small part due to the cloak of 
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secrecy hanging over pay. Ledbetter might never have learned of the discrimination she experienced 
but for the anonymous informant. The Supreme Court’s 2007 majority opinion would have made it 
nearly impossible for American women to learn of their discrimination in time to bring pay 
discrimination claims due to employers banning or discouraging pay discussion, which are further 
reinforced by the income-talk taboo (Levine and Stanchi, 2001; Lyons, 2012; Kulow, 2013; Fox, 2014; 
Kim, 2015). The formal explanation for this snowballing phenomenon is the “cumulative effect of 
individual acts”, a phrase from Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion 
(Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. 2007: 2180). This concept is reinforced by the 
“accumulation of disadvantage” phenomenon, which illustrates the impact of low starting salaries 
on women’s lifetime earnings (Babcock and Laschever 2009: 131), and the widening GPG during the 
first decade of their working lives (Manning and Swaffield, 2008). 
Under the Ledbetter Act, American women are theoretically more able to seek justice upon 
discovery of illegal discrimination. However, the law only deals with the consequences of secretive 
workplaces and does nothing to motivate employers to become more open about wages, as 
mandatory gender pay gap reporting legislation purports to do. Given the clear need to shift the pay 
knowledge-power asymmetry between employers and employees within the context of  individual-
rights based anti-discrimination legal regimes (Dickens, 2000), it is important to explore whether 
‘pay transparency’ performance actually achieves this.  
The empirical justification for this thesis’s focus on the UK’s HE industry stems from the research gap 
to be explored in Chapter 4. UK academia has a widely acknowledged problem with gender 
inequality in pay and related career progression. Knights and Richards (2003, pp. 217–218) observed 
more than 15 years ago "that the GPG is widening in academia, in contrast to the situation in the 
wider labour market." The GPG in academia has remained a recognised problem. The University and 
College Union’s (UCU) national pay claim for 2016/17 contained a demand for nationally-agreed 
action by institutions to close the GPG by 2020 (University and College Union, 2016a). As awareness 
of the ethnic pay gap and intersectional G/EPG in academia is also on the rise, the UCU has been 
pushing for better data to address this problem. As such, the UCU 2015/16 national pay and equality 
claim called on universities to conduct mandatory biennial equal pay audits, disaggregated by 
gender, race and disability status (University and College Union, 2015b). Yet, at the individual and 
organisational level, researchers have not questioned why the pay ‘transparency agenda’ has not 




Despite the growing body of literature critiquing the HE sector for a persistent GPG and increasingly 
the G/EPG, the experience of seeking—particularly as a woman, BAME or BAME woman academic—
to advance one’s pay and career in relation to the pay ‘transparency agenda’ performance is 
underexplored. Whilst pay gaps can be decomposed (Chapter 2) to help identify what factors 
account for their persistence, quantitative assessment can obscure organisational processes and 
societal norms that reinforce and reproduce structural inequality. Accepted controls for pay 
differentials within academia, such as productivity measured by publication quality and quantity 
(Ward, 2001), are themselves prone to bias (Miller and Mctavish, 2011; Schucan Bird, 2011; 
Knobloch-Westerwick and Glynn, 2013; Knobloch-Westerwick, Glynn and Huge, 2013; Maliniak, 
Powers and Walter, 2013; Smith et al., 2015; Hengel, 2017). Publication statistics have become 
institutionally unquestioned metrics applied to academic promotion procedures (Caffrey et al., 
2016), and promotion unlocks access to higher pay. 
  
Arguably, questioning such processes is difficult for academics, partly due to the multi-layered 
pressure on HE to perform the pay ‘transparency agenda’ (Chapter 4). Could this ‘agenda’ have 
solidified power hierarchies that preserve the inequality it was meant to reform? While the ‘agenda’ 
has created an opportunity to make inequalities visible to some degree, engagement by university 
senior management could strengthen inequalities’ legitimacy. By indicating the problem is being 
resolved, it becomes easier to individualise the experiences of disadvantage and fail to challenge 
systems that preserve existing hierarchical power. Analysis of how this multi-layered ‘transparency 
agenda’ performance pressure is manifested and experienced by individual academics working 
inside universities—who are themselves influenced by the societal income-talk taboo but may also 
demonstrate agency by discussing pay in certain circumstances (Chapter 9)—is missing from UK HE 
scholarship. This thesis will seek to fill this gap by critically analysing the performance of the 
‘transparency agenda’ within institutions from a multi-layered perspective, including interlinked 
reward and progression. 
 
Finally, there is a methodological justification for the multi-layered, multi-strategy approach of this 
thesis (Chapter 5). Most existing pay secrecy research has focused on the formal and informal 
actions and motivations of employers (Chapter 3). This leaves a blind spot in terms of the employee 
experience of pay secrecy and the visibility of potential pay inequality. The focus of most research 
on pay secrecy suggests that the employer motivation to maximise profit and productivity is the 
main driver for pay secrecy/transparency. Existing research explores the direct impact of pay 
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secrecy/transparency on performance (Burroughs, 1982) or task-performance (Belogolovsky and 
Bamberger, 2014), or factors that indirectly impact worker performance, such as employee well-
being (Perez-truglia, 2019), morale (Breza, Kaur and Shamdasani, 2018) or pay satisfaction (Lawler, 
1965b, 1965a, 1995; Thompson and Pronsky, 1975; Futrell and Jenkins, 1978). Little consideration is 
given to the impact of pay secrecy on employees’ financial well-being.5  
 
Even Marasi and Bennett’s (2016) call for broader research and understanding into pay secrecy at 
work advocates for investigating factors that remain predominantly aligned with employer 
motivations and concerns for the bottom line. This includes measuring “workplace deviance, 
organizational citizenship behaviors, organizational commitment, and perceived organizational 
support” (Marasi and Bennett, 2016, p. 50). This does not allow pay secrecy/transparency to be 
understood as a tool of managerial power. Rather, it positions the concept as something 
instrumental that employers choose to ‘do’ to employees in order to achieve their objectives, such 
as improving performance or creating happier workers who are believed to be better performers. By 
exploring and acknowledging the multi-layered actions by employers and employees, and the multi-
layered pressures on universities, this unique methodological approach will allow for the creation of 
a more nuanced understanding of the role of pay secrecy/transparency inside organisations. This 
understanding will be conceptualised through the central theoretical contribution of this thesis - the 
OSE.  
1.3 Research Questions 
This thesis aims to explain the paradoxical position of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ in UK HE, 
highlighting its weaknesses despite the growing policy rhetoric that transparency is an effective tool 
to reduce pay inequality. Pressure to implement this ‘agenda’ stems from sources external to 
universities, including the state, media, sectoral collective bargaining, industry norms, and a key 
employment tribunal decision (Chapter 4). However, success of the ‘agenda’ depends on what 
happens inside the ‘black box’ (Acker, 1991; Clegg et al., 2016) of university bureaucratic structures. 
In her GPG analysis of Swedish banks, Acker (1991) advocated for the importance of critically 
analysing every-day organisational practices that impact wage setting, beyond collective bargaining:  
Real wages are set by people in interaction with other people…I needed another way of 
looking at wage formation that could show how wages actually get produced and what 
processes result in concrete, dollars-and-cents (kronor) differences between women and 
 
5 Bennedsen et al.’s (2018) research on Denmark’s 2006 GPG reporting regulation and Cullen and Perez-
Truglia’s (2018) organisational experimental survey about employee pay awareness are notable exceptions.  
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men. Who does what, with what tools, and with what resources of power and control inside 
the black box of wage setting? This process is hidden in studies of the gender-based wage 
gap. (Acker, 1991, p. 392) 
The primary research question of this thesis is ‘Why hasn’t the pay ‘transparency agenda’ closed the 
gender and gender-ethnic pay gap in UK higher education?’ This research question is motivated by a 
research gap of organisational and individual level investigations into the performance of the pay ‘ 
transparency agenda’ in academia, and my personal interest in pay equality and observations of 
secrecy shrouding pay even in otherwise progressive institutions (Chapter 5).    
Drawing on a range of intersectional feminist conceptions of gender, ethnicity, and power at work 
(Crenshaw, 1991; Bradley, 1999; Acker, 2006b, 2006a; Ahmed, 2007, 2012; Cho, Crenshaw and 
McCall, 2013; Eddo-Lodge, 2018) and Layder’s (1993, 1998, 2013) research mapping approach, this 
study will adopt a multi-layered, multi-strategy approach. Therefore, my sub-research questions 
include:  
• To what effect has the pay ‘transparency agenda’ been performed in the two university case 
studies? 
• Do academics in the two university case studies violate the ‘income-talk’ taboo, and if so, 
how might observed social pay comparison behaviour patterns be explained? 
• How does the pay ‘transparency agenda’ within UK universities influence awareness of pay 
(and related progression) inequality by academics, particularly women and BAME 
academics?   
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters as follows: 
• Chapter One provides a general understanding of the research scope and aims, justification 
for the research focus, the research questions, and outlines the remaining chapters.  
 
• Chapter Two is the first of the three-chapter literature review that progresses from broad 
theoretical concepts to this thesis’s specific research context. This chapter presents the 
theorised relationship between workplace organisational processes and the persistent GPG 
and G/EPG (bases of inequality), through the lens of Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality 
regimes. Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) analytical framework provides the foundation for explaining 
inequality in the workplace with respect to gender and ethnicity. This idea is reinforced by 
exploring the limitations of relying solely on the quantitative reporting of the headline 
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gender pay gap, decomposing the gap, and analysing the intersection of ethnicity and 
gender in the pay gap. Inequality regimes provide a useful tool to add nuance to the 
positivist quantitative focus on bases of inequality. 
 
• Chapter Three synthesises the existing knowledge of multi-layered sources of influence on 
pay secrecy/transparency in the workplace: government statute, trade union collective 
bargaining, employer policies, broad social norms, and employee behaviour. This chapter 
proposes how to draw these often-siloed forces together to theoretically underpin the 
analytical framework developed throughout this thesis, namely the organisational salary 
environment (OSE). The OSE is a three-pronged concept accounting for the forces that 
influence employees’ awareness of pay inside organisations. The literature related to 
inequality regimes and pay communication/secrecy is drawn on in this chapter to begin the 
construction of this novel analytical framework. This approach enables a critical analysis of 
how multi-layered pressures may variably and concurrently make pay more or less 
secretive/transparent from the perspective of employees. 
 
• Chapter Four describes and analyses the sectoral level HE context in which this thesis is 
situated. This chapter applies the labour economics and sociological literatures on the GPG 
and G/EPG, and the awareness of multiple levels of influence on the OSE, to the UK HE 
sector. This chapter first demonstrates the persistence of the GPG and G/EPG in UK 
academia, which is partially explained by vertical segregation in the academic hierarchy, 
horizontal segregation across disciplines, and the motherhood pay penalty. Secondly, key 
sources of influence on universities to perform the pay ‘transparency agenda’ are identified. 
These include the state, the media, sectoral collective bargaining, industry norms, and the 
employment tribunal system. This chapter illustrates the context of the thesis within UK HE 
and identifies a significant research gap this thesis seeks to fill, which is the understanding of 
how multi-layered pay ‘transparency agenda’ performance pressure manifests and is 
experienced by individual academics working inside universities. 
 
• Chapter Five presents this thesis’s multi-layered, multi-strategy research design (Tables 5-2 
and 5-3) and explains the methodological perspective. This includes my reflexivity as a 
researcher and research philosophy, highlighting the influence of intersectional feminism 
and the critical realist approach used by Layder (1993, 2006, 2013). The methods selected to 
implement this research and the data used for analysis are described. This includes 
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secondary analysis of the GPG in HE and the two case study institutions; a binomial logistic 
regression using primary survey data on social pay comparison behaviour by academics, and 
thematic analysis of interview data and associated policy documents from the two case 
study institutions.   
 
• Chapter Six applies a critical lens to formal ‘pay transparency’ performance through pay-
related policies and external recognition-seeking in the case study universities, which impact 
the employer ‘pay communication’ policy component of OSE. This analysis engages with the 
visibility and legitimacy components of Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes 
framework. Despite some remuneration and related policy differences between the two 
institutions, striking similarities emerge. Although both institutions provide similar 
commitments to producing regular equality and diversity data, concerns about the extent to 
which visibility is achieved emerge. This remains true for heads of department, despite their 
access to radical pay transparency of those working under them. Radical pay transparency 
refers to the revelation of actual individual pay levels. Additionally, both universities held 
Athena SWAN awards that seemingly legitimated existing arrangements, while academics 
and the union representatives alike expressed substantial concern that the legitimacy was 
superficial. This chapter contributes to an understanding of the ‘pay transparency’ paradox. 
 
• Chapter Seven focuses on the employee behaviour (social comparison of pay) component of 
the OSE to achieve analysis at the level of situated activity. This analysis engages with the 
visibility of inequality component of Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes. This chapter 
records and analyses patterns of pay discussion within specific real-world organisational 
contexts: two HE institutional case studies. For the first time, this analysis provides a 
window into hidden pay discussions by UK academics that occur despite the income-talk 
taboo. Strikingly, being a professor is the most important predictor of discussing pay, while 
neither gender nor ethnicity is significant. 
 
• Chapter Eight focuses first on the informal pay secrecy norms that are reinforced through 
indirect and internalised managerial control behaviours and the ’helpfulness trap’ of the 
‘Kafkaesque’ citizenship expectations (Clegg et al., 2016) that are placed on women, BAME 
academics, and BAME women. ’Kafkaesque’ is a literary metaphor used to refer to the 
feeling of academics that they are “trapped in a vicious circle created by bureaucratic rules 
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that they can neither understand nor escape” (Clegg et al., 2016, p. 158). These forms of 
managerial control have a mutually constitutive relationship with the income-talk taboo 
component of the OSE. This chapter also demonstrates experiences of bureaucratic reward 
processes and policies in the context of recruitment pay, promotion pay, and professorial 
banding decisions. Inconsistencies experienced with these processes stimulate the 
employee social pay comparison behaviour (and other social interactions) component of 
OSE, which generate opportunities to experience pay transparency, but complaints raised on 
the basis of such transparency do not yield systemic reform. Therefore, this analysis engages 
with the management control and compliance and the processes producing organisational 
inequality components of Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes framework to further 
critical assessments of ‘pay transparency’ performance and strengthen the demonstration of 
the ‘pay transparency’ paradox. 
 
• Chapter Nine concludes this thesis by drawing together the findings of the empirical 
chapters in relation to the primary and three sub-research questions and the thesis’s 
contributions. The primary theoretical contribution of this thesis is the development of the 
OSE concept, with three mutually constitutive components, and the demonstration of its 
value for analysing the employee experience of pay secrecy/transparency inside 
organisations. The primary empirical contribution is the analytical demonstration and 
explanation of the ‘pay transparency’ paradox inside two case study universities. The 
primary methodological contribution is to demonstrate the value of a multi-layered, multi-
strategy approach to explaining the persistence of pay inequality despite performance of the 
pay ‘transparency agenda.’ This chapter will also address research limitations, relevant 
developments since the 2016/17 fieldwork of this thesis, policy implications and potential 




Chapter 2 Gender and Gender/Ethnic Pay Gap Inequality  
2.1 Introduction 
This is the first of the three-part literature review in this thesis. This chapter aims to establish the 
theorised relationship between workplace organisational processes and the persistent gender pay 
gap (GPG) and gender/ethnic pay gap (G/EPG), reflecting an understanding of gender and ethnicity 
as bases of inequality (Acker, 2006a, 2006b). To achieve this aim, this chapter will illustrate how 
intersectional analytical frameworks founded on Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes can 
explain persistent workplace inequality. It will present the theoretical connection between pay 
secrecy and pay inequality and explain how the inequality regime framework applies to this thesis. 
Moving beyond a purely positivist quantitative focus is necessary to better explain how and why 
workplace disadvantage persists. The deceptive complexities of reporting the headline GPG will be 
critically reviewed and decomposition analysis, the statistical procedure that is commonly used to 
identify factors behind the GPG, will be explained. This chapter will also explore measurement of the 
more complex—although increasingly studied—intersectional G/EPG. 
2.2 Acker’s Inequality Regimes and Pay Secrecy 
This section presents Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes as a useful foundation for an 
analytical framework to help explain persistent gender and ethnic pay inequality. The challenge of 
accounting for all factors that may ‘explain’ pay inequality, is made harder to unpack by the societal 
pressures that themselves influence some of the ostensibly legitimate factors on which to base 
remuneration. Therefore, this section will demonstrate the theoretical link between pay secrecy and 
the GPG and then detail the value of Acker’s inequality regimes as an analytical framework 
foundation to help understand that relationship  
2.2.1 Proposing Pay Secrecy as a Factor to Explain the Gender Pay Gap 
This section will explain the theoretical link between pay secrecy and the GPG and will then 
articulate the expectation that employer or legislative actions to reduce pay secrecy, by increasing 
pay transparency, are useful tools to narrow the GPG. Empirical conclusions are mixed, but 
promising. Pay secrecy/transparency literature refers to a range of actions, including pay 
transparency/secrecy led by employer policies, such as ‘gagging clauses’ in contracts to prevent 
people from talking about pay or reporting on the company’s GPG. Other actions may be led by 
legislation, including prohibiting the enforcement of ‘gagging clauses,’ mandating GPG reporting at 
the company level, or requiring the publication of individual level salaries. 
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Recognising the difficulty of measuring pay secrecy in existing datasets, the Institute for Women’s 
Policy Research (IWPR) conducted a novel US survey with a measure of pay secrecy based on 
employee reporting of employers’ formal and informal pay secrecy policies. They found that in the 
public sector, respondents were more likely to report that ‘wage and salary information is public’ 
relative to the private sector. Private sector respondents were much more likely to report that 
discussing pay was informally discouraged or even formally prohibited at work. The IWPR noted a 
higher GPG in the more secretive private sector, observing that “while there may be no direct link 
between pay secrecy and pay inequality, pay secrecy appears to contribute to the GPG in earnings” 
(Hegewisch and Williams, 2014).  
The argument for employer-led pay transparency to narrow the GPG has been made by women and 
labour rights advocates in the US and the UK (Trades Union Congress, 2013; Hegewisch and 
Williams, 2014; Hill, 2015), highlighting these public and private sector differences. Referring to the 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) 2012, the TUC found that in the UK the private full-time 
GPG was 19.9%, while the public sector full-time gap was only 13.6% (Trades Union Congress, 2013). 
A report by the United States Office of Personnel Management (2014) found that female white-
collar federal workers experienced a nearly 13% gap, while the American Association of University 
Women (AAUW) noted that American women overall experienced nearly double—a 22% gap (Hill, 
2015, p. 19). However, other factors, such as the relative strength of the profit motive in the private 
sector or generally better oversight within government departments, may also explain these 
differences.   
Legal and economic scholars have argued that moving towards employer-led pay transparency, 
which may or may not be mandated or encouraged by legislation, helps to narrow the GPG 
(Ramachandran, 2012; Kulow, 2013; Kim, 2015).6 However, the field leans heavily on the US 
 
6 The impact of pay transparency has also been studied in the context of city managers and CEOs, but with a 
focus on high pay, not the GPG. The UK’s High Pay Centre analyses the ratio between median FTSE 100 CEOs 
and median full-time employees. CEO pay was 144 times that of median employees in 2015. These reports 
complement calls for government to require CEO pay transparency (J. Miller, 2016). UK regulations came into 
force in 2019 to require publicly listed UK companies with 250 or more employees to annually publish their 
CEO to worker pay ratio from 2020, using median, 25th, and 75th percentiles (Gov.UK, 2019). Mas (2014, 2016, 
2017) examined the impact of public sector pay transparency on city manager salaries in the American state of 
California, following legislation that mandated public disclosure. He found wage compression at the high end 
of the pay distribution and suggested that this was the result of a populist backlash against perceived 
excessive pay, not restraint of salaries that were above market value. The unintended consequence was that 
higher-qualified city managers were leaving because they could earn more elsewhere. Others have suggested 
that a similar unintended consequence occurs in the private sector when trying to balance public perceptions 




experience. Furthermore, in contrast to Kim (2015), Burn and Kettler (2019) found limited evidence 
that pay secrecy bans in US states had much impact on the GPG. Recent research in the Canadian 
higher education (HE) sector found that public sector salary disclosure laws have had a narrowing 
impact on the GPG amongst university faculty (Baker et al., 2019). However, these studies do not 
fully explore multi-layered sources of pay secrecy in organisations, such as the role of the income-
talk taboo or employee agency to discuss and share pay information with colleagues. 
Kulow (2013) advocates for increasing employer-led pay transparency through legislation mandating 
employers to disclose individual level wages, alongside relevant employee demographics, in order to 
raise women’s’ awareness of how their pay compares to others’ pay. She suggests that this 
necessary measure should be acceptable, given the prevalence of wage disclosure in the public 
sector, which is also consistent with the growing culture of openness triggered by the pervasiveness 
of social media (Kulow, 2013). However, her recommendations are based on her assessment of the 
legislative history relating to US gender-based employment discrimination, and the fact that gender 
differences in key pay factors, such as education and training; seniority; occupational segregation; 
and attainment of high paying jobs, cannot fully explain the continued GPG. She noted that while 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act gives women more time to become aware of their discrimination, it 
does not help them to become more aware. Kulow (2013) refers to other studies that demonstrate 
that mandatory wage disclosure laws in Minnesota and regulations of the US federal government 
have narrowed the GPG, but does not explain the methodology behind these findings. Kulow’s 
(2013) argument, while consistent with the underpinnings of this thesis, stems largely from 
analysing previous research at a macro level, and is almost entirely US-based. 
Ramachandran (2012) proposes making employer-led pay transparency an affirmative defence 
against employment discrimination claims under US law. This would not make transparency 
mandatory, as Kulow (2013) advocated, but would encourage companies to become transparent in 
order to pre-emptively block discrimination claims. This would arguably reduce intended and 
unintended pay discrimination. In a review of empirical literature, Ramachandran (2012) indicates 
that such employer-led pay transparency would help to narrow the GPG. Positioning unionisation 
and collective bargaining as evidence of pay transparency, Ramachandran (2012) points to research 
suggesting that where unionisation rates are higher, there is often less discrimination. These 
findings were similar for race-based discrimination in the US manufacturing sector (Agesa and 
 
has implications for the broader pay distribution, particularly between workers of similar jobs. Mas (2017) 
highlights the need for further research into the impact of pay transparency on the GPG. 
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Agesa, 2008) and for gender-based discrimination in the same sector, particularly in male-
dominated workplaces (Elvira and Sapporta, 2001). This suggests that pay transparency could help 
to reduce women’s exclusion from beneficial social networks (Ramachandran 2012), although, due 
to the income-talk taboo, protecting the right to discuss pay may not be sufficient to overcome pay 
inequality, particularly where it results from occupational segregation.  
Kim (2015) provides an economic analysis that suggests that legislation to protect the right to 
discuss pay is helping to narrow the GPG in some US states. At least eleven states had passed some 
form of a prohibition on wage secrecy by 2015. These laws prohibit employers from punishing their 
employees for discussing their pay but do not require employers to proactively report anything 
about pay. These laws generally cover private sector employees but also public sector employees in 
some states. Using a difference-in-difference human capital wage regression of a gender-balanced 
sample of about 2.1 million employees from the Current Population Survey, Kim (2015) finds that 
women’s wages increased, most noticeably for college educated women. The GPG also narrowed in 
states with pay transparency legislation, relative to states without it (Kim, 2015). Conversely, Burn 
and Kettler (2019) find that legislation that bans pay secrecy has no net significant impact on the 
GPG, using a more limited sample of full-time managers. However, when analysing the data by sex, 
company size, and whether earning above or below the median wage, they find heterogeneity; the 
laws led to increased pay for some managers and decreases for others, particularly in the states with 
more recent legislation. 
Using a different understanding of pay transparency, Bennedsen et al. (2018) find that mandatory 
publication of GPG reports in Denmark has narrowed the GPG with no net negative impact on 
profits, predominantly due to slow male wage growth. Baker et al. (2019) explore the impact of laws 
that require individual salary disclosure for academics earning above certain thresholds in public 
universities of several Canadian provinces. Their analysis finds that these radical transparency 
statutes have narrowed the GPG by 2.2-2.4 percentage points (about 30%), although this was 
achieved mainly by slowing the growth of male salaries and only marginally increasing the growth of 
female salaries. They also show that these impacts were strongest within unionised institutions. 
This illustrates some inconsistency in the research findings that ‘pay transparency’ is a useful tool to 
combat the GPG, but it also demonstrates how different findings are linked to different 
interpretations of transparency and what multi-layered forces are involved in its creation, such as 
social norms, legislation, employers, trades unions, and employees themselves. Burn and Kettler’s 
(2019) finding that protecting the right to discuss pay does not result in a net reduction of the GPG, 
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reinforces Kulow’s (2013) critique that the Lilly Ledbetter Act only gives American women more time 
to become aware of pay discrimination but does not help them become more aware. Both highlight 
the often-missing component of pay secrecy/transparency discussions in relation to the GPG, 
namely the income-talk taboo. While legislative and employer policies are important, the individual 
agency of employees to conform to the societal income-talk taboo or not is also an important part 
of the conversation. Cullen and Perez-Truglia’s (2018) study based on an organisational 
experimental survey in a large private-sector US company, suggests that policies to protect the right 
to discuss pay are of limited value in narrowing the GPG because of social privacy norms and the 
income-talk taboo, which they find affect men and women similarly. A comprehensive critical 
analysis of the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ inside organisations requires 
accounting for multi-layered influences. 
2.2.2 Inequality Regimes as Analytical Framework Foundation 
Ackers’ (2006b, 2006a) inequality regimes provides a foundation on which to build the analytical 
framework for this thesis’s multi-layered approach. Inequality regimes have helped to explain 
puzzling inequality in public organisations, where inequality remains despite features expected to 
reduce inequality (Healy, Bradley and Forson, 2011). Acker (1991, 2006c) used gender regimes—a 
precursor concept to inequality regimes—to highlight linkages between secretive pay environments 
and a lack of institutional processes to collectively discuss pay inside highly-unionised Swedish 
banks. Acker (1990) details five interconnected processes through which organisations may be 
gendered. These include gender-based divisions; symbols strengthening divisions; women and 
men’s engagement with the same and opposite sex; gendered workplace identities; and gendered 
organisational social structures, which contrast with traditional views that bureaucratic 
organisational logics are gender-neutral (Acker, 1990, 2012). The homogenous perception of pay 
secrecy as “something very British in our culture” (Pearlman 2013) provides an opportunity to 
illuminate Acker’s (1990, 2006b) assertion that workplace processes cannot be separated from 
gender, race, and class power dynamics. Belief in the gender neutrality of organisational processes is 
common but often false (Acker, 1990): 
As a relational phenomenon, gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present. 
Since men in organizations take their behavior and perspectives to represent the human, 
organizational structures and processes are theorized as gender neutral. When it is 
acknowledged that women and men are affected differently by organizations, it is argued 
that gendered attitudes and behavior are brought into (and contaminate) essentially 
gender-neutral structures. This view of organizations separates structures from the people 
in them. (Acker, 1990, p. 142) 
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Appreciating gender as an embedded organisational process is difficult. Acker (1990) argued that 
feminists identify organisational hierarchy as male-dominated, but fail to critically analyse the 
gendered nature permeating throughout organisational hierarchy. Writing that institutional 
explanations for the GPG place emphasis on labour market regulation, O’Reilly et al. (2015, p. 304) 
state:  
These approaches have been associated with dual labour market and segmentation theory 
where exclusionary practices have been reinforced by trade unions protecting insiders’ status 
and reinforcing labour market segmentation (Rubery, 1978); although unions have also 
contributed to more inclusive practices that involve reducing the gender pay gap.7  
Peruzzi (2015) observes that social partners sometimes involuntarily reproduce inequality through 
job evaluation exercises associated with collective bargaining. In her ground-breaking work, Doing 
Comparable Worth, Acker (1989) illustrates gender-embeddedness throughout the hierarchical pay 
structures by illustrating the problems that women face working in the public sector for the US state 
of Oregon. The sector underwent a comparable worth restructuring during the 1980s, which was 
intended to enshrine the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, between men and women. 
However, neither unionisation nor a technical approach to pay, initially assured the protection of 
women. There was political resistance to the proposed changes to job value ratings that were 
perceived to harm men (jobs dominated by men) or reduce the class boundaries between 
management and workers. There was also a reluctance to reward skills that were prominent in 
female-dominated jobs, such as human relations skills. Although ultimately the exercise was partly 
successful for the women, the analysis revealed that technical reforms to wage setting are not 
immune to the political components of wage setting (Acker, 1989; Parcel, 1990). However, as 
Guillaume (2015) and Deakin et al. (2015) note, specifically in the British context, unions have clearly 
generated more inclusive policies and practices that have helped to narrow the GPG, for instance by 
providing equal pay litigation support in employment tribunals. Unions have also been instrumental 
in campaigning for and negotiating equal pay clauses in collective bargaining agreements and 
pushing for equality audits (Healy and Ahamed, 2019).   
Acker (2006b, 2006a) advanced from gender regimes to inequality regimes, which particularly 
encompass gender, class, and race-based inequalities. Reminiscent of ‘gendered’ organisations, she 
conceptualises intersectional organisational inequality as: 
systematic disparities between participants in power and control over goals, resources, and 
outcomes; workplace decisions such as how to organize work; opportunities for promotion 
 
7 See also (Deakin et al., 2015; Guillaume, 2015) 
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and interesting work, security in employment and benefits, pay and other monetary 
rewards, respect; and pleasures in work and work relations. (Acker, 2006b, p. 443) 
Acker’s (2006b, p. 441) framework helps to “conceptualize intersectionality, the mutual 
reproduction of class, gender, and racial relations of inequality, and…identify barriers to creating 
equality in work organizations” through seven components.  
Figure 2-1: Acker's Inequality Regimes: Foundation of Thesis Analytical Framework 
Source: (Acker, 2006b, 2006a) 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the inequality regime framework, in which each component is of analytical 
importance. In practise, these components are interlinked, as indicated by the dual-sided arrow. 
This concept will be built upon in the remaining two literature review chapters to further construct 
the analytical framework of this thesis. The first inequality regime component refers to the bases on 
which inequality is embedded into organisational structures. This thesis focuses on gender and 
ethnicity. The second component addresses the shape and degree of inequality within 
organisations, which can be illustrated by power imbalances and wage data that is disaggregated by 
gender and ethnicity. Acker (2006b) notes that unions may not always lessen inequalities, which 
suggests that the shape and degree of the pay transparency that unions promote may be relevant to 
pay secrecy analysis. The third component addresses processes producing organisational inequality. 
The way work is organised, recruitment is completed, and wages are set are of most relevance to 
pay secrecy (Acker 2006b). Reminiscent of Acker’s (1990) gendered organisations, this component 
considers how systems reproduce intersectional inequality. The fourth and fifth components 
examine the visibility of organisational inequality and its legitimacy, which refers to the extent to 
33 
 
which organisations justify gender, race or class inequalities on unrelated grounds. The sixth 
component encompasses management’s control over employee compliance with inequalities. 
Control may be direct, indirect, or internalised (Acker 2006b). Pay secrecy obscures visibility of wage 
inequality, while management cues and societal pressures may legitimise that secrecy. Lastly, Acker 
(2006a) includes interest competition between management, unions, and employees, noting that 
structural inequality challenges may arise externally. The UK policy context, which included 
impending gender pay gap reporting regulations, presented a looming challenge to the 
organisational environments analysed in this thesis. Acker (2006a, p. 129) is pessimistic about the 
potential for long-term change, given the “gendered and racialized substructures of organizing” and 
“wage dependence, the economic imperative that forces most people to work in order to survive.”  
A critical approach is important to better understand the efforts to perform the pay ‘transparency 
agenda.’ The UK’s mandatory GPG reporting requirement can be understood as a necessary but 
insufficient means of reducing the GPG. In relation to occupational segregation (Perales, 2013; 
Kirton and Greene, 2016), even if companies were required to publish usefully disaggregated gender 
wage data, arguably, most employees would have neither the time nor the skills to produce complex 
comparisons to reveal a systemic underpayment of feminised labour (Perales, 2013). Furthermore, 
company level reporting cannot create a full picture of occupational segregation since it only 
examines one company at a time, although occupational segregation may still appear inside a large 
organisation. Inequality regimes could help to critically assess employer explanations provided for 
aggregate GPGs under the UK’s new mandatory reporting requirements. For instance, in the first 
round of reporting in 2018, Queen Mary University of London suggested that their mean GPG of 
nearly 22% was accounted for by what is essentially gendered vertical and horizontal segregation 
inside the organisation (Perales, 2013; Kirton and Greene, 2016). The narrative stated:   
Queen Mary acknowledges that its mean pay gap is high. Initial investigation has identified 
the following areas which possibly influence this figure.   
• High hourly rates of a small number of external experts, who are male and employed 
to lecture at the time of the data capture. 
• A higher proportion of males in senior, higher salaried roles in certain academic areas 
like Science and Engineering 
• Services such as cleaning and catering being run in-house in Queen Mary. These 
services have a number of roles on lower grades and are occupied predominantly by 
female staff. (Queen Mary University of London, 2018, p. 2) 
From the perspective of Acker’s (2006b, 2006a) inequality regimes, this document can be read as a 
means of legitimising inequality, and it suggests that work is being done to narrow the aggregate 
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GPG. This narrative provides a rational explanation for the problem; it indicates that the aggregate 
figure is not explained by illegal discrimination between men and women doing the same work or 
work of equal value. Even when inequality is revealed, often through macro level statistics, the 
problem has remained intractable. For instance, social partners in several European countries8 have 
been reluctant to re-negotiate pay grading of female-dominated jobs even where unequal pay for 
work of equal value has been clearly shown (Rubery, Grimshaw and Figueiredo, 2005). That the 
document discusses the female-dominated cleaning workforces, reinforces the perception of 
feminised labour being low-paid without particularly challenging the notion. Whilst quantitative 
analysis tells part of the story of pay inequality, qualitative analysis founded on inequality regimes 
helps to make visible invisible forces, motivations and structures that allow its persistence. 
2.3 The Headline Gender Pay Gap 
This section will explore why quantitative methods, which emphasise bases of inequality, such as 
gender and ethnicity, are insufficient to explain the reproduction of workplace disadvantage. 
Notably, the headline GPG (raw, unadjusted, or aggregate GPG (Ward, 2001; Whitehouse, 2001; 
Chzhen and Mumford, 2011; Rubery, 2015)) is a simple description of gender-based pay differences 
in the workforce. It parsimoniously describes the average difference between what men and women 
earn at work. It is commonly written as a percentage gap. If women earned an average of £79 per 
period and men earned an average of £100 per period, the GPG would be 21%, meaning women 
earned 21% less than men on average. This is calculated as [(100-79)/100] (Leaker, 2008). This 
concept can also be presented as the gender pay ratio, which is the average female earnings per 
period divided by the same for men. Using the illustrative pay figures from the previous example, 
the gender pay ratio would be 79%, meaning that on average, women earn 79 pence for every 
pound earned by men, calculated as 79/100 (Grimshaw, 2000).  
Headline GPGs alone do not evidence gender-based pay discrimination, which under UK law 
originated with the Equal Pay Act 1970, now updated to the Equality Act 2010 (Chapter 1). Illegal 
discrimination refers to “unequal pay for equal work (unequal remuneration in the same job) and 
unequal pay for work of equal value (low valuation of jobs that women do)” (Karamessini and 
Ioakimoglou, 2007, p. 34). An employer has committed an equal pay violation, only when this occurs 
within the same organisation. An aggregate GPG does not necessarily mean there is an equal pay 
violation because the pay differential may be partly caused by “differences in human capital and job 
 
8 Finnish social partners, the German metal workers union, and Austria’s Union of Salaried Employees were 
discussed (Rubery, Grimshaw and Figueiredo, 2005).  
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characteristics” (Mankiw, 2004, pp. 421–422). Human capital refers to “the accumulation of 
investments in people” (Mankiw, 2004, pp. 412–413), which includes things like educational 
qualifications, in-work training, and experience or tenure that are thought to make workers more 
productive and thus merit higher pay. Job characteristics, such as working conditions and level of 
responsibility, are also argued to justify pay differentials that compensate employees for work 
judged to be less pleasant or more difficult. However, the validity of these often subjective 
assessments can be difficult to objectively measure (Mankiw, 2004). 
The apparent simplicity of the headline GPG also belies the deceptive complexities that may be used 
to minimise the appearance of a problem or prioritise focus on certain aspects of it, motivated by 
political objectives (Peruzzi, 2015). Given the range of ‘headline’ figures attainable using the same 
dataset and time period shown in Table 2-1, it is important to understand what alterations to 
measurements are commonly used, what impact those alterations have on the gap size reported, 
and what motivates the use of different measurements by different actors  (Blau and Kahn, 2003). 
The headline GPG must also be interpreted in context, considering the economic, institutional, and 
cultural environment of the workforce it describes. On the national level, for instance, there is a 
negative GPG in Bahrain; women’s average earnings outstrip men’s (Chubb et al., 2008). This does 
not indicate a female employment paradise. “Rather, this exception is explained by the relatively 
few women who enter paid employment in the country, and those that do are well educated and 
from upper socio-economic backgrounds” (New JNCHES Equality Working Group, 2011, p. 11). The 
same need to understand context applies at the workplace level, where a small or negative GPG 
could obscure a generally male-dominated workplace with only a few highly paid women.  
2.3.1 Official Government Statistics 
Multiple factors guide how the headline figure may be reported and interpreted, including national 
convention and understanding of what the GPG indicates about employment inequality. Differences 
in reporting practices, labour market trends, and pay structures make comparison over time and 
across countries challenging, particularly without harmonised datasets (Rubery, 1992; Blau and 
Kahn, 2003). Reporting the GPG based on hourly wages, arguably provides a closer measure of 
unequal reward for similar effort than reporting based on weekly or annual wages if women and 
men work significantly different hours. However, if part of the discrimination that women 
experience stems from access to fewer working hours, then reporting the GPG using hourly wages 
obscures this inequality. Table 2-1 illustrates some alternative ways to report the UK’s headline GPG 
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for full-time and all employees, using the ASHE 2016 revised dataset (Office for National Statistics, 
2018a).9  
Table 2-1: 2016 UK Gender Pay Gap Using a Diverse Array of Calculation Methods  
 
Source: Author’s analysis of AHSE 2016 (Revised) (Office for National Statistics, 2018a) 
The UK convention is to report the GPG using hourly earnings, while the US convention has been to 
use annual earnings. In their headline figure, the UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) uses 
median hourly wages for full-time employees, excluding overtime, which obscures the differences in 
hours worked and bonuses received between men and women. By following this method, the GPG 
in the UK was 9.4% in 2016 (Myck and Paull, 2001; Smith, 2017), which yields the narrowest gap, 
minimising the appearance of a problem. Similarly, the European Commission also reports their 
‘unadjusted’ GPG based upon the “average gross hourly earnings of male and female employees” 
(European Commission, 2014b, p. 3). However, the European Commission acknowledges that “using 
hourly pay as a basis for calculating the GPG can also mask specific differences in pay that go 
unrecorded, for example, bonus payments, performance-related pay or seasonal payments” 
(European Commission, 2014b, p. 3). Peruzzi (2015) heavily criticised the EU’s political decision to 
rely on any unadjusted GPG because it ignores compositional factors for the gap, which are relevant 
for understanding what obstacles may be preventing women from fully enjoying the equal pay 
principles that the EU is supposed to protect. Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
and Directive 2006/54/EC “require a comparison between men and women undertaking ‘the same 
 
9 Relevant figures for part-timers would show the part-time pay penalty, not the gap between male and 
female part-time employees (Manning and Petrongolo, 2008; Trades Union Congress, 2015a). 
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work’ or ‘work of equal value’” (Peruzzi 2015: 449). Such criticisms could be levelled at any 
aggregate reporting practice, but arguably, the official US practice of using annual wages could 
better represent the actual gap in earnings between men and women, at least for those working 
full-time. The US government’s headline GPG comes from the United States Census Bureau’s 
Current Population Survey and uses median gross annual earnings of year-round, full-time workers. 
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics report on this data revealed that women earned 80.5% of men 
salaries in 2016, so the GPG was 19.5% (Hegewisch and Williams-Baron, 2017). The most 
comparable figure for the UK in 2016 using Table 2-1 was 18.7%.10 
2.3.2. Advocacy Reporting Practice 
Despite the variation between using hourly or annual wages, the government figures that have been 
previously discussed were all based on median wages. Using median wages means that high and low 
outliers do not skew analysis (Government Equalities Office, 2015). However, the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC), which represents a collective of UK unions, typically also reports a mean GPG using 
hourly pay, excluding overtime (Trades Union Congress, 2015a). As shown in Table 2-1, that figure 
was 14.1% in 2016. This is higher than the comparable median gap, indicating that outlier high 
earning jobs are male-dominated. Further complicating this issue, leading UK women’s rights 
advocates, the Fawcett Society (2014), chose to emphasise the median gross hourly GPG for all 
employees, while all statistics previously referenced have referred only to full-time workers.11 Table 
2-1 shows the figure by this method was 18.7% in 2016.  
Figure 2-2 illustrates the wide variation of reportable gaps, which depends on whether the mean or 
median has been used, whether the analysis is limited to full-time or all employees, whether the 
analysis uses hourly, weekly, or annual wages, and which components of pay are included. 
 
10 ASHE annual data is not limited to those working year-round, whilst the US Census figures are.  
11 The ONS also reports this figure, but it is not their headline calculation (Smith, 2017). 
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Figure 2-2: 2016 UK Gender Pay Gap Using Multiple Calculation Methods 
Source: Author’s analysis 2016 ASHE (Revised) (Office for National Statistics, 2018a) 
The gap for all mean measures of overtime pay and incentive pay exceeds all other gap figures. This 
calls into question the ONS’ political choice to headline with a conservative figure that excludes 
these components. The headline ONS figure, by design, does not reflect the differences between 
men and women’s working hours and bonus pay. Although they produce more detailed analyses 
(Office for National Statistics, 2018c), the headline figure attracts media coverage. This generates an 
important criticism of headline GPG methodology because working hours and bonuses are shown to 
account for considerable differences between men and women’s earnings, possibly due to 
discrimination in the workplace and broader society (Crompton and Harris, 1998; Crompton and 
Lyonette, 2005; Bryson and Forth, 2006; Metcalf and Rolfe, 2009; Healy and Ahamed, 2019). 
2.3.3 Academic Research Practice 
Academic researchers also use a range of headline GPG calculation methods. A seemingly crucial 
distinction is the reference period for the wage measure. As mentioned, using hourly wages rather 
than annual, monthly, or even weekly earnings obscures the impact of men typically working more 
hours than women (Myck and Paull, 2001). Many prominent researchers use hourly wages. Blau and 
Kahn (2006, p. 47) approximated an unadjusted hourly GPG by using “full-time, nonfarm wage and 
salary workers aged 18-65 years.” Blau and Kahn (2007, p. 2) have also reported the raw GPG in the 
US, using the “average hourly earnings of full-time workers.” Olsen and Walby (2004) similarly 
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calculated a raw GPG for Great Britain using the mean hourly wages of full-time employees, 
including overtime. Diverging on the type of employees analysed, Rubery et al. (2005, p. 189) 
calculated an unadjusted GPG for EU member states that was based still on “average gross hourly 
earnings” but including full-time and part-time employees who were working over 16 hours per 
week only. While using hourly earnings is common, it is not an absolute. Weichselbaumer and 
Winter-Ebmer’s (2005) meta-analysis of 788 GPG estimates from 263 articles published during the 
1960s-1990s, found that about 60% did not conduct their analysis using hourly wages.   
Another critical issue for comparative GPG analysis is the lack of completely harmonised wage data 
even within the same database (Rubery, 1992; Blau and Kahn, 2003). In an analysis of 22 countries, 
using the International Social Survey Programme, about half of the countries reported gross income 
and the others net. Most countries reported monthly or annual earnings, while only one reported 
weekly (Blau and Kahn, 2003). It is difficult to settle on a universally optimal earnings measurement 
for the headline GPG because as Lips (2013b, p. 226) observed, no single measure of hourly, weekly, 
or annual wages can adequately describe a vastly complicated wage structure, complete with “full-
time and part-time workers, contingent workers, unionized and non-unionized workers, people who 
are paid a salary and people who are paid by the hour, people who receive bonuses and other 
compensation, etc.”12 The key issue here is to ensure that, whatever headline GPG measure is used, 
the implications of the selected measure are clearly explained and that the measure is calculable 
using a consistent and comparable method across the analysis (Lips, 2013a).   
2.4 Gender Pay Gap Decomposition Analysis 
Headline GPGs are often criticised by sceptics for comparing apples with oranges; they do not 
account for the many potentially legitimate reasons for differences in pay (Risher, 2015), such as the 
human capital of workers and the characteristics of jobs (Mankiw, 2004). Therefore, scholars have 
progressed beyond reporting variably calculated headline GPGs, to also trying to explain why those 
unadjusted gaps remain. Building from human capital theory, many scholars have placed 
explanatory factors into two broad categories: human capital and discrimination. The goal is to 
explain what proportions of the GPG can be attributed to them (Olsen and Walby, 2004; Bolitzer and 
Godtland, 2012). Although numerous advances have been made (Nielsen, 2000; Hettler, 2007; 
Moral-Arce et al., 2012; Amado, Santos and São José, 2018), labour economists traditionally use the 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) to decompose the headline 
GPG using variables that are theorised to legitimately account for differences in pay. The 
 
12 See also (Olson 2013) 
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decomposition calculates what proportion of the GPG is explained by measurable differences 
between men and women, which are argued to legitimately impact pay, like human capital levels 
and job characteristics. Decomposition also demonstrates what proportion of the gap results from 
different returns to the same characteristics between men and women, such as the same level of 
education. The proportion of the gap left unexplained could be attributed to discrimination (Olsen 
and Walby, 2004; Bolitzer and Godtland, 2012). 
2.4.1 Employee Characteristics: Human Capital Theory 
Becker’s (1962) human capital theory provides the foundation for partly attributing the GPG to 
divergent education, training and skills between men and women (Suter and Miller, 1973; Mincer 
and Polachek, 1974). The concept of human capital has been disaggregated into specific and generic 
skills. Specific skills are applicable in a given employment environment and tend to be accrued at 
least partly from training provided by the firm. Generic skills are transferable and relevant in several 
employment settings (Tam, 1997). However, there are critiques of this distinction. Perales’ (2013) 
replication of Tam’s work with a UK dataset found that, when controlling for specialised human 
capital, occupational feminisation of wages persists. This supports the understanding that ‘women’s 
work’ is devalued through occupational segregation and female-dominated occupations tend to 
attract lower pay than male-dominated ones (England, 2000). 
The concept of human capital has been further broken down by the origin of employees’ skills. A 
distinction has been drawn between whether skills were obtained through formal education (Elliott, 
Dale and Egerton, 2001) or in-work training (Dearden, Reed and Reenan, 2006). In work-training has 
been further subdivided into on-the-job employer provided training courses, off-the-job employer 
provided training courses, and other work related training courses (Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 
1996). More recently, Sakellariou (2013) demonstrated that the origin of employees’ cognitive skills, 
either school or non-school acquired—as opposed to simply measuring years of education—is 
partially responsible for the GPG. This drew on Ishikawa and Ryan’s (2002) observation that the 
impact on wages of school-acquired and non-school acquired cognitive skills depends on race and 
gender.  
Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer’s (2005) extensive meta-analysis of international GPG research 
revealed that, whilst the unadjusted GPG has shrunk considerably since the 1960s, the unexplained 
portion of the gap, commonly derived through Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, has not. However, 
when different methods and data sources of the selected studies were taken into account, the 
resultant meta-regression analysis found a 0.17% annual decline in the unexplained portion of the 
41 
 
gap, representing small but measurable progress.  Nevertheless, scholars continue to conjecture 
that labour market discrimination may be a factor behind the remaining unexplained portion of the 
GPG (Blau and Kahn, 2006). 
As women have begun to persistently outpace men in HE, the human capital explanation for the 
GPG is appearing increasingly incomplete (Blau and Kahn, 2006; McDaniel, 2012; Olson, 2013). Lips 
(2013a, 2013b) appeals for alternative approaches to complement traditional decomposition 
analysis. Robust academic debate on this topic includes arguments that “the key reason to critique 
the human capital approach is just this: that a narrow focus on such an approach aids in the 
rationalization of discrimination against women by positing numerous logical "reasons" for their 
differential treatment and making people comfortable with the gap" (Lips, 2013a, p. 225). There are 
other methods of understanding the varied factors. For example, the Brown, Moon, and Zoloth 
(1980) method seeks to assess occupational segregation and unequal pay for equal work and 
generates decomposition using a Marxian and feminist analytical framework of wage determination 
(Karamessini and Ioakimoglou, 2007). The Brown-Moon-Zoloth method transcends the Oaxaca-
Blinder’s neo-classical wage setting assumptions that “wages are determined through individual 
transactions and the workings of market forces according to the marginal revenue product of labor” 
(Karamessini and Ioakimoglou, 2007, p. 32), by including modelling for the effect of occupation 
segregation on the GPG. However, their model can only detect the ‘distribution effect’ of 
occupational segregation, referring to “women’s concentration in the lower-paid occupations and 
industries” and not the ‘undervaluation effect’, referring to “lower average wages in feminised 
occupations and industries” (Karamessini and Ioakimoglou, 2007, p. 46). By contrast, the 
Karamessini-Ioakimoglou method measures both, and takes as an analytical starting point the 
Marxian understanding that wages are set socially in relation to the power of labour, determined by 
“culture – such as social habits pertaining to reproduction – and the balance of power between 
labor and capital, depending on unemployment and institutions. The historical or social element of 
the value of labor power varies over space and time according to social habits and social conflict” 
(Karamessini and Ioakimoglou, 2007, p. 32). 
2.4.2 Employee ‘Choices’: The Part-Time Pay Penalty, Horizontal and Vertical Segregation, and the 
Unequal Division of Household Labour 
A unifying theme of the literature that seeks to explain the GPG is the awareness that the problem is 
complex; numerous factors beyond human capital have been theorised and tested to help better 
explain the GPG’s persistence. As previously indicated, research has demonstrated the impact of 
occupational segregation and the appearance of a statistically significant penalty for engaging in so-
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called ‘women’s work’ (Hegewisch et al., 2010; Perales, 2013). Mumford and Smith (2007) add to 
this an important demonstration of the influence of workplace segregation on the British GPG.   
Occupational segregation can be horizontal, in terms of the occupations where men and women 
work, and vertical, in terms of the hierarchical level of jobs held by men and women. Male-
dominated occupations and positions at higher levels tend to be higher paid than female-
dominated, lower level jobs (Kirton and Greene, 2016). Scholars also point to women’s 
overrepresentation in part-time work (Blackwell, 2001) and the part-time pay penalty (Fernández-
Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2011). Olsen and Walby (2004) demonstrated that not all human 
capital from work experience is equally rewarded. Not only was part-time experience not associated 
with higher wages (even considering years worked on a pro-rata basis), but every year of part-time 
work actually correlated with a slight decline in wages (Olsen and Walby, 2004). However, Blackwell 
(2003) did not find evidence of a clear worsening of this part-time disadvantage for ethnic minority 
women, which was due to the heterogeneous experience of different ethnic groups. 
Linked to the higher concentration of women in part-time work, another prominent explanation for 
the persistence of the GPG is the unequal division of household labour between men and women, 
especially childcare (Donath, 2000). This is called the motherhood penalty.13 Mothers face a salary 
slump (Waldfogel, 1998; Budig and England, 2001; England, 2005) and an occupational status 
trajectory penalty (Abendroth, Huffman and Treas, 2014), while fathers receive a boost (Hodges and 
Budig, 2010; Petersen, Penner and Høgsnes, 2014). However, this fatherhood bonus accrues 
primarily to certain men, namely white, married men who work in cognitively demanding roles 
(Hodges and Budig, 2010; Friedman, 2015). "The effect of becoming a father is another source of 
privilege for privileged men, but less so for men who are in at more socially disadvantaged positions. 
African Americans specifically seem to be excluded from claiming the wages of organizational 
hegemonic masculinity” (Hodges and Budig, 2010, p. 742). Hegemonic masculinity originated in 
Connell’s sociological works in the 1980s (Connell, 1982, 1983, 1987; Connell et al., 1982; Carrigan, 
Connell and Lee, 1985) and has been used to help understand the role of gender and power within 
organisations, which "requires the policing of men and exclusion or discrediting of women" (Connell 
and Messerschmidt, 2005, p. 844). It is characterised by a picture of “the strong, technically 
competent, authoritative leader who is sexually potent and attractive, has a family, and has his 
emotions under control" (Acker, 1990, p. 153). 
 
13 However, research suggests that the impact of the motherhood penalty varies widely with income level, 
tending to hit the lowest earnings with the most intensity (Budig and Hodges, 2014). 
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Another strand of research argues that gendered employment and university degree choices explain 
much of the gap (Daymont and Andrisani, 1984).14 If women ‘chose’ to behave like men, they would 
not experience workplace disadvantage. Thus, Sloane (1988) predicted that as gendered labour 
force participation rates continue to equalise, so will wages. Hakim’s (1996, 2006) writing on 
gendered choices and gendered workplace attachment provides further critique of those who argue 
that the GPG is an outcome of institutional disadvantage. In her ‘preference theory,’ women can be 
disaggregated into a small grouping of home-centred women, who are deeply committed to their 
family and do not want to secure paid employment; a small grouping of work-centred women, a 
rare breed of mostly childless women who value their careers above family; and the largest grouping 
of adaptive women. Adaptive women want to work but not to the exclusion of family life. Hakim 
(2006) argues that women’s economic outcomes are different to men’s because most women are 
not fully committed to paid employment. Conversely, Hakim (2006) asserts that most men are work-
centred, or primarily committed to paid employment. Acceptance of ‘preference theory’ could 
explain a lack of interest in discussing wages among women. If most women were not primarily 
committed to paid employment, it might seem strange to observe a keen interest in comparing their 
pay with others amongst most women. However, Hakim has come under significant critique for 
ignoring practical constraints, namely economic barriers, which influence women’s paid work. The 
high cost of childcare in Britain encourages women to cluster into poorly remunerated part-time and 
female-dominated work (Crompton and Harris, 1998; Crompton and Lyonette, 2005). These 
constraints also pressure men to be breadwinners and restrict the time that they may prefer to 
spend at home caring for their children. These constraints on men have begun to be explored within 
the context of a universally toxic hegemonic masculinity, as mentioned previously when introducing 
the fatherhood bonus (Friedman, 2015). 
2.4.3 Employee Attitudes: Gendered Pay Negotiation, Risk Aversion, and Competition 
Recognising further complexity to the causes of the GPG, other scholars propose that gendered 
psychological traits are part of the explanation (Blau and Kahn, 2017). Babcock and Laschever (2009) 
suggest that women’s persistent economic disadvantage stems partly from gendered workplace 
behaviours, coloured by women’s passivity. Their experimental study found that women scored 45% 
lower than men on a scale that measured the respondent’s belief that their circumstances could be 
improved, which is in line with earlier and often contested findings that men are more willing to 
negotiate their salaries than women. They conjectured that the continued unequal balance of power 
 
14 However, other research has since suggested that a continued GPG persists for same majors among those 
who had the same major just one year out of gradation (Corbett and Hill, 2012). 
44 
 
in favour of men in business and politics explains this ‘rational’ psychological reluctance of women 
to negotiate their worth in the workplace (Babcock and Laschever, 2009). While other studies have 
made similar arguments about women’s relatively lower likelihood to negotiate and their tendency 
toward risk-aversion and away from competition (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Bertrand, 2011; Blau 
and Kahn, 2017), these findings have tended to primarily be based on lab experiments. In a large-
scale natural field experiment, Flory et al. (2015) suggested that women are averse to competitive 
work settings, relative to men, but caution that gender differences exhibited could reflect an 
aversion to uncertainty rather than competition. However, Leibbrandt and List’s (2015) study 
demonstrated that simply stating that salary was ‘negotiable’ eliminated the gender difference in 
negotiation attempts by potential recruits. Croson and Gneezy (2009) also observed that there may 
be a publication bias. Studies that find a gender difference are more likely to be published than 
those that do not, although they attempted to counteract this by including unpublished works in 
their review. The suggestion that the GPG results from women’s lack of negotiating prowess was 
exacerbated by Sandberg’s (2013) Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead. 
Despite the appearance of blaming women’s workplace disadvantage on women’s behaviour, some 
of these same scholars have also found that experimental data indicates that women’s reluctance to 
negotiate pay is not borne of any innate deficiency but is based on gendered norms. When women 
and men negotiate similarly, women’s efforts are received more negatively (Bowles, Babcock and 
Lai, 2007). Artz et al.’s (2016, 2018) research based on the Australian Workplace Relations Survey for 
2013-2014 found that when controlling for hours worked, there is no statistically significant 
difference between men and women’s pay negotiation frequency, although men were more likely 
than women to receive a pay rise when they asked. As Artz et al. (2016, p. 3) succinctly conclude, at 
least in Australia, “women do ask but do not get.” 
Furthermore, Manning and Saidi (2010) found that women’s supposed dislike of competitive 
workplaces explained almost none of the actual GPG in the UK. They highlighted that previous 
studies reporting a gender-divide in the preference for competitive working environments had all 
been experimental, so they instead operationalised competitive tendencies in the real labour 
market by recording whether an individual’s contract included performance-related pay or not. Blau 
and Kahn’s (2017, p. 855) US-based research on the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) microdata, found that psychological traits explained only a modest proportion of the gap, 
which was “considerably smaller than, say, occupation and industry effects.” Similarly, Manning and 
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Swaffield (2008), using data on those who had been in the British workforce for ten years, found 
that gendered psychological traits had a very small impact on the GPG.  
2.4.4 Missing: Pay Secrecy in Income Datasets 
Although a limited argument could be constructed for incorporating pay secrecy into a human 
capital theory-based decomposition model, pay secrecy is complex and little data exists to measure 
it inside organisations. Some surveys have found more than one-third of private employers in the US 
openly admit to prohibiting pay discussion (Colella et al., 2007). The first survey of workers asking 
about pay secrecy in their workplace was conducted for the Institute for Women’s Policy Research 
(IWPR). They found that about half of US workers reported that their employers imposed formal 
policies to prohibit or informally discourage talking about wages. However, they also revealed a 
minor gender distinction of women reporting higher rates of discouragement than men, and a sharp 
distinction between the public and private sectors. In the private sector, 62% of women and 60% of 
men reported employer prohibition or discouragement from discussing pay, whilst only 18% of 
women and 11% of men in the public sector did. The IWPR analysis suggests that this gender 
distinction in terms of employer-driven pay secrecy may worsen the GPG but does not analyse 
whether the gender differences were statistically significant (Hegewisch and Williams, 2014). 
Rosenfeld (2017) conducted peer-reviewed analysis of IWPR’s data and found that while formal pay 
secrecy policies were more common in ‘coercive bureaucracies’ (i.e. non-unionised private-sector 
firms), informal discouragement was felt equally. Companies were also no more likely to discourage 
women, ethnic minority, or immigrant staff from discussing pay than their male, white, or non-
immigrant counterparts. However, when silence obscures inequality, those experiencing the 
inequality would be disproportionately harmed. Weakening the income-talk taboo would require 
social change, specifically because “pay secrecy is perpetuated in most workplaces by a wide-spread 
social norm against discussion of salary, rather than a coercive legal rule forbidding such discussion" 
(Lyons, 2012, p. 364).  
From a different perspective, Burchell and Yagil (1997) used the Social Change and Economic Life 
Initiative data on social pay comparison to reveal patterns of employee pay discussions, but they did 
not link this analysis strongly to gendered differences or income. Furthermore, the data came from 
one area of England in the late 1980s. From the perspective that knowledge is power in wage 
negotiation, employee power is weak relative to employers' power. Rosenfeld and Denice (2015) 
used the British Workforce Employment Relations Survey (WERS) to suggest that employee 
perceptions of managerial financial transparency impacted pay, where ‘very good’ financial 
transparency was associated with 8-12% higher pay compared to employees who perceived it as 
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'very poor.' However, whilst gender was a control in their models, they did not analyse whether this 
impact was different for men and women. Furthermore, characterisation of managerial 'financial 
transparency' in WERS is too broad for discussion of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ as it 
encompasses company finances, not just pay (or related progression) data. Consequently, novel 
data on academic social pay comparison behaviour will be generated and analysed in this thesis 
(Chapter 7). 
2.5 Intersectional Analysis: The Gender/Ethnic Pay Gap 
Much of the research underlying this chapter has predominantly focused on gender as a base of 
inequality. A growing number of studies are increasingly recognising pay disparities tied to ethnicity 
(or gender and ethnicity), particularly comparing Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME) 
individuals with white employees (O’Reilly et al., 2015). Although not all ethnic divisions fare worse 
than white employees, in the British context, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and black Africans 
consistently fare worse in unemployment rates, occupational status and earnings when controlling 
for traditional individual human capital variables (Heath and McMahon, 1997; Berthoud, 2000; 
Blackaby et al., 2002; Platt, 2005; Heath and Cheung, 2006; Longhi and Platt, 2008; Brynin and 
Güveli, 2012). Brynin and Güveli (2012) draw interesting parallels between the influence of 
occupational segregation on the GPG and the influence of segregation on the British ethnic pay gap. 
Societal maternal pressures placed on women that contextualise gender-based occupational 
segregation do not apply when considering ethnicity alone. However, Brynin and Güveli (2012) 
attributed the aggregate ethnic pay gap primarily to occupational segregation. As with feminised 
labour, the harm was far-reaching. “Working in an occupation with a relatively high level of ethnic 
minorities is nevertheless associated with a wage penalty. It should be noted that this effect occurs 
regardless of the worker’s own ethnicity” (Brynin and Güveli, 2012, pp. 577–582). 
Ethnic or race-based pay gaps are often absent from government pay analyses. Neither race nor 
ethnicity are measured in the ASHE dataset (Scruton, 2015), which is considered to be the most 
reliable measure of UK wage levels (Leaker, 2008). This deficiency also occurs on the organisational 
level. A recent survey of FTSE 100 HR and Diversity and Inclusion leaders revealed that 83% of 
respondents felt their company’s data on ethnicity and race diversity needed improvement (Beech 
et al., 2017). A PwC survey of 80 UK employers found that 95% had never analysed their ethnic pay 
gap; the majority (75%) had not even collected employee ethnicity data, with many citing data 
protection concerns and small sample sizes as the primary reason they had not done so (Bennett, 
2019).   
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When BAME pay gaps are reported, they are often framed as exacerbating the GPG rather than 
being discussed in their own right. UK women’s activists and unionists recognise Equal Pay Day in 
November, the month from when women are considered to be working for free for the remainder 
of the year (Kollewe, 2015). Americans observe a similar occasion but include additional days to 
reflect the larger disparity faced by women of colour, specifically Asian, African-American, Native 
American and Latina women (American Association of University Women, 2016). Robust 
quantitative analysis of this complex intersectional perspective on the experience of pay inequality 
is still in its early stages. Woodhams et al. (2015, p. 63) describe this as “the snowballing penalty 
effect”, finding support for an intersectional rather than additive impact on pay penalties. The 
researchers considered sex, race, age, and disability using payroll data over several years from a 
single company, generating an N of more than half a million. “The results indicate, then, that for 
individuals with more than a single disadvantage, there is an intersectional effect on their pay. Like a 
snowball, it gathers weight exponentially as it descends” (Woodhams, Lupton and Cowling, 2015, p. 
73). While this thesis does not aim to develop a comprehensive model to account for the GPG or the 
G/EPG, it will incorporate an analysis of the G/EPG within HE in order to demonstrate the 
persistence of inequality as a justification for studying pay transparency/secrecy experienced by UK 
academics (Chapter 4). 15  
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has first demonstrated that an intersectional analytical framework based on Acker’s 
(2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes is suited to explain workplace inequality and its relationship with 
complex pay secrecy/transparency. This was achieved by justifying the theoretical connection 
between pay secrecy and pay inequality and explaining the components of the inequality regime 
framework applied in this thesis. This chapter highlighted the value of moving beyond the positivist 
quantitative focus on bases of inequality (gender and ethnicity) by analysing the complex and value-
laden considerations that go into headline GPG calculation. It also explored the arguments for 
developing decomposition analysis based on worker characteristics, ‘choices’, and attitudes and 
clarified the importance of moving beyond a gender silo, to consider the intersection of ethnicity-
based pay discrimination.  
 
15 This will compare wages of BAME men and women and white women against white men. A within-BAME 
group analysis would be useful for understanding within-group differences but would not contribute to this 
thesis, as BAME respondents to my survey and especially interviews are too few to analyse separately and 
maintain anonymity.  
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This chapter emphasised the need to better explain the persistence of pay inequality, because of the 
frequent absence of a key factor from existing quantitative exercises to explain pay inequality, 
namely pay secrecy, which may be an invisible reinforcing mechanism of workplace pay inequality. 
Incorporating this concept into previous decomposition methodologies could be a partial response 
to the identified literature gap. However, no dataset with a variable suitable to measure this 
concept could be identified and statistical models still lack nuanced understanding of the hidden 
societal, organisational and interpersonal dynamics that shape the development of workplace pay 
discrimination, which this thesis will explore through critical analysis of the performance of the pay 
‘transparency agenda’ in UK HE (Chapters 6 and 8).  
The following two literature review chapters will help to further construct an analytical framework 
founded upon inequality regimes in order to analyse the relationship between pay secrecy and pay 
inequality. The theoretical contribution of this thesis will be the organisational salary environment 
(OSE) framework, which provides a new tool to conceptualised pay secrecy/transparency inside an 
organisation. Chapter 3 will draw on the pay communication literature to provide further theoretical 
derivation of this tool. Chapter 4 will provide the contextual understanding of gender and ethnic-
based inequality in UK academia in order to provide guidance for operationalising the OSE inside the 




Chapter 3 Organisational Salary Environment: Conceptualising Pay 
Secrecy/Transparency at Work 
3.1 Introduction  
This second part of the literature review chapter focuses on existing knowledge of the multi-layered 
sources of pressure on organisations to become more transparent about pay (and related 
progression) practices. These pressures range from macro social norms to individual pay discussion 
behaviour. At the level of the society, the typically taken-for-granted presentation of the income-
talk taboo will be described to provide a rationale for critical inquiry into this force. The potential 
influence of government statute on organisational pay transparency, referencing the UK’s 
mandatory gender pay gap (GPG) reporting regulations, will be examined. Employer ‘pay 
communication’ policy is the focus of most existing pay secrecy/transparency literature, and its 
influence on pay transparency will be explored. The expected influence of trade union collective 
bargaining to highlight remuneration-setting processes will be discussed. Lastly, individual pressure 
will be explored with reference to the extent to which employees are known to violate the income-
talk taboo through social pay comparison.  
This literature will be reflected upon to clarify the gap in pay secrecy/transparency studies that this 
thesis will fill; this chapter contributes to knowledge of these pressures by considering these factors 
in relation to each other in order to further derive the theoretical underpinning of this thesis’s 
analytical framework, namely the organisational salary environment (OSE). The OSE is a novel tool to 
conceptualise the dynamics that influence employees’ awareness of pay inside organisations. The 
implication of this conceptualisation for critical analysis is that dynamic factors variably make pay 
secretive or transparent. For instance, to describe pay in an organisation as ‘transparent’ because 
there is a collectively bargained pay scale, is inadequate if the organisation also has policies or 
informal practices that allow for deviation from that scale.      
3.2 The Societal Income-Talk Taboo: A Tool to Maintain Hierarchical Power?  
At the level of the society, the typically taken-for-granted presentation of the income-talk taboo will 
be described to provide a rationale for critical inquiry into this force. Social norms influence the 
organisations in which people operate. Where employees lack clear understanding of how their pay 
is determined, they could seek to confirm if they are being paid fairly by asking colleagues. However, 
a considerable societal barrier exists, the income-talk taboo (Fox, 2014). Given the importance of 
individual level pay knowledge to equal pay claims (Wild, 2017), this taboo merits inclusion in critical 
analysis of organisational pay conditions. However, current research into the problematic 
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implications of this taboo for gender and ethnicity-based pay inequality is limited. Economic 
justifications that rationalise the taboo from the employer and employees’ perspective do not 
interrogate gender or ethnicity-based pay inequality. Legal scholars acknowledge the problematic 
nature of the income-talk taboo for pay inequality but nevertheless tend to accept the norm as 
homogenous. Most promisingly, Fox (2014) provides a anthropological case for understanding the 
income-talk taboo from a more sociological perspective: as a mechanism of reinforcing power 
inequality at work. 
3.2.1 Income-Talk Taboo Respect by Employees and Employers: Economic Modelling 
Economists have positioned the income-talk taboo in various ways as a rational calculation by 
employers and employees, rarely considering gender or ethnicity-based inequality implications. 
Bierman and Gely (2004) argue that the income-talk taboo makes good business sense from the 
employer's perspective. It avoids workplace conflict linked to jealousy, and it allows employers to 
reward employees who make 'firm-specific' investments in their human capital. Akerlof and Yellen 
(1990, p. 255) argue that workers comply with the taboo as a reaction to the fair-wage effort 
hypothesis, which is the idea that “workers proportionately withdraw effort as their actual wage 
falls short of their fair wage.” The latter is determined with reference to co-workers’ wages (Akerlof 
and Yellen, 1990). Since wages are seen by employees as a reflection of their effort, they may be 
reluctant to discuss pay and risk shame if they do not measure up.16 These authors suggest 
homogenous behaviour by individuals, regardless of situational context, and make no attempt to 
gender the norm.  
More recently, Lavie (2009) used economic modelling to explain why employees comply with the 
income-talk taboo.17 He modelled this norm as an optimal compromise between binding 
conventions, where workers expect to remain working at set pay, and spot markets, where workers 
follow high wages. Binding conventions allow enough labour mobility for sufficient productive 
efficiency, while making employers agree to fixed wage contracts, which protects employees from 
aggregate wage shocks (Danziger and Eliakim, 1997). If the labour market is weakly competitive, the 
firm can ‘afford’ transparency and will not have to match many external offers. When labour market 
 
16 The characterisation of income-talk taboo as a protection from shame also has resonance within social 
psychology. Freud (1908) links money to anal eroticism, which Trachtman (1999, p. 279) notes “suggests that 
shame is a powerful motive for reticence in money matters.” The money taboo’s breadth may explain the 
dearth of research into it; potential researchers are not external to societal norms. Trachtman (1999, p. 283) 
defined money psychologically as “our projection onto coins, bills, bank accounts, and other financial 
instruments of our beliefs, hopes, and fears about how those things will affect who we are, what will happen 
to us, and how we will be treated by others or by ourselves.” 
17 Lavie uses the terms wage taboo, salary taboo, and wage-secrecy norm (Lavie, 2009).  
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competitiveness is moderate, secrecy is imposed and workers comply, allowing the firm to match 
offers only for its best workers. When labour market competition is intense, companies raise all 
wages to pre-empt losing employees and match all external offers (Lavie and Robin, 2008; Lavie, 
2009).  
However, Lavie (2009) acknowledges that external offer matching models say little about internal 
firm relations and wage setting. He proffers another model that characterises the secrecy norm as 
“the result of continuous public behaviors and beliefs and [is] subject to constant negotiation and 
evolution over time. In the short run, however, agents experience the norm as an exogenous rule 
that is not subject to changes or policy discussions” (Lavie, 2008, p. 11). This model suggests that 
low-paid workers embrace the taboo to avoid feeling inadequate, while high-paid workers do so to 
protect salary increases from scrutiny. Additionally, firm owners support a stronger wage-secrecy 
norm, whilst employees and the self-employed support a weaker wage-secrecy norm (Lavie, 2008, 
2009). A central conclusion of Lavie’s wage-secrecy norm model, consistent with many worker 
advocates’ conventional wisdom, was that “a strong secrecy norm increases inequality at the macro 
level” (Lavie, 2009, p. 38). However, he did not link that inequality concern to gender, ethnicity, or 
discrimination, referring instead to inequality between extreme high and low earners.  
The modelling discussed was theoretical with no reference to fieldwork or data (Danziger and 
Eliakim, 1997; Lavie, 2008, 2009; Lavie and Robin, 2008). Foreshadowing the anthropological 
income-talk taboo, these models frame the norm as reinforcement of the hierarchical capitalist 
power of employers over employees. Lavie (2009) asserts that secrecy protects firm owners’ high 
pay from scrutiny and increases macro-economic inequality. For the matching models (Danziger and 
Eliakim, 1997; Lavie and Robin, 2008; Lavie, 2009), employees give up potential upward wage 
volatility in exchange for decent contracts with guaranteed wages. Labour market competitiveness is 
seen to justify pay secrecy inside firms, which may in turn create a justification for discrimination 
based on market forces. Similar argumentation is used when labour market analysts assert that 
regulations to reduce gender bias will make it harder for women to obtain work (Elson, 1999). None 
of these models conjecture the potential interplay of sex or ethnicity with income-talk taboo 
compliance.  
3.2.2 Legal Scholars Acknowledge a Homogenous Income-Talk Taboo  
Legal scholars acknowledge the income-talk taboo, but seldom with significant empirical questioning 
of the function of the norm. This seems unusual, given the growing policy advocacy for more 
openness around pay as a tool to combat the GPG (Chapter 1) and raises questions about the 
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implications of this apparently powerful social norm for the preservation of the powerful and 
privileged at work. Legal scholars have demonstrated somewhat tacit acceptance of this taboo. 
Levine and Stanchi (2001, p. 551) led with a bold declaration that “one of the last American taboos” 
forbids salary conversations and that compliance by employees strengthens employer power. 
However, they only substantively analysed the systemic undervaluation experienced by legal writing 
professors (Levine and Stanchi, 2001), without demonstrating the implications of the taboo in that 
undervaluation. Others have gone further by actively arguing against prohibiting company bans on 
discussing pay, because it would create economic uncertainty, and asserting that pro-active state 
legislation in the US state of California to mandate ‘pay openness’ was ill-advised (Gely and Bierman, 
2003; Bierman and Gely, 2004). Bierman and Gely (2004, p. 191) concluded that “the social norms 
favoring workplace pay secrecy/confidentiality make both practical and economic sense, and should 
not be disturbed.”   
In response, Edwards (2005, p. 42) urged researchers to “determine the extent to which the money-
talk taboo manifests itself in various contexts, whether its effects are solely beneficial or harmful, 
and how, if at all, lawmakers should respond to these effects.” Yet, the norm has still been 
uncritically assumed to be homogenous and omnipresent, if also problematic. When Estlund (2011) 
called for mandatory transparency at work, she explicitly excluded pay from her arguments. She 
noted that the topic would raise complex concerns for employers and should be researched 
separately. Answering this call and in contrast to Bierman and Gely (2004), Eisenberg (2011), argued 
that the legal protection of pay transparency was essential for economic stability. Yet, Eisenberg 
(2011, p. 989) simplistically noted that “even in the absence of pay secrecy policies, discussions 
about money-especially wages-are often considered crass or arrogant in the workplace.” By 
contrast, Lyons (2012, p. 380) called for stronger statutory protections of wage discussions in the US 
to combat social norms that “discourage pay transparency and impose social sanctions on 
individuals who openly discuss their salary or ask about another's salary.” However, her central 
argument that a mandatory wage disclosure law is needed to subvert social norms, whilst probable, 
still did not interrogate the assumed homogeneity of income-talk taboo adherence (Lyons, 2012). 
Kulow (2013) made a similar argument for legally protected pay transparency, with a brief 
acknowledgement of the income-talk taboo. In response to her own earlier paper, Estlund (2014, p. 
786) also called for legal protection of pay transparency to reduce pay discrimination, whilst 
acknowledging that “employees are still impeded from discovering pay disparities by widespread 
pay secrecy norms.”  
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3.2.3 The Anthropological Income-Talk Taboo: A Scaffold of Workplace Power 
Most promisingly, anthropologists pose an understanding of the income-talk taboo from a more 
sociological perspective: as a mechanism of reinforcing power inequality at work. The mechanics of 
the income-talk taboo are superficially similar to other anthropological taboos, indicating something 
with which individuals are reluctant to engage (Walsh, 2002). However, the context that explains 
why the taboos are forbidden, by whom, when, and what happens when a taboo is violated is 
important. The anthropological taboo (Douglas, 1995; Barnes, 2000; Walsh, 2002) refers to 
something that is forbidden. Why should discussing ones’ pay be forbidden? 
Fox (2014, p. 291) refers to the ‘income-talk taboo’ as the strongest taboo within the broader 
English money-talk taboo. Recent research by a prominent gender equality campaign group, the 
Fawcett Society (2018), demonstrated this social norm through a nationally representative UK-wide 
online survey. Weighted by age, sex, and region, the study revealed that 47% of men and 53% of 
women feel awkward about revealing their pay to a co-worker. Yet, Fox advocates digging beyond a 
simplistic characterisation of this taboo as an established cultural value: 
The taboo is clearly related, in a ‘grammatical’ sort of way to the rules of privacy, modesty, 
and polite egalitarianism, but this is how anthropologists always try to explain the more 
outlandishly irrational beliefs or grotesque practices of the tribes and societies they study…It 
is important to understand why people do these things. But it doesn’t make them any less 
daft. (Fox, 2014, p. 290) 
Taboos exist within a responsibility system that preserves order and societal morality and may be 
enforced by representatives of the polity’s central authority (Walsh, 2002). The social morality 
protected by Fox’s (2014) income-talk taboo is capitalism. Taboo concepts are framed as something 
that threatens society’s central organising principles (Douglas, 1995). The income-talk taboo’s 
apparent societal function is frequently justified by concern for maintaining stability for the firm, 
such as by avoiding employee conflict, balancing employee and employer risk sharing, and 
rewarding employees for making human capital investments that are specific to a firm (Bierman and 
Gely, 2004).  
Additionally, Walsh (2002) emphasises that anthropological taboos need not be universally 
respected, even within a village, to be considered a taboo. Drawing on Barnes’ (2000, p. 8) societies 
as “systems of responsibilities”, Walsh (2002) asserts taboos have no agency; individuals living under 
them have the “freedom to do otherwise” (Fischer and Ravizza, 1993, p. 6). Therefore, variations in 
taboo compliance within social structures or organisations would not negate the taboo. Thus, it is 
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necessary to answer Edwards (2005) call to develop a critical understanding of the function of the 
income-talk taboo and to better understand who observes the income-talk taboo (Chapter 7).   
3.3 Government Statute: Encourages/Mandates Pay Transparency 
Government statute can influence employers by placing regulative or voluntary pressure on 
employers to create varying degrees of pay transparency both within organisations and in public. 
Here, the influence of government statute on organisational pay transparency will be illustrated by 
the UK’s mandatory GPG reporting regulations. While these regulations require employers to 
generate some degree of pay transparency, they have been criticised as watered down from equal 
pay audits (Trades Union Congress, 2015b). Implementation of these regulations was on the horizon 
when fieldwork was conducted for this thesis, prodding large employers to think more about their 
remuneration processes. Section 78 of the Equality Act 2010 authorised government to require 
companies with 250 or more employees to report their GPG publicly. However, the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition Government, which came to power shortly after Labour’s Act passed, 
chose to delay this action and instead test launch a voluntary reporting scheme—Think, Act, 
Report—in September 2011 (Miller and Swinson, 2012).  
Unsurprisingly, following a year of implementation, only 54 companies signed up to this voluntary 
scheme, representing a workforce in excess of one million (Miller and Swinson, 2012). The 
government maintained its conviction “that the voluntary, business-led approach which Think, Act, 
Report sets out is the best way to encourage employers to drive culture change, tackle the complex 
issue of equal pay and promote equal opportunities for everyone” (Miller and Swinson, 2012, p. 8). 
However, by the May 2015 general election, the Conservative Party revised their confidence in 
voluntarism. The Party’s election manifesto committed to implement section 78, by proclaiming that 
“We want to see full, genuine gender equality. The gender pay gap is the lowest on record, but we 
want to reduce it further and will push business to do so” (Conservative Party, 2015, p. 19). The 
government launched a mandatory GPG reporting consultation. By February 2016, just 300 
employers had even pledged to ‘think,’ and merely 7 had ‘reported’ their GPG (Government 
Equalities Office, 2016a). In February and March 2017, Parliament finally approved two regulations 
mandating all private, voluntary, and public employers with 250 or more employees to publish GPG 
reports. The regulation applicable to universities—The Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties and Public 
Authorities) Regulations 2017—came into force on 31 March 2017. This expansion of the Public 
Sector Equality Duty requires governing bodies of English universities to publish annual GPG details. 
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The first reports were due March 30, 2018, whilst private and voluntary employers were given until 
April 5, 2018 (HM Parliament, 2017a, 2017b). 
However, the reporting criteria of these regulations impacts the influence that they could have on 
OSEs, and consequently the degree to which the GPG may narrow as a result. The minimum size of 
companies that must report18, format of reporting, compliance enforcement mechanisms, and to 
whom companies must report their GPG statistics are all important considerations, which were 
identified by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) (2015b) and the Fawcett Society (Olchawski, 2015). 
The GPG regulations require the reporting of just six descriptive statistics, including the mean and 
median GPG based on all employee hourly pay, mean and median bonus GPG, proportion of men 
and women who receive a bonus, and proportion of men and women in each pay quartile (HM 
Parliament, 2017b, 2017a). The TUC’s submission to the government consultation emphasised 
substantive differences in usefulness between GPG reporting and equal pay audits19 (Trades Union 
Congress, 2015b). Distinct from government mandated aggregate GPG reporting, which generate 
headline figures (Chapter 2), an equal pay audit20 “involves establishing where men and women are 
doing equal work including jobs that are different but of equal value, compares the pay of men and 
women doing equal work and takes action to narrow any gaps between individual men and women 
that cannot be justified by objective, non-discriminatory factors” (Trades Union Congress, 2015b, p. 
18). 
Alexander’s (2015) typology of workplace information demonstrated the importance of this 
distinction. Alexander (2015, p. 215) argued that “revealing firm-specific information about the 
hidden conditions of work” would not necessarily transmit the information effectively to employees. 
Pay is a commonly hidden condition of work where information given to employees may not result 
in reform (Alexander, 2015). She conceptualised this argument through five-part typology of 
workplace information, which is presented in Figure 3-1. 
 
18 Even if all employers reported, this would not eliminate the headline GPG, which partly reflects labour 
marked-wide occupational segregation. Rubery (2015, p. 62) notes that “It would be perfectly possible to 
imagine a scenario where there are zero gender gaps within organisations but a high aggregate gender pay 
gap, with more women being concentrated in lower paying organisations than men.”  
19 Companies that seek to avoid negative repercussions from an identified GPG might still adjust job 
classifications, as occurred during the Equal Pay Act 1970’s implementation period, although like Vauxhall 
Motors, they may risk committing illegal discrimination (Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2013). 
20 The Equality and Human Rights Commission’s (2011a) Equal Pay Code of Practice advises that equal pay 
audits must “compar[e] the pay of men and women doing equal work – ensuring that this considers work that 
is the same or broadly similar (like work), work rated as equivalent and work that can be shown to be of equal 
value or worth.”  
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Figure 3-1: Alexander’s Typology of Workplace Information Applied to Pay Transparency 
 
Source: Author’s pay transparency-relevant examples applied to (Alexander, 2015, pp. 189–193) 
This typology explains worker, interest group, and regulator behaviour in response to revealed 
hidden information. Revelation of firm-specific Type A information alone cannot generate reform. 
Mandatory GPG reporting generates Type A information that cannot help individual workers 
understand whether their pay is lower than a relevant comparator, neither does it suggest whether 
discrimination may be present. Type B information can indicate discrimination. If a worker manages 
to obtain such information, they would not be able to respond with a legal claim, approach their 
employer for redress, quit, or find another job without adequate Type C process information and a 
belief that the risk is worth the legal cost, which is Type D information. Pay transparency is valuable 
if it provides enough information to reveal illegal discrimination, takes place within a framework of 
enforceable anti-discrimination policy, and there is sufficient public awareness of employment rights 
and an ability to claim justice. A critical understanding of the practical influence of government 
statute on employer ‘pay communication’ policy is both essential and requires nuance.  
3.4 Employer ‘Pay Communication’ Policy: A Spectrum  
Most of the extant pay secrecy/transparency literature focuses on employer ‘pay communication’ 
policy, which will be discussed here. Employer ‘pay communication’ policy covers all efforts by 
employers to provide and control information about how pay and related progression decisions in 
an organisation function and to what effect (Marasi and Bennett, 2016). Such policy can be 
57 
 
characterised as secretive or transparent. A company may act to comply with legislation that 
encourages or mandates employers to be transparent or it may follow industry-specific norms about 
transparency (Costas and Grey, 2014). However, much of the research that is relevant to this thesis, 
relates to what pay secrecy/transparency achieves from the perspective of employers. Lawler’s 
(1965a) foundational pay secrecy research (and other work that followed) focused on interrogating 
the relationship between pay secrecy/transparency and worker satisfaction, motivation or effort 
(Lawler, 1965a, 1965b; Schuster and Colletti, 1973; Burroughs, 1982; Nosenzo, 2013), not the pay 
distribution or pay inequality (Colella et al., 2007).  
Schuster and Colletti (1973) found generally strong support for pay secrecy amongst professional 
employees within a single firm, although higher performers were more likely than lower performers 
to support employer-led pay secrecy. However, of the individual characteristics tested21, only 
education was significantly correlated with such beliefs. Those with graduate degrees were more 
likely to support open pay, whereas those who held a bachelors or no degree tended to support pay 
secrecy. Although this interrogation of employee perspectives was done with consideration for 
employer interests, it still did not explore the relationship between pay secrecy and pay. 
Leventhal et al.’s (1972) important early study suggested that moving from pay secrecy to pay 
transparency compresses the wage distribution. Participants awarded high performers lower reward 
and low performers less punishment in pay under conditions of transparency than under conditions 
of secrecy. However, this was an experimental study using college students, removed from an 
organisational context and employment non-discrimination legislation. Thus, the validity of these 
results in relation to real pay is uncertain. Suggesting that increasing pay transparency may be less 
costly or disruptive than significantly altering pay practices, Burroughs (1982, p. 45) noted that 
“compared with other pay-versus-performance issues, pay secrecy focuses on a single and simple 
dimension – that is, the range of employees’ knowledge about the compensation structure.”  
The pay secrecy to transparency spectrum should incorporate soft and hard employer pay 
transparency policy. In the soft sense, employers may ‘allow’ pay transparency by not prohibiting 
employees from discussing pay with contractual pay secrecy or ‘gagging’ clauses (Gow and 
Middlemiss, 2012). This passively protects employees by safeguarding their right to discuss pay 
without fear of formal employer retaliation. The employer is passive by not prohibiting wage 
discussions, but the employee must actively share wage information. The extent to which this 
 
21 Others include occupation, salary, and age (Schuster and Colletti, 1973). 
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matters depends on employees’ propensity to discuss pay, in contrast to the socially constructed 
income-talk taboo (Fox, 2014). Passive protection may not place pay information within the grasp of 
employees, therefore its impact on employees’ actual wage awareness is uncertain. In the UK the 
right to discuss pay was protected by section 77 of the Equality Act 2010 (Chapter 1). More than five 
years on the enforcement body, the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) (2015a), was 
still only reporting that they were monitoring the impact of the new protection. Lack of further 
information suggests that the impact may not yet be significant, at least in clearly measurable ways, 
such as use in employment tribunals. In the hard sense, employers can create pay transparency by 
proactively publishing relevant pay data or analysis to employees or the public. This may be 
encouraged or mandated by legislation, such as the mandatory GPG reporting in the UK, or by 
industry norms about pay transparency. The extent to which this matters depends on the usefulness 
of the data to reveal any actual inequality in a way that makes seeking remedy possible.  
Efforts to characterise employer ‘pay communication’ policy as hard or soft are under development. 
Colella et al. (2007) argued that pay secrecy must be considered along a spectrum to encompass the 
full range of hard and soft employer ‘pay communication’ policy. However, their spectrum only 
moves from a company with a formally enforced prohibition on pay discussion, to one with no 
norms or policies about pay discussion. Therefore, the most ‘open’ point is soft employer ‘pay 
communication’ policy. Burroughs (1982) proposed a broader spectrum for researching the impact 
of moving from wage secrecy to transparency, which also accounts for hard employer ‘pay 
communication’ policy. I have adapted this spectrum in Figure 3-2 to incorporate the distinction 
between employee-only and public transparency. Achieving these steps internally could help those 
already employed by a firm, but only public facing transparency would help jobseekers approach the 
negotiating table with better information. I also replaced “median” with “pay bands” in the 2nd and 




Figure 3-2: Adapted Pay Secrecy to Radical Pay Transparency Spectrum 
 
Source: Author-adapted from (Burroughs, 1982, pp. 44–45) 
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Burroughs (1982) reviewed psychological research about the impact of pay secrecy on productivity, 
which revealed some alignment with his spectrum, but failed to address employee perspectives. 
Marasi and Bennett (2016) provided one of the most comprehensive and recent organisational 
conceptualisations of what they call ‘pay communication.’ They defined ‘pay communication’ as 
“the organizational practice that determines if, when, how, and which pay information (such as pay 
ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay levels, and/or the entire pay structure) is 
communicated to employees and possibly outsiders” (Marasi and Bennett, 2016, p. 51). This built 
upon a welcome evolution from early conceptualisation of ‘pay secrecy’ based on the assumption 
that employers’ options were largely to be secretive or open (Lawler, 1965b; Schuster and Colletti, 
1973; Thompson and Pronsky, 1975), to a more nuanced understanding of the organisational 
concept along a spectrum (Burroughs, 1982; Colella et al., 2007). As an organisational concept, 
however, pay secrecy research still predominantly focuses on employers, specifically, actions taken 
(or not) by employers, employer motivations for those choices, and how those actions influence 
company outcomes. However, the wage secrecy spectrum remains a useful heuristic from this 
literature for considering the impact of employer ‘pay communication’ policy on the OSE and 
subsequently the GPG and G/EPG.  
3.5 Trade Unions: Litigation and Collective Bargaining    
Trade union collective bargaining is also expected to bring remuneration-setting processes into the 
light to encourage more transparent employer ‘pay communication’ policy, at least by establishing 
pay scales (Ramachandran, 2012). However, an important difficulty is that trade union density in the 
UK has been on a steady decline from a peak of 55% in 1979 (Healy and Kirton, 2013) to about 25% 
in 2016 (Moore et al., 2019). In organisations where unions are still recognised, they can influence 
more transparent ‘pay communication’ policy in two ways.  
First, British unions have evolved significantly since the 1970s in regard to advocating for equal pay 
and using litigation as a tool to achieve it. Although union-backed equal pay litigation remains rare, 
it has been an effective tool to reveal unequal pay and bring information about pay practices into 
the open, sometimes with implications beyond a single workplace. A GMB-backed equal pay claim 
from 1,500 women against the Cleveland County Council was settled in 1996 for £4 million. Male-
dominated jobs (gardeners and bin men) and female-dominated jobs (dinner ladies) had been rated 
equivalent through a 1988 job evaluation exercise yet were paid differently because only gardeners 
and bin men were offered productivity bonuses. Although this case had implications for Cleveland, it 
also revealed similar inequality problems in local authorities across the UK (Guillaume, 2015). 
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However, litigation is lengthy and expensive, even when successful. A second, more common way 
that trade unions encourage organisational pay transparency is through collective bargaining. Not 
only does this enforce the practice of having transparent pay scales and a union to monitor 
compliance, research commonly associates collective bargaining with greater pay equality. Studies 
have found this to be the case in the US manufacturing sector for both race-based inequality (Agesa 
and Agesa, 2008) and gender-based inequality, particularly in male-dominated organisations (Elvira 
and Sapporta, 2001). Healy and Ahamed (2019) found that unionisation and collective bargaining 
promoted pay transparency and generated scrutiny of company pay practices in the UK’s financial 
sector, and they also found that unionisation was associated with smaller GPGs, even for mothers. 
3.6 Social Pay Comparison: Individual Levers to Reveal Pay 
The last pressure on pay transparency inside organisations may come from individuals. This section 
will illustrate to the extent to which employees are known to violate the income-talk taboo through 
social pay comparison, an attempt to learn how one’s own pay compares with those working around 
them (Burchell and Yagil, 1997). This could involve personal conversations, participation in crowd-
sourced wage aggregator sites (Marasi and Bennett, 2016), or even accessing trade union developed 
pay comparison tools (University and College Union, 2016e). Individual social pay comparison, 
therefore, could run counter to the secrecy influence of the income-talk taboo discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter.  
3.6.1 Social Pay Comparison: Who Talks? 
Social pay comparison can be seen as fundamental to effective collective organising at work. The 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 in the US safeguards the right of workers to discuss their pay in 
order to enable “concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection” (Gely and Bierman, 2003, p. 126). Literature on the topic of social pay comparison 
suggests three categories of variables that may determine whether, and in what circumstances, 
individuals engage in social pay comparison or observe the income-talk taboo and remain silent. 
These are cultural, (institutional) company, and (individual) employee factors. They have been 
identified with considerably varying degrees of empirical backing, which this thesis aims to address. 
Figure 3-3 provides a conceptual diagram of the levels of influence on social pay comparison that are 
described in the limited extant literature on compliance with and violation of the income-talk taboo. 
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Figure 3-3: Spheres of Influence on Social Pay Comparison/Income-Talk Taboo Compliance 
 
Source: Author’s social pay comparison literature synthesis 
However, the relative and interacting impacts of these factors on compliance with the income-talk 
taboo have been little examined. The ordering of the concentric circles in the figure above only 
reflects conceptually the relative numbers of people that each category of factors would impact. 
Individual employees work for a company22; all companies operate within some external culture.  
Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) novel analysis, from a survey of people living in England’s Northampton 
Travel-To-Work area, explored the relative impact that individual and organisational level factors, 
including sex, had on social pay comparison. Initial analysis found a significant bivariate relationship 
between social pay comparison and several individual and organisational level factors. They found 
that employees who were younger, more educated, held higher skilled jobs, were not managers, 
 
22 This framework excludes the self-employed for parsimony. 
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were trade union members, worked full-time, voted for left-wing parties, had applied for other jobs 
within twelve months, thought their employment was insecure, and worked for larger organisations 
were statistically more likely to compare their wages with others than the converse. Although sex 
was included in the bivariate analysis, the relationship between sex and social pay comparison was 
not statistically significant.  
The authors also ran a multivariate logistic regression using all the variables that had achieved a 
statistically significant bivariate relationship with social pay comparison. Occupation had the largest 
influence on the propensity to engage in social pay comparison, followed by school qualification, job 
security, working hours and employer size. Age, job skill level, trade union membership, sex, and 
voting intention added no further explanatory power to the model. Given the study’s lack of a 
nationally representative sample or organisational/industry specific context, generalisability is 
limited. Burchell and Yagil (1997) also made no attempt to frame social pay comparison behaviour in 
relation to the GPG or G/EPG. 
Table 3-1 summarises the factors drawn from the literature that have been suggested to encourage 
income-talk taboo compliance or social pay comparison and is organised according to  analytical 
level. The factor without citation—collaborative society—is noted as a logical counterpart to 
competitive society, although it was not found to be explicitly discussed in the literature.
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More recently, Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2018) used an experimental survey to explore how pay 
information is or is not shared within an organisation, which is partly related to employee reluctance 
to engage in social pay comparison. In terms of policy implications, the authors argued that a statute 
protecting the right to discuss pay with co-workers is unlikely to help employees reduce information 
frictions to learn more about their pay circumstances. This is because their study suggested that 
because of the privacy norm, people do not discuss pay even when allowed to do so. They further 
suggested that radical pay transparency, revealing individual’s pay, would help employees less than 
anonymised transparency, which would reveal only average salaries for different roles. However, 
these findings were based on survey participants’ opinions, and the study did not ascertain the 
process through which individual or anonymised pay data could actually help employees.  
 
Scandinavian countries present interesting natural experiments that could shed some light on the 
influence of radical pay transparency on the GPG. Income tax returns, and therefore individual pay, 
have been public information in Norway since the 1800s, but access to this information was 
modernised with an online database in the early 2000s (Fernandez, 2010; Swift, 2012; Kulow, 2013). 
A similar exercise to make income tax returns public is also well-established in Sweden and Finland 
(Marcal, 2017). Notably, the Scandinavian nations are often held up as models of gender equality 
(World Economic Forum, 2019), although research has also shown that their progress is variable 
(Seierstad and Healy, 2012; Grönlund, Halldén and Magnusson, 2017). Kulow (2013) observed that 
Norway’s GPG had narrowed since it made individual’s pay publicly accessible online in the early 
2000s. Unfortunately, neither of the articles she referenced to make this observation were peer-
reviewed. The first, a blog post, acknowledged the unusually public nature of pay in Norway but 
questioned the need for such radical transparency and noted that legal access to the public 
database was tightened in 2011 due to privacy concerns (Brancaccio, 2012). The second, another 
blog, is the source from whence came Kulow’s (2013) primary observation about Norway’s GPG 
improvement, following public, radical pay transparency. However, it only referred to MSNBC’s 
money page as evidence (Fernandez, 2010). Peer-reviewed inquiry into the relationship between 
radical pay transparency and a narrow GPG in the Norwegian, Swedish, or Finnish contexts could not 
be identified, at least in the English language.   
 
However, unlike the majority of the pay communication literature explored earlier and Burchell and 
Yagil’s (1997) analysis of social pay comparison specifically, Cullen and Perez-Truglia (2018) do link 
their study to gender-based pay discrimination literature. They find that men and women face 
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similar ‘information frictions’, which are difficulties attaining perfect information about pay in one’s 
workplace, and hold similar levels of misunderstanding of what others around them earn, although 
women were less confident of their pay perceptions than men. This data interpretation is 
insufficient. Even accepting the applicability of this experiment to real organisational experience, 
their data merely reveals that men and women were equally unlikely to gain potentially ‘leverage-
able’ pay information. It does not counter the risk that these information frictions hide 
discrimination or unconscious bias (Noon, 2018) in pay setting. 
3.6.2 The Rise of Crowd-Sourced Wage Aggregators 
While exploration of employee-created transparency in this thesis will focus on social pay 
comparison (Chapter 7), the rise of crowd-sourced websites for collecting and sharing anonymised 
pay data represents another form of pay transparency that is created by employees (Marasi and 
Bennett, 2016). One of the largest crowd-sourced wage aggregator and employee review website is 
Glassdoor. It has more than 30 million users across 190 countries (Lenaerts, Beblavý and Fabo, 
2016). Other crowd-sourced wage sites include Salary.com and PayScale (Kureková, Beblavý and 
Thum-Thysen, 2015). A UK-based newcomer amongst crowd-sourced wage aggregators founded in 
2012, Emolument allows comparison with others by alma mater, company, and industry. Its 
founders claim that Emolument has gained popularity within the finance sector in the City of London 
and is being used by employees during salary negotiations (Hutchison, 2015). 
This growing trend may speak to an innate desire by employees to engage in social pay comparison 
to help determine what they should be earning in their jobs, even though some may not be 
prepared to publicly admit that desire. Reluctance to share information about wages in real life may 
be linked to the income-talk taboo. However, this has not stopped the development of a growing 
variety of crowd-sourced sites, which are often based on a mutually-beneficial model. Employee 
users provide their own salary data and other assessments of their employer in order to gain access 
to other people’s data (Lenaerts, Beblavý and Fabo, 2016). Employees are thus empowered to 
create some level of pay transparency, which can take place regardless of societal pressure to 
demonstrate the income-talk taboo. The websites require no human interaction and the 
information provided and received is anonymised. Scholars have begun to cautiously recognise 
these sites as potential large-scale data sources for labour market (Kureková, Beblavý and Thum-
Thysen, 2015; Lenaerts, Beblavý and Fabo, 2016) and even firm level analysis (Chandra, 2012; Huang 
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, Estlund (2011, p. 386) argues that the data these websites provide is 
“random, raw, and not clearly reliable” partly due to the likelihood of skewing by “disproportionate 
share of company boosters and malcontents.” Rosenfeld (2017, p. 14) further expresses doubt that 
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aggregator sites “replace the dissemination of objective wage and salary information by employers 
or employee organizations such as unions.” 
3.6.3 Trade Union Developed Wage Comparison Tools  
Social partner-developed sites have also emerged to help create pay transparency. A prominent 
example relevant to this thesis is the University and College Union’s (UCU) Rate for the job website, 
which exists to spur “debate about what constitutes fair pay for staff in our colleges and 
universities” (University and College Union, 2016e). However, data on this site is not user-
generated. The higher education (HE) wage data comes from the Higher Education Statistics Agency 
(HESA) (University and College Union, 2016d) and the further education wage data was gathered 
through Freedom of Information Act requests (University and College Union, 2016c). It may be 
interesting to know whether and how HE employees use the site. 
The existence and popularity of wage comparison sites demonstrates a desire of some employees to 
be more aware of what other people are earning. These sites may help employees to create pay 
transparency, thus satisfying a desire to know what salaries they should expect, without needing to 
challenge the income-talk taboo. The relatively recently observed trend of employee social pay 
comparison, sits opposite the income-talk taboo and employer ‘pay communication’ policy, as the 
primary scholarly recognition of workers’ agency and power in respect of pay secrecy/transparency. 
Therefore, this thesis will draw on a range of relevant literature to develop a more comprehensive 
theorisation of pay secrecy/transparency as it applies to the UK HE context (Chapters 6-8). 
3.7 Literature Gap Discussion  
Finally, this section reflects upon the literature that has been reviewed in order to clarify the gap in 
pay secrecy/transparency literature that this thesis will fill and in order to develop the theoretical 
underpinning of the OSE. This begins the construction of this thesis’s analytical framework, built on 
Acker’s inequality regime components. Marasi and Bennett (2016) call for future research into pay 
communication mechanics, who tells what to whom and how. Costas and Grey (2014, p. 1423) 
identify the need for secrecy to be conceptualised as a social process in organisational research, 
defining organisational secrecy as “ongoing formal and informal social processes of intentional 
concealment of information from actors by actors in organizations.” They elaborate on this 
distinction by explaining that:  
Formal secrecy involves bureaucratic forms of control, which attempt to directly regulate 
behaviour, either through formalization and standardization (e.g. organizational rules 
prescribing who may or may not have access to information) or indeed through legal 
enforcement. Informal secrecy works through normative forms of control, which indirectly 
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attempt to shape individuals’ behaviour through instilling certain norms, values, and beliefs. 
(Costas and Grey, 2014, pp. 1439–1440) 
This formal/informal distinction is important for the critical analysis of the performance of the pay 
‘transparency agenda’ in UK universities (Chapter 6), because universities are “publicly  accountable 
organisations…the avowed policy of organizations may be one of transparency and thus the 
elimination of formal secrecy, while the informal practices remain secretive” (Costas and Grey, 
2014, pp. 1440–1441). Characterising the organisational secrecy literature gap, Costas and Grey 
(2014, p. 1441) go on to argue that “the social processes of organizational secrecy, while not absent 
in the existing literature, lurk marginally in the shadows of organization studies, almost as secrets in 
themselves.” 
‘Pay communication’ is the “the organizational practice that determines if, when, how and, which 
pay information (such as pay ranges, pay raises, pay averages, individual pay levels and/or the entire 
pay structure) is communicated to employees and possibly outsiders” (Marasi and Bennett, 2016, p. 
51). Influenced by the income-talk taboo, the ‘pay communication’ climate of organisations is 
significantly impacted by management behaviour and institutional policy, and also the extent to 
which these create practical or symbolic (Edelman, 2016) pay (and related progression) 
transparency.  
Despite providing one of the most comprehensive and recent organisational conceptualisations of 
‘pay communication’, Marasi and Bennett’s (2016) work should be broadened. They identify two 
pay communication typology factors. The first, organisational restriction, refers to the release of pay 
information by employers to employees. The second, employee restriction, is about allowing 
employees to discuss their pay with each other. However, pay communication literature has a gap in 
terms of considering employee autonomy and perspectives. In order to begin to address this, I 
propose extending this typology by introducing two additional pay communication factors to 
account for a broader range of information that is relevant to an employee’s ability to understand 
their pay and advocate for reform where needed. This expansion draws on Alexander’s (2015) 
theorisation that the revelation of hidden information about work is not ‘self-actuating’ but requires 
multi-layered information, including about processes. As shown in Figure 3-4, I have added 
procedural communication, which is about the release of information on career progression 
processes, and external recognition communication, which is about how employers use equality, 
diversity, and inclusion (EDI) accreditations to drive reform of the procedures for pay and 
progression (or not). 
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Figure 3-4: Expanded Pay Communication Typology 
 
Source: Author expanded from (Marasi and Bennett, 2016, p. 52) 
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In order to construct this thesis’s analytical framework, these pay communication typology 
components are mapped onto the associated inequality regime components. Acker’s (2006b, 2006a) 
inequality regimes provide a useful foundation to this framework, in order to make visible the 
invisible machinations that reinforce pay inequality within organisations. Of salience to pay 
inequality that stubbornly persists within ‘enlightened’ UK universities, Acker notes that “even 
organisations that have very explicit egalitarian goals develop inequality regimes over time” (2006b, 
p. 443). The first column of Figure 3-5 lists the inequality regime components that I have adopted 
from Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes. The second column maps the ‘pay communication’ 
typology components in order to demonstrate the theoretical derivation of this framework drawn 
from my proposed expansion of the pay communication literature, particularly Marasi and Bennett 
(2016). These two columns together demonstrate a mapping between four inequality regime 
components that can be used to analyse organisational pay transparency/secrecy, in relation to four 
employer ‘pay communication’ behaviours that are relevant to employee awareness about pay 
inside those organisations. This provides the theoretical derivation for the OSE framework 
developed in this thesis. The OSE is a multi-layered concept that will help to conceptualise what 
influences the openness/secrecy surrounding pay in organisations. It also allows for a more 
comprehensive analysis than has currently been achieved in the literature, by expanding Marasi and 
Bennett’s (2016) pay communication typology.  
The OSE framework is founded on four interlocking inequality regime components (Rows A-D), 
shown in Figure 3-5. Row A’s visibility of inequality can be observed in terms of organisational 
restriction. This is the extent to which employers make information about pay public within 
organisations, and potentially to the public. In Row B, legitimacy of inequality can be observed in 
terms of how employers communicate to staff about external recognition of organisations’ EDI 
practices and its relation to pay and related progression practices. In Row C, management control 
and compliance can be observed in terms of formal and informal restrictions placed on employees 
who may wish to discuss their own pay. In Row D, processes producing inequality necessitates 
exploring how employers communicate their pay and progression policies to staff.  
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Figure 3-5: Mapping the Pay Communication Typology onto Inequality Regimes to Theoretically Underpin the Thesis Analytical Framework 
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This constructed foundation of the OSE can also be understood in relation to GPG literature in 
Chapter 2, which explored the structural complications of occupational segregation and 
intersectional inequality. Pfeffer (1998, p. 95) observed that “information is power, and sharing 
information diffuses that power.” Individual level information about the pay of a comparator 
(usually within the same employer) is necessary to claim the individual right to protection from 
workplace pay discrimination within the UK’s legal regime (Gow and Middlemiss, 2012; Mills & 
Reeve LLP, 2012).23 This has become more important in the UK as trade union power and sectoral 
collective bargaining has declined, driven by harsh anti-union legislation, which has also driven an 
increase in individualised employment litigation (Deakin et al., 2015). Yet, individual level pay 
information is often closely held in workplaces, despite limited efforts by government legislation and 
employer policies to provide an appearance of (usually aggregated) transparency. The same 
Conservative party that championed pay transparency through mandatory GPG reporting in 2017, 
also revoked the statutory Equal Pay Questionnaire in 2014, which weakened pressure on 
employers to provide employees with individual level pay information (Trades Union Congress, 
2015b; Wild, 2017). Furthermore, the income-talk taboo may further frustrate efforts to gain this 
information. Whilst the right to ask colleagues about their pay, where one suspects illegal 
discrimination, is protected by section 77 of the Equality Act 2010, there is no right to an answer 
(Chapter 1).   
3.8 Summary 
This chapter has constructed the case for filling a gap in pay secrecy/transparency literature by 
constructing the OSE as a theoretical lens through which to understand the multi-layered social 
processes that influence pay secrecy/transparency in organisations. The first two stages of the OSE 
have been constructed by aligning Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes with an expansion on 
Marasi and Bennett’s (2016) pay communication typology. This has been achieved by exploring the 
existing knowledge of sources of influence on pay secrecy/transparency within organisations, which 
include societal norms, government statute, employer ‘pay communication’ policy, trade union 
litigation and collective bargaining, and employee behaviour.24 This chapter has conceptualised 
workplace pay secrecy/transparency by drawing on identified literature gaps, particularly the 
 
23 Per the UK’s Equality Act 2010, hypothetical comparators can be used in limited circumstances (Gow and 
Middlemiss, 2012). 
24 Sources may vary with context and analysis level, like industry or workplace, which is why this chapter 
identified the importance of a multi-layered conceptualisation of pay secrecy/transparency within 




tendency of ‘pay communication’ scholarship to take the employer’s perspective, the under-
theorisation of organisational secrecy, and the lack of critical exploration of the income-talk taboo. 
Therefore, the primary sub-research question stemming from this chapter is: Do academics in the 
two university case studies violate the ‘income-talk taboo,’ and if so, does this violation vary across 
gender or ethnicity? This will be explored in Chapter 7. Transparency/secrecy driven by government 
statute and industry norms and resultant employer ‘pay communication’ policy will be empirically 
analysed in Chapter 6, whilst the income-talk taboo’s interaction with social pay comparison (and 
other social interactions) will inform Chapter 8. Chapter 4 will now complete this thesis’s literature 
review and further build this thesis’s analytical framework with the addition of themes emerging in 







Chapter 4 Pay Inequality in UK Higher Education: The Context 
4.1 Introduction 
This final part of the literature review will apply both explanations for the gender pay gap (GPG) 
(Chapter 2) and the necessity to analyse multiple levels of influence on the OSE (Chapter 3) to the 
context of this thesis, namely employment in the UK higher education (HE) sector. This chapter 
provides context level exploration, as denoted in this thesis’s research map (Chapter 5), by 
presenting the shape and degree of inequality (Acker, 2006b, 2006a) within the UK HE sector and 
the pay ‘transparency agenda’ pressures acting upon the sector. Chapter 2 demonstrated how the 
GPG and gender/ethnic pay gap (G/EPG) have been analysed by labour economists and sociologists. 
This chapter will use the terminology of the GPG literature to describe pay inequality in the UK HE 
sector. It will demonstrate the persistent inequality in HE, which underscores the importance of 
critically analysing the ‘pay transparency’ performance within HE. Chapter 3 constructed the 
foundation of this thesis’s organisational salary environment (OSE) conceptualisation by aligning 
Acker’s (2006b, 2006a) inequality regime components with the pay communication literature 
(Marasi and Bennett, 2016), which will enable more comprehensive analysis of multi-layered 
influences on organisational pay secrecy/transparency. This chapter will also show how multi-
layered power sources have reinforced the pressure on the HE sector to perform pay transparency 
(and improve employee awareness of pay) to foster equality. These factors range from state 
regulations imposed on all universities to an employment tribunal decision that cast judgment on a 
single university. This chapter further develops this thesis’s analytical framework by identifying 
contextually-relevant themes through which to operationalise the critical inquiry of the performance 
of the pay ‘transparency agenda’, as experienced by academics within two UK universities, to help 
explain the relationship between the OSE and the GPG and G/EPG (Chapters 6-9).  
4.2 Pay Inequality in UK Higher Education 
This section uses the pay inequality terminology that has been adopted by previous research 
(Chapter 2) to describe the areas of concern within UK academia. The concepts that are applied to 
HE employment include:   
1. The GPG and intersectional G/EPG 
2. Vertical segregation with a focus on the professoriate 
3. Discipline-based horizontal segregation (between science, engineering, and technology 
(SET) and non-SET disciplines) 
4. The motherhood pay penalty experienced within an academic career 
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Table 4-1 summarises how each concept has been characterised within HE employment and how 
inequality regime framing can account for the barriers that these concepts present. Accepted 
‘bureaucratic’ organising processes can be seen to subtly produce and re-produce structural 
inequality outcomes, including vertical and horizontal segregation and the motherhood pay penalty 
in the academic career.  
Table 4-1: Applying Gender Pay Gap and Inequality Regime Language to the UK Academic 
Employment Context 
 
Underscoring the importance of Acker’s (2006b, 2006a) inequality regimes to demonstrating how 
organising processes within UK universities reproduce inequality, Fletcher’s (2007) case study 
analysis demonstrated the blindness of UK manager-academics to structure and their tendency to 
blame women for experiencing inequality. Manager-academics commonly assumed that women 
chose work/life balance over sacrificing every waking moment to research (fully committing) and 
were oblivious to gendered structural issues in their university. Many male manager-academics 
admitted that they were unaware of a gender equity problem until it created a problem in their own 
lives, such as having to account for poor institutional gender equality statistics in funding bids. 
However, once the issue was raised, manager-academics continued to explain it through women’s 
‘choices.’ “By stressing the importance of choices made by women academics over structural 
constraints, manager-academics are effectively passing the buck, putting the onus on the women 
academics to change and refusing to take ownership of the issue of gender equity” (Fletcher, 2007, 
p. 273). Teelken and Deem (2013) analysed the inconsistency of university management governance 
with national and EU anti-discrimination policy and the persistence of gender inequality in UK, 
Swedish and Dutch universities; they concluded by calling for critically questioning of organisational 
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processes. Whilst they recommended that universities should conduct equality audits, Teelken and 
Deem (2013, p. 532) also encouraged “managers to realise that the existence of formal procedures 
for reducing inequalities do not, by themselves, either end gender discrimination or justify a lack of 
awareness of gender differences on a daily basis in academic work.”  
4.2.1 The Gender and Gender/Ethnic Pay Gap in Higher Education 
Despite national and EU anti-discrimination policy being on the radar of UK university senior 
management and a sector-wide pay scale for academics (excluding professors), an aggregate GPG 
and G/EPG persists. The following section illustrates the aggregate GPG and G/EPG trends in HE over 
the 13 academic years prior to 2016/17, when the fieldwork for this thesis primarily took place.25 
This demonstrates Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regime component: shape and degree of 
inequality within UK higher education (HE). The Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) provides 
the most reliable pay data for full-time academics working in UK higher education (Chapter 5). The 
following analysis was conducted on the nominal26 basic pay (annual salary) for all full-time 
academics (those on teaching, research or teaching and research contracts) in the HESA Staff Record 
for the academic years 2003/04 through 2015/16. As expected, the mean GPG is wider than the 
figure based on median salary across the analysis period. The mean GPG is vulnerable to influence 
by particularly high and low annual pay (Chapter 2). Therefore, Figure 4-1 indicates that there is a 
consistent cluster of highly paid male academics propping up the aggregate mean figure. However, a 
gradual narrowing is visible on both measures. The median academic GPG began at 10.3% in 
2003/04 and narrowed to 5.7% in 2015/16 (13.9% to 10.3% using median figures). In terms of 
magnitude, this means that the GPG narrowed by 4.6 percentage points using median salary and 
only 3.6% using mean salary over the full 13-year period. 
 
25 See Appendix I for output tables for analysis in Figures 4-1 to 4-3. 
26 All pay gaps reported in this chapter’s HESA analysis are based on nominal annual salary. However, as a 
further robustness check, all gaps were re-calculated following the same protocol, except using salary inflated 
into real 2016 terms (using the Consumer Price Index). As expected, this replicated the gap results gap results 
presented in this chapter. 
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Figure 4-1: Full-Time UK Academic Gender Pay Gap 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 
This contextual analysis reinforces the empirical puzzle that has motivated this study on UK HE 
academic employment. This publicly funded sector, which has faced significant equality, diversity, 
and inclusion (EDI) scrutiny and significant pay ‘transparency agenda’ pressure over the past decade, 
has continued to struggle with a challenging battle against pay inequality. HE trade unions have 
consistently brought this issue to university employers as part of sector-wide collective bargaining 
from the 2004 Framework Agreement for HE pay (JNCHES, 2004) to the 2016/17 national pay claim, 
part of which was a demand for nationally-agreed action by institutions to close the GPG by 2020 
(University and College Union, 2016a). Pay inequality within UK academia can be understood with 
respect to bases of inequality, namely gender and ethnicity in this thesis (Acker, 2006a). 
A 2011 literature review by the New Joint Negotiating Committee for Higher Education Staff (New 
JNCHES) (2011) found no major academic analysis of the GPG across UK HE. Some have been 
conducted, although few since the implementation of HE’s single pay spine. An early example by 
McNabb and Weiss (1997) found an aggregate GPG across UK academia of 16.9% in 1975, 13.6% in 
1985 and 15.2% in 1992. Controlling for age, tenure, rank and faculty, a significant chunk of the gap 
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remained unexplained in each period, which was about a third for 1992. The authors attributed the 
remainder to gender discrimination or unmeasured productivity.27  
More recent sector-wide equal pay audits reveal that an academic GPG persists, especially amongst 
professors, and vertical segregation is an important factor. A 2015 New JNCHES (2015, p. 8) sectoral 
equal pay audit found little within-level GPG (greater than 5%) for academics covered by collective 
bargaining, while acknowledging concerning evidence of vertical segregation.  
Table 4-2: Median Gender Pay Gap using Basic Annual Salaries and Proportion of Female Staff by 
Responsibility Level (Full-Time Employees) 
 
Source: HESA Staff Record 2013/14 analysed in (New JNCHES, 2015, p. 8) 
Curiously, the New JNCHES (2016) GPG report that followed did not include such a detailed audit. 
The University and College Union (2017) (UCU) refused to endorse the report, partly due to this de-
emphasis on the senior GPG. In response, the UCU (2017) issued their own GPG report, which 
demonstrated a similar concentration of men and problematic GPG within the senior ranks of 
academia and an aggregate academic median GPG of 12.2% (12% mean).  
 
27 Ward (2001) found a 15% aggregate GPG on a survey of academics at 5 established Scottish universities in 
1995/96. Controlling for age, tenure, rank, faculty, and additionally publication rates, 10% of the gap remained 
unexplained.   
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Table 4-3: Mean and Median Gender Pay Gap using Basic Annual Salaries and Proportion of Female Staff by Responsibility Level (All 
Academic Employees, Excluding Atypical) 
 
Source: HESA Staff Record 2015/16 analysed in (University and College Union, 2017, p. 13) 
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As in the UK labour force, analysis of the ethnic pay gap (EPG) or intersectional G/EPG in UK HE is 
less developed. However, consciousness of this concern is rightly growing. The Race Equality Charter 
in academia, to complement the gender-focused Athena SWAN Charter, and the THE’s first sector-
wide ethnicity pay analysis in 2017 are part of this shift (Grove, 2017b; Bhopal and Pitkin, 2018). 
Institutional awareness of the intersectional disadvantage faced by women of colour in UK academia 
was beginning to emerge in the run up to the 2016/17 academic year. Recognising this problem, the 
2015/16 national pay equality claim of HE trade unions called on universities to conduct mandatory 
biennial equal pay audits (disaggregating by gender, race and disability status) (University and 
College Union, 2015b). Although no academic analysis of the EPG or G/EPG in UK academia sector-
wide could be identified, further original analysis of full-time academic pay using HESA data and an 
intersectional approach, indicates that BAME women academics consistently experience the widest 
aggregate pay gap relative to white men. This matters. 
Figure 4-2: Full-Time Median UK Academic Gender/Ethnic Pay Gap 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 
In terms of the magnitude of change, Figure 4-2 demonstrates that the gap between BAME women 
and white men academics, using median annual salary, narrowed 3.9 percentage points from 20.0% 
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in 2003/04 to 16.1% in 2015/16 (4.6 percentage points from 22.7% to 18.1% using mean figures in 
Figure 4-3). The gap for BAME men, using median annual salary, slightly widened by 0.1 percentage 
point from 12.1% in 2003/04 to 12.2% in 2015/16 (although it narrowed by 2.3 percentage points 
from 13.8% to 11.5% using mean figures). The gap for white women academics using median annual 
salary narrowed by 0.3 percentage points from 6.0% in 2003/04 to 5.7% in 2015/16 (3.3 percentage 
points from 14.2% to 10.9% using mean figures).  
Figure 4-3: Full-Time Mean UK Academic Gender/Ethnic Pay Gap 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 
At least on the aggregate, to be a BAME woman academic is to experience the greatest pay 
inequality relative to white male academics. Whether looking at the mean or median gaps, the pay 
disadvantage faced by women of colour relative to white men is clearly more pronounced than for 
white women, and also more so than for BAME men using median figures. The gaps for all 
categories, however, are also noticeably wider using mean rather than median figures, which again 
suggests skewing by particularly high paid white male academics.  
82 
 
The EPG has been explored in academic literature within specific disciplines. Blackaby et al and 
Frank (2000) identified an 8% pay gap between black/Asian and white academic economists, after 
controlling for a range of individual and institutional characteristics. The problem has also begun to 
attract media coverage. The THE pay survey, which had been analysing HESA data by gender for a 
decade, analysed the EPG in the UK for the first time in 2017. The analysis28 showed that in the 
2015/16 academic year, Black academics experienced an aggregate gap of 12.6% relative to white 
academics using annual salary, while Asian academics faced a 10.4% gap. Black professors 
experienced a 6% gap (13.3% for other senior academic roles), while Asian professors earned more 
on average than white professors. Small numbers of Black senior academics (just 95 professors and 
30 other senior academics) limit the data’s reliability but also suggest a serious inequality of 
opportunity at the highest levels of academia (Grove, 2017b). These aggregate pay gaps provide a 
signal that all is not well for HE pay, but additional concepts help to explain why: vertical segregation 
in the professoriate, discipline-based horizontal segregation and the motherhood pay penalty.  
4.2.2 Vertical Segregation: The Professoriate 
The small numbers that limit reliability of EPG calculations at senior levels also help to explain some 
of the GPG and G/EPG across UK academia. This illustrates vertical segregation. The embeddedness 
of gender and ethnic vertical segregation in UK academia, indicates the importance of critically 
questioning recruitment and promotion organisational practices that reproduce this 
disadvantageous result (Acker, 2006a, 2006b). The UK professoriate is predominately male and 
overwhelmingly white (Universities UK, 2018). According to the AdvanceHE (2018) staff statistical 
report for 2016/17 figures, only 24.6% of professors across all disciplines in the UK were women. 
Only 9.4% of all professors were Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME), while only 2.1% were 
BAME women. Only 0.6% of professors were Black. A 2019 UCU report on the barriers faced by 
Black female professors revealed that all the UK’s Black female professors—just 26—could 
‘comfortably’ fit in a single seminar (Rollock, 2019). In vice-chancellor’s offices—the pinnacle of 
university power—things are similar for women and even bleaker for BAME academics. Only 24.3% 
of universities were headed by women, while only 5 were headed by BAME academics (AdvanceHE, 
2018). 
The first Black woman to lead a UK university was politician Baroness Amos as the Director of SOAS, 
University of London. In an interview with Grove (2017b), Amos urged that “we need to ask 
 
28 This analysis could not include all universities that were included in the GPG analyses due to missing data. 
The GPG figures were based on 154 universities, the Black pay gap was based on 114, and the Asian pay gap 
used 132 (Grove, 2017b). 
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ourselves why there is a lack of (black and minority ethnic) people in leadership positions at 
universities…We have equality legislation, action plans and good will, but the real challenge is 
implementation and we need to change the culture in HE.” In a recent examination of inequality of 
opportunity and lack of BAME representation in UK HE academic leadership, Miller (2016) identified 
a significant barrier; BAME academics reported having difficulty advancing without ‘white sanction.’ 
A significant endorsement from a white academic was needed for BAME academics to garner the in-
group connections necessary to get promoted. Acknowledging the difficulty of tackling such 
problems, Miller argued in an interview with Grove (2017b) that “to ignore what is blatantly an 
inequitable and racialized pay structure is to be complicit with structural inequality.” These 
complicities were apparent in the male academic-managers earlier described by Fletcher (2007).  
Vertical segregation has also been observed within specific disciplines. Analysis of online staff 
directories of UK political science departments revealed stark vertical gender segregation. The 
discipline remained majority male, having risen from only 10% female in 1978 to 30.8% by 2011, 
with sharp vertical segregation by academic seniority. There was gender parity amongst 
teaching/research fellows—precarious roles that are the lowest paid and rarely permanent—while 
only 15% of professors—the pinnacle of most academic careers—were female. Therefore, the data, 
shown in Figure 4-4, revealed a ‘leaky pipeline’ from precarity to the professorship in UK political 
science (Bates, Jenkins and Pflaeger, 2012). 
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Figure 4-4: Percentage of Male and Female UK Political Scientists within Seniority Level (July/August 
2011) 
Source: (Bates, Jenkins and Pflaeger, 2012, p. 141) 
Vertical segregation is not an absolution of the HE inequality problem, even if illegal discrimination 
may not be present. The GPG and G/EPG in UK academia can be understood partly as an equal 
opportunity gap. As one advances up the academic hierarchy, the workforce becomes whiter and 
more male (Awesti, Flinders and Savigny, 2016), particularly in the professoriate (AdvanceHE, 2018). 
This equal opportunity gap must be critically interrogated. It is a problematic explanation for the 
aggregate GPG in a university, unless one believes that white men are inherently better suited to be 
professors than women, and especially women of colour. Vertical segregation suggests that there is 
something about the recruitment or promotion processes structurally that disadvantages certain 
groups. Santos and Dang Van Phu (2019) surveyed academic staff across all of the UK’s Russell 
Group29 universities. Using an ordered logit model, their analysis demonstrated a negative 
association with being a woman and academic job rank, except for a small group of academics who 
managed to have their children at ‘career-convenient’ times. Questions must be asked of the role of 
 
29 The Russell Group formed in 1991 and is an association of 24 UK universities. “The self-selecting group 
defines itself in terms of academic excellence, selectivity, and research focus, but is criticized for being elitist 
and oligarchic” (Maclean, 2016, p. 182). 
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the organising processes (Acker, 2006b, 2006a) that have yielded this segregation: policies adjacent 
to these pay differences, such as the functioning of recruitment and academic promotion policies. 
These are processes that will be considered in more depth later in this thesis (Chapters 6 and 8).  
4.2.3 Discipline-Based Horizontal Segregation 
Horizontal segregation by gender is also a commonly identified factor in the headline GPG and refers 
to the clustering of men and women in different occupations. It contributes to the aggregate GPG 
through the appearance of a statistically significant penalty for engaging in so-called ‘women’s work’ 
(Hegewisch et al., 2010; Perales, 2013). In the academic context, horizontal segregation can be 
observed between academic disciplines. Horizontal segregation by discipline suggests something 
structural about barriers to entry, as does the motherhood pay penalty about barriers to re-entry. 
Women made up 41.9% of academics in science, engineering, and technology disciplines (SET), 
compared with 50.2% in non-SET disciplines. However, Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 show dramatic 







Figure 4-5: Proportion of Female Academics in UK SET Disciplines (2016/17) 
  
Source: (AdvanceHE, 2018, pp. 218–219)  
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Figure 4-6: Proportion of Female Academics in UK Non-SET Disciplines (2016/17) 
 
 Source: (AdvanceHE, 2018, pp. 220–221) 
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Horizontal segregation within academia should not substantially contribute to the aggregate GPG. 
UK universities set academic pay according to their pay scales, which are based on the sector-wide 
collective bargaining agreement. The lecturer pay range in economics should be the same as in 
English within a university. Professorial pay sits above this collective agreement (JNCHES, 2004). 
However, there are two potential complications to this assumption, which are market supplements 
and retention supplements. These extra payments to attract or keep a prized member of staff are 
used “to cope either with distinctly robust demand for faculty in various disciplines or with the 
(sometimes potential) robust demand for individuals because of the excellence of their academic 
records” (Doucet, Durand and Smith, 2008, p. 69). They introduce discretion into a pay structure 
that is otherwise described by a published pay scale. It is important to note that aggregate GPG 
figures based on basic pay only would render gender differences in these supplements invisible. It is 
difficult to observe the equalities implications of these awards, particularly if a university does not 
clearly publish data on their use, disaggregated by protected characteristics. 
Nevertheless, the equalities implications of market and retention supplements may be substantial. 
For instance, evidence from the employment tribunal decision, Professor EJ Schafer v. Royal 
Holloway and Bedford New College (2011), has illustrated how a poorly justified retention 
supplement helped a female professor secure legal remedy. A male professor was issued this 
payment, supposedly to retain him at the university, despite it being his second such payment in as 
many years and having recently failed to secure an external offer following an interview elsewhere 
(Mills & Reeve LLP, 2012). Analysing the GPG for UK economics academics, Blackaby et al. (2005) 
found that women were less likely to receive the outside job offers that can lead to retention 
supplements in pay at their current institution, controlling for qualities known to influence academic 
job market competitiveness. They also found that women who did receive outside job offers 
experienced a smaller salary boost than men. Blackaby et al. (2005, p. F103) concluded that 
“although there is evidence that women are disadvantaged in promotions, there is also a within-
rank pay gap. Effective policies to remedy the GPG must therefore look not only at promotions but 
also at entry wages, accelerated increments and discretionary points the top of Lecturer and Senior 
Lecturer scales.” 
No academic literature demonstrating the equalities risks of market supplements in UK HE, such as 
between disciplines, could be identified. Data on the use of market supplements in UK HE is elusive. 
However, there are some indications of the prevalence of the practice, which persists in the sector 
due to resolute negotiation by employers when the current sectoral-collective bargaining 
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framework was agreed. Some employers were already using market supplements in certain 
disciplines, including IT, law, accountancy, and business studies (NATFHE, 2005, p. 11). The 
University and College Employers Association’s (UCEA) Higher Education Workforce Survey 2017 
reported on UK recruitment and retention but did not provide any solid figures on the use of market 
supplements. The report only noted that interviews suggested that pay levels were generally 
competitive and the UCEA pay data showed that market supplements were used sparingly. No 
analysis of this data was presented by the UCEA (2017). Anecdotally, in October of 2017, University 
College London’s School of Management posted a shockingly high market supplement for a lecturer 
role advertised with a salary range of £42,304 to £52,240 annually, plus a market supplement of 
£40,000.30  
However, the gender equality concerns of market supplements have been demonstrated in the 
Canadian higher education sector. Doucet et al. (2008) conducted a logistical regression on the 
awarding of market supplements across a faculty in one Canadian university, where basic pay was 
determined through collective bargaining, which is similar to the UK context. After controlling for 
several individual traits, including academic discipline, women were three times less likely to receive 
a market supplement than men. Low levels of women in disciplines with high levels of market 
supplements would exacerbate this trend. Therefore, although academic research is limited in this 
area, there is a need for closer investigation of market and retention supplements through inclusion 
of pay and pay-related policies, which will be included in this thesis (Chapter 6).   
4.2.4 The Motherhood Pay Penalty for Academics 
The unequal division of household labour, particularly regarding parenthood, has been observed as 
an explanation for the GPG (Donath, 2000). Parenthood has been linked to the motherhood pay 
penalty (Waldfogel, 1998; Budig and England, 2001; England, 2005) and career stagnation for 
women (Abendroth, Huffman and Treas, 2014) and for men, the fatherhood pay premium (Hodges 
and Budig, 2010; Petersen, Penner and Høgsnes, 2014). The ‘ideal’ academic must devote long hours 
throughout an uninterrupted career to internationally-recognised research and research-led 
teaching (O’Meara, 2015), which illustrates the gendered organisation of academic work that is 
based “on the model of the unencumbered (white) man” (Acker, 2006b, p. 450).  
Having children has been observed as damaging to women’s career progression in the UK HE sector, 
which is partly linked to parental leave. Ward (2001) demonstrated that the most important 
 
30 Thanks are due to Ms. Dee Chambers, senior staffing officer of the school, who confirmed the accuracy of 
this figure by email and noted that the rate was necessary to compete with other business schools.  
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influence on UK academic salary was being full-time employed, which suggested limitations for 
those seeking to balance work and family by working part-time. This limitation was exacerbated by a 
statistically significant penalty of 1.4% for every month taken out of the workforce, which was used 
as a proxy for time taken to care for a child. Blackaby et al.’s (2005) study of UK economic academics 
did not find a direct negative impact of career breaks on pay but demonstrated an indirect effect. 
They found that career breaks reduce outside job offers, which are often hugely important to 
securing significant increases in pay. 
In their qualitative analysis of the masculine ‘meritocratic’ gendered nature of UK academia, Knights 
and Richards (2003, p. 213) argued that “the typical academic career path is structured according to 
a male perception of success: research-active, participating in the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE),31 an uninterrupted career history.” A more recent Royal Society of Chemistry report noted 
that female, in contrast to male, doctoral students echoed this perception of academia as a 
masculine career path, which expects mothers to make considerable sacrifices, places huge hurdles 
to returning to work, and has generated few role model mothers mastering this balance (Newsome, 
2008). Although parenthood, specifically motherhood, is not a factor that will emerge as a key 
theme that shapes the OSE directly in this thesis, these barriers that are faced by academics as 
mothers are relevant to promotion demands and the murkiness of promotion reward policy 
implementation processes that will be later unveiled (Chapter 8).  
4.2.5 Discussion 
This section has placed HE’s pay inequality problem within the language of GPG analysis in order to 
highlight the problematic bases of inequality, particularly gender and ethnicity. It also indicates 
some of the problematic organisational processes which reproduce this inequality, particularly 
promotion, recruitment, market supplements, and the intersection of promotion and maternity 
leave policies. While pay gaps can be subjected to complex decomposition techniques (Chapter 2) to 
help explain their persistence, quantitative assessment risks overlooking the means by which 
organisational processes reproduce structural inequality. In this context, legitimate controls for 
differences in pay, such as productivity measured by publication (Ward, 2001), are themselves 
impacted by bias (Miller and Mctavish, 2011; Schucan Bird, 2011; Knobloch-Westerwick and Glynn, 
2013; Knobloch-Westerwick, Glynn and Huge, 2013; Maliniak, Powers and Walter, 2013; Smith et al., 
2015; Hengel, 2017). Yet, publication measures that unlock access to higher pay are used 
unquestioningly in academic promotion procedures (Caffrey et al., 2016). However, questioning this 
 
31 The RAE was replaced in 2014 with the Research Excellence Framework (Stern, 2016). 
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process in the university context is paradoxically made difficult, partly due to the multi-layers of 
influence that have pressured HE employers to perform ‘pay transparency.’  
4.3 Multi-layered Transparency Performance Pressures Acting on UK Higher 
Education 
This section will identify multi-layered power sources that have pressured UK university employers 
to perform pay transparency—ostensibly to create more transparency about reward to improve pay 
equality—in the decade preceding the 2016/17 academic year. The power sources will be discussed 
moving from those furthest from, to those closest to, the individual university organisations, and 
include pressure from the following levels: 
1. The state’s Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) implementation 
2. The media spotlight from the Times Higher Education (THE) pay survey GPG league tables 
3. Sectoral collective bargaining that resulted in the national Framework Agreement for HE pay 
(excluding professors) 
4. Industry norms and equality frameworks, like the Athena SWAN Charter 
5. A landmark employment tribunal decision flagging equality concerns for professorial pay 
secrecy  
Table 4-4 summarises how each of these levels of power has pressured UK universities to 
perform ‘pay transparency.’ The PSED placed requirements on universities to create public 
visibility and thereby legitimate existing arrangements, leaving the impression that the 
university is ‘doing’ something even if ‘something’ never occurs. The THE pay survey created 
institutional level GPG visibility, with messaging that university senior management cannot 
control. University participation in the Equality Challenge Unit’s (ECU) voluntary equality 
frameworks can be seen in a similar light of creating visibility and legitimacy through the 
appearance of senior management engagement. UCU-led sectoral collective bargaining sheds 
light on ways that organisational pay setting practices could reproduce inequality. Finally, a key 
employment tribunal posed substantive legal pressure on universities to make professorial pay 
setting practices more transparent.
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Table 4-4: Multi-layered Sources of Pressure on University ‘Pay Transparency’ Performance in the Decade before the 2016/17 Academic Year 
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4.3.1 The State: The Public Sector Equality Duty   
Chapter 3 described the UK state’s role in promoting large employer ‘pay transparency’ 
performance through mandatory GPG reporting. Although universities will have been aware that 
these regulations were imminent during the 2016/17 academic year, when this thesis’s fieldwork 
was concentrated, universities had not yet been required to report. Therefore, this discussion of the 
state’s power to encourage ‘pay transparency’ performance in academia as a tool to reduce the GPG 
and other elements of protected-characteristic based inequality, will focus on the original PSED that 
was in place. PSED compliance can be seen as making inequality visible and lending legitimacy to 
existing arrangements by demonstrating that the university is ‘doing’ something (Acker, 2006b, 
2006a).  
At the turn of the millennium, UK statute fundamentally shifted institutional responsibility for 
promoting equality (not just eliminating discrimination) to public sector employers. This shift applied 
to public universities through the race equality duty in 2001, the disability equality duty in 2006 and 
the gender equality duty in 2007 (Gow and Middlemiss, 2012). The Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) was established in October 2007, partly to enforce these duties (House of 
Commons Women and Equalities Committee, 2019). The gender equality duty required employers 
to undertake equal pay audits every three years (New JNCHES Equality Working Group, 2011). Equal 
pay audits, also referred to as ‘equal pay reviews’ in HE, require methodical analysis of pay between 
men and women doing equivalent work, including identifying causes of any differences revealed and 
working to remedy unjustified discrepancies (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2018).  
However, the Equality Act 2010 created a combined duty that replaced these separate duties; 
section 149 of the Act created the PSED. The PSED general duty came into force on April 5, 2011 
across Great Britain. It required relevant employers, including universities, to demonstrate ‘due 
regard’ for three principles, but it did not prescribe how. The principles required employers to 
“eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment and victimisation and other conduct prohibited by 
the Equality Act 2010…advance equality of opportunity between people from different 
groups…[and] foster good relations between people from different groups” (Equality Challenge Unit, 
2017, pp. 1–3).  
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Presenting a renewed opportunity to nudge universities to perform ‘pay transparency’, the PSED’s 
specific duties for England came into force on September 10, 2011.32 The three specific duties placed 
on English universities included:  
1.) publishing equality information, including about employees with protected characteristics;  
2.) setting at least one measurable equality objective to support its PSED duties; and  
3.) publicly publishing compliance with the first two objectives (Brill, 2011).  
As Schedule One public authorities within the regulations, universities’ first reporting deadline was 
January 31, 2012 (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011b; HM Parliament, 2011). PSED 
compliance could have helped make workplace inequality visible in universities as a first step toward 
reducing that inequality. Under the new PSED, universities could still choose to use equal pay audits 
to demonstrate part of their compliance with the specific duties, although these audits were no 
longer required. When Acker (2006a) wrote about visibility in organisations, she acknowledged that 
inequality tends to be visible to those whom it harms (women, ethnic minorities) and invisible to 
those who benefit from their (often white) male privilege. Theoretically, PSED compliance should be 
equally visible to all in organisations, particularly given the requirement to publish this compliance 
publicly online. However, the risk was that compliance would be low or, worse, become a superficial 
tick-box exercise, as suggested by Ahmed’s (2007) critique that equality and diversity work within 
UK universities had become embedded within ‘performance culture.’ In her analysis of university 
engagement with the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000, from whence the race equality duty 
came, Ahmed (2007, p. 102) cautioned against the risk that “the document becomes not only a form 
of compliance but of concealment, a way of presenting the university as being ‘good at this’ despite 
not being ‘good at this.’” 
Contrasting assessments of PSED compliance by the HE sector have emerged from employer, trade 
union and government perspectives. From the employers’ perspective, a UCEA representative 
characterised equal pay audits as embedded university practice. This could suggest that removing 
the requirement to conduct equal pay audits when the PSED replaced the gender equality duty 
would be inconsequential. In her testimony before the House of Commons Select Committee on 
Women and Equalities (2016, p. 80), about equal pay audits being an important tool for reducing the 
GPG in UK HE, UCEA Chief Executive, Helen Fairfoul, maintained that “[equal pay auditing] has been 
embedded as habitual practice in the HE sector for many years now…It is a starting point for an 
 
32 Separate specific duty regulations apply to Scotland and Wales (Government Equalities Office, 2010). The 
thesis case studies are located in England. 
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employer to have an interest and to be prepared to do the analysis, to look at where there are 
discrepancies and to ask questions.” However, unions expressed concern that the harmonised PSED 
weakened the specific reporting requirements of the separate equalities duties. Although the PSED 
gave universities more flexibility in pay and equality transparency performance, the UCU (2015a) 
encouraged local branches to pressure their institutions to conduct equality pay audits as part of 
their compliance.  
From the government’s perspective, the EHRC analysed compliance with PSED reporting following 
the first reporting deadline in 2012. They found that universities were the least compliant group of 
public body employers at adequately publishing employee information (Pavitt, 2013). A 2018 report 
contracted by the EHRC showed improvement, although still 11% of further and higher education 
employers failed to publish even one equality objective publicly online, which is the second specific 
duty. A key finding of the report was that the statutory duty does not guarantee compliance; 
contextual factors, like EHRC monitoring and enforcement are important. Within HE, voluntary 
equality frameworks, including the Athena SWAN, Gender Equality, and Race Equality charters, were 
additional drivers of compliance. Whilst voluntary, the link imposed between Athena SWAN and 
access to significant medical research funding was believed to strengthen compliance (Kotecha et 
al., 2018).  
Therefore, PSED compliance in HE can be criticised in terms of completeness (some universities fail 
to comply), vagueness (requirements were weakened from the separate equality duties), and 
instrumentality (acting to gain access to research funding via Athena SWAN risks tick-box 
compliance). It has the potential to make inequality visible (or merely give this impression), while 
also increasing the legitimacy of existing arrangements by presenting the university as ‘doing’ 
something. Concerns about PSED compliance within HE highlight the need for critically analysing 
how the case study universities make inequality visible (Acker, 2006b, 2006a) by performing the 
transparency required for PSED compliance, which could involve equal pay audits or reviews 
(Chapter 6).   
4.3.2 The Media: The Times Higher Education Pay Survey 
While the PSED created weak legislative pressure on universities to become more transparent about 
employment equality performance, the THE has placed reputational pressure on institutions by 
imposing institutional level transparency. The THE (2019) is the UK’s leading HE media publication. 
Originally the Times Higher Education Supplement to the Times of London in 1971, it became an 
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independent publication in 2005.33 The THE boasted a global weekly readership of 380,000 (online 
and in-print), including 3.8 million unique online UK viewers from August 2016 to August 2017. Their 
professional readership includes junior academics (31%), senior academics (22%), and senior leaders 
(5%), with the remainder in temporary, professional or support roles (Times Higher Education, 
2017a, 2017b).   
The THE produced a degree of institutional level pay transparency in UK universities over the decade 
preceding the 2016/17 academic year. This transparency was somewhat analogous to the 
mandatory GPG reporting that universities were aware was upcoming (Chapter 3) because it was 
presented at the institutional level. The THE Pay Survey34 has been published annually at least since 
200735 and includes returns of nearly all public UK universities to HESA. The publication provides the 
mean average salary of male and female full-time UK academics by institution. These publications 
make inequality visible, without giving universities the chance to legitimate conditions by 
demonstrating their engagement. Universities greatly emphasise reputation maintenance (Ahmed, 
2007). Senior management may react defensively to these findings, as they have no power over the 
accompanying narrative.  
In 2007, statistics were only reported for all full-time male and female academics, without 
disaggregating by levels within academia (Fearn and Newman, 2007). Further disaggregation was 
produced in the 2008 to 2017 publications but with variation. Figures for all academics were 
consistently reported since 2007 and for professors since 2008 (Fearn and Newman, 2007, 2008; 
Fearn, 2009; Morgan and Fearn, 2010; Morgan, 2011a; Times Higher Education, 2012; Grove, 2013a, 
2014, 2015b, 2016a, 2017b). It is a shortcoming of this publication—and indicative of the tendency 
to emphasise the GPG first and the EPG second—that the EPG was only analysed for the first time in 
the 2017 report (Grove, 2017b). Aggregate UK-wide EPG data was provided in the article text, but 
 
33 Thanks are due to John Morgan for email verification of this date.  
34 As of March 9, 2019, only one explicit mention of this survey in academic journals could be found. However, 
this was only a brief mention in a recent analysis of the negative impacts of neoliberal English university 
hierarchies on early career researchers. Two articles about the survey were used to evidence the claim that 
professorial, and especially senior management, pay had outpaced minimal growth of remuneration for others 
in academia (Maclean, 2016).  
35 Thanks are owed to John Morgan and Ingrid Curl for email verification that no records of this exercise could 
be found in the THE publication archives prior to 2007. The UCU appears to have been involved initially, as the 
2007 publication credits the UCU with conducting calculations. Later publications attribute the analysis to 
public services firm Grant Thornton or make no attribution. However, THE journalist Simon Baker expressed 




these figures were not broken down by institution and were not intersected with gender. Therefore, 
they did not compare BAME men and women academics separately against white male academics.  
Nevertheless, the decade of institutional level GPG reports suggests something of a natural 
experiment to test the impact of institutional pay transparency on the OSE and pay inequality.36 It 
also raises a question of the degree to which these reports are noticed by employees. All the 
academic and professor-only reports that are available from 2007 to 2017, and which refer to data 
for the academic years 2005/06 through 2015/16, will be analysed in Chapter 6, contextualising 
trends in the case study universities against the sector, while awareness of these reports and any 
impacts stemming from it will be considered in Chapter 8. 
4.3.3 Sectoral Collective Bargaining: The UCU and Framework Agreement  
Union-led sectoral collective bargaining has sought to press universities to consider how 
organisational pay setting practices could reproduce inequality. Following two years of negotiations, 
the Joint Negotiating Committee for Higher Education Staff (JNCHES) agreed the collectively 
bargained Framework Agreement in 2004 with an effective date of August 1, 2006. JNCHES is the 
sector-wide collective bargaining body consisting of the UCEA and the recognised trades unions in 
HE.37 They included: Amicus, AUT, EIS, GMB, NATFHE, TGWU, and UNISON. The Agreement created 
a national pay spine onto which local pay scales were to appropriately map, partly with the aim of 
ensuring equal pay for work of equal value. This still fundamentally structures pay for academics in 
public UK universities today38, although professorial pay sits above this agreement (JNCHES, 2004; 
University and College Union, 2016b).  
Whilst the publicised intention of the Agreement was to create greater reward fairness across UK 
HE, with a particular aim to narrow the GPG (New JNCHES, 2015), the pay inequality concerns raised 
earlier remain. The JNCHES also intensified pressure on universities to systematically analyse pay 
equalities outcomes following implementation. The Agreement nudged universities to complete an 
equal pay review within one year of local implementation. JNCHES had issued guidance to 
universities about such reviews in 2002, updated in 2007 and again in 2013 (JNCHES, 2013). Noting 
the inconsistency between the Agreement’s equality compliance aims and its exclusion of 
 
36 QMUL PhD candidate Danula Gamage is exploring this natural experiment using the difference-in-difference 
method to analyse HESA data to reveal if this treatment has had any positive impact on women’s pay.    
37 The UCU formed on June 1, 2006, as an amalgamation of the Association of University Teachers (AUT) and 
the National Association for Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE) (Carter, 2008; University and 
College Union, 2018). 




professorial and senior management pay, the Prondzynski (2012) Review of Higher Education 
Governance strongly advised the application of pay scales to all university staff, including vice-
chancellors.  
As demonstrated in Acker’s (1989) ground-breaking analysis of comparable worth implementation in 
Oregon’s public sector, union collective bargaining efforts to improve gender equality are not always 
successful and sometimes reproduce inequality (Peruzzi, 2015). In this context, however, employers 
presented the barrier to success. Despite strong union objection to interference with job evaluation 
principles, the Agreement explicitly allowed “attraction and retention premia” only if an agreement 
on the functioning of such payments was agreed locally at a university. Attraction premia are also 
known as market supplements; retention premia are also known as retention supplements. The 
Agreement advised that local agreements should be based on “robust data on local and national 
labour markets and compliance with equal value legislation” (NATFHE, 2005, p. 11). Employers 
argued that these discretions were necessary to retain essential flexibility in order to recruit in 
certain difficult to fill disciplines or geographic regions, and some employers already had these 
supplements in place (NATFHE, 2005).  
However, such discretion presents potential concern in respect of the GPG. Specific advice was given 
in the Agreement to address this concern. The Agreement recommended that universities include 
“attraction and retention premia” monitoring by gender, ethnic groups and disability status in their 
equal pay reviews and ensure that any differences in pay of those doing “like work, work rated as 
equivalent or work of equal value, which arise from attraction and retention premia, can be 
objectively justified and, if not, that corrective action is taken” (JNCHES, 2004, p. 15).  
4.3.4 Industry Norms: Voluntary Equality Frameworks 
Following the implementation of the Framework Agreement, some UK universities have begun to 
engage with voluntary HE equality frameworks to demonstrate commitment to organisational 
equality, diversity, and inclusion norms. University participation in voluntary self-regulation can be 
seen in a similar light to PSED compliance. It involves similar and reinforcing activities, such as 
analysing staff data by protected characteristics and creating action plans to address issues that 
emerge (Kotecha et al., 2018; Rosser et al., 2019). Engagement creates visibility of inequality 
through documentation, while simultaneously enhancing the legitimacy of existing arrangements 
due to the ‘appearance’ of senior management action (Acker, 2006a, 2006b). The use of 
‘appearance’ here acknowledges the cynical belief that these frameworks fail to threaten the 
masculine ‘meritocratic’ gendered nature of UK academia (Knights and Richards, 2003). There is 
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widespread concern that the implementation of such frameworks creates focus on fixing 
‘disadvantaged’ people through mentorship schemes (Devos, 2008; Morley, 2013) or ‘gaming’ the 
award criteria (Bhopal and Pitkin, 2018), rather than creating necessary structural and cultural 
change (Maddrell et al., 2015). 
The ECU39 was responsible for overseeing and validating several of these equality and diversity 
voluntary self-regulation schemes, including the Athena SWAN, Gender Equality, and Race Equality 
charters (Equality Challenge Unit, 2017). This thesis will focus on Athena SWAN. The Gender Equality 
charter had already been subsumed into Athena SWAN during the 2016/17 academic year. The 
extent of participation in the Race Equality charter was too small to allow this thesis to identify 
whether the case study universities had achieved this award, without potentially jeopardising 
institutional anonymity. It is sufficient to recognise that a similar voluntary framework existed to 
promote race and ethnicity-based equality, which was launched in 2014 (P. Miller, 2016). Bhopal 
and Kalwant (2018) provide a comprehensive recent assessment of its implementation and propose 
reforms.  
The ECU40 was a charitable body that supported “universities and colleges to build an inclusive 
culture that values the benefits of diversity, to remove barriers to progression and success for all 
staff and students, and to challenge and change unfair practices that disadvantage individual 
groups” (Equality Challenge Unit, 2018e). The ECU founded the Athena SWAN charter in 2005 to 
promote women working in the UK HE disciplines of science, technology, engineering, maths, and 
medicine (STEMM). Award judging is based on a self-assessment written by a committee within the 
institution (or department), which is then assessed by a volunteer committee of academic and HR 
staff from other institutions. Universities must first receive at least a bronze award before their 
constituent departments can apply. Institutional and departmental awards come in bronze, silver, 
and gold. Possession of an Athena SWAN award sends a legitimating message to staff and the public 
that the organisation has embedded strong gender equality principles with respect to staff and 
students (Gregory-Smith, 2017).   
In May 2015, the scheme was extended to include all disciplines, which ended the need for the 
separate Gender Equality charter that had been run for non-STEMM disciplines since 2014 (Gibney, 
 
39 The ECU merged with the Higher Education Academy and the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education 
to create AdvanceHE (2018) in March 2018. 
40 The ECU also published guidance to help universities understand their PSED obligations (Brill, 2011; Pavitt, 
2013; Equality Challenge Unit, 2017). 
100 
 
2013; Equality Challenge Unit, 2018a, 2018b). Voluntary uptake, alongside the development of 
Athena SWAN as an HE industry norm, grew as the award became tied to key funding eligibility. In 
2011, the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) restricted its shortlisting to medical schools 
with a silver Athena SWAN award for two key funding streams, Biomedical Research Centres and 
Biomedical Research Units (Gregory-Smith, 2017). In 2013, Research Councils UK,41 the umbrella 
partnership of the UK’s seven research councils, announced its policy to require all funding 
applications to demonstrate evidence of institutional and departmental level engagement with 
equality and diversity. Although the policy did not explicitly require an Athena SWAN accreditation, 
this was listed among the types of desirable evidence (Research Councils UK, 2013b, 2013a). Some 
have felt that the instrumentality of Athena SWAN participation, by linking the award to research 
funding access, created pressure to perform the motions without upsetting the power inequalities 
that reproduce inequality inside the universities. This linkage is seen by some as controversial 
(Munir et al., 2013), in a similar sense to those who criticise the business case for diversity 
management (Knights and Omanović, 2016). 
A New JNCHES (2015, pp. 9–10) report in July 2015 credited Athena SWAN with ensuring that HE 
employers maintained “focus on addressing specific pay gap issues.” However, the ECU only added 
an equal pay audit/review section to the Athena SWAN institutional application under the new post-
May 2015 rules. Prior to that, an assessment of the GPG was not required, even at the institutional 
level. The original handbook did not even mention the terms ‘equal pay audit’ or ‘gender pay gap’ 
(Equality Challenge Unit, 2014, 2015a). This is surprising, as measuring pay is somewhat simpler than 
measuring the equity of a promotions process, which was strongly encouraged (Equality Challenge 
Unit, 2014). This is especially surprising given ECU’s preference for demonstrating quantifiable 
progress, requiring that “actions (and action plans) should be SMART (specific, measurable, 
achievable, relevant and time-bound)” (Equality Challenge Unit, 2014, p. 11).  
Therefore, the question remains: has Athena SWAN made inequality visible and created legitimacy 
of existing arrangements by driving structural or cultural change or has a mere veneer of equality 
been fabricated? It is relevant to this thesis to understand whether such industry normative, 
employer-led forms of the transparency of pay-related policies like promotion, recruitment, and 
appraisal—and eventually pay itself—actually help to narrow the GPG or improve women’s career 
progression. In 2013, the ECU commissioned Loughborough University researchers to assess the 
Athena SWAN charter’s effectiveness. While this review demonstrated an overall favourable impact 
 
41 RCUK became UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) in April of 2018 (Ghosh, 2018).  
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of Athena SWAN on women’s career progression, which is important in a context where vertical 
segregation is a major explanation for the GPG, this impact was measured through a survey of 
employee perceptions of fairness and equality within their university (Munir et al., 2013). 
A more relevant measure of Athena’s SWAN’s effectiveness would seem to be women’s actual 
career progression and associated pay. As Gregory-Smith (2017, p. 18) asserted, “the acid test is 
whether voluntary initiatives such as Athena SWAN can deliver measurable improvements to the 
employment prospects of women.” To this end, he applied the difference-in-difference method to 
data from the UK Medical Schools Council about academic clinicians because medical schools 
appeared to be heavily invested in Athena SWAN. He tested the impact of two developments on 
women’s employment outcomes, including their presence in the school, professorial status, and 
part-time status, but not the GPG. The developments tested were the 2005 launch of the Athena 
SWAN charter and the 2011 NIHR decision to make a departmental Athena SWAN silver award a 
requirement for key funding streams. He found no causal relationship between either of these 
developments and an improvement in women’s employment outcomes. Gregory-Smith (2017, p. 17) 
observed that, without more detailed analysis of actual organisational practices within Athena 
SWAN award holder departments, the results suggest that “either the progressive policies 
voluntarily introduced by the Athena SWAN adopters are insufficient to change female employment 
patterns (at least in the period under observation), or that Athena SWAN adopters are falling short 
in their application of the Charter’s principles.”  
A number of critical assessments of practices inside Athena SWAN organisations have emerged that 
suggest that the adopters are falling short of the Charter’s principles. These assessments include the 
unequal burden of Athena SWAN labour on women and junior staff, gender bias embedded into 
‘meritocratic’ promotion procedures, individualising gender, race and ethnicity-based disadvantage, 
and a blind-spot for growing precarity in the university. First, Munir’s (2013) evaluation for the ECU 
confirmed a preponderance of women bearing the not-inconsiderable burden of Athena SWAN 
labour and recommended that this problem be considered by the ECU. This problem is amplified 
given that this labour is not seen to directly contribute to women’s academic career progression, 
whilst it directly limits research output capacity, which does contribute (Caffrey et al., 2016). This is 
an example of what Hirshfield and Joseph (2012) called ‘identity taxation’, the extra labour that 
women and BAME employees are often tasked with, but not rewarded for, in their careers. It is 
unclear what, if any, steps the ECU has taken to address this issue (Ovseiko et al., 2016). This 
frequently women-led Athena SWAN work is time and resource-intensive and, without any direct 
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grant funding to support it, is often “reliant on goodwill and interest in the cause” of those with 
control over the university’s business plan (Rosser et al., 2019, p. 606). Given the known difficulty of 
navigating masculinised university micro-politics in efforts to change the gendered status quo 
(Parsons and Priola, 2013), this is likely to be challenging. 
Secondly, gender bias is embedded into the promotion procedures that are presented as 
‘meritocratic’, despite the ECU’s aims to fix the so-called ‘leaky pipeline’ that is responsible for male-
dominated hierarchies in academia. Under the pre-2015 rules, the ECU (2014) strongly encouraged 
the demonstration of an equitable promotions process. Under the post-2015 rules, the ECU (2015a) 
provided a detailed prescription of how to demonstrate this, including promotion application and 
success statistics; an explanation of how promotion candidates are selected, informed about the 
process, trained or mentored; and assessment of staff perception of the process, including whether 
it is fair and transparent. Notably, the handbook also requires “commentary on the criteria for 
promotion, including how university policy and practice considers the impact of career breaks on 
promotions: comment on how the full range of work-related activities (including administrative, 
pastoral and outreach work) are taken into consideration” (Equality Challenge Unit, 2015a, p. 48). 
Implicit in this text is the instruction to demonstrate that research output is not the predominant 
factor in academic promotions.  
Nevertheless, the pressure to publish remains essential to academic promotion (Caffrey et al., 
2016). This has been driven by growing competition between universities through the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF), which determines access to significant government research funds. 
Universities have put in place increasingly challenging research ‘performance’ targets on academics 
in order to game the metric (Morrish, 2016). However, the same metrics mentality that drives the 
Athena SWAN understanding of whether departments and universities are fairly promoting women 
(Smith et al., 2015) is also linked to gender biases in the academic publication processes that are 
tied to these performance management endeavours. Research about women (half the population) is 
considered niche and struggles to break into ‘mainstream’ (highly rated) academic journals (Miller 
and Mctavish, 2011). Research by women is seen to be lower quality (Knobloch-Westerwick, Glynn 
and Huge, 2013), held to higher readability standards, and takes longer to reach publication than for 
men (Hengel, 2017). Women are also less likely to publish (Schucan Bird, 2011; West et al., 2013), 
and when they do, their work is cited less frequently than men’s research. Citation is a measure of 
research impact (Knobloch-Westerwick and Glynn, 2013; Maliniak, Powers and Walter, 2013). King 
et al.’s (2017) fascinating study of all citation-linked academic articles in the online repository JSTOR 
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from 1779 to 2011 revealed that about 10% of all citations are self-citations—instances of the 
author citing their own work. However, men were 56% more likely than women to self-cite over the 
full period and 70% more likely in the last 20 years. While the paper could not establish a conclusive 
cause and effect relationship, a clear implication is that recruitment and promotion committees 
should ensure that measures of research impact disregard the direct and indirect positive influence 
of self-citation to reduce gender bias.  
Research about BAME academics working in the UK has revealed their experiences of being 
additionally held back by the lower esteem in which non-Western journals, particularly those based 
in African countries, seem to be held by the REF. BAME academics feel a necessity to publish more 
than their white counterparts to achieve the same promotions (Bhopal, 2015). An illustration of 
publication bias is suggested in the business and management field. In the 2018 Chartered 
Association of Business Schools Academic Journal Guide, there were no 4 or 4* rated (top) journals 
with the word ‘gender’ in the journal title and none on the list at all with the word ‘race’ or 
‘ethnicity’ in the title (Chartered Association of Business Schools, 2018). Publication in top journals 
on this list is essential to achieving promotion in UK business schools, and it is treated as a proxy for 
good REF contributions. Özbilgin (2009) characterised academic journal ranking as a tool to maintain 
white male hegemony within academia. In an adapted use of Acker’s (2006b) inequality regimes, he 
argued that top rated journals tend to exclude emancipatory research that challenges “hegemonic 
structures by increasing the visibility and illegitimacy of ‘inequality regimes’” (Özbilgin, 2009, p. 2) by 
revealing various social problems. 
Thirdly, universities have begun to create mentorship programmes, which are often specifically 
linked to women and people of colour (Teelken and Deem, 2013). Athena SWAN specifically asks for 
information about the mentoring offered to support promotion (Equality Challenge Unit, 2015a). 
While diversity-aimed mentoring may provide useful enrichment and networking connections in the 
short term, they fundamentally aim to fix the individual, not the structure that is disadvantaging 
people (Devos, 2008; Morley, 2013; Dashper, 2019). Therefore, there is a risk of individualising 
experiences when women and BAME academics take longer than white male academics to achieve 
promotion. A recent study of academic managers at pre-1992 (old) universities demonstrated that 
the women in this pool were no less ambitious or likely to put themselves forward for senior 
management positions than men. This underscores the risk that efforts to fix individuals, without 
addressing the bias imbued within organisational structures, is likely to fail (Shepherd, 2017).  
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Lastly, Athena SWAN reforms ring hollow while universities refuse to substantively engage with 
structural inequality that is created by toxic working environments. This includes growing early-
career precarity and workload intensification, which themselves often present gendered and 
racialised barriers to career advancement (Blackaby, Booth and Frank, 2005; Maddrell et al., 2015). 
The UCU led a significant industrial action involving 74 universities across February and March of 
2020 in which the dispute partly centred on workload intensification and precarious working 
conditions. In the midst of that dispute, leaked minutes of a virtual meeting of leaders of Russell 
Group universities, revealed some acknowledgement of the scale of precarious work at their 
institutions, although plans to remedy the problem appeared to be primarily motivated by a desire 
for reputation management (University and College Union, 2020a).  
4.3.5 Employment Tribunal: Professor EJ Schafer v Royal Holloway and Bedford New College  
While Athena SWAN has presented universities with the (somewhat missed) opportunity to grapple 
with the structural inequality that is re-produced by organisational practices, a landmark 
employment tribunal decision also pressured individual universities to reflect on how a veil of 
secrecy over pay setting practices, risks running afoul of the law. In 2007, Professor Elizabeth Shafer 
began investigating professorial pay, alongside some of her female colleagues, after reading about 
the academic GPG at her institution in the THE’s first pay survey (Schafer, 2011). Professorial pay 
was individualised, having been excluded from the HE sector’s collective bargaining agreement 
(JNCHES, 2004). However, pressure on universities to at least perform the ‘transparency agenda’ for 
professorial pay came instead from Schafer’s 2011 employment tribunal (ET) decision (Ward, 2011).  
Discrimination claims bring processes that reproduce inequality into the light (Acker, 1991); Acker 
(2006a) identified individualised pay setting as such a process. ETs are the final-stage mechanism for 
employees to exercise their individual right to be protected from discrimination.42 Professor EJ 
Schafer v. Royal Holloway and Bedford New College (2011) 43 began life in the inquiring mind of 
Professor Elizabeth Schafer, a drama and theatre studies academic, who had once been head of her 
department. Three other women joined Professor Schafer (2011) in what she described as a 
 
42 Trade unions sometimes use the threat of legal action to achieve collective bargaining victories, but 
employers, knowing that the ET process is resource-intensive and outcomes can be unpredictable, are not 
always swayed. So, unions also support members at ETs, which, even if successful, can take years. Pamela 
Enderby was supported by her union in one of the landmark cases establishing the right to equal pay for work 
of equal value in Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for Health (1993). This case was 
appealed all the way to the European Court of Justice and took more than 10 years to reach a successful 
resolution (Gow and Middlemiss, 2012; Conley, 2014).  
43 As of March 9, 2019, no discussion of this ET claim could be found in any academic journals, which is why 
the narrative has been compiled from media coverage and the ET decision.  
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“gruelling four year battle” of discovery that led to an employment tribunal, although the others 
settled with the university days before the hearing. The women were supported in this battle, first 
by a local UCU caseworker and later by UCU legal support (Lewis, 2011; Schafer, 2011; Ward, 2011; 
Chilver, 2018). Professor Schafer described this support as essential, underscoring the difficulty that 
many individuals experience in exercising their individual rights to equal treatment against a 
powerful employer. She explained:   
Without the backing of the UCU, I could have funded my case only by re-mortgaging my 
home. Fortunately, the UCU had been looking for a case to test whether professorial pay 
stood up to scrutiny because it was so unregulated across the sector. A few institutions were 
introducing banding systems but the norm was, and is still in most universities, very odd: 
newly appointed professors, having spent all their years working in higher education moving 
up a clearly marked out, nationally negotiated salary scale, are suddenly set adrift in a free 
market and may have to bid for pay rises without any idea of the rules of the game. 
(Schafer, 2011) 
The claim was decided based on the professorial pay processes that had been in place at the time 
the claim was made, and it examined starting salary, annual pay reviews, head of department (HoD) 
allowances (extra duty supplements) and retention payments (market supplements) for Professor 
Schafer and her comparators. The decision noted that Royal Holloway lacked a written policy for pay 
setting on becoming a professor, basing decisions on unwritten principles of 'custom and practice' 
that had developed. The VC who had enacted many of the 'custom-based' decisions of relevance to 
the case, was no longer employed by the university and provided no evidence for the hearing 
(Schafer, 2011; Mills & Reeve LLP, 2012; Chilver, 2018). 
The tribunal criticised the annual pay review process for lacking any defined principles required to 
achieve a pay rise, although the ET felt it had not been a material cause of pay disparity in this case. 
Inconsistencies in HoD allowances were also criticised, but these were not found to have created a 
gender-based disparity in this case. The allowances were meant to be paid during tenure as HoD, 
but some staff, seemingly arbitrarily, had the allowance added to their base pay afterwards, while 
Professor Schafer had not. Lastly, the decision criticised the basis of retention payments as tainted 
by sex. Although the decisions could be based on ‘genuine material factors’ other than sex, the 
reliance of these decisions on genuine or perceived geographical mobility put women at a 
disadvantage. The decision also noted that the university had no formal process in which to market 
test professorial salaries, although it had practical experience in doing so (Schafer, 2011; Mills & 
Reeve LLP, 2012; Chilver, 2018).  
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The tribunal’s decision delivered tempered success to Professor Schafer. As with most legal 
decisions, it was conservative, but it harshly criticised Royal Holloway for lacking a transparent 
professorial pay system, which created a risk of gender-based pay discrimination. This justified 
analysing the outcomes of several specific pay decisions. One retention payment was determined to 
have been unjustified, having been issued to a man for whom it was his second in as many years and 
who had recently failed to secure an external offer at interview.  Professor Schafer received an 
undisclosed settlement, followed by a £10,000 pay rise (Schafer, 2011; Mills & Reeve LLP, 2012; 
Chilver, 2018). The decision also acknowledged that the university had since implemented a 
professorial pay banding system, but it issued no opinion on it, as the change post-dated the claim 
(Lewis, 2011; Mills & Reeve LLP, 2012).  
By June 2011, the Telegraph reported that only 45 universities across the UK had any form of 
professorial pay banding, one of which was by then Royal Holloway (Ward, 2011). This decision was 
widely reported as a warning shot to universities up and down the UK; individualised professorial 
pay without written pay setting policies was no longer acceptable (Schafer, 2011; Ward, 2011; 
Chilver, 2018). In an interview with Ward (2011), Professor Schafer remarked that “as a result of this 
case all universities which don’t have a system need to get a system very quickly or there will be a 
whole queue of female professors waiting to take them to tribunal.” The extent to which this case 
has actually led to more transparent professorial pay in UK academia, from the perspective of 
individual professors, appears to be mixed. A New JNCHES (2015) report asserted that many 
universities had implemented zones, levels or banding for professors, but it provided no analysis or 
figures behind that statement. Therefore, one case study university in this thesis has implemented 
professorial pay banding, while the other has maintained the appearance of individualised pay.  
4.3.6 Discussion 
The sources of influence that have been described in this section have encouraged institutional 
transparency (increased visibility and to some degree legitimacy) of pay and pay-related inequality . 
This has led to some improvement in HE pay inequality. For example, in 2016, at least two UK 
universities, following internal analysis of their academic pay data, decided to implement targeted 
pay rises to narrow their GPGs. The London School of Economics commissioned Professor Oriana 
Bandiera to research the problem. She identified a 10.5% academic GPG, after controlling for 
experience and research output, with the gap widest amongst more senior academics. The 
institution then asked HoDs to nominate academics for pay rises based on a consideration for 
equity, with a steer to focus on women’s pay (Bandiera, Rana and Xu, 2016; Havergal, 2016). The 
University of Essex implemented a pay rise just for professors in 2016, but included all female 
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professors, in order to immediately bring the average female professorial pay to essential par with 
the average male level (Grove, 2016b). However, neither of these reforms, perhaps especially the 
broad-brush solution implemented at Essex44, addressed the reward or progression policies that led 
to the formation of the observed GPGs. Acknowledging this, Professor Bandiera’s analysis also 
identified the equal opportunities concern that was apparent in her analysis of the GPG of all 
academics:  
While women and men at the LSE are promoted to senior lecturer at the same rate, the 
chances of promotion become significantly more unequal after that. After 10 years at the 
institution, 35 per cent of men are readers, but only 20 per cent of women are, and, after 15 
years, men are more than twice as likely to have become professors; 24 per cent reach the 
top rung, compared with only 11 per cent of women. (Havergal, 2016) 
Concern over a persistent equal opportunity gap across the HE sector has been raised by the THE 
publication. In 2017, the THE reported that, over the three year period from 2012/13 to 2015/16, 
the proportion of professorships held by women declined in more than one-third (37%) of the 
universities that employed at least 150 professors. However, the aggregate proportion of 
professorships held by women across the HE sector rose from 20% to 23.1% in the same period 
(Grove, 2017a). 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has applied the concepts that were introduced in the previous two literature review 
chapters to UK academia in order to begin to contextualise the empirical analysis to be undertaken 
in this thesis. This first section placed HE’s pay inequality problem within the language of GPG 
literature in order to highlight bases of inequality, gender and ethnicity, and indicate problematic 
organisational processes that reproduce this inequality, particularly promotion and recruitment with 
respect to vertical segregation, market supplements with respect to horizontal segregation, and the 
intersection of promotion and maternity leave policies with respect to the motherhood pay penalty 
in academia.  
The second section identified multi-layered pay ‘transparency agenda’ sources that have created 
pressure on UK university employers to perform pay transparency—and ostensibly to improve 
individual employee awareness of pay in their organisations and improve equality in the lead up to 
 
44 However, unpublished analysis demonstrated that the professorial GPG was eliminated in 2016/17 and did 
not re-emerge for the next two years (Frank, 2019). A knock-on impact on lower academic ranks was also 
observed, which Frank (2019) attributed to a signalling effect. The VC’s transparent decision to raise female 
professors pay signalled to pay decision-makers, such as deans and heads, that achieving gender equality 
helps their own career trajectories. 
108 
 
the 2016/17 academic year. Paradoxically, this ‘agenda’ may solidify power hierarchies that preserve 
inequality. Pay transparency pressure has led to greater opportunity to make inequalities visible. 
However, the ostensible appearance of engagement by university senior management, has 
strengthened legitimacy by indicating that the problem is being resolved, while in some cases, 
universities may be exacerbating the problem with the ‘solution’, individualising the experience of 
disadvantage, and failing to challenge systems that preserve existing hierarchical power.   
What has been crucially missing from the academic literature that has been reviewed is how this 
multi-layered pay ‘transparency agenda’ pressure is experienced by individual academics who work 
in universities. With regard to this organisational context, the new ‘theme’ column of Figure 4-7 has 
been populated with employer behaviour themes (Rows A-D) that may be seen to operationalise 
pay communication factors in order to shape the OSE inside universities. Row A indicates that the 
visibility of inequality, which is impacted by the employer behaviour of organisational restriction, 
can be operationalised in the HE context by analysing institutional data transparency. Row B 
indicates that the legitimacy of organisational inequality, which is influenced by the employer 
behaviour of external recognition communication, can be operationalised in the HE context by 
analysing EDI accreditation activity. Row C indicates that management’s control over employee 
compliance with inequalities, which is reinforced by the employer behaviour of restricting 
employee’s freedom to discuss their pay, can be operationalised in the HE context with 
consideration for informal pay secrecy norms. Finally, Row D indicates that processes producing 
organisational inequality, which are driven by how employers communicate about those 
procedures, can be operationalised in the HE context with a focus on bureaucratic reward processes 
and related policies. Chapters 6 and 8 will implement this framework to analyse the OSE inside 
Universities Alpha and Beta by identifying prominent concepts which emerge through interview data 
in relation to each of these themes.  
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Figure 4-7: Operationalising the Thesis Analytical Framework inside an Organisational Context 
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Academics may themselves be influenced by the societal income-talk taboo but may also exercise 
their agency to violate this norm at times. This chapter has pointed to the importance of critically 
analysing the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ inside institutions from a multi-layered 
perspective, including elements of reward and progression, as a foundational step toward filling this 
research gap to better explain the connection between the OSE and the GPG and G/EPG. Therefore, 
this chapter has led to the remaining two sub-research questions. The first question is: To what 
effect has the pay ‘transparency agenda’ been performed in the two university case studies? This 
will be addressed in Chapter 6. The second question is: How does the pay ‘transparency agenda’ 
within UK universities influence awareness of pay (and related progression) inequality by academics, 
particularly women and BAME academics? This will be addressed in Chapter 8.  
111 
 
Chapter 5 Multi-Layered, Multi-Strategy Methodology 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter locates this thesis within a multi-layered, multi-strategy methodological framework. 
First, the origin and motivation for this study will be justified, with reflexive acknowledgement of my 
personal, political, and employment experience. Then the research philosophy will be explained to 
develop the multi-strategy methodology of this thesis. The multi-strategy methods used in this 
thesis will then be described within the research design, which will be illustrated by a two-part 
research map that is adapted from Layder (1993, 2013) and a case-study design that draws on Yin 
(2014). Finally, the specific methods selected to collect data and the primary techniques used to 
analyse data in this thesis will be described.  
5.2 Reflexivity: Political and Employment Influences on the Researcher 
Following Silverman (2010), I have adopted a natural history approach to this chapter. This enables 
me to acknowledge the influence of my personal context as a researcher on the decision to pursue 
this PhD topic and requires reflexivity. My first paid job was as a hardware store cashier, earning 
money for university; a colleague gave me real education. She had given up a managerial position 
elsewhere after learning that several male managers with less experience were making thousands 
more. Faced with a company ban on discussing pay and no resources to bring legal action, she left 
the job and economic status that she had worked for years to attain to become a cashier at my 
store. I grew up exposed to concepts like the gender pay gap (GPG) and discrimination through 
activism with my mother, school research, and my debate team, but these concepts had always felt 
abstract. My colleague was real. Her former employer’s pay secrecy policy not only obscured 
potential disparity, it left her feeling powerless to seek remedy when, through social pay 
comparison, she learned about her low pay.  
Prior to beginning my MSc, I worked in a women’s suffrage museum, a women’s equality charity, 
and a women’s health charity, workplaces that were primarily dominated by white women like me. I 
likely experienced less overt or covert employment discrimination than many women, especially 
women of colour. I never felt disadvantaged. However, my perspective as a woman who has worked 
for organisations that campaign for equal treatment of those who experience inequality based on 
gender, race, or ethnicity, has led me to question allegedly objective social conventions. Primary 
among them is the idea that what we earn is private information. Even working in the charity sector, 
I have felt the cloak of silence over pay. I recall my slightly more senior colleague at a national 
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women’s health charity asking me for advice, in advance of her annual appraisal meeting. Having 
worked in the organisation for several years, she was hoping to get a promotion and raise, but she 
did not know how to build a case for her value. How could she learn what others more senior to her 
were paid in order to create a frame of reference for what was reasonable to request? Was she 
even supposed to request a raise? In one of the most progressive organisations in America, in a 
female-dominated workplace, a young woman felt that pay was a concept veiled in secrecy. Our 
workplace was not unionised. Even though we always contracted with unionised shops where 
possible, I do not recall anyone ever suggesting that we should unionise. 
My MSc dissertation involved speaking with policy activists in the US and UK who had advocated for 
statutory protections for employees to discuss pay with each other. I did not ask them to make any 
international comparison, but my interviewees knew which countries I was researching. Several 
interviewees—on both sides of the pond—believed that people were more open about pay in the 
other country that I was researching. Several of my MSc classmates spoke to me during informal 
discussions about how secrecy around pay was, for example, a Dutch thing. Both of these 
experiences encouraged me to further question the real function of the income talk-taboo, which so 
many individuals from western cultures seemed to just tacitly accept as ‘the way it is.’ 
My thesis acknowledges a need for reflexivity given my own position as a prospective UK academic 
and person with UK HE employment experience. Over the course of my PhD, I have become 
professionally immersed in the HE context in which I was researching, although always as part of the 
growing precarious workforce (Bryson and Blackwell, 2006; Jones and Oakley, 2018). At Queen Mary 
University of London, I have worked as an hourly-paid invigilator without a contract, as a research 
assistant on both fixed-term annualised hours contracts and through one-off payments without a 
contract, and as a teaching associate and teaching fellow on successive fixed-term, part-time 
contracts. Therefore, some degree of separation has been maintained. This thesis intentionally 
focuses on established academics, those holding lectureships through professorships, in order to 
foster new understanding of the underexplored area of pay secrecy, without the additional 
complexities of casualisation. However, the line between core and periphery staff (Atkinson, 1985) 
in HE is becoming increasingly blurred. Some aspects of the experience of casualisation emerged in 
my data, such as through the experience of a lecturer on a fixed-term contract. My experience of 
working inside HE has also helped to sharpen my analysis through my practical understanding of 
terminology in the sector. My experience as a research assistant supporting my department’s first 
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and second Athena SWAN applications also gave me invaluable insight into the enormity of the 
process, a theme which came clearly through from my interviewees in both case studies.  
 
The research philosophy driving this thesis is embodied within my intersectional feminist approach, 
which demands a critical assessment of the power behind mundane routines in social organisations. 
This approach has been especially influenced by Crenshaw (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall, 2013; 
Carastathis, 2014), Acker (2006a, 2006b) and Layder (1993, 2013). An intersectional feminist 
understanding encourages my multi-layered approach. My research design emphasises the principle 
of inclusivity by elevating the individual voices of women and BAME women academic staff 
(Carastathis, 2014). Allowing intersectional feminism to orient my research is intricately interwoven 
with my reflexive recognition of how my political beliefs and employment experiences, particularly 
those within UK HE, have shaped my own critical perspective of work, equality, and power.  
5.3 Research Philosophy 
5.3.1 Intersectional Feminist Critical Realism 
This section embeds my research within a particular philosophical position, namely critical realism 
(Layder, 1993, 2006, 2013), oriented by intersectional feminism (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall, 2013). 
Sociological research methodologies run along a continuum; clearly defining where this thesis lies 
provides guidance for interpreting the findings. At the positivist extreme is Merton’s (1967) middle-
range theory, which guides research to systematically test precise theory in order to cumulatively 
advance knowledge, and privileges quantitative data on empirically observable phenomena and 
deductive inquiry (Layder, 1993). At the interpretivist extreme is Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) 
grounded theory, which guides research to privilege qualitative data within a different kind of 
systematic inquiry that attempts to generate theory through inductive exploration. The latter 
criticises the former for pushing investigators toward finding “data to fit the theory rather than to 
generate theory that fits the data” (Layder, 1993, p. 45). Limiting my inquiry within one of these 
ideal types would be insufficient to unpick the complex relationship between my conceptualisation 
of the organisational salary environment (OSE) (Chapter 3) and pay inequality (Chapter 2), 
particularly due to the lack of quantitative data on social pay comparison behaviour.  
Therefore, the philosophical position of this thesis is critical realism, which can be understood as the 
ontological belief that an objective reality exists, which is independent of human observation, and 
the epistemological belief that human knowledge of reality is socially constructed. This distinguishes 
critical realists from positivists, who tend toward the former belief, and social constructivists, who 
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tend toward the latter (Sayer, 1992; Easton, 2010). Layder (1993, pp. 7–8) explains that “the realist 
approach attempts to address this complexity by offering a layered or ‘stratified’ model of society 
which includes macro (structural, institutional) phenomena as well as the more micro phenomenon 
of interaction and behaviour.”  
This thesis also implements Layder’s (1993, 2013) social domain theory and adaptive theory 
methodology. These complement each other. The adaptive approach stimulates the emergence of 
theory about the relationship between structure and agency, with which social domain theory is 
primarily concerned. Adaptive theory allows for the ‘disciplined flexibility’ that is required to ensure 
the consideration of social reality across the social domains of Layder’s (1993, 2013) research map: 
the self/psychobiography, situated activity, setting, and context. Layder (1993, 2006) argues that 
recognising ontological distinctions between these domains is essential to understanding how the 
ontologically distinct concepts of structure and agency and the macro and micro are false dualisms 
and integrally linked. Therefore, a multi-layered, multi-strategy approach enables the exploration of 
social pay comparison patterns using quantitative methods and the more nuanced interconnections 
of social pay comparison behaviour, the societal income-talk taboo and employer ‘pay 
communication’ (Marasi and Bennett, 2016) within the OSE using qualitative methods and in 
relation to the HE pay inequality context. 
Layder (1998) also underscores the importance of orienting (or sensitising) concepts to steer such 
complex research, particularly in its early stages. Intersectional feminism is a key ‘orienting concept’ 
for this thesis. ‘Intersectionality’ was coined by Crenshaw in the 1980s, as an heuristic device to 
explain the experience of African-American women as distinct from white women or African-
American men (Cho, Crenshaw and McCall, 2013). While it is sometimes criticised for tending 
toward endless sub-divisions of overlapping social categories, intersectionality’s foundational raison 
d'être makes it a logical complement to Layder’s concern for breaking down the false dualism of 
structure and agency. “Intersectionality is inextricably linked to an analysis of power” (Cho, 
Crenshaw and McCall, 2013, p. 787). Crenshaw emphasised this point in her discussion of structural 
intersectionality and the necessity for battered women’s shelters to consider not only the acute 
violence that brought a woman to their doors, but also the “multilayered and routinized forms of 
domination” she may simultaneously face linked to particularly gender, race, and class (Crenshaw, 
1991, p. 1245). Underscoring the value of intersectionality as an analytical sensibility, Cho, Crenshaw 
and McCall (2013, p. 789) noted that “intersectionality has travelled into spaces and discourses that 
are themselves constituted by power relations that are far from transparent.” Intersectionality 
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studies do not sit within a categorically ring-fenced discipline. They adapt to methodologies and 
fields as appropriate:  
What makes an analysis intersectional—whatever terms it deploys, and whatever its iteration, 
whatever its field or discipline—is its adoption of an intersectional way of thinking about the 
problem of sameness and difference and its relation to power. This framing—conceiving of 
categories as not distinct, always in the process of creating and being created by dynamics of 
power—emphasizes what intersectionality does rather than what intersectionality is. (Cho, 
Crenshaw and McCall, 2013, p. 795) 
Cho, Crenshaw and McCall (2013) identified three themes of intersectional studies, acknowledging 
that some studies may overlap these categories. The themes included those that consider social 
processes, like labour market experience, through an intersectional analytical framework; those that 
take discursive explorations into intersectionality as a methodology and a theory; and those that 
seek to turn academic theorizing and analysis of intersectionality into practical change (Cho, 
Crenshaw and McCall, 2013). This thesis overlaps the first and third themes. It contributes the OSE 
as an original intersectional analytical framework to explain the organisational processes that 
contribute to the persistence of gender and ethnic-based pay inequality, and develops plans to 
report those findings within the HE sector and in the broader policy arena. This aims to reinforce 
with empirical analysis what activist groups like the UK’s Women’s Equality Party (2017) and the 
Fawcett Society (2019) already argue: perfunctory pay transparency is insufficient to address deeply 
embedded workplace inequality. 
5.3.2 Ontology 
The ontological position adopted within this thesis best aligns with critical realism in terms of 
believing that an objective reality exists. The pay, bonuses, and promotion decisions that stimulate 
or stifle academic careers, and the policies that are intended to guide those decisions, are objective 
reality. The policies can be read, and the decisions can be recorded in HR databases. Academics 
objectively experience the results of these decisions through their bank accounts. This thesis also 
follows Woodhams and Lupton’s (2014) prescription to use a critical realist ontological 
understanding of difference, drawing on pre-existing categories (ethnicity and sex) to drive analysis. 
This, combined with the multi-strategy method in this thesis, strengthens the prospect of achieving 
practical impact because the results can be framed in equality, diversity, and inclusion (EDI) 
language to which management is accustomed.      
5.3.3 Epistemology 
The epistemological position within this thesis also aligns best with critical realism, in terms of the 
belief that although an objective reality exists, our knowledge of that reality is socially constructed. 
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That is why it was important to include a range of voices across the two case study institutions, 
which included remuneration policy shapers, union representatives, and academics. The intentional 
mixture of academic interviewees by their gender, ethnicity, and position within the academic 
hierarchy makes this thesis also emancipatory by amplifying the voices of women, BAME academics, 
and BAME women academics, in order to challenge the “hegemonic structures by increasing the 
visibility and illegitimacy of ‘inequality regimes’” (Özbilgin, 2009, p. 2) inside academia. Consistent 
with Marks and O’Mahoney’s (2014) caveats of the implications of critical realism for data 
collection, these interviews sought to record more than just recalled conversations, but also to 
collect biographical information about the interviewees and other individuals whose experiences 
they sometimes also described, as well as structural information (particularly policy documents 
concerning pay and related progression practices). Multi-layered data collection throughout this 
thesis further enabled a critical consideration of the interrelations of different strata of analyses, 
from the individual to the total political/economic system. Here, the thesis’s central research 
questions align with Easton’s (2010, p. 123) prescription that critical realism calls the researcher to 
question:  
‘What caused the events associated with the phenomenon to occur?’…It is only possible to 
understand social phenomenon by recording and analysing the associated events that take 
place as a result of the actors acting…The events can be recorded live or exist in records of 
the past including the memories of those human actors who can attest to the events. 
In answering the research questions, this thesis provides an ‘explanatory critique’ (Bhaskar, 1989) of 
pay and related progression practices inside UK academia. There is a commonly-held belief that such 
processes are transparent, owing to the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda.’ This thesis 
aims to explain the power dynamics that reinforce that belief, whilst revealing the contrasting 
experiences of women, BAME academics, and BAME women academics. Thus, this intersectional 
feminist thesis aligns with New’s (2003) guidance that critical realism is valuable for feminist 
research.  
5.3.4 Methodology 
The primary principle driving the selection of methods in this thesis is a multi-strategy approach. 
“Methods or strategies of data collection are adopted and used in order to throw light on specific 
problems or topics, rather than because of some predetermined commitment to specific methods or 
type of data (qualitative or quantitative) as representing the ‘best way’ of approaching a topic or 
tackling a problem” (Layder, 2013, p. 70). This is not a licence to employ methods without regard for 
previous literature or established best practices. Rather, it indicates ‘disciplined flexibility’ (Layder, 
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1993). This approach has some similarities to the more mainstream concept of ‘triangulation’ 
(Denzin, 1970), which encourages the use of multiple methods and data sources to reinforce an 
initial finding (Yin, 2014). However, the ‘disciplined flexibility’ of the multi-strategy approach goes 
beyond triangulation, to improve research validity. The approach allows for flexibility in the research 
design, in order to respond to analytical problems that arise from the data and to achieve a more 
robust understanding of reality through a “density of analytic and empirical coverage” (Layder, 
1993, p. 123). This is demonstrated in this thesis. An original social pay comparison survey is 
implemented because such data did not exist. Analysis of this quantitative data suggests concerns 
about the role of the income-talk taboo inside the case studies, but these concerns require 
validation through qualitative conversations with academic staff about their pay discussions and 
other social interactions at work. Interviews with multiple types of actors also enable the 
consideration of multiple and complementary perspectives of the same phenomenon to help 
strengthen study conclusions.   
This multi-strategy methodological approach aligns with the adoption of Layder’s (1993, 2013) social 
domain and adaptive theories, and it is consistent with critical realism (Layder, 1993, 2006, 2013). 
The  methodology of this thesis enables a clearer understanding of “the multifaceted nature of the 
empirical world” (Layder, 1993, p. 7), by recognising the inextricable links between the layers of 
social organisation to overcome the unhelpful division between micro and macro analysis. 
Understanding social reality as an amalgam of overlapping and interwoven layers, allows this thesis 
to detect units of analysis and timescales that relate to social organisation and change (Layder, 
1993). This is consistent with the intersectional feminist orienting concept, emphasising the 
structural and multi-layered complexity of power and inequality (Crenshaw, 1991; Cho, Crenshaw 
and McCall, 2013). These methodological principles, influenced by Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality 
regime foundation to the analytical framework, enable this thesis to critically explain the invisible, 
embedded mechanisms that create, preserve, and reinforce inequality in the workplace.  
This thesis has been designed using Layder’s (1993) research map, which contains four social 
domains or research elements. Each is distinct, interdependent, and integrally connected with social 
activity and organisation. Understanding the micro-experiences of daily life at the level of situated 
activity and psychobiography/self, requires sight of the meso-setting environments and macro 
contextual factors. While the social domains are interrelated, the research map provides a tool to 
explain the separate scrutiny that is required for analytical purposes (Layder, 1993). Table 5-1 
demonstrates how Layder (2006, p. 274) layers the social domains to acknowledge their 
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interconnection “through social relations of power which are also stretched out over time and 
space.”   
Table 5-1: Layering of Layder’s Social Domains Research Map and Power over Time and Space 
 
Source: (Layder, 1993, p. 72, 2006, p. 273) 
The following briefly describes how separate scrutiny of the social domains for analytical purposes 
applies to this thesis: 
1. Context/Contextual Resources: This refers to the broadest macro level social organisation, 
which is removed from the individual’s direct experience. In this thesis, the contextual 
analysis explores the HE sector, by considering the gender and ethnic-based pay gap 
experienced by the UK’s academic workforce and the pay “transparency agenda” pressure 
that has been exerted on the sector. 
2. Setting/Social Settings: This refers to the social organisation at the meso or intermediate 
level of analysis, which is the specific area in which the situated activity occurs. In this thesis, 
the setting/social settings are two university case studies. 
3. Situated Activity: This refers to the emergent meanings of the social interactions that are 
observed or recalled. In this thesis, these interactions involve academics, the union 
committee and senior management at two case study universities, focusing particularly on 
reports of interaction concerning pay and progression. 
4. Self/Psychobiography: This describes how an individual experiences and engages with their 
social surroundings. An individual’s perceptions in this domain are read through their own 
119 
 
personal experiences, social connections, and identity. This research concerns the 
self/psychobiography of academics who work in two case study universities. 
The prior history and social relations of power interact with the functioning of all four social 
domains over time. Layder (1993, 2006) incorporated social relations of power into this multi-
layered framework out of recognition that power and control are housed within the social domains 
and may influence other social domains. Structural power may be built into the context or settings 
in which situated activity occurs, and it may be subtle. Therefore, analysis at one or two social 
domains may be blind to important power relations flowing from another domain. Concluding that a 
company is transparent because at the level of setting the organisation has pay banding, would 
overlook the subtle structural power observed at the level of self by staff, manifested in staff reports 
that their line-managers reacted with disbelief when they raised pay inequality concerns. This 
reported disbelief is predicated on the existence of ‘transparent’ pay bands.     
5.4 Research Design 
5.4.1 Research Strategy 
The research strategy and design has been iteratively moulded throughout the research process to 
arrive at appropriate methods to answer the research questions. Layder’s research map provides an 
heuristic tool for the “planning and ongoing formulation of field research which has theory 
generation as its primary aim” (Layder, 1993, p. 73). I have adapted this map to help create and 
explain the research design, which enabled a critical assessment of the relationship between my 
original OSE conceptualisation and pay inequality, by conducting analysis at different levels of social 
organisation. 
The failure of decomposition analysis to fully explain the complex GPG and more complex 
intersectional G/EPG (Chapter 2), justifies the multi-layered, multi-strategy approach adopted in this 
thesis (Whitehouse, 2003). The OSE has been constructed in this thesis as a promising lens through 
which to understand the persistence of unexplained pay inequality in the UK’s HE sector (Chapter 4). 
The employer ‘pay communication’ policy component of the OSE has been the focus of recent 
research, with the suggestion made that more transparent policies help to minimise inequality 
based on ethnicity and gender, while secretive policies may have the reverse impact (Hegewisch and 
Williams, 2014; Lytle, 2014; Marasi and Bennett, 2016). 
Identifying what proportion of the GPG or intersectional G/EPG can be attributed to ‘pay 
communication’ in the OSE, as a decomposition analysis could potentially achieve, goes beyond the 
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scope of this thesis. This is partly due to the absence of variables to measure ‘pay communication’ 
policies (or social pay comparison behaviour) in the existing datasets that are considered to be the 
most valid measures of UK wage levels, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (Leaker, 2008). More importantly, this limitation is also due to my 
ontological suspicion of the veil of secrecy over pay as part of a complex phenomenon, driven and 
shaped by institutional formal and informal policies, broader societal norms, and individual 
interactions—the OSE. Measuring this phenomenon in quantitative terms at this early stage in 
conceptual development, would be premature and possibly never advisable in isolation. 
The complex nature of gender pay inequality precludes comprehensive analysis from any 
single perspective or method. For example, quantitative methods that rely on aggregate 
data and focus only on factors that can be represented numerically reveal nothing about the 
organisational and historical processes that underpin the perpetuation of the gender pay 
gap. Unseen within such analysis are factors such as organisational barriers, sex segregation 
at the level of specific jobs, the processes through which undervaluation of ‘female’ skills 
occurs, and inequalities in bargaining power. (Whitehouse, 2003, p. 125) 
This thesis illuminates the potential role of transparency as something that paradoxically silently 
hides inequality from scrutiny. This dynamic is supported by an anti-discrimination legal regime that 
requires any alleged victim to first bring a claim in order to have his or her rights protected. Such a 
system requires the victim to have the financial and legal resources to bring a claim, or at the very 
least to have some indication that discrimination that warrants a claim has occurred. UK 
employment anti-discrimination protections remain individualised, without recourse to 
representative remedy (Dickens, 2000). “Representative (the term used in the UK) or class (used in 
the US) actions are essentially the same and can be taken where a group of people with the same 
common legal interest collectively bring a claim to a tribunal or court” (Gow and Middlemiss, 2012, 
p. 179). In 2008, the Civil Justice Council of England and Wales issued a report, ‘Improving Access to 
Justice through Collective Action’, to the UK’s Lord Chancellor45, which along with earlier European 
Union (EU) anti-competition legal pressure, pushed the UK government to consider generic reform 
to allow collective legal claims (Mulheron, 2017). The Trades Union Congress has called on 
government, largely in vain, to specifically enable employment tribunals to provide representative 
action remedy (Fawcett Society, 2010). Despite these entreaties, government has taken a restricted 
approach to reform, so far only greenlighting the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which allows “opt-out 
 
45 The Lord Chancellor is the member of the prime minister’s cabinet charged with upholding the rule of law 
across the government (Horne, 2015). 
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class action which is aimed at facilitating private actions for anti-competitive conduct” (Mulheron, 
2017, p. 815).46 
Contrastingly, the government chose to raise barriers to bringing an individual employment tribunal 
claim by imposing fees in 2013 (Pyper, McGuinness and Brown, 2017) and revoking the statutory 
Equal Pay Questionnaire in 2014 (Trades Union Congress, 2015b; Wild, 2017). Following significant 
advocacy, led by the trade union UNISON, against the employment tribunal fees that restricted 
access to justice, the UK’s Supreme Court forced the government to revoke the fees in July 2017 
(BBC, 2017). Discussing pay with colleagues, which is protected by the UK’s Equality Act 2010 when 
illegal discrimination is suspected (HM Government, 2010), could provide a useful point of reference 
for employees with existing pay concerns. 
Consequently, this thesis has applied a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods as appropriate. 
The research philosophy and methodological principles described earlier in this chapter provide a 
rationale for critical analysis of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ in this thesis, through the lens of 
power and privilege and a recognition that embedded workplace practices, which are presented as 
impartial, may reproduce inequality (Layder, 1993; Acker, 2006b). Orientation by intersectional 
feminism connotes an understanding that the OSE and pay inequality are generated through 
multiple layers of context, in which access to power may be linked to unseen practices of gender 
and ethnicity, which should be made visible. Details of the research design and how it has been 
developed through my adapted research map will be provided next. 
5.4.2 Design Process 
Consistent with the natural history approach to the methodology developed in this thesis 
(Silverman, 2010), the research process has required iterative and dynamic flexibility. This is 
particularly applicable given the research focus on the income-talk taboo, which was often 
acknowledged but seldom critically analysed prior to this thesis. This thesis has followed the 
orthodox steps of conducting a literature review, establishing a methodology and research design, 
conducting fieldwork, analysing data, and writing up the results. However, this process has been 
characterised by flexibility, such as incorporating new literature at multiple points and revising 
methods based on limited availability of secondary data and the practicality of data collection, which 
has been essential to successful completion. Rarely is quality research a strictly linear process 
(Silverman, 2010). At the outset of my PhD, my aim was to compare the income-talk taboo 
 
46 Large, essentially collective claims have been accepted in equal value cases, such as Abdulla v. Birmingham 
City Council (2013), but through grouping of individual claims (Deakin et al., 2015). 
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adherence across four countries. However, this developed organically through a flexible process of 
reflection that led to a narrower but richer embedded (multiple units of analysis) multi-case analysis 
of the OSE inside two universities, in the context of the UK HE sector.   
5.4.3 Research Map 
My two-part research map has been adapted from Layder’s (1993) research map and Acker’s 
(2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes. This helped to rationalise and explain the different analyses, 
conducted at different levels of social organisation and with different units of analysis, as part of the 
cohesive investigation in my thesis. Addressing the investigation at different levels is required for 
this exploratory research on the OSE and pay inequality, which are influenced by complex, multi-
layered factors. I have used relevant theories and concepts, which have been discussed in greater 
detail in my literature review chapters, such as social pay comparison and the income-talk taboo. Of 
broad applicability to this thesis is Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes, which aligns with 
Layder’s (1993, 2013) social domain and adaptive theory, to develop my research map. 
Answering my research questions requires interrogating issues of privilege and workplace power 
relations, which lends itself to using Acker’s (2006b) inequality regimes with an organisational focus, 
alongside Layder’s (1993, p. 170) “integration of macro and micro levels of analysis”, to place the 
organisational analysis within a broader context. This links quantitative and qualitative analysis in 
order to illustrate the subtle functioning of inequality regimes through the examination of employer 
practices and employee behaviour, which are influenced by social norms (Hokema and Scherger, 
2016). The relationship between the OSE and pay inequality is best understood through a 
comprehensive analysis, which includes the sectoral labour market context and the organisational 
setting, alongside social interactions and individual experiences. Table 5-2 and Table 5-3 summarise 
the research map adopted in this study at each social domain, including the research elements, the 




Table 5-2: Research Map (First Half): Context and Setting 
 
Source: Adapted by author from: (Layder, 1993, p. 72) 
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The contribution of this thesis began at the social domain of the ‘context’, with a macro level 
quantitative focus on pay inequality based on gender and ethnicity in UK HE. The objective of this 
research was to describe pay inequality by gender and ethnicity over time within UK academia, 
whilst also reviewing academic explanations for this inequality in the sector. The elusive resolution 
of pay inequality in academia, despite many pressures on the sector to ensure that pay is 
transparent, justifies further exploration of this sector. This particularly aims to pre-empt questions 
as to why a more obviously secretive industry, such as financial services, was not selected. 
Additionally, identifying the historical multi-layered pressures on the sector to perform pay 
transparency is relevant to the broader social context that ‘pay transparency’ action by employers 
has become a bold rhetorical tool in UK politics over the period of the analysis (Chapter 1). This tool 
allows employers to present the impression of fighting against pay discrimination and promoting 
equal opportunities, specifically based on gender. This contextual analysis discussion is influenced by 
theories of intersectional feminism, human capital, occupational segregation, and preference. This 
contribution has been presented in Chapter 4. 
 
Moving on to the ‘social setting’ social domain, this thesis takes a meso level quantitative focus on 
the intermediate social organisation of the work setting. The work setting selected is working in 
academia (teaching and/or research), within two research intensive universities in the South East of 
England. The research objective is to describe the apparent bureaucratic functionality of pay and 
progression policies within each case study university. A critical discussion of these apparently 
objective policies is influenced by intersectional feminist theories and inequality regime theory. This 
analysis is done through the thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with remuneration 
shapers and University and College Union (UCU) committee representatives, in addition to 
remuneration-related policy documents published by the two case study institutions. This 
contribution is presented in Chapter 6. 
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Table 5-3: Research Map (Second Half): Situated Activity and Self 
 
Source: Adapted by author from: (Layder, 1993, p. 72)
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The situated activity social domain begins my micro level analysis, with a focus specifically on social 
pay comparison behaviour (and absence of this behaviour), as reported by academics who worked 
inside the case studies. The research objective is to illustrate and analyse patterns of social pay 
comparison amongst the academics, which is influenced by social pay comparison theories. This is 
done through analysing data from my original Qualtrics online survey. From my critical realist 
perspective, considering why social pay comparison happens and does not happen is particularly 
salient because “critical realists also believe that the non-occurrence of an event when one is 
expected not only requires explanation but may also provide very useful insights” (Easton, 2010, p. 
120). This analysis is influenced by my semi-structured interviews with academics, as well as by 
limited social pay comparison research, intersectional feminist theories, and inequality regimes. 
These situated activities are discussed in terms of how the macro and meso level socio-economic 
context may influence them, and how they may in turn influence feelings of self-identity and power 
within the workplace. This contribution is presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Lastly, the social domain of the self will conclude my micro level analysis, with a focus on self-
identity and social interaction of academics, which is influenced by intersectional feminism and 
inequality regimes. Consistent with this approach, all participants were asked to identify their own 
ethnicity and gender. This makes use of my semi-structured interviews with academics, during 
which much time was invested in discussing individuals’ personal experiences interacting with pay 
and progression policies and in particular, their perceptions of fairness and transparency of these 
processes. These self-identities help to explain the described ‘situated activities’ of social pay 
comparison (or absence thereof) in the two case study ‘settings’ of this thesis. This contribution is 
presented in Chapter 8. 
5.4.4 Institutional Access 
Prior to embarking upon any fieldwork, I secured institutional access to the two case study 
institutions. This required written communication with the appropriate member of senior 
management at both institutions. Access was granted under the condition that no outputs of this 
thesis would identify the universities. They will be referred to throughout as two research-intensive 
universities in the South East of England. All possible efforts have been taken to honour this 
agreement, particularly when describing the aspects of the institutions that are critical to the 
analysis and referring to publicly available documentation about them. To maintain this 
confidentiality, no direct quotations from these public documents were used. At the time of 
securing institutional access, I was not, nor had I ever been, a member of academic staff in either 
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case study. Therefore, securing access involved presenting myself as a trustworthy and ethical 
researcher to the relevant gatekeepers, whose trust I deeply appreciate. 
5.4.5 Ethics, Confidentiality, and Anonymity 
Consistent with my agreement not to identify my case study universities, all individuals who 
responded to my survey and whom I interviewed were given similar assurances of anonymity and 
confidentiality.47 The universities are referred to as Universities Alpha and Beta throughout this 
thesis, which will be maintained in any resulting publications. The institutions are characterised as 
research intensive universities in the South East of England out of recognition that the research-
intensive label and geographic proximity to London are important factors influencing pay and job 
competition, which could in turn influence the OSE. This balances a need for analytical clarity, 
particularly regarding the case study selection process, with the overarching importance of 
honouring confidentiality and my ethical commitment. In a similar vein, details of the research sites 
and interviewees are included only where appropriate to the analysis in order to avoid unnecessary 
identification risk. Care has been taken in the reporting of all survey data and interview feedback to 
maintain this ethical commitment, such as by removing all references to specific names, 
departments and programme titles from any interview quotations reported in the analysis. 
Another critical balance has had to be struck between the academic standard of retrievability and 
maintaining a chain of evidence in case study research, alongside the overarching importance of 
honouring confidentiality and my ethical commitment. Since documents used in these case study 
analyses may still be publicly available online, formally citing them would immediately violate my 
ethical commitment not to identify the universities, and in some cases, identify interviewees. While I 
have maintained a private database of these documents for personal use and can discuss the 
categories of documents, following the advice of the American Psychological Association, I omit 
quotations and citations of these publicly available documents. “Subject privacy…should never be 
sacrificed for clinical or scientific accuracy” (Lee and Hume-Pratuch, 2013). 
This PhD study was given ethical approval by the Queen Mary Ethics of Research Committee 
(Reference Number: QMERC2016/51) prior to the commencement of any fieldwork. All updates and 
material requested have been provided to the committee as appropriate. 
 
47 See Appendix B for the consent information that was provided to all potential survey respondents and 
Appendix C for the informed consent form signed by all interviewees.  
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5.4.6 Embedded (Multiple Units of Analysis) Multiple-Case Design 
The paradox between the income-talk taboo and the growing recognition by the UK government 
that pay transparency is an important weapon in the battle against pay inequality and 
discrimination, helps to establish the relevant ‘context’ of the case study design, namely the UK’s HE 
sector, which has been described in Chapter 4. The OSE for academic pay ought to be fairly 
transparent because the pressures to perform the pay ‘transparency agenda’ are long-standing. 
Despite the introduction of various policies, regulations and schemes, the HE sector continues to 
struggle with a persistent GPG, pay secrecy and a lack of transparency, as highlighted in Chapter 4 
by Professor Schafer’s employment tribunal claim against Royal Holloway (Ward, 2011). 
 
With this context in mind, using a case study design is consistent with the critical realist approach, 
which is “particularly well suited to relatively clearly bounded, but complex phenomena, such as 
organisations” (Easton, 2010, p. 123). This thesis specifically employs an embedded (multiple units 
of analysis) multiple-case design, where analysis takes place at the total system and the individual 
level, as shown in Figure 5-1 (Yin, 2014). Using an embedded design is consistent with the principles 
of Layder’s (1993, 2013) social domain theory and adaptive theory methodology. The design is 
multiple-case, using two research sites that have been selected as cases, which strengthens analysis 
and reduces vulnerability to claims of uniqueness (Yin, 2014). This design benefits from the 
complementarity of qualitative and quantitative data, which Yin (2014, p. 67) notes can “address 
broader or more complicated research questions than case studies alone.”  
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Figure 5-1: Research Design: Embedded (Multiple Units of Analysis) Multiple-Case Design 
 
Source: Adapted by author from (Layder, 1993, p. 72; Yin, 2014, p. 50) 
Using Layder’s (1993, 2006) terminology, comparing and contrasting analyses of the two separate 
case studies will be located at the level of: 
• Context: This is to justify the focus on UK HE by demonstrating its pay inequality trends over 
time, despite multi-layered pressure on the sector to perform pay transparency.   
• Setting: This is to create an understanding of the remuneration policy influencer (employer) 
and UCU committee members (union) perspectives of the OSE and policies that may shape 
it, based especially on semi-structured interviews with employer and union representatives 
and remuneration-related policy documents. 
• Situated Activity: This is to help critical narratives emerge to explain why social pay 
comparison happens (or does not happen), to be considered using the quantitative analysis 
of this behaviour in my primary Qualtrics survey. 
• Self: This is based on semi-structured interviews with academics to draw out how gender 




The two case studies have been selected based on the concept of replication logic. Literal and 
theoretical replication logics are the acceptable logics for the selection of case studies in a multiple 
case study design. Literal replication means that the cases are expected to yield similar outcomes 
and theoretical replication means that the cases are expected to yield different outcomes (Yin, 
2014). Theoretical replication logic has been used for the selection of the cases in this thesis. Both 
institutions share the traits that make UK academia a promising industry for this research; namely, 
they are public UK universities with recognised UCU branches, participate in the sectoral collective 
bargaining agreement for pay, have responsibilities under the PSED, and have their GPG reported by 
the THE pay survey (Chapter 4). In addition, being self-proclaimed research-intensive universities 
and having a geographic proximity to London could be important factors that might influence pay 
and job competition, which could in turn influence the OSE. Therefore, two universities that shared 
these traits were selected as a way of controlling for them within the analysis. 
 
It was impossible to know how to characterise the OSE in these two case studies prior to conducting 
this research. However, these universities differed in a key structural manner which, consistent with 
the argument that the presence of collective bargaining should make pay more transparent, could 
have been expected to create a more open OSE in University Alpha. University Alpha had 
implemented professorial pay banding prior to the 2016/17 academic year, whilst professorial pay 
at University Beta remained a black box without any sort of pay banding structure communicated to 
staff. 
5.5 Selected Methods  
Building upon the philosophical principles and the research strategy adopted in my thesis, this 
section will illustrate the research methods that have been selected and how the fieldwork has been 
conducted. As discussed in the research strategy, this thesis adopts Layder’s (1993) multi-strategy 
approach of ‘disciplined flexibility.’ This privileges the use of multi-strategy methods, acknowledging 
the strength afforded to research by approaching an investigation of social reality from the macro, 
meso, and micro levels and by using quantitative data to complement qualitative data. This will 
enable a comprehensive analysis of the social domains in order to make visible the invisible 
structural and social power relations that reinforce gender and ethnicity-based inequality. This is 
consistent with the critical realist position of this thesis that there is an objective reality, which is 
understood through the social construction of experiences. Easton (2010) argues that critical realism 
enables the understanding of a social phenomenon through analysing machine records (i.e. pay 
data, policy documents) and human memories (i.e. survey and interview data) about events 
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associated with the phenomenon. In this thesis, such events include things like pay, social pay 
comparison behaviour, EDI data reporting, and recruitment and promotion pay decision 
experiences. Why and how data and methods have been selected and implemented will now be 
elaborated. 
5.5.1 Secondary Data Collection 
The following briefly describes the secondary datasets that are analysed in this thesis.  
5.5.1.1 Higher Education Statistics Agency 
HESA data is the most reliable source of data on UK university staff. HESA is a charitable body set up 
in 1993 by statute to help higher education institutions (HEIs) fulfil their 1992 Higher and Further 
Education Act data reporting requirements to entities including the UK government and funding 
councils. The body is charged with collecting, analysing, and disseminating data on UK HE. These 
data are ‘official statistics’ that are regulated by the UK Statistics Agency. The HESA Staff Record 
contains data on the characteristics of all academic and non-academic staff who are employed by a 
reporting HEI in the UK, including their salaries. There were 163 HEIs in 2015/16, the final year of 
data analysed in this thesis. The HESA Staff Record reporting period runs August 1 through July 31 of 
each academic year (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2019b).  
Although limited data is public online through a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
Licence (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2019a), the raw data is controlled. Academic pay data in 
this thesis has been kindly granted by HESA, in association with Professor Geraldine Healy (Queen 
Mary University of London) and Professor Almudena Sevilla (University College London), who 
purchased access for a separate research project. HESA provided the raw data in two files, one for 
2003/04-2011/12 and one for 2012/13-2015/16. Thanks are also due to Danula Gamage, my fellow 
PhD researcher at Queen Mary University of London, who invested considerable effort in merging 
and cleaning the data for his use, with quality-checking support from me prior to analysis of the 
complete dataset. Data presentation in this thesis complies with the HESA Services Standard 
Rounding Methodology.48  
5.5.1.2 Times Higher Education Pay Survey 
The THE Pay Survey is an annual publication that reports the mean salaries of male and female full-
time academics in the UK by institution. Publications from 2007 to 2017 are used in this thesis, 
covering data from the academic years 2005/06 through 2015/16. Nearly all public universities are 
 
48 This HESA requirement is detailed in our access agreement. Requirements relate to headcounts, full-person 
equivalent and full-time equivalent data. 
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included in the reports, including the two case study universities. The figures come from analysis of 
the HESA Staff Records. This analysis has been published annually since at least 2007 (Chapter 4). In 
2007, these figures were only reported for all full-time male and female academics, without 
disaggregating by any levels within academia (Fearn and Newman, 2007). Varying additional sub-
divisions were presented in the 2008 through 2017 publications. However, the mean salary for all 
full-time male and female academics has been consistently reported since 2007. The mean salary for 
full-time male and female professors has also been consistently reported since 2008. These two 
metrics are used to analyse THE Pay Survey in Chapter 6 (Fearn and Newman, 2007, 2008; Fearn, 
2009; Morgan and Fearn, 2010; Morgan, 2011a; Times Higher Education, 2012; Grove, 2013a, 2014, 
2015b, 2016a, 2017b). 
5.5.2 Secondary Data Analysis 
This section describes the key methods used to analyse secondary data in this thesis. Conducting 
secondary data analysis, particularly making use of government official statistics, as a background 
resource was suggested by Layder (2013, pp. 97–98) as a “useful platform on which to develop 
ideas, particularly about settings and contexts of specific social activities.” As illustrated by my 
adapted research map presented earlier in this chapter, secondary data analysis provides 
information about the context in which the research has been conducted. 
5.5.2.1 Descriptive Analysis of the Gender Pay Gap in UK Academia and Case Study Institutions 
This descriptive analysis provides sectoral context using the unadjusted GPG and G/EPG for UK HE. 
HE pay and workforce composition analyses uses the HESA data directly (Chapters 4 and 6).49 
Analysis of the two case study universities uses THE pay survey (Chapter 6). Drawing on Acker’s 
(2006b) inequality regimes, the bases of inequality, gender and ethnicity, are used to assess the 
shape and degree of wage inequality. Acker (2006a, 2006b) endorsed using aggregate data for this 
purpose, acknowledging the interrelation between workplace and societal inequalities. All of the 
aggregate pay gaps are calculated for this thesis in a consistent manner; whether mean or median 
figures are used will be stated in any analysis provided: 
• Pay gap % = [1 - (mean hourly/annual pay of expected disadvantage group/mean 
hourly/annual pay of expected advantaged group)] * 100 
• If the mean hourly pay of women was £81/hour and the mean hourly pay of men was 
£100/hour, the GPG would be 19%, calculated as: 
 
49 See Appendix D for for details of the variables that were used to directly and indirectly conduct the HESA 
pay gap analysis presented in this thesis (Chapter 4). 
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o [1-(81/100)]*100 ➔ [1-0.81]*100 ➔ 0.19*100 ➔ 19% 
This analysis cannot generate any connections between the gaps and the cloak of pay secrecy or 
employee pay discussion behaviour. Apart from the dated and regionally-specific Social Change and 
Economic Life Initiative data used by Burchell and Yagil (1997), no more recent data measuring 
employee social pay comparison behaviour could be identified (Chapter 2). For this reason, this 
chapter will next describe the primary data collection for this thesis, beginning with running an 
original Qualtrics survey to generate data on social pay comparison by academics. 
5.5.3 Primary Data Collection 
The following section details the primary data sources that I have collected for analysis in this thesis, 
which include survey data, semi-structured interviews, and remuneration-related policy documents 
from both case study institutions. 
5.5.3.1 Qualtrics Survey 
The first main method of primary data collection employed in this thesis was an original web-based 
survey, built on the Qualtrics platform.  
5.5.3.1.1 The Survey Instrument 
The survey instrument was an online questionnaire50, which was designed to expand on the limited 
previous research into pay discussion behaviour by Burchell and Yagil (1997) and adapted to fit the 
UK academic target population of this study. Key sections of the survey instrument include: 
 
• Consent: This section included informed survey consent details and required all participants 
to provide their informed consent to participate. The full information text about the survey 
to ensure informed consent that was provided to participants is reproduced in Appendix B. 
Apart from the consent question, respondents were free to skip any other question.  
• Eligibility: This section included one question to confirm that the respondent qualified for 
the survey. To qualify, the respondent had to agree that they were employed at the named 
case study university, to engage in research and/or teaching. 
• Demographic Factors: Drawing on Burchell and Yagil (1997), this section included 10 
questions to collect demographic information of the respondent, most crucially sex and 
ethnicity.  
 
50 See Appendix E for the survey instrument text.  
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• Labour Market Factors: Drawing on Burchell and Yagil (1997), this section included 5 
questions about the respondent’s labour market orientation, including union membership, 
type of contract, and whether they had engaged in a recent job search.  
• Human Capital Factors: Drawing particularly on Burchell and Yagil (1997), Becker (1962) and 
Mincer (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Lemieux, 2003), this section included 6 questions about 
the respondents’ human capital, including education, length of experience, and discipline.  
• Pay Discussion Behaviour: Drawing particularly on Burchell and Yagil (1997) and extending 
further, this section asked 14 questions about pay discussion behaviour inside and outside a 
respondent’s workplace and queried the respondents’ opinions about the forces that 
influenced such behaviour. 
• Income Details: This section asked 19 questions about the respondents’ income, income 
band, mechanism of payment, and other elements of pay beyond basic pay. This was placed 
near the end of the survey in case it might have initially discouraged some participants from 
completing the survey. 
• Miscellaneous: The remaining 2 questions sought volunteers for semi-structured interviews 
and allowed respondents to opt into an incentivised draw to reward their participation. 
 
The practice of developing a survey, based on limited previous broader research into a 
phenomenon, in order to illuminate the previously unexamined behaviour of academics across 
disciplines, has precedent in other UK HE sector research, such as Fullwood et al.’s (2013) research 
into knowledge sharing behaviour by UK academics. Consequently, this thesis followed Fullwood et 
al.’s (2013) work, by interrogating the findings from the survey data through qualitative case study 
analysis. Questions in this survey were designed primarily to yield quantitative data, adapting 
Burchell and Yagil’s method (1997), but a small number of questions allowed for qualitative 
responses, which may support future research stemming from this thesis. 
 
Burchell and Yagil (1997) cautioned that the social desirability bias must be considered in the design 
of any future survey instrument to study social comparison of pay. The same taboo that makes 
employees uncomfortable with discussing wages with each other, may also make them 
uncomfortable with reporting discussions of their wages to researchers. The survey data used in 
Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) research was gathered through a face-to-face structured interview. In 
contrast, e-surveys remove the researcher from the data collection process. This recognised 
technique to lessen social desirability bias was used in this thesis (Fowler, 1995). 
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5.5.3.1.2 The Survey Platform 
Qualtrics is an online survey platform that facilitates the design, dissemination, and some analysis of 
surveys. I used this platform to design and disseminate my survey. I used SPSS to analyse the data 
because I distributed the survey as two separate surveys to the two case study universities. This 
enabled me to use each institution’s actual name in the introductory content and certain questions, 
but it meant that the full dataset could not be analysed directly within the survey platform. 
Locations in the survey instrument where the institution name was provided are noted as ‘[HEI 
provider]’ in Appendix E. Otherwise, the survey was identical for all respondents.  
I explored purchasing Qualtrics panel responses and found it to be cost prohibitive and ineffective. It 
could only secure approximately 150 responses, as my proposed sample criteria required 
respondents to be employed in a UK public HEI to conduct teaching and/or research. I also 
considered an experimental survey design, but I was not convinced that this could address the heart 
of my research interest: Do academics actually discuss pay? Is there a ‘culture of secrecy’ over pay in 
the actual context of UK academia? Therefore, I determined to distribute my survey using the 
publicly available email addresses of academics at Universities Alpha and Beta, after piloting my 
survey instrument. 
5.5.3.1.3 Pilot Survey 
A two-stage pilot was employed to build a draft survey in Qualtrics. In the first stage, the survey was 
informally piloted with two current UK academics, who also had experience conducting and 
analysing survey data. These individuals received the draft survey via the Qualtrics platform. They 
provided feedback from their perspectives as both technical researchers and busy academics, in 
order to improve question parsimony and clarity. For example, I had initially placed the survey 
section with income questions before the section with pay discussion behaviour questions, thinking 
it was preferable to get the most objective questions answered first, including the demographic, 
labour market, human capital, and income related questions. My informal pilot respondents 
recommended placing the income questions last. These would likely be the most sensitive 
questions. Placing the income questions earlier might discourage some respondents from 
completing the survey and from providing the essential information for this study: whether they 
discussed pay with colleagues. 
 
In the second stage, I conducted a formal pilot study following revisions that were made in response 
to the informal pilot. Pilot surveys are meant to mimic the conditions of the actual survey as closely 
as possible, and pilot participants cannot later be included in the real survey (Fink, 2009). The target 
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population of the real survey consisted of all individuals working in teaching and/or research at the 
two case study institutions during the first term of the 2016/17 academic year. To achieve as close 
an approximation of the real survey conditions as possible without excluding any potential real 
survey participants, the pilot survey was distributed using the same Qualtrics software to one large 
department of another research intensive university in the South East of England during the first 
term of the 2016/17 academic year. I manually collected email addresses of all academic and/or 
research staff listed on the department’s online directory. Initial cold participation requests were 
emailed to the 98 staff listed. The primary goals of the pilot were to help test whether similarly 
situated academics would, after having been sent a cold-contact participation request, respond to 
certain questions in the survey and also complete the survey (Bourque and Fielder, 2003). Revisions 
to the survey instrument were developed from this pilot process. Suggesting these revisions were 
effective, the completed response rate rose by more than four percentage points from the formal 
pilot to the real survey. 
5.5.3.1.4 Sampling Frame 
The sampling frame of this survey consisted of all individuals working in teaching and/or research 
across all disciplines at the two case study universities in the UK during the first term of the 2016/17 
academic year.51 As all contact details used were publicly accessible online, no specific permission 
was required to compile the distribution list. All individuals with a title that indicated engagement in 
teaching and/or research, who were listed on any academic departmental directory at either 
university, were included. In some cases, it was challenging to make this determination due to the 
use of non-standard job titles or individuals who were listed in multiple locations with different job 
titles. The HESA contract categories detailed by the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU) were simplified to 
reflect the range of academics to be included in my sample, to ensure relevance to the HE academic 
population. Given the survey’s distribution to research intensive universities, I removed post-1992 
titles from these categories to streamline the appearance of the survey (Equality Challenge Unit, 
2015b). A remaining problem was the HESA/ECU’s use of the Lecturer A/B distinction. While that 
distinction persists in some institutions, informal consultation with several current lecturers 
indicated that it would not be a familiar designation for many respondents. Therefore, I also only 
used the generic designations of ‘lecturer’ and ‘senior lecturer.’ The categories selected include: 
professor, senior lecturer, reader, principal research fellow, lecturer, senior research fellow, 
research fellow, researcher, senior research assistant, teaching fellow, research assistant, and 
 
51 Logistical restrictions meant neither a random sample nor an HE-wide census was possible, which will be 
discussed as a limitation (Chapter 9). 
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teaching assistant.52 Individuals for whom placement within academic work was unclear were 
included to avoid unintentional exclusion from the target population. Therefore, this survey was 
distributed to the entire accessible population of academics at the two case study universities, in a 
similar manner to other organisational surveys, which “normally involve all members of the 
organisation” (Simsek and Veiga, 2001, p. 222), such as the staff surveys that are commonly 
conducted by UK universities.      
 
The taboo nature of pay discussions and the necessity to avoid any unethical sense of coercion by 
respondents from their employers, meant that seeking head of department (HoD) permission to 
distribute the survey, a tactic used by Fullwood et al (2013), was not feasible. Had individual HoD 
permission been sought, not only might this have given the impression of coercing respondents, this 
breadth of distribution achieved in this thesis might not have been possible. Some HoDs might have 
refused explicit access or been too busy to respond. Institutional approval from senior management 
at the two universities was instead secured to satisfy the requirements of my ethics committee, 
while survey respondents were provided with a clear statement assuring them that their 
participation was fully voluntary.53 
 
An initial email invitation was sent on November 23, 2016 to all potential respondents in both case 
study universities separately. A first reminder was sent to those who had not yet completed the 
survey on November 30, 2016. A final reminder was sent on December 7, 2016. Respondents were 
able to unsubscribe from future reminders at all stages, and a small portion did. Data from both 
distributions were then combined for analysis in this thesis.    
5.5.3.1.5 Response Rate 
The response rate of this survey was 15.42%, using the completed responses submitted (384) and 
the total survey sample (2,491) shown in Table 5-4. The total survey sample excludes individuals 
who were sent the survey but whose email address returned an ‘undeliverable’ message (15) or who 
 
52 Given the temporary nature of most teaching assistants and many research assistants, most individuals 
holding these titles would not have been included in my sample because they would not have had 
employment profiles online. However, this is a benefit for interpreting my survey results because it means 
that my respondents were generally working under similar employment terms and conditions, apart from 
professorial pay not being subject to collective bargaining.  
53 The statement given to potential survey respondents was “This independent research is part of a PhD thesis 
that I am undertaking at Queen Mary University of London (QMUL ethical approval obtained ref: 




returned an automatic or manual email explaining that they were no longer at their institution or in 
an eligible job (2754). These individuals were not part of the eligible survey population. 
Table 5-4: Academic Survey Response Rate 
 
*This sample includes all identifiable academics (teaching and/or research) with publicly available 
email addresses on the sites of the two case study universities 
Several factors influence survey response rates. This figure alone is insufficient to determine the 
validity of survey data. Part of understanding the response rate requires context. According to the 
work of Bourque and Fielder (2003), a 15.42% response rate meets expectations, given the sampling 
frame construction, the techniques employed to maximise responses, and the employment sector of 
the survey. This response rate is also consistent with expectations based upon other comparable 
surveys in the literature (Burchell and Yagil, 1997; Bourque and Fielder, 2003; Baruch and Holtom, 
2008; Anseel et al., 2010; Fullwood, Rowley and Delbridge, 2013; Housewright, Schonfeld and 
Wulfson, 2013; Lawson, Kitson and Hughes, 2016). 
 
First, the liberal inclusion practice used to construct the sampling frame means that there may be 
additional individuals who were sent the survey but were ineligible because they had recently 
 
54 Three respondents indicated their disqualification through email and the survey. These individuals were only 
counted once in the disqualification calculation. 
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changed jobs or retired but had not been removed from their department’s website. While such 
individuals would not have been able to pass the qualification stage of the survey, they would have 
remained in my total survey sample count if they took no action. There is no way to identify such 
people. Therefore, the total survey sample may still be somewhat artificially inflated, which would 
inaccurately deflate the response rate.  
Secondly, the response rate of this survey is justified with reference to the techniques used to 
maximise responses. Bourque and Fielder’s (2003, p. 17) guide to conducting self-administered 
surveys reported an average response rate of 10-20% for online surveys, including those using 
“email invitations to organisational members”, as was used in this survey.55 Meta-analyses of 
organisational surveys also identified clear differences in the expectation of response rates from 
different types of respondents (Baruch and Holtom, 2008; Anseel et al., 2010). Of most relevance to 
this survey, Baruch and Holtom (2008) found that surveys in their meta-analysis that were based 
within the education sector had the lowest response rate of all the industry sectors that they 
identified. The mean response rate of this group of surveys was 49.1%, whilst the minimum was only 
10% (Baruch and Holtom, 2008). Academics working in HE specifically have hectic workloads that 
may prevent them from responding to an electronic survey. The prevalence of surveys to which 
academics are exposed may also generate survey fatigue (Lawson, Kitson and Hughes, 2016). 
Additionally, the taboo nature of discussing pay may prove to be a further disincentive. Burchell and 
Yagil (1997, p. 746) suggested that “in the same way that asking someone how much they earn is 
seen as a taboo question, admitting to making comparisons with the pay of others is also subject to 
a strong social desirability bias.” Apart from their research,56 no previous survey querying pay 
discussion behaviour in the workplace (whether by academics or otherwise) could be identified for a 
benchmark. 
Anseel et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis of organisational surveys from 1995-2008 demonstrated that 
techniques including providing advance notice, personalising survey invitations, ensuring the 
salience of the survey to potential respondents, using identification numbers for respondents, and 
 
55 More recent meta-analyses of organisational surveys of individuals, using a variety of administrative means, 
have found an average response rate of 52.3% to 52.6% (Baruch and Holtom, 2008; Anseel et al., 2010). 
However, these studies have also identified a general downward trend in organisational survey response 
rates: a decline from 1975 to 1995, with general stabilisation since (Baruch and Holtom, 2008), but a 
continued, if minor, decline in response rate trends through 2008, after controlling for varying response 
enhancing tactics (Anseel et al., 2010).  
56 The data Burchell and Yagil (1997, pp. 740; 746) conducted their analysis on was reported with an “achieved 
response rate” of more than 75%. However, it was an administered 90-minute survey of a broad array of 
topics aimed at a sample of the workforce of the Northampton “travel to work” area.   
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obtaining university sponsorship are all effective tactics to bolster response rates. All five techniques 
were used in this survey. Advance notice of about two weeks was provided through advertisements 
in a staff newsletter and on the staff intranet of the case study universities. Survey invitations were 
personalised by referencing the respondents’ specific university and with my personal signature as 
the researcher. The survey topic is highly salient as it is about the respondents’ own experiences. 
Additionally, coming in the wake of a significant dispute between the University and College Union 
(UCU) and the University and College Employers’ Association (UCEA) over the 2016/17 pay 
settlement, the issue of pay may have felt particularly salient for many respondents (University and 
College Union, 2016a). Each respondent was assigned a random identification number so that their 
name cannot be associated with their responses in any stored data used for analysis. All 
communications with potential respondents were assured of this confidentiality and anonymity. In 
order to avoid any feelings of respondent coercion, the QMUL ethics committee required me not to 
seek university sponsorship of my survey and to make explicit in all survey invitations that no 
organisational sponsorship had been obtained.  
 
Finally, the response rate of this study is consistent with, and even exceeds, other studies conducted 
in the context of UK HE. For example, a survey of UK academics, using a purchased e-mail listing, on 
the reasonably uncontroversial topic of research, teaching and communication behaviour, achieved 
only a 7.9% response rate (Housewright, Schonfeld and Wulfson, 2013). Online surveys about 
knowledge exchange behaviour by UK academics, which followed a similar process of obtaining 
email contacts to the one used in this survey, achieved response rates of 14.38% (Fullwood, Rowley 
and Delbridge, 2013) and 13.9% (Lawson, Kitson and Hughes, 2016) respectively. Thus, the 15.42% 
response rate in this study, meets expectations. 
5.5.3.1.6 Nonresponse Bias Assessment 
Another important consideration when assessing the validity of this survey data is the potential 
impact of non-response bias, which results from theoretically important differences between those 
who answer the survey and those who do not. Rogelberg and Stanton (2007, p. 198) note that “in 
the absence of good information about presence, magnitude, and direction of nonresponse bias, 
ignoring the results of a study with a 10% response rate—particularly if the research question 
explores a new and previously unaddressed issue—is just as foolish as assuming that one with a 
response rate of 80% is unassailable.” The researchers describe nine techniques for a nonresponse 
bias impact assessment strategy (N-BIAS). This thesis employs the first technique, archival analysis, 
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to compare the demographics of respondents57, which could theoretically be expected to be related 
to pay discussion behaviour, with known demographic data for the employment population at the 
two case study universities.  
 
The most recently available archival data, at the time of the survey distribution, was extracted from 
data that was publicly reported by the two case study universities and aggregated to describe the 
full target population of the survey (Rogelberg and Stanton, 2007). Data for University Alpha was 
entirely extracted from the university’s most recent equal pay audit and refers to the 2015/16 
academic year. University Beta had not released an equal pay audit that did not exclude professors. 
Therefore, I attempted to extract University Beta’s data from its most recent Athena SWAN 
application. However, the application only contained professorial and gender data (not ethnicity 
data) and only for STEMM faculty, representing about 76% of total relevant staff. Therefore, I 
extracted University Beta’s gender, ethnicity and total teaching and/or research staff figures from 
Tables 1 and 2a of the publicly available analysis of the 2015/16 HESA returns (Higher Education 
Statistics Agency, 2017). I finally consulted with HR staff at University Beta to confirm my 
interpretation of the HESA figures and to secure the number of professors in 2015/16, which was 
not reported in the public HESA analysis by institution. Separate figures for Universities Alpha and 
Beta are not reported in this thesis to further protect institutional anonymity, since the data is 
primarily from public sources.  
 
This N-Bias analysis demonstrates that the proportions of women, BAME academics and professors 
amongst the combined survey respondents were not statistically significantly different to the 
combined target population. This was calculated using a one-sample T-test, using test values from 
the aggregated archival data shown as ‘Case Studies’ Combined Population’ in Table 5-5. With 
dummy variables for being female, BAME, and a professor, the mean value for each variable is the 
same as the percentage of combined respondents with each trait. Similarly, the percentage of the 
known population with each trait was used as the test value for each one-sample T-test. This 
analysis provides confidence that this data has concurrent validity with the target population, and 
therefore is not significantly over or under-sampling based on gender, ethnicity, or professorial 
status. 
 
57 See Appendix F for a description of all respondent demographics.  
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Table 5-5: N-BIAS Assessment 
*Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic 
Given the clear importance of acknowledging intersectionality, as demonstrated in analysis of the 
BAME female pay gap relative to white men in Chapter 4, additional tests for the proportions of 
BAME women, BAME men, white women, and white men, if not also for these categories amongst 
professors specifically, would also have been desirable. Unfortunately, these intersectional figures 
for the case studies’ combined population could not be calculated from the publicly available 
archival data, as it was only available in report form and not as raw data to manipulate. 
5.5.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
The second main method of primary data collection that was employed in this thesis was semi-
structured interviews with actors of the academic workforce within my two case study universities. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with three actor categories within each case study, 
including remuneration policy shapers, who were individuals who worked in the centre of the 
university in HR or as part of the senior management team; union representatives, who were 
members of the University and College Union branch committees; and academics, who were 
engaged in teaching and/or research within each case study institution. Three primary arguments 
justify these categories. 
First, a fundamental feature of employment relationships, such as those between academics and 
universities, is an imbalance of power; employers wield more power than employees ceteris paribus 
(Sisson, 2016). The remuneration committees of UK universities, from which some of the 
remuneration policy shapers will be drawn, are required by the Committee of University Chairs58 “to 
monitor accounting, internal control, risk, appointment and remuneration issues” (Ntim, 
Soobaroyen and Broad, 2017, p. 83). This only requires these committees to maintain direct 
oversight of senior management remuneration, but committee members sit at the pinnacle of 
 
58 The Higher Education Code of Governance is not legally binding, but it sets industry standards for 
responsible practice (Committee of University Chairs, 2014). 
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power within the university administration and human resources and should have an informed 
understanding of remuneration policy and practice throughout their institution. Layder (1993) 
emphasised the importance of considering  structural power, with reference to Edwards (1979), 
particularly with respect to “the silent machinery of bureaucratic organisation” (Layder, 1993, p. 
155) when selecting research methods. “The researcher must be sensitive to the existence of partly 
hidden, social relations of control embedded in the setting and context of such firms and which lie 
behind the upfront interactions between workers and authority figures” (Layder, 1993, p. 156). This 
concerns the apparently impersonal policies on “job categories, work rules, promotion and 
discipline procedures, wage scales, definitions of responsibilities and so on” (Layder, 1993, p. 155). A 
representative of the equalities bodies inside the universities should also be aware of recent 
concerns or developments in regards to ensuring fair remuneration for academics, which may 
influence the transparency around pay. A person within the human resources office charged with 
EDI responsibilities should also be able to provide an institutional perspective on remuneration 
relevant policies with a similar equality lens. Taken together, remuneration policy shapers will 
provide a top-down employer perspective of pay secrecy and openness within the university. 
Second, in addition to employers, employees and trade unions have been identified as the other 
traditional actors in employment relations—alongside the state, whose policies provide some of the 
context for this thesis (Sisson, 2016). Therefore, the interviewee categories of UCU committee 
representatives and academics,59 alongside the employer perspective discussed previously, provide 
a holistic picture of pay secrecy and openness policy and practice from the key employment 
relations actors inside the universities.  
Lastly, pay is a critical element of the employment relationship on which trade unions seek to 
redress the imbalance of power for their members. This is why the union wage premium, although 
declining, has long been considered a benefit of membership (Williams, 2014). Therefore, focusing 
this research on the income-talk taboo, with reference to interviews from three different 
perspectives and key university policy documents that are directly or indirectly related to 
 
59 This research largely excludes casual staff doing teaching or research work, such as those hired to do one-off 
marking, one-off demonstrators, short-term research assistants, and compensated guest lecturers, who may 
fall under a labour service agreement (Sisson, 2016). This partly a logistical necessity; casual workers, even 
those doing academic work, typically do not appear on the public directories used to create the sampling 
frame for the survey associated with these interviews. It is also a conceptual decision. Since the income-talk 
taboo mechanism is under-researched, confining this initial exploratory work to those with reasonably parallel 
employment conditions should provide a clearer focus on the key phenomenon.  
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remuneration, should support a more comprehensive analysis of the power dynamics that shape 
relative secrecy or transparency of pay. Consistent with the ‘disciplined flexibility’ (Layder, 1993) 
approach to employing multiple data sources from different perspectives in workplace research, 
Acker’s (2006c) study of the gender regimes in Swedish banks, with respect to the GPG, consisted of 
interviews with employees and management and attendance at several relevant trade union events. 
5.5.3.2.1 Interview Schedule 
I crafted three similar interview schedules, which were adapted to the focus of each employment 
relations actor category. Schedules included 8-11 primary questions each. Interviews were semi-
structured, so that each question contained several prompts to help direct the responses toward 
areas of relevance that were identified in the literature that was reviewed prior to piloting and 
implementing the schedules.60 Interviews were intentionally semi-structured to allow the voice, 
experience, and perceptions of the respondents to come through, particularly when discussing 
potentially sensitive subject matter. Often, the respondents described the experiences of 
themselves or colleagues through vignettes, rather than in a direct answer. Interviews with 
academics became partial work histories, as respondents recalled events stretching back several 
years, which were still impacting their 2016/17 working lives. My reflexive and flexible approach to 
these case study analyses allowed me to engage in a fairly organic conversation with participants, 
particularly the academics and UCU committee members, to probe issues raised by participants, 
while addressing the key questions crafted into my schedule.    
Prior to beginning each interview, each participant was provided with a physical consent form and 
signed a copy for my records, pursuant to the regulations of the Queen Mary Ethics of Research 
Committee. I emailed a copy of this consent form, which contained information about the project, 
to each participant in advance of their interview, so they were aware of the project details and the 
consent form prior to signing the form on meeting. Two participants returned the consent form 
electronically signed prior to meeting, but the remainder signed the form just prior to beginning the 
interview. This helped to emphasise the professional nature of my research, reassure respondents 
that their information would be protected, and begin to build trust. In some settings, signing a 
consent form could be perceived as clinical. However, as I was interviewing people who themselves 
do research, the process helped in building trust with the participants to ensure that they could talk 
freely about sensitive and stressful issues that many were experiencing at work. I also reviewed the 
biography of each academic participant and their relevant categorising traits (for those who had 
 
60 See Appendix G to read the interview schedules.  
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volunteered via my survey and therefore already provided them) in advance of each interview so 
that I could ensure I emphasised relevant probes. For academics who had not participated in my 
survey, I asked the same categorising questions, which appear in the interview schedule, before 
beginning each interview. This also enabled me to include relevant prompts, such as ones about the 
union to UCU members.      
Key sections of the interview schedules include:  
• Expository: Consistent with acknowledged good practice, an expository statement provided 
a clear explanation of the purpose, format and length of the interview, reason for recording 
the interview, and reasonable assurances to participants of their confidentiality, anonymity 
and ability to ask questions, seek clarification, or refuse to answer questions at any point 
(Rose, 1994; Whiting, 2008, p. 37). 
 
• Icebreaker into the Income-talk taboo: This introductory question was meant to try and get 
respondents thinking about my subject to a degree that they may not have considered 
previously. When speaking with Dr Brendan Burchell at the Work, Employment and Society 
Conference 2016, he advised that since the taboo is something people may innately feel but 
have not necessarily considered deeply, it may be more useful to create a scenario in their 
head and ask them to comment on it, rather than to ask them first about their own 
experiences. This is why I began each interview with a “hypothetical-interaction question” 
(Lapan, Quartaroli and Riemer, 2012, p. 256), as a means to gather more rich data than with 
a direct, closed question. Furthermore, Leech (2002) suggested that expert respondents 
may find it easier to respond to these than direct questions when discussing their 
professional life. 
 
• University ‘Pay Communication’ Policies and the Income-Talk Taboo: The first major half of 
the interview schedule was developed to elicit descriptions of policy and cultural 
perceptions in relation to the OSE in each case study, from the perspectives of employers, 
the union, and employees. Related to the emphasis on structural power in employment 
relations analysis (Edwards, 1979; Layder, 1993), Acker (1990) argues that the proclaimed 
gender neutrality of workplace policies often obscures deeply gendered organisational logic 
or bureaucracy. This provides the theoretical justification for critically assessing the extent 
to which the universities themselves formally and informally regulate the balance between 
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secrecy and transparency surrounding pay, which may shape the extent of the taboo against 
discussing pay that is felt within the universities. Limited existing scholarship tended to treat 
the income-talk taboo as a settled, homogenous cultural force (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; 
Levine and Stanchi, 2001; Bierman and Gely, 2004; Lavie, 2009). However, there was 
potential for interesting gaps to emerge between the opinions of those at the centre and of 
(at least some) academics about how transparent pay was inside the universities. 
 
• Experience of University Pay Policies (Pay Scale, Market/Retention Supplements, 
Bonuses/Performance Awards, Allowances, Promotions, Professorial Review): The second 
major half of the interview schedule was meant to explore the operation of policies on pay 
(and related progression). Key concepts known to impact pay inequality, such as revealing 
one’s current pay level on application for a new job (Cowley, 2016; Sisson, 2016; Young, 
2016), bonus pay (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2009; Metcalf and Rolfe, 2009), 
parenthood (Waldfogel, 1998; Budig and England, 2001; England, 2005), and promotion 
were discussed in this section. UK academia has been criticised for presenting a false 
meritocracy. What is characterised as gender-neutral meritocracy in academia, has been 
found to be strongly imbued with masculine assumptions; these assumptions can be 
summarised by the characterisation of a successful academic: one who publishes 
extensively, always contributes to research metrics, and never takes a career break (Knights 
and Richards, 2003). Knights and Richards (2003, p. 231) note that “experience in industry or 
the non-academic professions is formally to be taken into account in selecting an academic 
for promotion but there is no formal recognition of giving birth or mothering.” Their 
criticism is consistent with Acker’s (2012) critique that organisational logic is often falsely 
presented as gender-neutral. The extent to which the false neutrality of pay (and related 
progression) policies may be individually felt, but subject to a cloak of secrecy, could 
strengthen the detrimental impact of such policies on academics. 
 
Although these interviews were semi-structured, I made clear from the outset that interviewees 
were free to ask me questions, which sometimes seemed to help them think through their 
responses. For example, one HoD asked why someone in their position would examine the pay of 
those within their department. I provided an anecdote of another HoD who had told me that this 
enabled them to take steps to help narrow the GPG within their department. In the spirit of ‘action 
research’, that respondent stated at the end of the interview that perhaps they needed to start 
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thinking more about pay issues. I also encouraged respondents to keep telling me stories of their 
anecdotal experiences when they were concerned about straying from the topic. Lastly, I made sure 
to give all respondents the opportunity for a final word at the end of each interview. Most did not 
have anything further to offer, but some provided quite helpful content in this way, such as a person 
who reflected that they find much more value in speaking about pay with friends outside academia. 
The person was considering their longer-term career options.   
5.5.3.2.2 Pilot Interviews 
Once I had agreed draft interview schedules with my supervisors, I conducted six pilot interviews to 
test my interview schedules in order to improve their clarity and ability to achieve a targeted line of 
semi-structured inquiry. All my pilot interviewees were based in one of my two case study 
institutions, apart from one who had recently moved to a new job. Participants were selected to 
provide the opportunity to engage with the different types of employment relations actors that I 
planned to include in my analysis. For academics, this included a mixture of males and females; 
white and a BAME individual, and a professor and non-professors, including one former HoD. A pilot 
interview was also conducted with a former remuneration policy shaper and a member of the local 
UCU committee. All pilot interviewee participants were therefore ineligible for participation in my 
case study interviews. Table 5-6 provides a summary of the pilot interviewees. 
Table 5-6: Pilot Interviewee Demographics Analysis 
 
5.5.3.2.3 Purposive Sampling of Interviewees 
The interviews for the two case studies were obtained through a process of purposive sampling.  
This was intended to maximise the depth of material that can be gathered from a small number of 
cases (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). I used multiple purposive sampling techniques to achieve 
comparability between case studies and analytically important groups of academics, which was 
based on “purposive maximum variation sampling” (Dupin et al., 2015, p. 73). This required 
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intentionally increasing the proportion of women and BAME academics interviewed to a level that 
was higher than their representation in the academic workforce of the case studies. Where this aim 
was not possible using the original pool of interview volunteers that I obtained through my Qualtrics 
survey, I supplemented with snowball sampling (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). Snowball sampling entailed 
securing additional interviewees from survey respondents with whom I had already established a 
connection, in order to reach workforce segments that might otherwise have been excluded 
(Atkinson and Flint, 2001). The remuneration policy shapers and UCU committee members were 
chosen based upon my expectations about the perspectives their positions could add to this 
research, with some guidance from the institutional gatekeepers and other shapers. Academics 
were chosen based upon my expectations about the interplay between workplace inequality, 
professorial status, and gender and ethnicity categories, with an intention to contrast the 
experiences of those with differing privilege.   
The academic interview volunteer pool began with those who volunteered for a potential semi-
structured interview through my Qualtrics survey. 120 individuals volunteered (31.3% of completed 
respondents). As may be expected, there was a significant difference between the pay discussion 
behaviour of interview volunteers and other respondents, as summarised in Table 5-7. Those who 
volunteered for a follow-up interview were more likely to admit discussing pay than those who did 
not volunteer. This difference is significant at the 1% confidence level (p = 0.006). Therefore, an 
effort was made to ensure that at least 25% of my interviewees did not report engaging in social pay 





Table 5-7: Interviewee Volunteer Analysis 
*p< 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 
Further examination of the pay discussion behaviour, as summarised in Table 5-7, justified sampling 
across disciplines. I coded the respondents’ disciplines as male-dominated, integrated, or female-
dominated, using the ECU’s (2015b) staff report figures and the 70% rule from Dex et al. (2008), 
where the authors suggested that women's wage growth is better when women work in male-
dominated or integrated workplaces, than when they work in female-dominated workplaces. Dex et 
al. (2008) characterised workplaces with more than 70% men/women as male/female-dominated 
and other workplaces as integrated. There was no statistically significant difference in the pay 
comparison behaviour for those in male-dominated versus integrated disciplines.61 This was true for 
all respondents and for men and women analysed separately.  
When respondents were asked to place their department within the categories of male or female 
predominance based on their perception, and when respondents were divided by those working in 
Science, Engineering and Technology (SET)62 disciplines or not, statistically significant differences 
were found. Those working in perceived female-dominated departments were the least likely to 
discuss pay, while those working in perceived male-dominated departments were the most likely to 
discuss pay. Contrastingly, those in SET disciplines (which tend to be more male-dominated 
 
61 This was also true for female-dominated disciplines but there was only 1 respondent in any female-
dominated discipline. 
62 SET used to match terminology of Equality Challenge Unit (2016) (now AdvanceHE) staff data reports.  
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nationally) were less likely to discuss pay than those working in non-SET disciplines. It could be that 
departments covering SET disciplines in my case studies were less male-dominated than their 
disciplines were nationally. Alternatively, respondents’ perception of the male/female dominance 
within their department may have been inaccurate. Either way, the analysis in Table 5-7 suggests 
that intentionally conducting semi-structured interviews with academics across disciplines made 
sense at this early stage in developing the OSE conceptualisation.  
The first group of interviewees consisted of 5-7 remuneration policy shapers per university case 
study, who represent the employer perspective. For each university, these interviewees consisted of 
a mix of those with involvement in the remuneration committee, such as the human resources 
director, vice-chancellor63 or an external committee member; and members of senior management 
and human resources with responsibilities for EDI issues, reward and/or trade union relations. Table 
5-8 details the interviewees who were obtained in this sub-category for both case studies.  
Table 5-8: Remuneration Policy Shaper Interviewees 
 
The second group of interviewees consisted of three UCU committee members per university, who 
had some connection to ethnicity and gender equality issues, as presented in Table 5-9. They 
provide the trade union perspective. UCU committee members—and some university policy 
shapers—were also academics. However, given the acknowledged difficulty in securing academics as 
research participants, due to their heavy workload and the frequency of such requests (Lawson, 
 
63 The term vice-chancellor is not used at all UK universities, but it is used in this thesis as the generic term for 
the most senior administrator of a UK university (Morgan, 2011b).  
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Kitson and Hughes, 2016), I interviewed such individuals in their capacity as UCU committee 
members or university policy shapers.  
Table 5-9: University and College Union Committee Member Interviewees 
 
The third set of interviewees were academics (16 per case study), in order to provide the essential 
employee perspective. Academic interviews drew on a mixture of participants by discipline (no more 
than three from the same department) to ensure that specific cultures that may exist within 
different parts of a university had no undue influence over this thesis’s findings. I assigned each 
department the discipline of nearest match to those reported in AdvanceHE’s (2018) staff data 
report on the 2016/17 academic year, as displayed in Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 (Chapter 4). 
Additionally, the different pay structures for professors and academics below the professoriate were 
discussed in Chapter 4. To capture a mixture of those with pay subject to sectoral collective 
bargaining and those under more individualised professorial pay structures, I sought to interview at 
least six professors per case study. The importance of this distinction is further supported by the 
findings of this thesis’s original survey, that professors were much more likely to discuss their pay 
than non-professors, ceteris paribus (Chapter 7).   
In terms of Acker’s (2006b, 2006a) inequality regimes as the foundation of this thesis’s analytical 
framework, it was also important to obtain a mixture of interviewees by their gender and ethnicity 
identities. Therefore, I aimed to achieve at least gender balance overall amongst academic 
interviewees within each case study. This intentionally elevated the voices of female academics 
above their employment representation in each university. Women made up nearly 40% of 
academic and/or research staff in University Alpha and nearly 45% in University Beta, according to 
the 2015/16 data used to validate the survey responses, which was the most recent available when 
the fieldwork was conducted.  
Finally, I sought to ensure a reasonable balance between BAME and white individuals within each 
case study. This again intentionally elevated the voices of BAME academics above their employment 
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representation in each university. The significantly lower proportion of BAME staff (than women) 
among academics working in the case studies would have made obtaining a 50/50 balance of 
interviewees challenging. This was punctuated by the lack of any BAME staff from University Alpha 
having initially volunteered for a follow-up interview through my survey. BAME individuals made up 
nearly 15% of academic and/or research staff in University Alpha and just over 20% of academic 
and/or research staff in University Beta, according to the 2015/16 data available at the time of the 
fieldwork. Therefore, I sought to secure interviews with 4-5 BAME academics per case study (25-
31.25% of the academic interviews).    
The decision to elevate the voices of women, BAME academics, and BAME women above their 
employment representation levels is consistent with the use of Acker’s (2006b, 2006a) inequality 
regimes and the intersectional feminist orientation of this thesis. Focusing on one category of 
disadvantage “leads at best to oversimplification of the concerns of inequality and at worst obscures 
the complex nature of inequality and domination, silencing the experiences of the least privileged 
and most subordinated” (Tatli and Özbilgin, 2012, p. 250). To consider potentially obscured voices in 
the thesis analysis, inclusion of such experiences needed to be maximised. 
Given the importance of identity and individual perception, I did not follow a proscribed definition 
or visible minority method for categorising interviewees.  For gender and ethnicity, interviewees 
were asked to categorise themselves. In the case of gender, most respondents identified as male or 
female. One respondent explained that she identified as a non-binary woman, although she felt that 
for the purposes of this study, she considered herself female because she felt that pay-related issues 
were influenced by how she was viewed by others, which was female. Therefore, for any analysis in 
this research where gender is important, her responses are considered to come from a female 
academic. In the case of ethnicity, I asked respondents whether they identified as white or BAME. 
Most had a clear answer, but again one respondent had a nuanced response. The respondent was 
mixed-race and brought up by white parents but felt perceived as black by colleagues. Again, in the 
context of the working environment, the respondent felt that BAME was the appropriate 
categorisation so that is how this respondent has been categorised.     
A competing consideration was the fact that this research represents the first in-depth explorations 
into workplace pay secrecy. Therefore, I chose to include male and white voices in the research. This 
would allow for comparison of the experiences of those located at different intersections of societal 
privilege and exploration of the conclusion that hegemonic masculinity within academia, limits 
everyone (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Connected to this consideration, I also decided to 
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include 4-5 interviews per case study (25-31.25% of academic interviews) with those who answered 
(or would answer) no to the question “This research specifically concerns conversations you may 
have about your pay level relative to the pay level of others. Do you ever talk about pay with your 
co-workers?” This presented a low bar for demonstrating willingness (or unwillingness) to 
contravene the income-talk taboo, namely ever talking about pay with co-workers. The original 
survey provided some information about the demographics of academics who answered ‘no’ to this 
question. However, given my interest in creating a full first picture of the function of workplace pay 
secrecy, it was important to interrogate more deeply the motivations and circumstances driving 
compliance and violation of the income-talk taboo.  
Through the Qualtrics survey, 120 academics volunteered for a follow-up interview, 34 from 
University Alpha (33.33% of 102 completed respondents) and 86 from University Beta (30.5% of 282 
respondents). Table 5-10 disaggregates these volunteers along professorial status, gender, and 
ethnicity, illustrating the definitive need to use snowball sampling to attain the desired 4-5 academic 
interviewees of BAME identity from University Alpha.     
Table 5-10: Initial Interview Volunteer Analysis 
 
Table 5-11 summarises the purposive sampling for academic interviews in University Alpha. The 
sampling also includes three HoDs per university, as they have unique oversight of the pay 
distributions within their academic unit and the ability to take steps to remedy the inequality that 
they observe. However, HoD status is not identified here to protect their anonymity.  
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Table 5-11: Academics: University Alpha (16 Interviews) 
 
Table 5-12 summarises the purposive sampling for academic interviews in University Beta. 
Table 5-12: Academics: University Beta (16 Interviews) 
 
The interview process was conducted in one phase from May 2017 through December 2017. I 
conducted a total of 50 interviews across the three academic employment actor types described 
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earlier (24 interviews at University Alpha and 26 interviews at University Beta). Interviews lasted 
approximately 60 minutes, although two were only 45 minutes and two lasted around 2 hours. 
Interviews were conducted in person64 to eliminate risk of technical difficulties cutting into interview 
time or creating poor quality audio recordings for transcription, and because it is easier to ‘read’ 
participant interest and comfort during in-person discussion. 
5.5.3.3 Publicly Available Pay and Progression Related Policy Documents  
Where appropriate, the substance of semi-structured interviews will be compared with the text of 
relevant policy documents related directly or indirectly to remuneration and equality from each case 
study. Documents that were obtained fall under the following headings: Athena SWAN, university 
EDI committee, equal pay audit/review, University and College Union, pay scale, market/retention 
supplements, bonuses/performance awards, allowances, promotions, and professorial review. I kept 
a physical binder and an electronic file of these documents for each case study for ease of reference. 
These documents drive the analysis in Chapter 6 but cannot be directly cited or quoted from, in 
order to maintain my ethical commitment to institutional confidentiality.  
5.5.3.4 Research Diary 
The importance of recording thoughts and minor analyses during fieldwork is well recognised 
(Silverman, 2010). Components of my research diary took two forms:  supervision reports and 
interview notes. After each supervision (approximately monthly), I noted what we discussed, 
including key research problems and planned next steps. Whilst these reports were an 
administrative requirement of my PhD programme, I typically included more detail than required. 
Therefore, they came to encapsulate key aspects of the research process, helping me to recall my 
research decision-making process. I additionally diarised through interview notes. I wrote notes 
during each interview, in addition to audio recording. They summarised the narratives and 
documented references that interviewees made to resources, documents, and occasionally other 
academic writing. Soon after each interview, I typed these notes for later reference. This helped me 
to secure and collate suggested resources and allowed me to add texture to the conversation 
summaries where I recalled something, but I had not been able to note it, such as when individuals 
significantly paused or laughed, suggesting thoughts beyond the stated words. 
 
64 I wanted to complete and transcribe one interview prior to attending an NVIVO training, and the participant 
could only participate by phone within that time frame. 
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5.5.4 Primary Data Analysis  
This section will finally explain the general processes used to analyse primary data collected for this 
thesis. 
5.5.4.1 Primary Survey Data Analysis 
This section describes the essential principles of the analysis of the Qualtrics survey data. Upon 
completion of the survey data collection, the data was downloaded from Qualtrics and files for the 
two case studies were merged. As part of the merge, I added a variable that indicated the case study 
that each response came from to enable comparison of pay discussion behaviour between the two 
institutions. This comparison was essential to demonstrating the legitimacy of merging the data 
(Chapter 7). Despite this combination, analysis of this full dataset remains indicative, not statistically 
generalisable to all UK academics due to the survey’s limited sampling frame. Nevertheless, the 
completed response rate—15.42%—indicated sufficient engagement with the exercise across both 
institutions (Table 5-4), whilst the N-BIAS analysis conducted suggested minimal concern of non-
response bias amongst the target population (Table 5-5). 
This survey revisited Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) attempts to identify factors associated with the 
propensity to engage in social pay comparison. For the first time, this survey begins to suggest who, 
among UK academics, are talking about their pay. This will be done first by testing the bivariate 
relationship between identified variables from previous literature and reporting social pay 
comparison behaviour using chi-square tests. Next, a binomial logistic regression model will be 
specified using the same independent variables and dichotomous dependent variable to indicate the 
relative strength of the previous relationships, ceteris paribus. 
5.5.4.2 Qualitative Case Study Data Analysis  
This section describes the essential principles of the qualitative case study data analysis, making use 
of the semi-structured interviews alongside remuneration-related policy documents from each case 
study. In consideration of ‘disciplined flexibility’ (Layder, 1993), early analysis of the survey data was 
completed prior to conducting most of the interviews. Therefore, I was aware that professors 
seemed to talk about pay more than academics below the professoriate and sought to probe 
respondents with that finding in mind where relevant. 
I transcribed all the interviews using Wreally.com. I opted against contracted transcribing for three 
reasons. First, many colleagues had transcription done externally and still had to spend a great deal 
of time verifying and correcting transcripts, even from internally recommended transcribers. 
Second, I wanted to be able to provide complete assurance to my participants that no one would 
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hear the recordings besides me. Some participants revealed particularly sensitive experiences. I 
believe this occurred because I established their trust. At the conclusion of an interview with one 
academic who was experiencing extraordinarily stressful pay and progression challenges, the 
participant told me that I was really good at interviewing, that I had a naturally kind way of listening, 
which seemed to open them up. While most of my respondents were not elite interviewees, some 
of them could potentially be personally identified from their transcripts, for example those with 
niche research areas that were discussed in the interview. Finally, doing my own transcription 
helped me to become familiar with my data before coding.  
The process of analysis was iterative, drawing on the initial synthesis of literature and evolving to 
consider key ideas that emerged from the interviews. Writing Chapters 6 and 8 began somewhat 
before the coding process and continued after it was complete. NVIVO is a valuable tool for 
qualitative analysis, particularly where there is a desire to explore intersecting identities (such as 
gender and ethnicity) and experiences of processes (Mooney, 2016). Therefore, I used NVIVO 11. I 
initially created a classification sheet to record interviewee demographics to enable later recall of 
text by, for instance, BAME women professors. I also auto coded each interview transcript by 
speaker and by interview question to enable more efficient exploration of content pertaining to key 
ideas of interest, such as the promotion process. Next, I began manual coding of each transcript, 
guided initially by creating parent nodes from the four key themes identified in Figure 4-7 (Chapter 
4). Themes are ideas “that can be seen running through several responses” (Harding, 2013, p. 6). 
Under this came child nodes using the four theorised concepts that were associated with inequality 
regime components and linked with a pay communication typology component. A concept is an 
“underlying idea that is not necessarily referred to directly by respondents” (Harding, 2013, p. 6). 
Under these, emerged key categories based on the experiences of academics. Categories are 
headings “under which different sections of data can be placed for the purpose of analysis” 
(Harding, 2013, p. 6). Two free nodes that did not fit this hierarchical node system precisely were 
also identified.65 The iterative aspect of this analysis, which involved reading each full transcript 
many times, helped to reduce the risk of the NVIVO process becoming mechanistic. The hierarchical 
node coding tree process enabled me to identify commonalities in the experiences of academics, 
and to consider these experiences in relation to the assertions of remuneration policy shapers, 
union representatives and university policy documents, similar to the thematic analysis process of 
Healy et al. (2010).  
 
65 See Appendix H for a summary of coding nodes. 
158 
 
Chapter 6 Employer ‘Pay Communication’ Policy, Perspectives on Data 
Transparency, and External Recognition: The Setting 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the analysis is located at the level of the institutional setting and draws on the 
intermediate social organisation of two workplaces. Analysing the institutional setting of two 
research intensive universities in the South East of England is consistent with the adoption of 
Layder’s (1993, 2013) social domain and adaptive theories in this thesis (Chapter 5). This analysis will 
address the first sub-research question: To what effect has the pay ‘transparency agenda’ been 
performed in the two university case studies? To answer this question, this chapter will revisit the 
analytical framework that was initially developed through Chapters 2-4 for thematic analysis of the 
relationship between the organisational salary environment (OSE) and the persistent gender and 
ethnicity-based pay inequality in the two case study universities. Then the two institutional case 
studies will be described. The description will first demonstrate the extent to which the pay 
‘transparency agenda’ has been formally ‘performed’ in each institution, based on their public pay 
and progression-related policies. Second, the description will reveal the pay inequality inside the 
case study institutions, based on the Times Higher Education (THE) pay survey, whilst exploring the 
additional changing forces that could augment the pay inequality that is experienced within the UK’s 
higher education (HE) sector. Finally, this chapter will compare and contrast the institutional settings 
of Universities Alpha and Beta through the lens of policy shapers, union representatives and 
academics, with a focus first on the theme of data transparency and second on the theme of 
external recognition of inclusive employment practices. The chapter will conclude by demonstrating 
the theoretical contribution that emerged from this analysis, namely the functioning of employer 
‘pay communication’ policies as the first component of the OSE analytical framework.  
6.2 A Call for Thematic Analysis  
While the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ to reduce unfairness, especially based on 
gender and ethnicity (Chapter 1), has been argued, the paradox is that perfunctory transparency can 
become a defence of gendered and racialised practices that reinforce inequality. The focus on the 
employer perspective in traditional ‘pay communication’ research has been described as a 
considerable shortcoming in the existing literature (Chapter 3), which creates a risk that the 
asymmetric power of employers over employees (Sisson, 2016) encourages such communication to 
become secrecy masquerading as transparency. This has been illustrated, for instance, in the 
context of Dutch and UK academic recruitment practices (Bozionelos, 2005; van den Brink, Benschop 
and Jansen, 2010). Thematic analysis here and in Chapter 8 will strengthen the understanding of this 
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paradox, by extension to pay and related progression policies in UK academia, contextualised by the 
income-talk taboo (Fox, 2014). 
Performance of pay transparency in the two university case studies did not mean radical 
transparency of individual level pay. The more conservative focus of transparency was on presenting 
systems for pay determination and progression as transparent and reporting some aggregate 
analyses of the outcomes of those systems, albeit not always in a timely or consistent fashion. This 
suggests a risk of something similar to what the US legal and sociology scholar Edelman (2016) called 
“symbolic civil rights.” Edelman (2016) argues that human resource departments have a tendency to 
create the appearance of doing something, which is motivated by legal compliance rather than 
motivated by eliminating discrimination. This partially explains the persistence of workplace gender 
and race discrimination, despite decades of legal protection. Edelman (2016, p. 107) points to 
“symbolic structures, including statements and posters indicating a commitment to civil rights 
compliance, policies banning discrimination (and later, sexual harassment), and the creation of 
compliance officer positions, grievance procedures, and training and recruitment programs”, as 
problematic tactics intended to demonstrate legal compliance that have been adopted by 
government, universities and private employers. Ahmed (2012) made a similar observation of the 
weak link between stated equality policy aims and actual outcomes and cultural shifts surrounding 
racism in UK universities. Ahmed (2012) deftly illuminated the practice of UK universities creating 
equalities documents instead of doing equalities work—at best—or creating equalities documents 
that actively obscure bad practice to preserve reputation—at worst. This chapter will demonstrate 
that universities operationalise equal pay and diversity data publication and external recognition 
communication, such as about Athena SWAN, in a similar manner. This will thus reveal a pay 
‘transparency paradox’, from which will emerge the first OSE component, namely the functioning of 
employer ‘pay communication’ policies.  
This chapter and Chapter 8 will apply the foundation of this thesis’s analytical framework that has 
been developed through Chapters 2-4. Acker (2006b, p. 441) described her inequality regimes, on 
which this thesis’s analytical framework is founded, as “interlocked practices and processes.” This 
thesis applies analytical separation between the four components used in the thematic analysis, 
whilst acknowledging their interconnectedness in practice. For example, professorial pay banding at 
University Alpha is a bureaucratic process through which professorial pay and advancement is 
determined, and the experience of academic staff with professorial banding in Alpha will be 
analysed from this perspective in Chapter 8. However, the decision in University Alpha to analyse 
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pay only within professorial pay bands and not across the professoriate as a whole in their equal pay 
audits, has implications for understanding the influence of vertical segregation within the 
professoriate on the gender pay gap (GPG). This will be discussed from the perspective of data 
transparency in this chapter.  
6.3 Case Study Comparison: ‘Pay Transparency’ Policies 
UK universities are quasi-public, taxpayer supported institutions and subject to multi-layered 
pressures to become more transparent about their pay (Chapter 4). Within this context, there is a 
certain degree of similarity in terms of employment policies across HE institutions in the UK, but 
there are also differences in how institutions have responded to growing transparency pressures. 
While the thematic analysis of this chapter will focus on the institutional setting created by data 
transparency and external recognition communication, it is important to first assess the differences 
in the degree of formalised transparency that the policies of Universities Alpha and Beta indicate. 
Table 6-1 illustrates several ways in which University Alpha appears to have progressed towards a 
more formalised and transparent pay and related progression practice than University Beta by the 
academic year 2016/17. This table has been prepared based on an analysis of policy documents 
from the respective website of each institution, supplemented by clarifications from relevant actors 
during the interviews and through e-mail follow-ups where necessary. Policies have been organised 
under each of the four themes of this thesis’s analytical framework: data transparency, external 
recognition66, informal pay secrecy norms, and bureaucratic pay and promotion processes. In the 
table, a formalised policy that demonstrates transparency is indicated by underlined bold text, and a 
policy that detracts from transparency is indicated by normal text.
 
66 As of April 7, 2018, only one UK institution held an Athena SWAN gold award, 15 held a silver award, and a 
further 127 held a bronze award (Equality Challenge Unit, 2018c). To preserve institutional anonymity of 
Universities Alpha and Beta, the level of institutional award held will not be reported. That they engaged in 
successfully attaining the recognition is sufficient. Additionally, only 9 UK institutions held a Race Equality 
Charter award, while 42 were signed up to the charter (Equality Challenge Unit, 2018d). To again preserve 
institutional anonymity, the award status of these institutions will not be reported in this thesis. That the 




Table 6-1: Key Pay and Progression Policies by Analytical Framework Theme in Universities Alpha and Beta during 2016/17 
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Of the 13 policy areas analysed across the four themes, University Beta policies detract from 
transparent performance in six areas, while University Alpha does so in only two. Given the greater 
degree of formalisation of pay transparency at University Alpha than Beta across a range of pay and 
related progression policy areas, workplace equality outcomes and experiences could be expected 
to be better at Alpha than Beta. We might particularly expect this for professorial pay, given that 
Alpha had a well-established professorial pay banding structure, which is thought to ensure greater 
equality, while University Beta did not.  
Therefore, it is surprising that the following section reveals that these institutions had a consistently 
similar and above average GPG for all academics. It is further unexpected that the professorial GPG 
at University Alpha was markedly worse than average across the UK and was growing wider leading 
up to 2016/17, while at the same time, Beta was consistently much better than average across the 
UK and was narrowing. Striking similarities in the inequality experiences reported by academics in 
both institutions will be unpacked in Chapter 8. This suggests that pay ‘transparency agenda’ 
performance serves a symbolic role for institutional reputation, whilst creating barriers to practical 
challenges to inequality. The risk of formalised employment practices falling short of their goal of 
reducing workplace inequality has been explored under the coined term ‘hyper-formalisation’ (Noon 
et al., 2013). This concept has been used to explain persistent academic recruitment inequality in 
the Dutch and British contexts, as previously mentioned (Bozionelos, 2005; van den Brink, Benschop 
and Jansen, 2010).  
6.4 Case Study Comparison: Pay Inequality 
This section describes the GPG trends at Universities Alpha and Beta using the THE pay survey to the 
fullest extent possible, without compromising institutional anonymity.67 This locates Universities 
Alpha and Beta within the macro HE sectoral context level analysis that was presented in Chapter 4. 
Since at least 2007, the THE has created transparency pressure on UK universities by publishing an 
analysis of the mean salary for full-time male and female academics by university (Fearn and 
Newman, 2007). Since 2008, they have also included the same figures for professors only (Fearn and 
Newman, 2008; Fearn, 2009; Morgan and Fearn, 2010; Morgan, 2011a; Times Higher Education, 
2012; Grove, 2013a, 2014, 2015b, 2016a, 2017b). Similar criticism of the THE’s publication was 
expressed by policy shapers at the centre of both universities during the interview stage of this 
 
67 This analysis pertains only to the gender pay gap because the Times Higher Education pay survey has only 
analysed the gap shown in HESA data by gender year-on-year. Institutional level pay analysis by gender and 




thesis. The criticism was based on the THE’s use of an aggregate level of analysis. Nevertheless, this 
publication does create visibility of inequality (Acker, 2006a, 2006b). Unlike university compliance 
with the PSED and Athena SWAN applications, universities do not control the THE’s published 
messages about this visible inequality. However, the THE only calculates the unadjusted GPG, while 
equal pay audits disaggregate the data, to consider whether pay is different between men and 
women doing jobs that have been rated of equal value through a job evaluation exercise (Equality 
and Human Rights Commission, 2015b).  
The above understanding of equal pay audits is somewhat weakened when the audits are critically 
analysed within the practical context of academic employment. In many respects, academics from 
lecturer to professor do the same basic job, particularly those who are employed through traditional 
teaching and research contracts. The academic promotion guidance of Universities Alpha and Beta 
suggests that academic promotion, which unlocks access to higher points on the pay scale or above 
the pay scale, essentially rewards subjective assessment of past achievements, not the duties of the 
new role that the academic fills following a promotion. Academics are aware of the importance of 
an academic CV (or its contents) to the success of academic promotions. This notion can be 
illustrated in practise. If a senior lecturer is promoted partly based on scholarship achievements that 
are demonstrated through the creation of a successful module and the academic repeats the 
teaching of that module for several years, they do not revert back to the pay range of a lecturer 
because they have not created another brilliant new module. If a professor achieves the 
professoriate partly based on publishing ‘paradigm-shifting’ research and their work subsequently 
becomes less revered, they are not demoted to the pay range of a reader. Without advocating for 
such pay declines, these examples raise questions about the appropriateness of the traditional job 
evaluation (Acker, 1989) and equal pay audit logic in the specific context of academic employment in 
the UK. Universities should reflect on the implications of this for their pay setting and promotion 
practices. 
Universities Alpha and Beta had both conducted at least one equal pay audit in the decade prior to 
2016/17. However, the level of detail that was released publicly about these audits varied. 
Therefore, direct comparison between the institutions or consistent analysis of change over time is 
impossible. While University Alpha’s audits included all staff, University Beta’s most recent audit 
excluded professors. By contrast, the THE Pay Survey analyses data that nearly all public UK 
universities submit directly to HESA and has used a uniform analysis method over the past decade. 
This allows for a consistent comparison to be made over time between the two case study 
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universities. Furthermore, the limitations of job evaluation principles in the context of academic 
work suggests that there is value in making such aggregate comparisons.  
The THE has never provided institutional level analysis by ethnicity or gender/ethnicity in their pay 
survey. Although aggregate UK-wide ethnic pay gap data was finally provided in 2017, the analysis 
was not broken down by institution, nor was it presented in intersection with gender. The 
publication did not compare BAME men and women academics separately against white male 
academics. Therefore, this section can only consider the GPG trends over time. It cannot shed any 
light on the potentially distinct trends experienced by BAME men and women academics (Fearn and 
Newman, 2007, 2008; Fearn, 2009; Morgan and Fearn, 2010; Morgan, 2011a; Times Higher 
Education, 2012; Grove, 2013a, 2014, 2015b, 2016a, 2017b).  
Despite the performance of some transparent pay and related policies in both universities, Figure 
6-1 demonstrates that the GPG at Universities Alpha and Beta had consistently run at, or somewhat 
wider than, the gap for all public UK universities that are included in the THE publication.68 This 
suggests that there was at least a structural pay inequality concern for women in both universities. 
So, although this analysis cannot show that men and women at the same level, such as lecturer, are 
being paid differently, it does at least suggest there may be a vertical segregation problem. Men 
may be more concentrated at higher paid job levels, particularly as professors, whereas women may 
be more concentrated at lower paid job levels. Equality questions should be asked about the 
academic promotion systems and recruitment processes that generate such outcomes. 
 
68 Analysis of the THE pay survey publications here follows the established protocol in this research by 
labelling the specific institutional figures University Alpha and University Beta. This graph compiles multiple 
years of THE data, which is also behind a paywall, and is reported in a substantially different format. THE 
reports average annual salary for full-time men and women, whereas this analysis relies only on the 
percentage gaps between men and women. Therefore, connecting these figures to their case study of origin 
does not substantially identify the research sites. 
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Figure 6-1: Universities Alpha and Beta Mean Full-Time Academic Gender Pay Gap 
 
Note: The ‘All UK HE Providers’ figure was not reported in the 2007 publication. 
Source: Author’s analysis of the Times Higher Education pay survey (2007-2017)  
 
The GPG amongst professors within University Alpha was wider than the national average in most of 
the 2007-2017 publications and was widening further in the last few years of the analysis, whilst the 
same gap in University Beta was narrower than the national average over the same period and was 
narrowing in the last few years of the analysis.69 Does this mean that University Beta has solved the 
pay inequality problem, at least for those women who manage to reach the lofty heights of 
professor, whilst inequality is worsening for such women in University Alpha? The aggregate data 
presented by the THE cannot answer that question, but it does suggest an important point of 
difference between the two institutions. As pointed out by Helen Fairfoul, chief executive of the 
University and Colleges Employers Association (UCEA) in the 2017 THE survey publication, the 
professorial GPG could widen ‘counter-intuitively’ due to an increase in the promotion of women to 
the professoriate. Newly promoted professors would generally begin as the lowest paid professors 
 
69 The figures behind this statement were calculated using the same process as the all academics figures (in 
this case, GPG = [(male professorial annual salary mean - female professorial annual salary mean)/ (male 
professorial annual salary mean)]. However, the figure demonstrating these professorial trends and appendix 
tables providing the precise GPG figures underlying the all-academic and professor only GPG analysis are not 
presented in this thesis. This is to protect institutional anonymity of Universities Alpha and Beta.    
166 
 
within an institution. Starting from a position where men were more normally distributed along the 
range of professorial pay in an institution, it would take time for women to achieve a similar normal 
distribution in order to narrow the gap (Grove, 2017b). It is possible that this could partly explain the 
widening professorial pay gap at University Alpha. During the interviews, Alpha policy shapers were 
keen to promote their flagship women’s mentorship scheme, which was created to help more 
women to achieve promotion to the professoriate. However, Alpha union representatives were 
sceptical that the programme had significantly shifted the proportion of women in their 
professoriate, based on their own analysis of workforce statistics.70  
 
Conversely, if recently appointed women professors were becoming discouraged and leaving the 
institution, leaving the more senior women professors in-post, this could reduce the professorial 
GPG. The THE analysis revealed that more than 1/3 of UK universities with 150 or more professors 
saw the proportion of professorial posts held by women decline from 2012/13 to 2015/16 (Chapter 
4). The analysis, however, did not show whether this shift occurred due to the number of male 
professors growing more quickly than female professors or whether instead more female professors 
left the institution. If it was the latter, no comment was made on the relative pay of the women who 
left (Grove, 2017a). It may be worthwhile, however, to note that the proportion of professorships 
held by women at University Beta declined during this three-year analysis period. These theoretical 
explanations for the aggregate GPG trends would benefit from further investigation into the 
experience of becoming a professor, which this thesis will address through a discussion of 
professorial pay setting experiences in Chapter 8.   
 
This section has so far discussed the aggregate institutional level trends in the GPG and professorial 
GPG for Universities Alpha and Beta, in relation to trends across the HE sector. Vertical segregation, 
particularly regarding the male-dominance of the professoriate, may account for some of this 
continued pay gap. As illustrated in Chapter 4, vertical segregation is a significant concern across UK 
academia, with only 24.6% of all professorships held by women, only 9.4% held by BAME staff, and 
only 2.1% held by BAME women in the 2016/17 academic year (AdvanceHE, 2018). However, it is 
important to acknowledge some additional changing forces that may augment the pay inequality 
experienced within HE. These particularly include changes in the workforce composition, market 
supplement and discretionary pay awards, pay ranges, and the Research Excellence Framework 
 
70 The representative was not able to share their analyses due to confidentiality concerns, so this disconnect 
could not be further interrogated. 
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(REF). Conversely, union-led collective bargaining for pay across the sector, ought to have 
constrained pay inequality. 
 
The first additional force that may augment pay inequality within UK HE is the changing composition 
of the academic workforce, particularly with respect to the professoriate and gender. Analysis of the 
UK’s academic workforce was conducted for this thesis using the headcount of all full-time academic 
staff (those on teaching and/or research contracts) in the HESA Staff Record for the academic years 
2008/09 through 2015/16. This dataset was also used to demonstrate HE pay inequality trends in 
Chapter 4. This analysis begins in the 2008/09 academic year because the variable that directly 
identifies professorial status is only present in the HESA data from 2008/09 onwards.71 This analysis 
illustrates that although the professoriate remains predominantly male, it has become somewhat 
less so over time.72 However, the professoriate as a proportion of all academic staff has remained 
stable.73  
 
Figure 6-2: Proportion of Full-Time UK Professors by Gender 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of the HESA Staff Record 2008/09-2015/16 
NB: The p-value for coefficient (0.0085) of the trend line is <0.01.  
 
71 Prior years cannot be analysed with the data accessible for this thesis.  
72 A Universities UK (2018) analysis of all professorial posts in the UK from 2009-10 through 2016/17 shows 
similarly that the professoriate remains predominantly both white and male, despite gradual improvement. 
73 In compliance with HESA’s terms of data use, all headcount percentages are based on groups of more than 




According to Figure 6-2, the professoriate remains predominantly male despite having declined from 
81.56% male in 2008/09 to 75.87% male in 2015/16. Mumford and Sechel’s (2019) recent analysis of 
UK academic pay indicated that the higher concentration of men within the professoriate is a strong 
influence on the GPG and that the professoriate is the academic rank with the highest unexplained 
GPG, although their analysis was based solely within the economics discipline. However, their 
findings aligned with Bandiera et al.’s (2016) analysis of the salary of all academic staff at the London 
School of Economics; women were less likely than men to become professors, whilst the 
unexplained GPG was the largest amongst professors. These results make sense given what is known 
about academic pay systems. The academic pay structure is much more rigid up to the level of 
professor, due to its alignment with the national pay spine that has been agreed through sectoral 
collective bargaining. Professorial pay sits above pay spines and is subject to greater 
individualisation and potential discretion (Chapter 4). Pay setting that allows for greater discretion 
and individualisation is known to present a greater risk of generating pay inequalities, for instance in 
the context of the Swedish Karlstad University (Gonäs and Bergman, 2009). Analysis from the 
perspective of the Institute for Employment Studies further indicates that companies that seek to 
narrow their GPG should reduce individualised and discretionary pay setting (Brown 2019). 
Therefore, the predominant vertical segregation of men into the professorial ranks, where pay is not 





Figure 6-3: Professors as a Proportion of All Full-Time UK Academic Staff 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of the HESA Staff Record 2008/09-2015/16 
NB: The p-value for coefficient (0.0009) of the trend line is >0.05. 
 
However, as Figure 6-3 demonstrates, the professoriate as a proportion of all full-time academic 
staff has remained stable—from 13.25% in 2008/09 to 13.39% in 2015/16. An OLS regression 
indicates that the minimally increasing trend line shown is not statistically significant. Therefore, it 
would be difficult to attribute the academic GPG over the analysis period to increasingly 
individualised pay. Essentially, the same proportion of the academic workforce has remained subject 
to a collectively bargained pay scale over the analysis period. However, the statistically significant 
trend of an increasing proportion of women newly entering the professoriate could form part of the 
explanation, as argued by the UCEA Chief Executive mentioned above (Grove, 2017a). 
 
A second potentially augmenting force on academic pay inequality is change to the share of the 
workforce that may be in receipt of market supplements and discretionary pay (bonuses). These 
payments generate deviation from a transparent pay scale. As discussed in Chapter 4, market and 
retention supplements have been used in the UK HE sector for many years. These extra payments to 
attract or keep a prized member of staff are used “to cope either with distinctly robust demand for 
faculty in various disciplines or with the (sometimes potential) robust demand for individuals 
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because of the excellence of their academic records” (Doucet, Durand and Smith, 2008, p. 69). They 
were already in use when the Framework Agreement that underpins the current national pay spine 
for the HE sector was being negotiated. Despite strong union objections, an employer-backed 
allowance for such “attraction and retention premia” payment was included in the final Agreement 
(NATFHE, 2005, p. 11). This was accompanied by union-backed monitoring guidance to help 
employers mitigate the potential inequality risks of using such payments (JNCHES, 2004). The 
poorly-justified retention payment practice of the UK’s Royal Holloway and Bedford New College, 
was highlighted by the 2011 employment tribunal decision in response to Professor Liz Schafer’s 
gender-based pay discrimination claim (Mills & Reeve LLP, 2012; Chilver, 2018). Ward’s (2001) 
analysis of pay in 5 old British universities found that discretionary pay awards, separate to a 
transparent pay scale, did not have a significant impact on the GPG. However, no more recent 
academic analysis of bonus payments or the use of market supplements in UK HE could be 
identified. Furthermore, raw data on the use of such payments could not be identified through the 
HESA Staff Record or any other accessible sources.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, whilst data on market supplements proves challenging to acquire, a 
report based on the HE employers’ own data collected through the Higher Education Workforce 
Survey 2017, asserted that market supplements were used sparingly, but the report provided no 
actual analysis of that data (University and College Employer’s Association, 2017). A search of 
‘market supplements’ on the UCU  (2020c) homepage also reveals no analysis of market supplement 
usage; the term returns only 15 hits, most of which are from 2007 or earlier. The most recent 
document, a 2018 guide for equal pay reviews and GPG reporting, essentially echoes the agreed 
guidance from the time of the Framework Agreement that universities ought to monitor their use of 
market supplements in order to help mitigate the equality risks of their use (New Joint Negotiating 
Committee for Higher Education Staff, 2018). However, bonus pay awards have been found to 
present a significant concern for the GPG within the UK’s financial sector (Healy and Ahamed, 2019). 
Furthermore, recent analysis has found evidence to support the concern that market supplements in 
the Canadian HE context (Doucet, Durand and Smith, 2008) and discretionary payments in the 
Australian HE context (Currie and Hill, 2013; Bailey et al., 2016), do present inequality risks.  
 
A third potentially augmenting force on HE pay inequality could be changes to the range of pay for 
particular grades, especially professors. Analysis has been conducted for this thesis on the pay 
ranges of full-time academic staff (those on teaching and/or research contracts) who are professors 
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and those who are not professors. These are the two job ranks that are directly identified in the 
HESA Staff Records, and this division is available for the academic years 2008/09 through 2015/16. 
First, a boxplot of annual salary for all full-time academic staff (those on teaching and/or research 
contracts) is provided to demonstrate major differences to pay ranges by professorial status and 
gender. This treats the data over the full analysis period as one sample. Annual salary has been 
inflated into real 2016 values using the Consumer Price Index from the UK’s Office for National 
Statistics, which is consistent with other GPG analysis, such as Healy and Ahamed (2019). Secondly, 
analysis to assess changes to pay ranges is demonstrated. The interquartile range, which is the 
difference between the 25th and 75th percentile of salary, is used as a measure of the pay range for 
each grouping in this analysis. This provides a more stable basis than the absolute range of pay, due 
to outliers in the data. These analyses together indicate that the range of pay is wider for professors 
than non-professors—and wider for men than women—but provide little evidence of dramatic 
widening or narrowing of the pay ranges over time.74 
 
Figure 6-4: UK Full-Time Academic Salary 2008/2009 through 2015/2016 
 
 
74 In compliance with HESA’s terms of data use, all interquartile ranges and boxplots of salary (types of 
averages) are based on more than 7 individuals, so none are suppressed. 
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Source: Author’s analysis of the HESA Staff Record 2008/09-2015/16 
Boxplots provide a standardised method to visualise pay ranges by academic rank and gender, which 
has been used, for instance, in Li et al.’s (2019) analysis of the GPG in the US HE sector. The pay 
ranges for academic staff by professorial status and gender are visualised through boxplots in Figure 
6-4. The horizontal lines running through each box represent the median salary. As already 
anticipated by the GPG analysis using the HESA Staff Record in Chapter 4, the median salary for 
women is lower than for men within both the non-professor and professor groupings. The bounded 
vertical lines show the pay ranges excluding outliers75 and the horizontal bounds of the boxes show 
the interquartile range of pay for each grouping. Both methods illustrate that the pay range is wider 
for professors than for non-professors. Pay ranges are also wider for men than women within both 
the non-professor and the professor groupings. Considering this analysis is filtered to include only 
full-time academic staff, the considerable distribution, particularly of high outliers76, may indicate 
some surprising variation from established pay scales for a select few staff.   
 
As previously discussed, research has indicated that the male-dominated professorial rank has the 
widest unexplained GPG (Bandiera, Rana and Xu, 2016; Mumford and Sechel, 2019). The 
Prondzynski (2012) Review of Higher Education Governance strongly advised universities to apply 
pay scales to all university staff—including professors and senior management—in order to meet 
the equality compliance aims of the Framework Agreement. Yet, professorial pay still sits above the 
nationally agreed pay scale. It is therefore notable to confirm here, as expected, that the range for 
professorial pay is wider than for all non-professorial academics. This is important because research 
across many national contexts indicates that wage compression, which is often achieved through 
trade union collective bargaining or minimum wage laws that raise the floor of low pay, is associated 
with a narrowing of the GPG (Blau and Kahn, 1996; Kahn, 2015). The following analysis, however, 
does not demonstrate notable widening or narrowing of pay ranges over the analysis period.   
  
 
75 Pay ranges shown in the boxplot are minimum-bound by the 25th percentile salary minus (1.5*interquartile 
range) and are maximum-bound by the 75th percentile salary plus (1.5*interquartile range). Data points 
beyond this defined range are shown as outliers.  
76 These outliers may accurately reflect variation in pay, although they may also reflect university data entry 
errors, such as miscoding of the vice-chancellor or other members of senior management. Further 
investigation into these outliers was not possible in the scope of this thesis. 
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Figure 6-5: Interquartile Ranges for UK Academic Pay (2016 value) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of the HESA Staff Record 2008/09-2015/16 
NB: The p-value for the coefficients (0.2616 and -31.924) of both trend lines is >0.05. 
 
Figure 6-5 builds on the previous analysis with a focus on the interquartile range to explore any 
change over time. However, the figure demonstrates that there is no statistically significant trend of 
either widening or narrowing of the pay ranges for either professors or non-professors.  
 
Figure 6-6: Interquartile Range for UK Academic Pay by Gender (2016 Value) 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of the HESA Staff Record 2008/09-2015/16 
NB: The p-value for the coefficients (-6.5377 and 35.582) of both male trend lines is >0.05; 
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The p-value for the coefficients (-164.75 and 259.91) of both female trend lines is <0.05. 
 
Figure 6-6 disaggregates the previous interquartile range analysis by gender. This analysis illustrates 
that the pay ranges have not significantly widened or narrowed for male academics or for all non-
professors and all professors. However, there is a statistically significant, although gradual, widening 
of the pay range for women professors, and the opposite for women non-professors. Figures 6-4 
through 6-6 do not provide evidence to suggest that changes to the pay ranges account for the 
persistent GPG. However, the consistently wider pay range within the professoriate, widest for male 
professors, does strengthen previously discussed concerns about the male-dominated professoriate 
as a contributing factor to academic pay inequality. 
 
A final force that may account for continued HE pay inequality is the impact of the REF on 
recruitment and pay strategies. As discussed in Chapter 4, the REF determines access to significant 
UK government research funds, and universities have put in place increasingly demanding research 
performance targets on academics in order to game the metric (Morrish, 2016). Nevertheless, the 
REF exercise is commonly acknowledged by those in the sector to sharply impact recruitment and 
pay strategies. This burden is felt particularly keenly by early-career academics who are too often 
caught in a double-bind of taking on fixed-term teaching-only contracts to survive in the present, 
but because their “teaching time is contractually prioritised over research time” they struggle to 
progress essential publications that are needed to secure permanent employment in the future 
(Peters and Turner, 2014, p. 2322). Munir et al.’s (2013) assessment of Athena SWAN identified the 
REF as an external pressure on departments, which some staff felt actively worked against gender 
equality goals. One of their respondents remarked:  
 
I think the REF’s got a huge amount to answer for because we’ve got an increase in the 
number of professors and a decrease in the proportion of women because basically, as far as 
I can tell, the school’s gone and hired a whole load of bigwig male professors on sort of 20% 
positions to bulk up our REF return and I just think this is demoralising. I think that if the 
school and the university seriously wanted to sustain careers they would be investing in the 
longer term in the staff they’ve got and not bringing in these 20% people that are just totally 
transient. (Munir et al., 2013, p. 127) 
 
The prevalence of ‘poaching’ recruitment behaviour by universities was of sufficiently widespread 
concern that the prominent Stern Review in July 2016 recommended ending the portability of REF-
reportable research outputs to new institutions to discourage this cyclical practice (Stern, 2016). 
Nevertheless, this change does not lay to rest the inequalities concerns about the academic 
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publication process on which the REF is based. There are well-documented inequalities concerns 
with the academic publication process (Miller and Mctavish, 2011; Knobloch-Westerwick, Glynn and 
Huge, 2013; Hengel, 2017), academic citations, which are seen as an impact metric (Maliniak, 
Powers and Walter, 2013; King et al., 2017), the inflated publication standards to which BAME 
academics feel they are held to for promotion (Bhopal, 2015), and academic journal rankings 
themselves (Özbilgin, 2009). 
 
Conversely, union-led collective bargaining for pay across the sector ought to have constrained pay 
inequality. Union membership and collective bargaining coverage has been shown to reduce the 
GPG in other employment contexts; nevertheless, augmenting factors may still preserve inequality 
(Healy and Ahamed, 2019). In the HE context, some of these augmenting factors may particularly 
include, the higher concentration of men in the professoriate where pay is not covered by collective 
bargaining, the use of discretionary pay awards and market supplements, and the influence of the 
REF on recruitment and pay strategies. The extent to which these factors augment pay inequality, 
despite the presence of a transparent pay scale, certainly merits further scrutiny, but it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
 
Analysis of the 2007-2017 THE publications demonstrated that Universities Alpha and Beta 
performed similarly to the HE sector in terms of the GPG. The GPG at the two institutions ran 
consistently at, or slightly wider than, the gap for all UK public universities. This analysis suggests 
that the OSEs experienced inside these two institutions are not extreme outliers from the HE sector. 
Whilst vertical segregation can help to explain some of the gap in a manner that is legally defensible 
(Szyszczak, 1985), it can also indicate inequalities concerns with recruitment or promotion systems 
(Kirton and Greene, 2016). Several additional factors that may help to account for the pay inequality 
trends experienced within HE have been described. Whilst these augmenting forces are separate to 
the forces of the ’pay transparency’ agenda on which this thesis is focused, the performance of ‘pay 
transparency’ inside universities may help to obscure their impact. In light of this analysis, the broad 
claims of pay and promotion transparency within UK HE demand the critical scrutiny that this thesis 
provides, based on social pay comparison behaviour and pay and promotion experiences inside 
Universities Alpha and Beta. The remainder of this chapter will explore the extent to which the 
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relative formalisation of the institutional setting of these workplaces serves as a symbolic signal of 
inclusive employment practices, rather than a practical driver of equality. 
6.5 Data Transparency: Visibility of Organisational Inequality (OSE Theme One) 
A number of regulative and voluntary compliance pressures have been developing in recent years, 
which should have encouraged UK HE institutions to become more transparent about their 
employment practices and to develop more inclusive workplaces (Chapter 4). Regulative compliance 
pressure has come from the mandate on universities as large, tax-payer supported employers to 
produce transparent documentation about the employment experiences of staff, disaggregated by 
protected characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, and gender. The use and impact of such 
documentation in Universities Alpha and Beta created the opportunity to analyse the institutions 
through the lens of Acker’s (2006b, 2006a) inequality regime component: visibility of inequality and 
the first OSE theme: data transparency. Acker (2006b) asserted that inequality is less visible to the 
dominant or privileged members of an organisation than to those who experience disadvantage, 
such as on the basis of gender, race, or class. However, the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) placed 
regulative compliance pressure on UK universities to become more transparent and thus equitable 
employers, in part, by producing reports that make inequality visible (Chapter 4). Compliance with 
these regulations presents an opportunity to make inequality visible in a concrete way, to all staff, 
regardless of privilege. However, the risk is that the compliance is low and poorly enforced or, 
perhaps worse, becomes a tick-box exercise of the type suggested by Ahmed’s (2007, p. 111) 
critique that UK university equality and diversity work has become embedded within ‘performance 
culture’ to actively obscure bad performance. 
6.5.1 Public Sector Equality Duty Compliance: A Window or a Smokescreen? 
Acker (2006a, p. 109) created the inequality regimes concept to illustrate the “interconnecting 
organisational processes that produce and maintain racialized and gendered class relations.” The 
organisational processes of recording, analysing, and publishing staff data by protected 
characteristics, present critical opportunities to break down the barriers that allow the privileged to 
remain blind to their own privilege (Acker, 2006a) by creating a public, written record of inequality 
in the organisation. However, these processes can also obscure inequality by creating the 
impression that the institution has documented the problem when it has not (or not done so well). 
Measuring visibility of inequality requires more nuance than simply pointing to a report on a 
university website. The question is not just what data is produced but how is it presented and 
perceived (or not) within the institution, and what (if any) change comes about as a result?  
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As summarised in Table 6-1, University Alpha’s policy documents presented a commitment to the 
transparency agenda, stimulated by years of expectations to comply with the PSED specific duties 
for England that were brought into force on September 10, 2011 (Brill, 2011). The institution’s 
equality and diversity strategy was publicly available online. The multi-year strategy document, 
which included the academic year 2016/17, contained a clear acknowledgement of the institution’s 
PSED obligations, specifically noting the necessity to publish annual reports on staff by protected 
characteristics. However, the implementation was less robust. Annual staff diversity reports had 
ceased when less frequent equal pay audits production began, although the audits included a similar 
breadth of protected characteristics, not only gender. The institution also publicly released the 
entirety of these comprehensive equal pay audit reports. 
University Beta similarly made its multi-year equality and diversity strategy document publicly 
available online. This strategic document also included 2016/17 and contained a general 
acknowledgement of the institution’s PSED general duty. The document contained a plan to 
implement annual GPG reporting, in anticipation of the 2017 revised PSED specific duties for 
England. The institution had published annual staff diversity reports, which promisingly had included 
a breadth of protected characteristics and even annualised promotion outcomes. However, the 
institution had ceased publication of these reports several years before 2016/17 and had not 
replaced them with any alternative, much to the frustration of the Beta UCU committee. Whether 
this problem was due to a lack of resource commitment by senior management, poor database 
infrastructure, or intentional obfuscation, could not be confirmed. However, it became clear during 
interviews that this shortcoming was part of a systemic struggle that Beta faced with institutional 
data. This deficiency is the most likely explanation as to why the strategy document contained an 
action to develop a working group to plan for timely publication of equality data. The presence of 
this action indicated that achieving this level of new data transparency would require significant 
effort. Furthermore, unlike Alpha, Beta had not yet begun to implement a regular schedule for equal 
pay audits. Beta had only completed one partial audit by 2016/17, which only included staff affected 
by the Framework Agreement (JNCHES, 2004). As professorial pay is not covered by sectoral 
collective bargaining, it was not included. In further contrast, Beta only published summary details 
of this audit, rather than a comprehensive report. 
Given the greater degree of formalised transparent staff data reporting by protected characteristics, 
at University Alpha, although it was not perfect, one might have expected to observe stronger 
perceptions of equality, or at least stronger perceptions that the university was acknowledging its 
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shortcomings and working to reduce discrimination and to promote equality there than at 
University Beta. This was not the case. As previously demonstrated, the all-academic GPG had 
remained consistently slightly above the national average in both institutions during the decade 
leading up to 2016/17. For the professorial GPG, University Alpha had a wider gap than the national 
average, which was getting worse. In contrast, the professorial GPG in University Beta was narrower 
than the national average, and it was getting even better. These aggregate figures suggest that there 
was opportunity for PSED-linked reporting to make inequality visible. Although University Alpha 
appears to have a more established regime for pay and representation data transparency, serious 
deficits and concerns emerged in both institutions. 
University Alpha was one of many UK universities that chose to implement professorial pay banding 
following the landmark employment tribunal at Royal Holloway (Chapter 4). University Alpha’s 
published guidance on professorial banding described the scheme as an effort to promote fairness, 
equality, diversity, and transparency. Does the professorial banding exercise promote these things, 
or has it become a post-hoc justification for existing and persisting gender-based pay disparity, 
which has worsened since its implementation? 
Alpha UCU representatives explained that Alpha’s regular equal pay audits had never been able to 
report the GPG in the top professorial pay band because there were initially no women and later, 
still too few to meet data protection requirements. This suggests that the vertical segregation 
problem across the academic workforce in HE (Teelken and Deem, 2013), commonly described as a 
‘leaky pipeline’ in regards to woman and BAME academics (Bhopal, Brown and Jackson, 2015, p. 40), 
was being replicated within the Alpha professoriate. 
Yet, Alpha senior management had resisted pressure from the UCU committee to make professorial 
banding outcomes transparent, which would make this vertical segregation visible. The senior 
management had suggested that professors themselves would oppose the practice. When 
questioned about this reluctance, an Alpha policy shaper explained that “We don’t talk about 
somebody going from band [X] to band [Y] any more than we talk about giving a lecturer an 
accelerated increment.” However, the same policy shaper went on to explain that University Alpha 
considers the professors on different bands to be doing fundamentally different jobs, so the 
comparison of professors on two different bands is more like comparing the pay of senior lecturers 
and readers, rather than comparing the pay of two lecturers on different spinal points. The Alpha 
policy shaper argued that Alpha’s growing professorial GPG, reflected in the THE pay survey, is 
misleading:                
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They look at the very crude academic grades, so, lecturer, senior lecturer, professor…When 
you look at our [N] bands of professors, so this is how people are measured against very 
clear criteria, at any one level, there is no significant gender pay gap. When you add them all 
together, what you find is that there are more men at the higher level and so when you add 
all the data together and you don’t stratify the data, it looks like…there’s a gender pay gap. 
The assumption then is that somehow, you’re making poor judgments about these people. I 
would argue the system is robust. It’s clear. It’s transparent. That’s the first thing. The 
second thing is that at the professorial level, we are talking about [X] different sorts of jobs. 
So, our view is, if you are a professor at [the bottom band], you are not doing the same job 
as a professor [at the top band]. So, to add [all the professorial bands] together and say 
there’s a gender pay gap, it’s like adding apples and pears and oranges and saying we’ve got 
the number 27 coming out at the end. It doesn’t mean anything.  
The shaper doubled down on the transparency and robustness of the banding system, while further 
describing clear vertical segregation within it, and using segregation as an argument that Alpha does 
not have a professorial GPG problem. While it is good practice to try to explain aggregate gaps by 
things like tenure and qualifications, professors are treated as a single category across the THE pay 
survey. This is a reasonable approach for the THE to take, as there is no reason to believe that the 
job (or jobs, as the Alpha policy shaper indicated) of professor are substantially different at Alpha 
than at other universities across the UK.  
If the top and bottom professorial bands were fundamentally different jobs, it would seem rational 
to make the banding public, in the same manner as for lecturers, senior lecturers, and readers. 
Rather, professorial banding serves a similar, although more hidden, role as an academic promotion 
below the professoriate. Similar to the critique of academic promotion logic articulated earlier, the 
inconsistency with this policy shaper’s justification of professorial banding is that a top band 
professor is not demoted if they cease to repeat achievements that earned them the top slot. The 
pay of a certain band of professor is, therefore, not directly tied to the activities that their job 
requires. Professorial banding, like academic promotion, largely rewards subjectively assessed past 
achievements, which again weakens the validity of traditional job evaluation language as a tool to 
justify differences in pay between different levels of professor. Given the uncritical description of 
professorial gender segregation by the policy shaper, there is reason to worry that Alpha’s equal pay 
audits conceal rather than reveal inequality problems.  
A UCU representative remarked of this auditing process that “It’s a branding exercise for the 
university, and it doesn’t fix the underlying problems. I think there is enough data to show we have 
quite severe problems. Ok, they’re across HE, but we’re certainly very bad in terms of gender and I 
think in terms of BME.” When asked how the UCU committee has tried to push Alpha to become 
more transparent, another representative succinctly explained that “We constantly asked, 
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constantly, for information broken down by protected characteristics on promotion and on pay, 
particularly with respect to professorial banding and we have found it extremely difficult to get 
information.” The equality and diversity reports Alpha published before beginning equal pay audits 
did not include promotion analysis. 
Although University Beta did not have professorial banding, a similar perception that data was 
difficult to crack emerged from policy shapers and the union alike. One policy shaper said of 
equalities data in Beta: 
It’s an issue which is exhausting. I mean talking about data is exhausting, not because data is 
exhausting, but because the inaccessibility of data at [University Beta] is such a substantial, 
vast problem that I think it actively inhibits progress in the whole of the institution. 
Unfortunately, all I have received, even in discussions with the [VC] about this is a kind of 
shoulder shrug, well, yeah, data is a problem.  
The shaper worried that indifference from the centre of the university was generating growing 
hostility between the unions and the institution. They expressed concern that management was also 
too prone to cite data protection with small numbers in quantitative data as a reason for ignoring 
BAME academics, observing: 
If [University Beta] as an institution valued qualitative analysis more as a source of data…it 
would see that there is a very significant problem. It really worries me what I’ve heard. It’s 
very hard for me to see how the experiences of BAME female academics, the persons I’ve 
spoken to, it’s hard for me to see it in any other light. I can’t see how it could be anything 
other than discrimination. And this is not because people come up to me and say I’ve been 
experiencing discrimination. It’s because they’ve come up to me and talked about an on-
going systemic problem, or set of problems, because it’s always very complete, that they’ve 
been experiencing for years and years and years. It’s really alarming.  
The University Beta UCU committee shared these data concerns, having submitted several Freedom 
of Information requests to try and retrieve several years of missing staff equality and diversity 
reports that the university stopped releasing. One committee member described their motivation: 
[University Beta] is constantly claiming that this is a diverse place to work and study, and it 
isn’t. What do they mean by that? They are using that as a way to extract money from 
people of colour, by saying you should come here, using it to encourage people to apply to 
work here, so they can extract more labour from people of colour, and they’re using images 
of ethnic diversity in their marketing to extract money from people of colour and to 
encourage them to come here. So, it’s extremely colonial. 
After their requests proved unyielding, the union launched a public petition, which finally led to 
partial disclosure. However, the released data was aggregated across the missing years, rendering it 
useless for observing trends as previous reports had been annual. A union representative explained: 
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They’ve pretended they they’re going to put the data up and they’re going to put the data 
up for the past [several] years, but they actually haven’t, and they won’t even tell us why 
they haven’t…Have they lost the data? Do they have a system that is, you know, is there 
something wrong with their IT system? Are they short-staffed?…Can we even trust the data 
that they’re giving us at this point?  
The representative went on to explain that this experience was typical; when the UCU committee 
requests data relating to pay and equalities, “they will either ignore us, or they'll say we're already 
doing this, and then not do it. Or they'll say yes, we'll do it, and then they won't do it. So, it’s very 
unsatisfactory.” 
Although both universities had clearly and publicly acknowledged their data transparency duties 
under the PSED, their actual implementation appeared to be weak. It is striking that the university 
with the widening professorial GPG, Alpha, had already embedded equal pay audits. Both UCU 
committees expressed frustration with accessing staff data broken down by protected 
characteristics, particularly when seeking ethnicity data or anything besides sex. This section of 
analysis has illuminated the risk that incomplete and inconsistent transparency of equalities data, 
whether stemming from a deliberate strategy or poor management, serves to obscure inequality, 
while the institution purports to make it visible.  
6.5.2 Head of Department Radical Pay Access: Transparency for What Purpose? 
When asked what pro-active steps their institutions took to make pay processes more visible, most 
academics at both institutions struggled to recollect examples of active pay transparency. However, 
heads of department (HoDs)77 at both institutions had access to radical pay transparency within 
their departments – but only within their departments. A Beta HoD expressed similar scepticism to 
other academics about the active creation of pay transparency inside the wider university. They 
noted that “the basis for that is that I don’t know what pay is in other [departments]. So, if I don’t 
know what pay is in other [departments], that means I don’t have the information. I don’t know 
where I would look. I’m not sure I would be told if I asked.” While most academics must rely, 
sometimes frustratingly so, on institutionally published documents, such as staff diversity reports 
and equal pay audits, in order to see aggregate inequality made concretely visible through data, this 
small group of hierarchically privileged academics had access to a slice of radical pay transparency of 
those immediately around them. Acker (2006b) observed that supervisors may play a role in subtly 
reducing or strengthening inequalities through their interactions with those they supervise. 
 
77 Demographics of HoD interviewees will not be attributed when they are being referred to as HoDs in this 
thesis, to protect their anonymity. 
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Therefore, it is important in the HE context to analyse what HoDs do with their privileged access to 
individuals’ pay information.  
HoDs had access to the pay data of everyone who worked within their department, creating the 
potential for them to observe inequality, within their departmental microcosm, to a degree of detail 
that is otherwise only accessible to HR professionals. This radical transparency affords HoDs the 
potential capacity to become agents of change in departments, if they observe individuals or groups 
of academics who, despite the appearance of a transparent pay scale, are being paid less than 
similarly situated colleagues. However, Alexander’s (2015) typology of workplace information 
provided a theoretical explanation for the apparent general lack of corrective action by HoDs in 
these case studies. Taking the workers’ perspective on revealed hidden information at work, 
Alexander (2015, p. 182) argued that "information is thus instrumental: transparency mandates are 
designed with the first-order goal of revealing the true conditions under which workers are 
employed, but also with the second-order goal of prompting regulatory or market responses to 
improve those conditions." Thus, HoDs can only create such an outcome if they are motivated to 
assess pay by protected characteristics and have the power to do something about it. 
Regarding the motivation to assess pay, a clear divide between the institutions emerged. Of the 
three Alpha HoDs interviewed, none expressed having had any inclination towards assessing the 
systemic fairness of pay in their department. The data with which they were provided, did not 
include protected characteristics, just the name and spinal point (or pay band for professors) of each 
member of staff. One HoD described having only looked at the pay data for a logistical reason—to 
ensure an employee on a fixed-term contract had their contract renewed at the same spinal point. 
Even then, the HoD admitted that “I didn’t bother to find out how much that was.” The other two 
HoDs had taken a deeper look at the data but without any intention of assessing fairness of pay by 
protected characteristics. One HoD said they looked at the data primarily to get an understanding of 
how much money the institution was spending on staff in their department as part of the overall 
budgeting process. However, they did recall being surprised about pay differences amongst three 
white staff members who had received the same academic promotion at the same time. One of the 
three, a man, was a point above the other two, a man and a woman. They remarked: 
That was a bit of a surprise because I didn’t know that could happen until that point. I knew 
that you could get contribution points because you can apply to the committee to be 
considered for a contributory point or to get an extra increment or to accelerate more 
quickly at any time, but I was surprised about this case because I remember when they were 
all promoted. It wasn’t that long ago, and I was then surprised why that person might have 
managed to negotiate a bit better than the other two. 
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The remaining HoD said they looked at the data out of general interest and only looked at 
professorial pay. They acknowledged that “I didn’t pay any attention to gender or anything like that. 
I was just looking, oh, this person gets quite a lot. Oh, that person gets this. Oh, I would have 
thought this person got more. That’s all. It’s just general interest, really.” 
Conversely, all three Beta HoDs had assessed the fair distribution of pay in their departments, 
particularly as it pertained to professorial pay. A structural finance distinction between the two 
institutions may help to explain this divergence. Payroll was part of a central budget at Alpha, while 
it was decentralised to departments at Beta. However, this factor did not lead to consistent impact 
on pay disparities, suggesting that HoDs still did not feel particularly empowered as change agents, 
even in Beta. 
The first HoD felt that the data indicated a quite discretionary salary appointment practice. It 
appeared that the previous HoD had appointed at inconsistent spinal points relative to prior 
experience, and there was clear evidence that staff on teaching-focused contracts were being 
treated inequitably in the allocation of their workload. Some ‘favourites’ of senior staff had been co-
opted to support research, leaving the remaining teaching-focused staff to shoulder heavier 
workloads than their contracts prescribed. While the HoD did not characterise this as a matter of 
discrimination based on protected characteristics, barriers to advancement in UK academia for 
BAME staff, especially female BAME scholars, has been attributed elsewhere to perceptions of being 
left out of the so-called ‘in-group’ or ‘club’ (P. Miller, 2016, p. 210). Nevertheless, this HoD did not 
describe taking concrete steps to remedy what they found: 
So all I’ve done is to try and make things more transparent and to try and instil a culture of 
fairness and kind of collegiality and really instil, in my department, a sense that we will all 
succeed together or, there’s a greater chance of us all succeeding together rather than to kind 
of create a competition that creates kind of perverse incentives. 
Acker (2006b) would not have been surprised to see individualised pay decisions, diverging from 
collectively-agreed pay setting practices. However, the HoD’s proposed solution displayed a 
surprising level of confidence in the system, which they had just acknowledged had allowed for a 
high degree of individual deals that created unfair outcomes. This underscores Alexander’s (2015) 
point that information transparency is not ‘self-actuating.’   
The other two Beta HoDs had focused on professorial pay analysis and observed, what appeared to 
them, to be evidence of unexplained disadvantage for some female professors, although neither had 
analysed pay by ethnicity. However, only one felt empowered to try to narrow the gap directly. The 
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first HoD recalled that “the two highest paid members of staff were actually women, but then there 
was all the men in the sort of [higher range], like ALL the men. And then [in the lower range] were all 
the rest of the women, apart from one or two very junior male members of staff.” The HoD had 
discussed their concern with their dean, who had expressed that the pattern was partly explained by 
the fact that most of the female professors had been promoted internally, while most of the male 
professors had been recruited as professors to drive REF scores. That is a striking affirmation of the 
suspicion that secrecy of professorial pay obscures structural causes of pay inequality, while also 
demonstrating the influence of REF-based recruitment strategies on the GPG. This HoD’s only 
remedial actions to this problem were to encourage women to apply for promotion and to provide 
examples from the HoD’s own experience about what had helped them increase their pay as a 
professor, which was publishing books and securing large grants. Interestingly, the HoD mentioned 
that their department was preparing to apply for an Athena SWAN award, and this would likely spur 
further work on pay equality. 
The other HoD was the only one of all six HoDs interviewed across both universities who reported 
having taken proactive steps to narrow the GPG. The HoD acknowledged that preparation had been 
underway for the department’s first Athena SWAN award when they became head, which had 
motivated their systematic efforts. Although the HoD remembered feeling a sense of relief that pay 
looked generally fair across the ranks, they did focus in on professorial pay because that is where 
the most discretion is possible. The head observed several clusters within the professorial pay that 
broadly seemed to make sense based on tenure, research, and academic leadership taken on by 
those within them: 
But one thing I did notice was that within those bunches, quite often there was a female 
colleague who was at the bottom of the bunch. So, when it came to professorial review 
time…I did systematically go through and if there was a female colleague at the bottom of 
the bunch and I couldn’t see a good reason why, I picked a male colleague who I thought 
had similar performance and characteristics and I made a case to match their salary. So, in 
the end, that was actually just two people…it’s not a big uplift, but it actually was enough to 
generate conversation at the faculty level as to why I thought this was reasonable…The 
other part of it, was, just by chance, well, I assume by chance, the two most recently 
promoted professors in the school were women and I noticed they had been, when they 
were promoted, they were sort of automatically put on a very low level in the professorial 
scale and so when I saw that distribution, those two really were outliers. They were very 
low. So, I got market supplements for them in an off-cycle way. I just did it. 
The net result of those two efforts by the HoD was a narrowing of the department’s professorial 
GPG by several percentage points. The HoD reflected that no one else in the department knew of 
these efforts as they happened. Of course, the four women would have known about their 
185 
 
individual pay rise but they would not have known about the systematic review from which they 
benefitted. A brief mention of the review effort and the net impact on the GPG in the department’s 
Athena SWAN application was the only formal communication to anyone else in the department 
about this activity. The HoD had also promised to conduct a similar exercise for academics below the 
professoriate, which would first require manually appending gender to the pay data provided by the 
institution, as they had done for professors, but expressed a desire for guidance as to how to 
implement this more complex promise. The HOD also noted they had not attempted to analyse pay 
by ethnicity, which they felt would present further difficulty in terms of determining a consistent 
categorisation. 
When told that a Beta HoD had reported observing inequality concerns in their data, an Alpha HoD 
expressed surprise and indicated that HoDs at University Alpha did not possess power over pay 
decisions: 
I never thought about looking at people’s pay to see whether their pay, you know, whether 
there are inequalities in pay. This has now made me think that perhaps I should go and have 
a look because I haven’t really because I just, I suppose I had assumed that if the principle of 
appointing you on to a scale that’s better than the one that you were on works, then I would 
have assumed that happened to everybody else in my department, because that happened 
to me when I was first employed here…I was employed on a higher scale than I was before 
and the way pay, I think, the people who decide on your pay scale is HR. It’s not [the HoD]. 
Echoing this belief in where power to make pay decisions lies, another Alpha HoD said if they were 
to observe apparent unfairness in pay, their only recourse would be to encourage the affected 
employee to apply for a performance-related pay increment or a promotion. This was strikingly 
similar to the conclusions of two of the three Beta heads, although they had observed what they felt 
to be problematic pay data patterns. The opportunity for HoDs to turn the visibility of inequality, 
revealed to them through slices of radical pay transparency, into action to narrow inequality, was 
constrained by the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ at the level of the setting. The 
HoDs primarily considered the perceived transparent process of academic progression to be the 
optimal solution to the problems they observed, although those same processes had led to the 
problematic data. Thus, the mixed motivation and power of HoDs to observe pay inequality 
problems around them and achieve any concrete remedy, illustrates the limitations of even radical 
pay transparency to narrow the GPG. The radical transparency afforded to HoDs was not designed 
to move beyond providing firm-specific information to relate to context information, such as 
conditions at other universities or substantive equalities law. If it were, the data HoDs received 
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would also, for example, include demographic details rather than just names and pay information 
(Alexander, 2015). 
6.6 EDI Accreditation: Legitimacy of Inequality (OSE Theme Two) 
Another pressure on universities to create some form of transparency, stems from the voluntary 
compliance pressure that is exerted by external awards that recognise good employment equality 
practice, such as the Athena SWAN award and the Race Equality charter (Gregory-Smith, 2017; 
Bhopal and Pitkin, 2018). This voluntary compliance pressure will be analysed through the lens of 
Acker’s (2006b, 2006a) inequality regime component: legitimacy of inequality and the second OSE 
theme: EDI accreditation. Although EDI accreditations are voluntary, as there is no legal requirement 
to comply, universities seek them out to gain reputational kudos. Awardee institutions can reference 
their status on their website and marketing material to highlight their organisational commitment to 
equality and diversity to potential students. Important funding streams have also begun to require 
these awards, which places significant financial pressure on universities to at least be seen to be 
doing the right thing (Chapter 4).  
Acker (2006b) theorised a relationship between visibility and legitimacy. She argued that high 
visibility and low legitimacy of inequalities present the greatest opportunity to reform inequality 
regimes. The opposite emerged in these case studies, which provides an inequality regimes-based 
explanation for the limited impact of pay ‘transparency agenda’ performance. Universities Alpha 
and Beta provided the impression of high visibility of inequality through their data reporting 
strategies;  yet, the common critique of poor data access and the practice of giving HoDs pay data 
without accompanying demographic information indicated low visibility in practise. Furthermore, 
the awarding of equality accreditations presents a high degree of legitimacy to existing 
arrangements. Inequality made visible, as previously explored, whatever the data reveals, can be 
validated by such external accolades. As illustrated by the vastness of academic research on many 
facets of workplace inequality, the subject is complex. Most people are not experts. The vernacular 
of Olympic medals, including bronze, silver, and gold, next to phrases like gender equality and race 
equality is enough to legitimate institutional efforts to many. Furthermore, the requirements and 
recommendations of funding bodies to require or encourage these awards, as evidence of 
embedding equality and diversity principles, gives them further apparent legitimating power. 
6.6.1 Athena SWAN: A Means to Legitimate Inequality Regimes 
The Athena SWAN award is a voluntary recognition that departments and universities may achieve, 
which recognises commitment to and progress on gender equality principles for staff and students. 
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Possession of an Athena SWAN award sends a legitimating message to staff and the public that the 
organisation has embedded strong gender equality principles (Gregory-Smith, 2017). Both 
institutions held an institutional Athena SWAN award in 2016/17, although actors throughout both 
universities expressed concern that the process had become a behemoth exercise in form filling, 
crowding out capacity or will to change practices. 
Turning first to University Alpha, their most recent institutional Athena SWAN application 
highlighted several areas for improvement, including unfavourable equal pay compared to many 
other UK universities, and offered the equal pay audit process discussed previously as a means to 
identify the problem and to establish actions for remedy. It is noteworthy that the successful 
application also framed equalities work as a cost, not an investment. It cautioned that the action 
plan had to be tempered by considerable financial limitations facing the HE sector. Acker (2006a, p. 
121) observed that “appeals to ‘the market’ and to the necessity for coordination, efficiency, and 
productivity often legitimate inequality regimes.” Policy shapers shared this perception of Athena 
SWAN as a cost, describing the application process itself as burdensome and monstrous. One 
shaper, who acknowledged that universities initially had to engage with Athena SWAN because of 
the requirements of certain funding bodies, went on to remark: 
Now, it’s just become a huge bureaucratic exercise that takes up a massive amount of effort, 
and for not a lot of reward, I think…It’s become this monstrous thing that takes a huge 
amount of time. In fact, we’re even thinking of having more staff, I mean, I could do with a 
lot more staff to be able to do very useful things, but we’re thinking of more staff just to 
feed the Athena SWAN beast.  
Another policy shaper explained that “The schemes try to become so comprehensive, they then 
become burdensome and all you do is worry about the scheme and you don’t worry about the issue 
that the scheme is designed to address.” 
Echoing concerns of policy makers but with added scepticism, a UCU representative expressed 
concerns that the award application was standing in for the work it was meant to report, illustrating 
Ahmed’s (2007) characterisation of equalities documents standing for actually doing equalities work. 
The representative observed: 
So, the issue, you know, look, giving out awards for doing a great job, that’s like a substitute 
for actually doing a great job…At best, it’s like teaching to the test when they’ve set up 
specific criteria. So, like, if the criteria for Athena SWAN had been elimination of the gender 
pay gap, we wouldn’t have one. 
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Another representative further observed of University Alpha that “Their defences are up and they’re 
putting in for things that will make them look better, like Athena SWAN. You know, going through 
the motions. It doesn’t mean you’re achieving anything. It just means you’re doing something.” 
When asked whether the institutional Athena SWAN had an impact on the transparency of pay and 
progression at Alpha, UCU representatives consulted did not feel it had. One committee member 
expressed concern that despite the presentation of promotion data analysis in the application, 
promotion practices remained problematic: 
I think [the data analysis] has increased [senior management’s] defensiveness and desire to 
cover up or come up with other explanations, which aren’t really explanations or 
appropriate explanations. I don’t think it’s stopped them still blocking the promotion of 
people they just don’t feel are quite right. We find ourselves doing an awful lot of casework 
for women, and people with disabilities, LGBT…Interestingly, when I supported people who 
hadn’t got the results they felt they should have on professorial banding, I was supporting 
just as many men as women, but I more often won my cases for the men. It was like you 
were pushing on a partly open door when you were fighting the cases for the men. It was 
much harder for the women. 
A variety of academics painted a similar picture of an institution where equality documents rather 
than equality work were paramount. A white female professor noted that in the context of Athena 
SWAN, it was “certainly my experience of HR, and their engagement with it, because I’m on the 
committee for Athena SWAN in my department, has been that it’s a bit of a box-ticking exercise, 
thank you very much. What can we say and how can we make it less painful? Almost the quickest 
way from A to B.” A white female academic expressed a similar sentiment, arguing of the focus of 
her institution: 
It’s more about appearance than it is about actually, you know, making sure women get 
promoted as often as men, about the pay gaps and so on and so forth…[Athena SWAN] is 
obviously something that looks very good…this awareness of equality, diversity and so on 
and so forth. So, I think they want to be seen as being aware of all of these issues. Whether 
they actually do a whole lot about them in practise is a different thing.  
Turning to University Beta, while one policy shaper argued that the Athena SWAN application itself 
demonstrated transparency, it is interesting to note that there was only a very brief mention of 
equal pay in Beta’s most recent application. This section provided the professorial GPG that was 
calculated for an internal review, which was much narrower than the ECU benchmark for HE. Similar 
to the single Beta HoD who took proactive corrective action of the GPG in a department, the 
application explained that Beta had made proactive adjustments, while checking this figure annually 
for several years. In further parallel with the actions of that HoD, this analysis had not otherwise 
been publicly known—the only equal pay audit Beta had completed did not include professors—
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until this brief mention in an Athena SWAN application. Another policy shaper recalled a discussion 
of these efforts with the VC, which suggested the active promotion of secrecy: 
[The VC] said that one of the things they noticed a few years ago was that there was a 
significant disparity between female professorial salaries and male professorial salaries for 
equivalent work, with equivalent levels of experience. So, [the VC] said that over the course 
of a few years, they took measures to address that. But this information was not made 
public and was not publicly reported to, as far as I understand, I don’t know whether it was 
reported to the affected individuals, but it certainly was not made known within the 
institution. [The VC’s] justification was that [the VC] felt that if they were public about this, 
about the disparity, and about what they were aiming to do to address it, then they would 
be urged to take action immediately, when budgets were not sufficient to do so. So, they 
took this action apparently over a couple of years, two or three years, and [the VC] told me 
the situation is much better now. I have no evidence to attest to that or to the contrary. So, I 
have no idea. But what I found very surprising about that conversation was that it was 
advocating for non-transparency about pay equality on the basis of it causing disruption that 
might prevent the actions being taken. That position doesn’t make a great deal of sense to 
me because I don’t see how a discussion about an issue would necessarily prevent, if 
attempts, if actions were already being taken, I don’t see how open discussion about those 
actions could prevent those actions from being taken. 
There may have been a concern by Beta senior management that publicising efforts to remedy the 
GPG would have been resisted by male professors who felt they would lose out in a zero-sum battle 
of budgetary constraints. In fact, the Beta HOD who proactively worked to narrow the GPG in their 
own department noted that even the small post-hoc acknowledgement of those efforts in their 
departmental Athena SWAN application spurred some of this sentiment. The HoD remarked: 
I did hear one male professor explain to another male professor, who didn't get a raise that he 
thought he should have got, oh but this year we had to do adjustments on female salaries. He 
would have got that information from that one sentence in Athena SWAN.  
However, the same policy shaper who felt the VC actively promoted secrecy of the professorial GPG, 
further expressed concern that the motivation underlying Athena SWAN activity was not driven by a 
genuine desire for culture change and clear reporting of the GPG and equalities data, despite 
pressure from the union. The shaper observed that:  
When it’s presented to senior management, they don’t say yes, let’s have a review into this. 
They haven’t, certainly haven’t resourced it, so no. They’re more concerned I think about 
Athena SWAN, progressing aspects of that, I think more geared toward the charter and 
accreditation around it. 
In a similar vein, a UCU representative expressed scepticism that the process had influenced pay 
transparency practices, commenting that “The paperwork proceeds on its own momentum. 
Practices stay at a different level. And connecting the two will take a lot of time because once the 
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paperwork is done with Athena SWAN, and once it’s submitted, it’s gone.” The representative also 
explained that the union had felt shut out of the application process, whether by intention or 
because HR lacked the capacity to engage with them. 
Academic viewpoints appeared to be consistent with these sceptical perceptions. A white female 
academic in a department without Athena SWAN expressed scepticism that the process had led to a 
more transparent pay environment. Echoing Ahmed’s (2007) concerns about the equalities 
documents standing in for equalities work, she observed that:  
I’m not sure if equality and diversity is something that is really put on the agenda here. I’m 
not sure if that’s coming through clearly from senior management at all. I think fine, they’re 
very happy with the [award], but sometimes, I think getting an award and reaching a goal can 
almost act as a way of being satisfied…Yay! Well done us.  
A white male professor in a department with an Athena SWAN award expressed concern that the 
primary motivation had been funding access, as he noticed that men on his department’s senior 
management team were quickly replaced with women, including a woman of colour, following a link 
being made between Athena SWAN and funding. He observed that: 
We just become what is needed, but we don’t mean it. There was discussion at one of the 
board meetings if we knew anyone in [our department] that was a transgender, because if we 
get a transgender and probably if the transgender is pregnant, we will get so much points, 
then we will get an Athena Gold. 
He was shocked by this assertion, which was made in a meeting of his department’s senior 
management and professors, but he did not say anything. He did not remember anyone else 
pushing back on the commentary. 
A white female academic working on a fixed-term contract in a department with Athena SWAN 
expressed frustration with the rhetoric of the award, in sharp contrast to her personal experience at 
work: 
I don’t know what it does. I don’t know what it is. For me, it’s just another one of those 
really fucking annoying things that I have to do or acknowledge in amongst trying to do 
some research and running 2.5 modules, and, you know, talking to students…Oh, you get 
those fucking annoying emails from people, which are like can you make sure you put the 
Athena SWAN logo on the bottom of your emails? And you’re like, no, fuck off! Pay me more 
money and I might do! You know, it’s just so empty. It’s just completely empty sentiments. 
Like, it’s just like just do really, really basic things, like pay people the right amount of money 
for the job they do.  
A white female academic further felt that Athena SWAN discussions were particularly steered away 
from the topic of pay and pay inequality. During a department meeting about Athena SWAN, she 
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had tried to introduce a discussion of pay, thinking that it was foundational to gender equality, and 
remembered being sharply silenced: 
The wise men of this institution have been pushing Athena SWAN activities and analyses and 
submissions not in terms of pay data but in terms of other things, opportunities, talks, 
maternity policies, parental leave policies, anything else but pay. When I mentioned pay in a 
school meeting, it was shut down. No, we can’t discuss it because it’s not our job. It is not 
within our remit. It is something that is a matter for the centre. 
Similarly, another white female academic, who was involved with Beta’s institutional Athena SWAN 
efforts, also felt that it had no impact on the institution’s pay transparency environment. When 
asked whether the subject of pay ever came up within the context of her institutional Athena SWAN 
work, she replied:  
No, it’s really because it’s HR policy. I mean, I’ve tried, also with other things around 
recruitment and things like that, and all the time it’s just no; it’s HR policy. You can’t change 
that. So that’s not, you know, we can’t do that…You don’t start things and don’t discuss 
things that don’t get you anywhere, right? 
A key policy implication of Rubery and Koukiadaki’s (2016) international review of the mechanisms 
to close the GPG was that a nuanced approach is necessary, which must include transformations of 
the labour market to become more transparent, as well as specific tactics to address gender-based 
pay equity. Specifically, in regards to voluntary approaches to encourage gender pay equity, they 
advise to “only promote company prizes for good gender pay policies that are evidence-based and 
ratified by the workforce” (Rubery and Koukiadaki, 2016, p. 109). This chapter section has suggested 
that the Athena SWAN charter, at least in its current form, falls short on both accounts. A growing 
body of literature has begun to question whether it does what it says on the tin (Maddrell et al., 
2015; Caffrey et al., 2016; Gregory-Smith, 2017; Rosser et al., 2019). Additionally, there does not 
appear to be widespread ratification of the process amongst the academics consulted in Universities 
Alpha or Beta. Respondents had too limited knowledge of the process to comment or expressed 
strongly negative opinions of its efficacy. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has sought to address the research question: To what effect has the pay ‘transparency 
agenda’ been performed in the two university case studies? In a cynical vein, one might say this 
‘agenda’ has been ‘performed’ to ‘minimise’ rather than narrow pay inequality by presenting data 
that obscures more than it reveals. The thematic policy analysis conducted in this chapter illustrated 
a greater extent of formalised performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ in Alpha than Beta. 
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This was surprising given that this chapter has demonstrated that both institutions had similarly 
slightly worse than average overall academic GPGs. Alpha additionally had a worse than average, 
widening professorial GPG, while Beta’s was better than average and narrowing. However, when 
compared in terms of the regulative and voluntary compliance pressures that have emerged to 
encourage the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ to promote workplace equality in UK 
HE, a remarkably similar picture emerged between the two institutions.  
Figure 6-7 summarises the emergent concept that arose during the analysis of the first two themes 
of this thesis’s analytical framework (Rows A and B) to deliver part of the key theoretical 
contribution of this thesis, namely the functioning of employer ‘pay communication’ policy as the 
first component of the OSE. Thematic analysis of the employer ‘pay communication’ in response to 
voluntary and regulative pressures revealed a ‘pay transparency’ paradox. Promised, but limited, 
transparency to comply with the PSED restricted the visibility of inequality, while engagement with 
the Athena SWAN charter presented a legitimation of existing arrangements.  
Figure 6-7: Operationalising Organisational Salary Environment: Employer ‘Pay Communication’ 
Policy 
 
Along Row A, a primary regulative compliance pressure on both institutions to perform greater 
transparency was the PSED. However, while both institutions published equality and diversity 
strategy documents that proclaimed their commitment to transparent equality reporting, clear 
deficiencies in the degree of visibility of inequality were made evident by UCU representatives. In 
Alpha, the implementation of professorial banding, which could be a tool to narrow pay inequality, 
led to the visibility created by the equal pay audits becoming instead a tool to legitimate vertical 
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segregation by gender within the professoriate. Although it was not raised by policy makers or the 
union, the audits reported an even worse picture for ethnicity, with no BAME staff in the top 
professorial band. In Beta, despite a similar commitment to publishing equalities data, the actual 
reporting was so delayed that the UCU committee felt compelled to launch a public campaign. 
When data was eventually released, it was in a format that made its comparison with previous 
reports or analysis of trends over time impossible. Indeed, as Acker (2006a, p. 122) remarked 
“visibility does not necessarily lead to action to remove inequalities: Those with greater power or 
privilege may be convinced that their power and privilege are richly deserved.” This chapter also 
demonstrated the limitations of radical pay transparency, when afforded only to those with 
hierarchical privilege, HoDs, and in a format that did not make analysing gender or ethnic-based pay 
inequality straightforward. The revelation of hidden information about working conditions is not 
‘self-actuating’, especially when the transparency is not constructed in such a way as to make it 
useful for challenging inequality (Alexander, 2015).  
Along Row B, a primary voluntary compliance pressure on both universities to perform greater 
transparency was the Athena SWAN charter, which provides organisations with significant public 
kudos. The voluntary award encourages universities to publish analysis of gender-based inequality in 
their organisations, although very little specifically on pay, and to reflect on the paths to remedy. 
Financial pressure has strengthened this force, as several key funding strands have begun requiring 
successful engagement with Athena SWAN to maintain eligibility. Both universities held Athena 
SWAN awards, which can be seen as a legitimation of existing arrangements. It signals that an 
organisation opposes gender-based inequality and is taking significant steps towards remedy. 
However, there was some agreement amongst policy shapers, academics and the union 
representatives that the legitimacy was superficial, although their views differed as to why.  
This chapter concludes with a critique of the ‘transparency agenda’ for HE pay and progression, 
rather than a straightforward argument for more transparency. A ‘pay transparency’ paradox for 
employer ‘pay communication’ policy has emerged from analysis in this chapter, which is why 
employer ‘pay communication’ policy is the OSE component that is contributed in Figure 6-7. In both 
institutions, a strong commitment to making inequality visible was presented, but genuine visibility 
of inequality was low, such as due to data presentation that downplayed the problem of professorial 
vertical segregation in University Alpha and intermittent and inconsistent data presentation in 
University Beta. Alongside low visibility of actual inequality, engagement with Athena SWAN in both 
institutions provided so-called transparency that sent messages of high legitimacy of existing 
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arrangements to non-expert members of the organisation. In contrast to Acker’s (2006b) belief that 
high visibility and low legitimacy of inequality inside organisations presents the greatest opportunity 
for reforming inequality regimes,  low genuine visibility of inequality and high communicated 
legitimacy of existing arrangements has presented a hostile environment to change in these two 
institutions. Similar institutionally self-defensive employer-created ‘pay communication’ through 
pay ‘transparency agenda’ performance was found in both universities. This served to silence 
inequality complaints that called into question hierarchical power structures, such as the robust 
professorial banding process that had been established or pay setting processes in the context of 
Athena SWAN discussions. Whilst transparency was the stated intention of both institutions, an 
impression of high legitimacy of existing arrangements was emphasised and the actual visibility of 
inequality was reduced by inconsistent data transparency in practise. Institutionally self-reflexive 
transparency is needed, but institutionally self-defensive transparency abounded. It is therefore 
worth exploring the extent to which academic staff discuss pay amongst themselves in these two 




Chapter 7 Pay Discussion Behaviour Survey Analysis: Situated Activity 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the analysis is located at the level of situated activity and draws on the social activity 
of social pay comparison by academic staff inside two workplaces. This chapter addresses the 
second sub-research question: Do academics in the two university case studies violate the ‘income-
talk’ taboo, and if so, how might observed social pay comparison behaviour patterns be explained? 
This question engages with Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regime component: the visibility of 
inequality within the higher education (HE) sector, by focusing on social pay comparison. Social 
comparison of pay and its relationship with the gender pay gap (GPG) has received limited attention 
by organisational and employment researchers (Burchell and Yagil, 1997). This absence of critical 
analysis and the persistent taboo against discussing pay (Pearlman, 2013; Fox, 2014) is surprising, 
considering the growing use of pay transparency as a tool to promote equal pay. To begin to address 
this literature gap, the OSE as a theoretical analytical framework is developed throughout this 
thesis. The OSE is composed of employer ‘pay communication’ policy, as emerged in Chapter 6, as 
well as social comparison of pay and social norms about discussing pay, which will be explored in 
this chapter and emerge more fully in Chapter 8. As illustrated in Chapter 6, ‘pay communication’ 
policies include policies and protocols that explain pay and progression in a company and formal or 
informal pay secrecy policies. However, knowledge of individual comparator’s pay, such as might be 
obtained through social pay comparison, is necessary in order to identify potentially illegal pay 
inequality. While British employees are legally allowed to discuss their pay to reveal individual level 
inequality, until now there has been little data on whether academics do discuss pay (Gow and 
Middlemiss, 2012; Mills & Reeve LLP, 2012). 
Therefore, the sub-research question of this chapter will be answered by the recording and 
analysing of previously unknown patterns of pay discussion within the context of the HE sector, 
using original data collected through a web-based survey of academics in Universities Alpha and 
Beta. Following a justification for treating the responses from both institutions as a single sample, 
this chapter will present the results of the survey data analysis. The analysis will first demonstrate 
the bivariate relationships between social pay comparison behaviour and the factors that have a 
potential theoretical relationship with it. A binomial logistic regression model using those factors to 
assess the relative strength of their relationships with reported social comparison behaviour will 
then be conducted, before using contextual understanding of HE employment conditions to 
consider how to account for the findings.  
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7.2 Social Pay Comparison Behaviour Survey: Combined Sample Justification 
To record and analyse social pay comparison behaviour, a web-based survey was emailed to 
academics in Universities Alpha and Beta. This chapter’s analysis treats the combined responses 
from both universities as a single dataset in order to help preserve the institutional anonymity that 
might be compromised by divulging specific comparisons between the demographics of respondents 
and the demographics of the surveyed population of the institutions individually. Given the limited 
extant data on social pay comparison, there was no theoretical reason to expect that social pay 
comparison behaviour would significantly differ between Universities Alpha and Beta, and so the 
data was aggregated. Furthermore, three statistical checks using a dummy variable for University 
Beta membership confirmed that there was no statistically significant difference in the reported 
social comparison behaviour between the two institutions. 
A summary independent two-sample T-test was run to compare responses from the two 
institutions. This required calculating the mean reported social pay comparison behaviour (the 
proportion of those who reported that they compare pay), the standard deviation and the number 
of responses for each institution. These figures were used to run the T-test. The p-value of the 
independent samples T-test, assuming equal variances, was 0.082, meaning the difference was not 
statistically significant.78 Second, a cross-tabulation of the dummy variable for reported social pay 
comparison behaviour and the dummy variable for University Beta membership confirms this result. 
The Pearson chi-square value was 2.807 (p-value: 0.094), so again there was no statistically 
significant difference. Finally, a binomial logistic regression of social pay comparison behaviour 
confirms the results, even when controlling for several other variables. I added the University Beta 
dummy variable to the same model that is used in the results section of this chapter. The dummy for 
University Beta membership results in negligible shifts to the conclusion of the model and adds 
nothing to it, with a highly insignificant p-value of 0.457.79  
7.3 Results 
For the first time, this survey begins to suggest who, among UK academics, discuss their pay with 
colleagues. This results section will first describe the bivariate analyses conducted between social 
pay comparison behaviour and selected independent variables, in order to identify which ones may 
be most closely related to the propensity to discuss pay. Secondly, a binomial logistic regression 
 
78 The mean, standard deviation and N of Universities Alpha and Beta are not reported in this thesis to 
preserve institutional anonymity, which might be compromised by indicating their relative size.  




model will be specified to explore the relative strength of these relationships. The aim is to illustrate 
and explain the social pay comparison behaviour of academics, who work in a sector with a known 
persistent GPG and G/EPG (Blackaby and Frank, 2000; Blackaby, Booth and Frank, 2005; Bandiera, 
Rana and Xu, 2016; Mumford and Sechel, 2019; Rollock, 2019) and inside a country with an income-
talk taboo social norm (Fox, 2014). Given the intersectional focus of this thesis on gender and 
ethnicity, it is of interest whether social pay comparison behaviour varies along gender or ethnic 
lines and how to account for the relationships that are (or are not) demonstrated.  
7.3.1 Bivariate Relationships with Social Pay Comparison  
The demographic and labour market variables that were used by Burchell and Yagil (1997) have 
been translated into the present survey, as relevant to the HE employment context, with four 
additions, as shown in Table 7-1. A total of 14 independent variables were tested in this analysis. I 
chose not to include a class variable in this survey, due to this study’s focus on professional 
workers.80 Instead, I included a professorial dummy, in recognition of the different pay structures for 
professors and academics below the level of professor (Chapter 4). The variable for parental status 
has been added in recognition of the impact of parenthood on the GPG, the so-called motherhood 
penalty and daddy bonus (at least for white, professional, married men) (Waldfogel, 1998; Budig 
and England, 2001; Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003; England, 2005; Hodges and Budig, 2010; Budig 
and Hodges, 2014; Petersen, Penner and Høgsnes, 2014). The variable for science, engineering and 
technology (SET) discipline or non-SET discipline has been added in recognition of the horizontal 
segregation patterns inside academia (Hegewisch et al., 2010; Perales, 2013; Kirton and Greene, 
2016; AdvanceHE, 2018). This could have also been of interest, given that Athena SWAN awards 
were originally only available in science, technology, engineering, mathematics and medicine 
(STEMM) disciplines, before being extended to include all disciplines in May 2015 (Equality 
Challenge Unit, 2015a). The ethnicity variable for Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME) status 
has been added in recognition of the key trait intersecting with gender that is used for intersectional 
analysis in this thesis. Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) analysis did not include ethnicity. Lastly, the 
country cultural identification variable has been added in recognition of the significant, uncritical 
tendency to ascribe the income-talk taboo to a specific country cultural context, such as Fox’s (2014) 
characterisation of the taboo as ‘English.’ All respondents were working in the UK at the time of this 
survey, but given the international workforce of UK academia, some respondents may have grown 
up outside of the UK. Long-term immigrants to the UK could have become UK citizens by the time of 
 
80 However, class background could prove a fertile direction for future research on the income-talk taboo and 
is an increasingly recognised salient factor for many aspects of academic employment.   
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responding to this survey, which would have obscured their upbringing outside the UK, so 
respondents were not asked for their citizenship. Instead, they were asked whether they identified 
most strongly with the culture of the UK or somewhere else. The following section will explore the 
bivariate relationships between each independent variable and reported social pay comparison 
behaviour, revealing which relationships were significant. The results for gender, ethnicity and being 
a professor, which were the key variables used to validate the survey data (Chapter 5), will be 
discussed in greater detail.  
Table 7-1: Independent Variable Translation Summary 
 
Similarly to Burchell and Yagil (1997), the next step was to provide a bivariate analysis of each 
potential independent variable and the propensity to engage in social pay comparison. The question 
used to measure this propensity was: This research specifically concerns conversations you may 
have about your pay level relative to the pay level of others. Do you ever talk about pay with your 
co-workers?81  
Table 7-2 reveals the percentage of respondents who compared pay, the chi-square values, and the 
level of significance (if any) for each bivariate relationship with social pay comparison behaviour. 
More than half (54.7%) of the sample reported engaging in social pay comparison with their co-
 
81 This is adapted from the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative question (Gallie, 1991) used in Burchell 
and Yagil’s (1997, p. 740) research on initiating factors of social pay comparison; the original more vaguely 
worded question read: "Some people compare their pay with the pay made by other individuals or groups of 
people. Do you ever do this?" My adaptation clarifies my research focus on (gendered and racialized) power 
dynamics embedded within the work organisation (Acker, 2006b). 
199 
 
workers. Only 47.7% of Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) sample reported discussing pay. Significant 
differences in the conduct of the two surveys make it impossible to consider this evidence of a 
declining income-talk taboo in the UK over time, particularly in view of the fact that the survey in 
this thesis is occupation-specific. However, it does suggest that despite the conventional wisdom of 
the income-talk taboo, a considerable number of academics do breach the social convention. 
The international makeup of the HE sector was noted in the HE context discussion of this chapter as 
a possible reason to explore social pay comparison in HE because the income-talk taboo social norm 
may vary across nations. Of the 372 respondents who answered this question, 55.1% reported 
identifying most strongly with the culture of a country outside of the UK. However, the variable 
measuring identification with the UK cultural context, or not, was not significantly related to social 
pay comparison behaviour. This strengthens the earlier critique that ascribing the income-talk taboo 
to national culture is insufficient (Chapter 1). At least this does not indicate that the norm is unique 
to the UK. Future research into whether the income-talk taboo norm and social pay comparison 
behaviour does in fact vary by country context is needed (Chapter 9).  
Seven variables from Table 7-2 were statistically correlated with social pay comparison behaviour. 
Of these, five variables described individual characteristics. Those who were professors were more 
likely to discuss pay than those who were not. Professorial pay is not covered by collective 
bargaining (Chapter 4). Therefore, there is the greatest secrecy surrounding pay and the potential to 
gain from uncovering hidden knowledge at this level. Those with a doctorate degree were more 
likely to discuss pay than those with below-doctorate education levels, although this latter group 
was small (n=38). This could reflect the fact that the traditional academic career trajectory requires 
a PhD. Therefore, those with a PhD have a greater chance of reaching higher pay, and thus stand to 
benefit more from knowing the pay of others in preparation for individual pay bargaining, 
particularly when they reach the professoriate. Those who were University and College (UCU) 
members were more likely to discuss pay than non-members. Given the purpose of unions is to 
improve pay and conditions of members, it should be no surprise that UCU members were more 
likely to discuss pay. However, the UCU’s support for pay is mainly through collective bargaining of 
the national Framework Agreement and subsequent annual pay awards (JNCHES, 2004; University 
and College Union, 2016b). This would not necessarily encourage individual level pay discussions. 
Those who had applied for another job in the past 12 months were more likely to discuss pay than 
those who had not. This is logical, given those who are actively looking for alternative employment 
are hoping to negotiate a new starting salary soon, and so would be motivated to enquire about 
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others’ pay. Lastly, there was a statistically significant difference in pay discussion behaviour based 
on voting intention. Those who intended to vote Conservative were the least likely to discuss pay, 
and those who intended to vote Liberal Democrat or Labour were the most likely. The intention to 
vote Labour is likely positively correlated with being a UCU member. Likewise, having a doctorate 
degree is likely positively correlated with being a professor.  
Two additional traits refer to structural factors of the job or organisation. Those who were on an 
open-ended contract were more likely to discuss pay than those who were on a fixed-term contract. 
This makes sense because those on an open-ended contract may be more embedded in the 
workplace and have a greater potential opportunity to try to improve their pay because their job is 
more secure. Finally, those working in SET disciplines were less likely to discuss pay than those 
working in non-SET disciplines. This is somewhat surprising given the longer history of Athena SWAN 
‘transparency’ in SET disciplines, although it may underline Athena’s SWAN’s historical neglect of 
pay analysis as an equality concern. As discussed in Chapter 4, equal pay audits were only added to 
the application process in the new post-May 2015 rules, and then only for institutional applications 
(Equality Challenge Unit, 2014, 2015a). 
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Table 7-2: Social Comparison of Pay by Academics with Reference to Demographic and Labour Market Characteristics 
*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01   





*p < 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01  
a0 cells (0.0%) have an expected count of less than 5 for all chi-square tests displayed. 
bA simplified form of ‘Intended Vote’ has been used here because some cells had expected counts below 5 with the full range of categories, 




Given the intersectional focus of this thesis on gender and ethnicity, it was of interest to check 
whether there was a gender or ethnicity relationship with social pay comparison behaviour. A 
greater proportion of men than women reported discussing pay in the sample. However, the chi-
square test lacks significance at the 5% confidence level (p-value: 0.371). There was not a 
statistically significant difference between the reported pay discussion behaviour by men and 
women. This is similar to Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) analysis, where 51.5% of men and 44.1% of 
women reported comparing pay, but the relationship was again not statistically significant at the 5% 
confidence level (p-value: 0.065). This is also consistent with Cullen and Perez-Truglia’s (2018, p. 6) 
findings that men and women face similar ‘information frictions’ (difficulties attaining perfect 
information about pay in one’s workplace) and similar levels of misunderstanding of what others 
around them earn.  
It is important to consider, regarding this finding, that pay discussion behaviour may relate to pay 
negotiation behaviour; survey respondents appeared to agree. 82.4% of valid respondents (314 
individuals)82 agreed83 with the statement “Discussing pay with one’s colleagues helps one to 
determine whether one is being paid fairly or not.” Nearly two-thirds of respondents would also act 
on information they learned. 65.1% of valid respondents (248 individuals)84 agreed85 with the 
statement “If I learned someone with a similar job to me was paid more than I am, I would take 
some action to attempt to remedy the imbalance.” Therefore, finding no statistically significant 
difference between the pay discussion behaviour of men and women is consistent with the findings 
of a study analysing Australian women’s negotiation behaviour, which found that women negotiate 
at comparable rates to men, but they do not benefit comparably to men from those efforts (Artz, 
Goodall and Oswald, 2018). 
7.3.2 Ethnicity 
A smaller proportion of BAME staff than white staff reported discussing pay. However, the chi-
square test again lacks significance at the 5% confidence level (p-value: 0.179). Therefore, there was 
not a statistically significant difference between BAME and white staff’s reported pay discussion 
behaviour. As Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) analysis did not include any measure of ethnicity, no 
comparison can be made with previous findings.  
 
82 Three respondents did not answer this question. 
83 strongly agree, agree, or somewhat agree 
84 Three respondents did not answer this question. 




What did emerge prominently, however, was that professorial status was significantly related with 
pay discussion behaviour. A greater proportion of professors than non-professors reported 
discussing pay. The chi-square test reveals statistical significance at the 1% confidence level (p-value: 
0.000). This is in striking contrast with Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) finding that occupation was the 
strongest predictor of social pay comparison behaviour. They found that managers were least likely 
to report comparing pay, while nurses, and to a greater extent, teachers, were more likely to do so. 
They argued that this could be explained by the fact that manager pay was usually individually 
determined and if they were union members, their union representation was weak and had little to 
do with their pay. Conversely, nurses, and to a greater extent, teachers, had powerful unions and 
had also come through several years of high-profile union pay battles prior to the survey. 
 
This sample was confined to one occupation, namely academics working in the UK HE sector. 
However, job title was used as the closest measure possible to stand in for occupation. UK 
academics below the professoriate had been through recent significant pay battles prior to this 
survey, most recently over the 2016/17 pay settlement. Academics are represented by the 
reasonably strong UCU (2016a). Conversely, professorial pay is very individualised. While professors 
may be UCU members, they are not covered by the UCU’s collectively agreed national pay spine 
(Grove, 2013c), although Universities Alpha and Beta both voluntarily increased professorial pay in 
line with the annual pay agreement. In fact, the secretive nature of individualised pay for UK 
professors, led to the high-profile employment tribunal equal pay decision in the case of Professor 
Schafer and her employer, Royal Holloway and Bedford New College (University and College Union, 
2010; Lewis, 2011). If Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) conclusion that pay is discussed least where it is 
most individualised was applicable to the HE context, one would have expected professors to 
discuss their pay the least amongst academic staff. This survey indicates precisely the opposite.  
7.3.2 Binomial Logistic Regression on Social Pay Comparison 
This chapter next specifies a binomial logistic regression model that describes the likelihood of 
academics to engage in social pay comparison. This model includes all 14 variables that were tested 
in the previous section using bivariate analysis alone. The model can only run on individuals without 
missing data on any variables in the model. This excluded 42 of the 384 respondents due to non-
response to some questions as respondents could skip any question. 
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Table 7-3: Names and Definitions of Model Variables  
 
Considering recent criticism that stepwise entry, as used in Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) model, is 
vulnerable to influence by randomness in data and so poorly replicable, this model applied the 
forced entry method. Hierarchical entry is also vulnerable to influence by the researcher’s bias. 
Forced entry removes the influence of randomness and researcher bias on the order that variables 
enter the model. All variables, which have been selected for inclusion on solid theoretical grounds, 
are put into the model simultaneously; therefore, Table 7-4 displays a single model (Studenmund 
and Cassidy, 1987; Field, 2013). The model suggests that only being a professor86, having a 
doctorate, being a Liberal Democrat or Labour Supporter and being a UCU member influenced the 
propensity to discuss pay, when controlling for the other identified demographic variables. These 
traits all increase the propensity of respondents to report discussing their pay. The relative size of 
these influences follows in decreasing order. Being a professor was the strongest predictor of 
reporting pay discussion behaviour, increasing the likelihood by 3.6 times that of non-professors, 
ceteris paribus. Having a doctorate increased this likelihood by 3.5 times, being a Liberal Democrat 
supporter by 3.4 times, being a Labour supporter by 3.3 times, and being a UCU member by 2.1 
 
86 It may be useful to further to explore quantitative trends in the data regarding with whom these academics 
reported discussing their pay. Questions were included into the survey to capture this information, with 
respect to sex, ethnicity, age, job category, and UCU membership. However, too many respondents skipped 
these questions or gave a neutral response to make this data meaningful, so it has not been reported. 
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times. None of the other variables added anything to the model. Overall, the model explains about 
16-22% of the likelihood of reporting social pay comparison.87 
Table 7-4: Binomial Logistic Regression for Reported Pay Discussion Behaviour 
Note: This table reports the odds ratios (standard errors in parentheses). 
*p< 0.1. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter has provided and analysed primary data related to the social pay comparison 
component of the OSE inside the two case study universities. Social pay comparison violates the 
income-talk taboo (Fox, 2014). This original survey revisited Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) early 
attempts to identify demographic and labour market factors associated with the propensity to 
engage in social pay comparison. While their study was conducted on data from a random sample of 
the workforce of an English locality, this web-based survey was distributed by email to the entire 
accessible population of academics at two case study universities in late 2016, in a similar manner to 
other organisational surveys (Simsek and Veiga, 2001), such as staff surveys commonly conducted 
by UK universities. 
 
87 The Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients confirms the model is significant at the 0.1% confidence level. 
207 
 
This survey has contributed original empirical illustration of the hidden pay discussion behaviour of 
UK academics. More than half of respondents (54.7%) reported discussing their pay with colleagues. 
However, there was statistically significant variation in this behaviour. 14 independent variables 
were collected by this survey, in order to translate Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) analysis into the UK HE 
employment context. This chapter first tested for bivariate relationships between each of these 
variables and social pay comparison behaviour. Half of these characteristics were significantly 
related with discussing pay, including: having a PhD, being a professor, being a UCU member, having 
applied for jobs in the past 12 months, vote intention, being on an open-ended contract, and 
working in a non-SET discipline. These factors were all positively correlated with discussing pay, 
except for voting intention.88  
Analysis was deepened by specification of a binomial logistic regression of social pay comparison 
behaviour with a model comprised of these same 14 independent variables. This model revealed 
that only being a professor, having a doctorate, being a UCU member, and specifically being a 
Liberal Democrat or Labour voter (relative to being a Conservative voter) remained significantly and 
positively correlated with discussing pay. No other variables achieved a significant contribution to 
the model. Hierarchical status was the most important factor in predicting pay discussion behaviour, 
with professors 3.6 times more likely to discuss their pay than their junior colleagues, ceteris 
paribus. 
The organisational survey style design of the distribution means that these results are not 
statistically generalizable to the UK HE sector or the UK workforce. They reflect the behaviour of 
academics at two universities. Nevertheless, these results support earlier critiques of the often 
uncritical presentation of the income-talk taboo in academic literature (Chapter 3). Conversely, 
some variation in compliance with the income-talk taboo could be expected. As anthropologist 
argue, social taboos do not have agency; individuals living under them have the ‘freedom to do 
otherwise’ (Fischer and Ravizza, 1993, p. 6). Nevertheless, Fox’s (2014, p. 290) critical 
anthropological admonishment cautioned that “it is important to understand why people do these 
things.”   
This survey has demonstrated that, despite the so-called income-talk taboo, academics are more 
likely than not to discuss pay with each other at some stage. This is interestingly the case, even 
 
88 As reported in Table 7-3, voting intention was a categorical variable and not a dichotomous dummy 
variable. As such, this result required further investigation to explain the relationship, which was done through 
the treatment of this variable as categorical in the binomial logistic regression. 
208 
 
though 85.6% of those same respondents agreed with the statement ‘British people have a strong 
aversion to talking about their salary and related matters.’ What these results most strikingly 
illustrate through the binomial logistic regression model is a stark difference between the pay 
discussion behaviour of junior and senior academics. The most influential factor explaining the 
propensity to discuss pay was having reached the professoriate, a point at which, generally 
speaking, an academic would feel the most secure in their academic career. It could be that a 
professor can risk having conversations about pay that violate the income-talk taboo. This tendency 
to discuss pay when the risk of doing so is perceived as lower due to having achieved greater career 
establishment is also consistent with the finding that those with PhDs were more likely to discuss 
their pay than those without PhDs, as well as the finding that UCU members (who have access to 
union support) were more likely to discuss their pay than non-UCU members. Professors are also 
those who are likely to benefit the most by discussing pay. Professorial pay is above the academic 
pay scale and, therefore, their pay is higher and more individualised than pay for other academics. A 
professor is more likely to learn information that suggests that they should have a higher salary than 
a lecturer would be, as the range of pay for professors is also wider than for other academics 
(Chapter 6).   
The most parsimonious explanation of this result, however, is structural and perhaps linked to an 
understanding that pay—as well as pay inequality—results from power imbalances between 
institutional employment relations actors, including government, trades unions, and employers. 
Trades unions are often important players in efforts to narrow the GPG, as Conley et al. (2019) 
explored in the UK, Italian, and Polish contexts. Acker’s (1989) analysis of the comparable worth 
efforts in the US state of Oregon demonstrated this potential role of trade unions in the context of 
concerning horizontal occupational segregation. Considering this union perspective, non-professors 
in this survey are covered by sectoral collective bargaining that is linked to the national Framework 
Agreement (JNCHES, 2004); the UCU negotiates for a pay uplift every year on their behalf (University 
and College Union, 2016a). Professorial pay is not covered by these sectoral collective negotiations, 
and the veil of secrecy over professorial pay has been subject to judicial criticism for putting 
institutions at risk of equal pay claims (Lewis, 2011). Therefore, this professorial pay discussion 
proclivity may simply be behaviour of last resort. Professors are more likely to have pay 
conversations with colleagues because there is no transparency for their pay. Hence, without 
recourse to a pay scale, there is no other way for professors to learn what their colleagues earn, and 
in turn, what they should earn. A key distinction, however, is that University Alpha had established 
institutional professorial pay banding prior to 2016/17, and University Beta had not. Nevertheless, 
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professorial pay discussion behaviour was not statistically different between the two institutions,89 
calling into question the degree of transparency of the institutionally managed professorial banding 
procedures at Alpha. Union and remuneration shaper voices sharply disagreed on this question 
(Chapter 8).  
Lastly, it was somewhat surprising from the gender and ethnicity-based intersectional focus of this 
thesis that pay discussion behaviour was not statistically different between men and women, or 
BAME and white academics. These early findings could be further tested in a more generalisable 
survey with a randomised sample of all UK academics, or a representative sample of the UK labour 
force. However, an increasing likelihood to discuss pay as one becomes more secure in one’s job 
could help to explain some of the persistent inequality in pay due to the vertical segregation that is 
faced by women academics, particularly BAME women, if talking about pay (and related 
progression) with colleagues helps academics to advance their careers. The survey data cannot 
elaborate on this conjecture.  
Qualitative analysis of social pay comparison (or lack thereof) and the links between employment 
structures and pay secrecy should be further explored, with consideration for Marasi and Bennett’s 
(2016) call to consider how pay information is communicated and Fox’s (2014) entreaty to 
understand the ‘why’ behind taboo compliance/non-compliance. The nature of employee social pay 
comparison should be critically interrogated. We know from this chapter that academics in these 
case study institutions were more likely than not to report discussing pay, at least in some contexts, 
and this was particularly true for professors. To complete a more nuanced picture of the OSE in 
Universities Alpha and Beta, the findings of this survey will be supplemented by semi-structured 
interviews with a sampling of remuneration policy shapers, union representative and academics 
across the disciplines from the two case study universities in Chapter 8.  
  
 
89 In University Alpha, 67.9% of professorial respondents discussed their pay, while 72.9% of University Beta 
professors did. However, a cross-tabulation of the dichotomous variable for reported social pay comparison 
behaviour or not and the dummy variable for University Beta membership with the sample cut to professors 




Chapter 8 The Income-Talk Taboo, Employee Social Pay Comparison 
Interactions, and Perspectives on Informal Pay Secrecy Norms and 
Bureaucratic Reward Processes: The Self 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the analysis is located at the level of the self and draws on the micro level experience 
of workplace social pay comparison and other social interactions that relate to pay and self-identity. 
Analysing situated activity and self level experiences within two research-intensive universities in 
the South East of England is consistent with the adoption of Layder’s (1993, 2013) social domain and 
adaptive theories in this thesis (Chapter 5). This qualitative thematic analysis primarily draws on 
semi-structured interviews with academics from the level of lecturer to professor. Supplemental 
critical context is provided by analysing semi-structured interviews with UCU representatives and 
policy shapers, and relevant public pay and progression-related documents that were available from 
the two institutions during the 2016/17 academic year. Whilst Chapter 6 sought to illuminate the 
shape of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ implementation in the two case study universities, this 
chapter seeks to deepen an understanding of how that implementation may contrast with stated 
equality goals and interacts with social pay comparison behaviour. Therefore, this analysis will 
address the final sub-research question: How does the pay ‘transparency agenda’ within UK 
universities influence awareness of pay (and related progression) inequality by academics, 
particularly women and BAME academics?  
The focus of Chapter 6 was on the employer’s ‘pay communication’ policy activity—the explicit role 
of university management in shaping the organisational salary environment (OSE) through the 
publication of equalities data and seeking public recognition of equalities reforms, which emerged 
through the analysis of the first two OSE themes. This chapter completes the OSE analysis, using the 
third and fourth themes. Analysis along the first of these two themes, informal pay secrecy norms, 
will yield a second emergent component of the OSE, the income-talk taboo, by investigating the 
informal ways in which university management shapes and benefits from this societal force. The 
second of these themes to be addressed in this chapter, bureaucratic reward process and policy, will 
yield the final emergent component of the OSE, employee social pay comparison behaviour and 
other social interactions, to explore how this behaviour helps to reveal the contradictory impact of 
bureaucratic processes and policies that have been presented as tools of transparency and equality 
at work. This explores the emergent phenomenon from Chapter 7, that academics do discuss pay 
with each other to a higher degree than what one might expect, given the so-called income-talk 
taboo (Fox, 2014), from a qualitative perspective.  
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8.2 Informal Pay Secrecy Norms: Management’s Control over Employee 
Compliance with Inequalities (OSE Theme Three) 
Turning to the first area of thematic analysis for this chapter, the maintenance of informal pay 
secrecy norms at Universities Alpha and Beta will be analysed through the lens of Acker’s (2006b, 
2006a) inequality regime component: management’s control over employee compliance with 
inequalities. Acker (2006b, p. 454) wrote that “organisational controls are, in the first instance, class 
controls, directed at maintaining the power of managers, ensuring that employees act to further the 
organisation’s goals, and getting workers to accept the system of inequality.” The exercise of 
management control is enabled by hierarchical organisational, gendered and racialized power 
structures and these embedded structures hinder inequality regime change (Acker, 2006b). 
Managerial control may be direct, indirect, or internal. Direct management control can take the 
form of bureaucratic policies to be obeyed, reward, coercion, or even verbal or physical violence 
(Perrow, 1991; Hearn and Parkin, 2001; Acker, 2006b). A direct form of management control 
relevant to this thesis would be the bureaucratic policy of pay secrecy clauses (PSCs) in employment 
contracts. These ‘gagging clauses’ may prohibit employees from discussing their own pay with 
anyone, including their work colleagues, and they are typically found in private sector firms (Gow 
and Middlemiss, 2012). Nevertheless, the Equality Act 2010 protects the right of employees to 
discuss pay amongst each other if they suspect illegal discrimination (Doherty, 2011). Given the law, 
the tendency of PSCs to be found in the private sector, and the strong tradition of academic 
freedom inside universities, it would be surprising if academics working in public universities in the 
UK were subject to direct managerial control through PSCs. This is especially so given the efforts by 
the case study universities in this thesis to perform the pay ‘transparency agenda (Chapter 6). As 
anticipated, no policy shaper, union committee member or academic interviewee in either case 
study institution provided compelling evidence of the use of such clauses within their organisation, 
and nearly all provided resounding assurance that, to the best of their collective knowledge, no 
academic in their organisation was prohibited from disclosing their pay by a PSC. 
Consequently, in the HE context, it is more useful to consider forms of indirect and internalised 
managerial control. These forms of control serve to reinforce the social norm-sewn cloak of secrecy 
over pay in practise, in contrast with the theoretical performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda.’ 
The social anthropologist Fox (2014, p. 291) referred to the so-called ‘income-talk taboo’ as the 
strongest taboo within the broader money-talk taboo. Yet, she advocated for critical assessment of 
this taboo, rather than just accepting it as an established cultural value, noting that “it is important 
to understand why people do these things. But it doesn’t make them any less daft” (Fox, 2014, p. 
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290). The following sub-sections will bring to light the societal income-talk taboo component of the 
OSE by exploring the indirect and internalised forms of managerial control over this societal force. 
An example of disturbing internalised managerial control is ‘the helpfulness trap’, which creates an 
unspoken barrier to progression and will be examined from the perspective of women and BAME 
academics. Echoing conclusions drawn in Chapter 6, despite a greater degree of formal transparency 
policy in University Alpha than Beta, indirect and internalised managerial controls in both 
universities will be shown to reinforce the income-talk taboo. 
8.2.1 Indirect Managerial Control and the Pay Secrecy Norm 
Indirect managerial control may take the form of tracking or monitoring work, hindering access to 
information, or recruiting employees from relatively powerless demographics (Acker and Van 
Houten, 1974; Acker, 2006b). Examples of indirect control were already evident in the analysis of 
Chapter 6, such as the difficulties that were faced by UCU representatives of both universities in 
accessing consistent and comprehensive staff diversity data and the concerted effort by Beta senior 
management to conceal on-going efforts to narrow the professorial GPG until the exercise was 
completed. When data is eventually released after great delay or not at all, it ceases to be a useful 
tool to examine inequality, as institutions can assert that things have improved since the data was 
collected. Where a GPG remedy is conducted under the cloak of silence, with minimal 
acknowledgement on completion, the information restriction reinforces the norm that pay 
problems are not to be discussed. 
Informal cues from the centre, arising from HR processes or communication, and head of 
department (HoD) behaviour may also indirectly discourage open discussion about pay. Alpha and 
Beta policy shapers generally pointed to formal institutional policies of establishing pay and 
progression as evidence that pay was fairly determined and open for discussion, pursuant to data 
protection law. However, one Beta policy shaper was sceptical in this regard, observing: 
We have a pay structure, but we don’t have a pay policy. So, we don’t say this is where we 
expected to pay people. These are the reasons why. There are our grade differentials 
between lowest grade staff and high-grade staff. This is the difference. If you have a pay 
policy, then you can say things like: what’s the lowest pay? What’s the median pay? 
Differences between the lowest pay staff and the highest pay staff, which is the [VC]. What 
does that look like? They’re not transparent about things like that…I don’t think the appetite 
is there.  
Related to this point, although policy shapers in both institutions talked about academic pay and the 
pay scale as though it was clear that lecturers, senior lecturers and readers were each in turn paid 
within certain ranges, neither institution had published documentation on their websites detailing 
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such ranges. Within this context, a Beta policy shaper acknowledged that the societal discomfort 
with discussing pay (not specific to Beta or HE), is likely to be exacerbated for some managers in the 
university by the practical deviations from the published pay structure. Some managers may be 
particularly uncomfortable with discussing pay because they know that academic pay does 
sometimes diverge from the published pay scale. These divergences can come in the form of market 
supplements, for example. Describing the justification for using market supplements for academics, 
even for lecturers, the policy shaper remarked: 
We definitely have areas where, because of the nature of the work, they don’t sit nicely into 
our pay structures. We would never get anyone employed. For example, in economics we 
would never employ people if we paid them on the normal lecturer salary. So, we have to 
look at more creative ways to be able to address those things. Areas of marketing as well, 
we can’t usually get people to do those kinds of jobs. 
Given these intersecting forces, the shaper said that they would not be surprised if an academic was 
met with shock by their HoD or an HR professional, if she queried why her pay was lower than the 
pay of a similarly situated man. The shaper added that “It also depends on what school they were 
working in because like I said there are, I’m aware of grade drift in certain schools.” Further blurring 
stems from the placement of senior lecturers and readers within the same institutional pay scale 
band in both universities, which will be further explored in the second theme of this chapter. 
Compounding this nebulosity, UCU representatives in both institutions expressed concern that 
HoDs—the frontline of university management from the perspective of academics—and HR 
professionals tended to discourage academic pay discussions and efforts to better understand 
progression policy. One Alpha representative explained: 
Heads of department are woefully ignorant, as are even more senior management, on HR 
rules and procedure. They’re woefully ignorant on the law…There are appropriate ways to 
deal with an issue like [staff querying pay differentials]. One of them is not to say to the 
individual you shouldn’t be talking about your pay…In the Equality Act in particular, if any of 
this has been post 2010, it’s illegal. It’s never clear that these people know. They just don’t 
have the experience, judgement or training on a lot of issues to know, perhaps, that they’re 
doing things wrong, and they learn by example from other people who also don’t have the 
judgement, training and experience.  
A similarly pessimistic message was presented by a Beta UCU representative, who observed: 
There is no real avenue to go and speak about pay disparity often because it’s confidential 
and it’s very hard to also produce some sort of documentary evidence to say somebody’s 
being paid higher. That will not be available to you. HR often normally don’t give you advice 




Beta and Alpha academics appeared to be vulnerable to chance in terms of the reaction to sensitive 
pay discussions by HoDs and HR professionals. HoDs could play champion or silencer in 
conversations about pay. For example, one white female professor recounted being told twice by 
her head that she should not be talking about her pay with anyone. The first time was in the context 
of querying why her comparable male colleague was paid more than she was, even though he had 
finished his PhD several years more recently and had a weaker publication record. She recalled: 
I found out that he was on three or four thousand pounds more than I was…I was saying ‘oh 
my God, it’s really hard to live.’ And he was like ‘well, you know, because I’d been at [former 
university] a couple years, I got this, you know, my salary scale is higher, so I am comfortable 
on this’…So, I went to [my HoD] and said ‘Oh, this is weird. Can we talk about this?’ And he 
went ‘Oh, you really shouldn’t be talking about this. You shouldn’t be talking about this’, and 
I was like ‘Oh, ok.’  
The second instance that she recalled illustrated her HoD’s continued efforts to silence discussion of 
her pay, while also revealing how little the HoD appeared to know about what she earned. She was 
seeking her HoD’s signature on a form to document her earnings to a prospective landlord. She 
explained: 
We had a room of visiting academics and a very senior visiting academic from America was 
talking to [the HoD] and I was like ‘Oh, [HoD], I need this form signed.’ And he was like ‘Oh 
my goodness, you don’t earn enough to rent this house by yourself!’ And I’m like ‘Yeah, no, I 
don’t.’ And he was like ‘that’s awful.’…The senior academic from America was just like, 
‘What do you mean she doesn’t earn anything?’ And [my HoD] was like ‘Don’t talk to, don’t 
tell anyone how much you earn,’ to me…Then, when I was about to say how much less than 
[the required income to rent alone] I earned because this senior academic had asked me, 
my HoD was like ‘*Gasp* You shouldn’t say this!’  
The HoD’s discomfort with discussing pay and clear desire to suppress conversation could stem from 
a lack of power to resolve the matter, or a lack of willingness to try. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
payroll came out of a centralised budget in University Alpha, so it was not under direct HoD control. 
Consistent with this understanding, when asked whether she felt she received messages from 
university authority figures, like her HoD, about discussing pay, another white female academic 
acknowledged “Well, the thing is, I’m not really sure who deals with pay. I mean, like, it’s certainly 
not [the HoD]. I mean, maybe to some extent.” However, she did recall that her HoD had sent her 
the pay offer when she was being recruited to Alpha, which she simply accepted. 
By contrast, some Alpha HoDs were more engaged, championing, and open (at least in the context 
of one-to-one conversations) regarding the pay of their subordinates. Another white female 
professor recalled having been encouraged to negotiate her pay harder, when her original 
inclination had been only to ask for her current salary plus a small increase to cover her new 
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commute. She was making an important leap from holding a post-doc elsewhere to her first 
permanent academic job, a lectureship at Alpha. She recalled: 
[My HoD] offered me in the end, the top of the [lecturer grade] in reflection of my 
experience and all the rest and to make sure that they’d matched and then gone a bit 
further than my salary. He made this quip, ‘you know, you need an agent’…I think he was 
basically insinuating don’t be afraid to ask for more. So, you know, I think that’s interesting 
because I can’t imagine that’s an across the board experience for people in academia.  
While that now-professor experienced strong support on her pay, such openness did not appear to 
be the norm at Alpha or Beta. A BAME male professor observed of senior management in Beta:  
I think it’s, to the senior people in the university, I think it’s convenient to try and keep 
things unspoken and as lacking in transparency as possible because it is a difficult and 
awkward topic and subject to have to kind of deal with and it can open a can of worms 
about what is and isn’t a fair pay system.  
A Beta BAME female professor echoed this perception, arguing that a social taboo around discussing 
pay in the UK serves the interests of employers in order to minimise salary costs, which could be 
more difficult to maintain in the light of radical pay transparency between individuals. She noted: 
I don’t think people talk very much about pay, but that only helps sustain the disadvantages 
that are already present in the system. It serves the interest of the employers rather than 
the employees, so I think it’s really important that people are open about their pay. I think 
all pay should be public anyway. Everybody’s pay should be publicly accessible in an ideal 
world, in my world.    
The framing by HoDs of payroll as an institutional cost to be minimised, contributed in a more subtle 
manner to the reinforcement of the pay secrecy norm. The language suggested that to question 
one’s own pay, would be a greedy act. For example, a white male academic working within the 
humanities and social sciences observed that the only open discussion of pay he could recall ever 
taking place within his department, was in a department meeting where pay was framed as an 
institutional burden. He recalled the discussion, which he considered to be ridiculous: 
Our previous [HoD] presented the breakdown of the [department] budget, which was the 
first and last time that’s been done, incidentally, which is interesting, and said ‘Well, I want 
you to realise that 50%, 57% of our expenditure goes on staff costs.’ And the implication 
was that we should feel lucky because so much money was being lavished on us, right? And I 
thought, but where else is it going to go? We don’t have a Large Hadron Collider or 
something…I thought it was a stupid thing to say. What point are you trying to make? Of 
course, it’s staff costs. We’ve got no other costs. You know, photocopying and space, you 
know, you have to rent space from the university, but beyond that, we haven’t got 
equipment or anything…So, that was a very headline figure, but beyond that, I’ve never 
heard pay discussed sort of openly.  
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A Beta BAME female professor further agreed that existing structures and behaviours by 
management serve to keep matters of pay both hidden and individualised. Although pay is related 
to an institutional pay scale, when problems with that implementation arise, those problems are not 
addressed in a collectivised manner. Pressure to keep pay discussion individualised also makes 
identifying the pay of potentially relevant comparators, which are needed for possible equal pay 
claims, challenging (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011a). The professor argued: 
It would help to change things much more quickly if there was more of a mass 
demonstration against pay inequalities, rather than people having to negotiate things 
individually…When people have to individually stick their necks out, there are individual 
repercussions to how they are viewed and I think that’s really unfair for institutional 
issues…At the moment, if you’re dealing with ‘I think I’m being paid less than I should be,’ 
you know, on what basis can you argue that you know? You’ve got no information.  
Therefore, although there was some variation in behaviour, a considerable degree of indirect 
managerial control could be seen to be exerted by HoDs in such a way as to reinforce the pay 
secrecy norm. This control was exerted through conversations where HoDs discouraged academics 
from discussing pay openly. This behaviour may be driven by HoDs’ awareness that actual pay does 
diverge some from stated pay structures, their own lack of power to resolve pay inequality, or their 
own lack of willingness to try to resolve pay inequality, which may itself be driven by HoDs’ own 
awareness of the income-talk taboo.    
8.2.2 Internalised Managerial Control and the Pay Secrecy Norm 
Acker (2006b) also acknowledged that internalised managerial control takes the most invisible form. 
These controls can look like adopted trust in bureaucratic systems, such as the professorial pay 
banding process in Alpha, or the pay scale and academic promotions procedures in both universities. 
An Alpha BAME female and white male professor both agreed that they would not be surprised if 
university management expressed shock if a woman came to them and explained that she had 
discussed pay with a similarly situated man and learned that he was being paid more. This 
demonstrates the trust in bureaucratic systems that was perceived to be expected by management 
and their trust in pay secrecy norms as an organising process. The same BAME women professor 
remarked: 
I think that what these institutions do is they make everything public, and they make the 
argument that, they make the point that, you know, if you’re an SL, you’re between [£X] and 
whatever on the spine and that’s where you come in and everyone, it doesn’t matter, you’re 
paid equally to the person who is on the same pay spine as you, regardless of whether 
you’re male, female, older, or younger. That’s their protection, so they’d be like ‘What? 
That’s not possible!’  
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Relatedly, the same white male professor added that “I think senior management, although they 
claim to be following due process, in practise, do not do so, not necessarily just in relation to pay but 
in relation to employment practices more generally.” To further illustrate the pressure from senior 
management to implicitly trust bureaucratic systems, the white male professor went on to remark 
that although he served on an institutional promotion committee, the committee had no knowledge 
of—nor power over—pay rises awarded for the promotions they approved. He said of pay rises for 
promotions that “it’s not seen as something that academics should have any right to know about. 
It’s down to HR and their relationship with the individual academic.” Individualising pay decisions 
can be seen as part of the tendency of universities to individualise problems, rather than 
acknowledge problems with the established systems. This sort of blind trust in the bureaucratic 
system encouraged by senior management is an internalised control mechanism over the pay 
secrecy norm and will be illustrated in the pay rises associated with promotion that will be discussed 
in the second theme of this chapter. Yet, there is an ambiguous nature to promotion pay rises, as 
the promotion policy documents in both universities do not explain how pay rises should work at 
promotion. They are silent on the matter of how such pay rises are calculated. 
For white women in both institutions, promotion was presented by management as a resolution to 
the acknowledged unfairness that the women were experiencing. This unquestioning trust in 
bureaucratic systems was made apparent by Alpha and Beta academics. These academics appeared 
to have internalised the social taboo against discussing pay to the extent that even the idea that 
they might be underpaid due to their sex was not something they could readily imagine. In Alpha, a 
white female professor felt that this British cultural aversion was organic, although also convenient 
for management. She remarked: 
So, money is a bit sordid, and I do think that’s a kind of self-policing thing. I do think it’s a 
cultural thing to do with British or English notions of not discussing salary, and I think that it 
doesn’t need to be policed in any way by the centre, but it benefits them…because people 
don’t realise that they could be earning more. They don’t think in those terms.  
A Beta white female professor could easily have been describing her Alpha counterpart. The Beta 
professor said that she would be unhappy with radical pay transparency, where everyone’s pay was 
publicly available online, as is practised in some North American public universities (Monopoli, 2016) 
and in some Scandinavian countries through a tax return database (Fernandez, 2010; Swift, 2012; 
Kulow, 2013; Marcal, 2017). Interestingly, she expressed this even though she suspected there was a 
large disparity in institutional financial investment between the humanities, where she worked, and 
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the sciences. Although she felt this was unfair, particularly given her department’s strong rankings, 
she explicitly did not characterise the disparity as gendered. 
Valuing pleasure from work also functions as an internalised control against discussing pay. This 
control is related to the common understanding amongst the academics interviewed that academia 
is a calling, something beyond ‘minor’ concerns like pay. Several Alpha academics expressed this 
view, including a BAME male academic who observed: 
I think in the university sector, I think it’s sort of an underlying, unspoken sort of rule that, 
you know, money is not the thing that drives you in the university. You know, there are 
other things that drive you: the teaching, the research…There’s a sort of unspoken rule in 
universities, you know, that you’re not going to make money here. If you want to make 
money, you go to the business world. 
Similarly, a white female professor agreed that there is “a mentality in academia that like, you know, 
the job and the quality of experience kind of takes priority over everything, including money.” She 
went on to posit that there is an unspoken expectation that “of course, you would go and take the 
amazing research experience and research community over things like financial security, or even, for 
that matter, job security, you know, in terms of permanence of contract.” A similar view was 
expressed by a white female Beta academic who explained: 
There is definitely an odd situation where there is a perception of shock if individuals within 
higher education institutions treat the higher education institution as an employer, rather 
than as a, I don’t know, some form of church, abbey, or monastery…I think part of that may 
be because the duty of care between the university and its participants has been, I think the 
duty or that kind of contract have broken quite comprehensively now…I get the impression 
that it may have once been the case that university institutions cared for their academics, 
cared for their staff, in a somewhat feudal or patriarchal way. My sense now is that because 
we’re talking about institutions that now operate according to the principles, I guess they 
are neo-liberal principles of, it’s a form of business model, and so those cultures of care 
have been eroded. But there is not an equivalent employee-employer culture that has 
properly embedded itself. The policies are there because they have to be. The law is there 
because it has to be. But I don’t get the impression that the culture has made that shift yet.  
The strength of the perception that academia is beyond pay that came through from the academics, 
contrasts sharply with existing policies at Universities Beta and Alpha on retention and market 
supplement payments. These reward policies are designed to create an objective justification for 
paying someone more than what they would receive on the standard pay scale on the basis that the 
standard pay would be insufficient to recruit or keep a desired candidate (Doucet, Durand and 
Smith, 2008). It therefore follows that some academics must be (perhaps quietly) driven by ‘minor 
concerns’ like pay. Otherwise, employers would not have so forcefully demanded the allowance to 
219 
 
keep these policies during the course of negotiating the Framework Agreement of 2004 (JNCHES, 
2004; NATFHE, 2005). 
A final internalised control is fear, such as the fear of being seen as what Healy, Bradley, and Forson 
(2011, p. 482) called a ‘troublemaker.’ In a similar vein, Ahmed’s (2018a, 2018b) ongoing research 
about ‘complaint as diversity work’ in UK higher education (HE) illustrates how formally reporting 
problems that are experienced in universities should be an important tool to record and combat 
those problems. However, instead, those complaints are often used as evidence of what is wrong 
with the complainer, rather than the workplace. It is within this context that an Alpha UCU 
representative expressed concern that: 
Most people are just terrified to speak up, even in an anonymised form. People are very, 
very afraid. Very afraid. If you’ve been treated badly, the last thing you want to do is make a 
fuss and have your head of department do even more, you know? Because you know that 
senior management wouldn’t listen to you. They’ll listen to your head of department.  
The fear of being seen as a troublemaker is amplified within the context of a highly competitive job 
market. A Beta white male academic observed that “I think it’s quite hard to mobilise people around 
pay, actually, because there’s this view that, well, we’re kind of lucky to have a job at all. Well, other 
people have it much harder. Well, we’ll look greedy.” A BAME female professor at Beta felt that a 
white female professor had been reluctant to speak with her, due to an apparent fear of this zero-
sum resource competition. The two academics had applied for a readership at the same time, but 
only the white woman was initially successful. A colleague advised the BAME woman to seek advice 
from the newly promoted white woman for the next time. She did, but the white woman never 
replied to her email. The white woman went on to become a professor a year before the BAME 
woman did. When the BAME woman learned she was being promoted to professor the next year, 
she again sought the white woman’s advice, this time because she was considering trying to 
negotiate a higher pay rise on becoming a professor. The BAME woman felt the initial offer being 
made was low. Although the BAME woman explained that she had a much better relationship with 
the white woman by this time, again she received no reply. The BAME professor felt that the white 
woman (wrongly) worried that helping someone else would reduce her own resources, observing: 
The funny thing is when I made a case for higher pay, the head of school said [they] looked 
at the kind of pay of everybody in the school, the lowest paid, the three lowest paid people 
were women so [they] decided to lift the pay of somebody else as well, which is that person, 
who never replied to my emails…So, I think we also internalise this kind of pay secrecy to a 
large extent and we think that we are competing with each other, I think. So, beyond pay 
secrecy, I think it has something to do with the capitalist system and capitalist work 
relations as well, I think. That people are always kind of positioned as competitors.  
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There is also a related internalised fear of causing resentment by revealing pay information. For 
example, a white female Beta professor felt that radical pay transparency would be a bad idea 
because it would create feelings of resentment in the university. She felt that “it would make lots of 
people cross.” She pointed to the backlash against the BBC’s transparency of high pay as evidence of 
the importance of maintaining individual level pay secrecy. The BBC pay story had broken shortly 
before the interview, and it had revealed significant gender disparity amongst the highest paid BBC 
talent (BBC News, 2018). The professor reflected: 
I’m a great believer in privacy…I mean, you know when there was all that brouhaha about 
what people were being paid at the BBC. I mean, they are paid at crazy salaries, but it 
produced very unpleasant results. You know, people were being attacked personally for the 
sums of money they earned. I thought that was pretty unpleasant.  
This concern reflects an embedded acceptance of the power privilege that is enjoyed by employers 
over workers. If pay differentials between workers are unjustified, which when exposed, would yield 
these feelings, the veil of secrecy over pay is merely preventing those feelings. The creation of 
radical transparency would not be the root cause of the resentment. The root cause would be the 
employer’s unjustified pay decisions, which themselves do not always appear to be the result of a 
rational strategy but a series of ad-hoc individual decisions.  
8.2.3 ‘The Helpfulness Trap’ inside ‘Kafkaesque’ Bureaucracy: Unspoken Career Barriers Faced by 
Women and BAME Academics  
A disturbing example of internalised managerial control, drawing on the fear of being seen as a 
troublemaker, is the unspoken pressure that women, BAME academics, and BAME women feel to 
undertake supportive work that is not strongly rewarded through promotion. This ‘helpfulness trap’ 
emerged in the data and can be understood as an unspoken pressure on women and BAME 
academics to say ‘yes’, to go above and beyond for their department, particularly regarding 
pastoral, administrative, and diversity work, even though that work was less rewarded or 
unrewarded in the academic promotion process. The general concept of this ‘helpfulness trap’ was 
elucidated by Padilla (1994), in regards to the experience of ethnic minority academics in the US HE 
sector. Padilla (1994, p. 26) coined the term ‘cultural taxation’ to describe “the obligation to show 
good citizenship toward the institution by serving its needs for ethnic representation on 
committees, or to demonstrate knowledge and commitment to a cultural group, which may even 
bring accolades to the institution but which is not usually rewarded by the institution on whose 
behalf the service was performed.” The concept continues to come up in literature about ethnic 
minorities working in HE (Turner, 2002; Joseph and Hirshfield, 2011) and has been broadened to 
encompass other marginalised groups that are similarly impacted, such as women, under the term 
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‘identity taxation’ (Hirshfield and Joseph, 2012). This is related to the discussion of the significant 
labour involved in the Athena SWAN process (Chapter 6), as well as the significant criticism that the 
award tends to disproportionately place this burden on women (Rosser et al., 2019).  
This ‘helpfulness trap’ can be seen as a double bind when examining university processes through 
Clegg et al.’s (2016) lens of ‘Kafkaesque’ bureaucracy. They identified three processes that 
contribute to the feelings of entrapment by a vicious cycle inside the ‘Kafkaesque’ bureaucracies: 
meaninglessness, inaction, and helplessness. Socially constructed meaninglessness refers to the 
feeling that an organisational process is intentionally constructed and actively implemented in a 
complex manner that is difficult to comprehend. Managed inaction refers to the organisational 
signals that individuals lack agency to remedy apparent organisational problems. Finally, taught 
helplessness refers to the resignation by individuals to their lack of agency, in the face of the intense 
emotional labour that is required to complain about organisational problems. These processes can 
be seen in the experiences of academics in this thesis, building on the cultural and identity taxation 
concepts (Padilla, 1994; Hirshfield and Joseph, 2012) with the ‘helpfulness trap.’ This analysis 
illuminates the double bind added to this dilemma by the silence of transparency around pay and 
related elements of the Kafkaesque university bureaucracy, such as workload and progression. The 
silence of transparency refers to the pressure to shut down, or at least isolate, individual inequality 
concerns as anomalies because ‘transparent’ pay structures are in place. This leads to impunity for 
the perpetrators (even if unconsciously) of potentially unfair work allocation decisions.  
Academic experiences of workload allocation yielded a sense of socially constructed 
meaninglessness to the different tasks of work and the time they are expected to take (Clegg et al., 
2016). Although not explicitly linked to pay, the workload model was frequently described by 
academics as a tool that creates and sustains gendered and racialised inequality in the institutions. 
For salaried academics90, the workload model is used to allocate teaching and admin academic 
duties, alongside research time, by applying a notional value of hours to different tasks. Although all 
full-time staff had the same number of hours ‘available’ for this model91, the actual assignment and 
division of those hours clearly caused tension. A Beta female academic observed that one reason for 
this, emphasising the notional nature of the model, was that “we have found somehow certain 
administrative jobs have been given quite a generous allowance in terms of hours, but certain 
 
90 This contrasts with hourly paid staff, where the workload model sometimes becomes a formula to directly 
calculate pay. 
91 Those on teaching-only contracts have more hours available for the model than those on teaching and 
research contracts, as the former are expected to undertake more teaching activities. 
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teaching jobs have been underestimated in terms of how much work they require.” An Alpha white 
female professor expressed a similar concern, recalling a male colleague’s experience: 
That is a really huge way that inequality comes, through career progression as well. I think 
they should be doing much more to monitor it to really see what’s going on. We have a 
workload model, but there’s stuff that goes on in the workload model and then people don’t 
check it and all sorts. I know somebody had their admin roles super weighted and there was 
just no reason. It was a new admin role, but it was not mysteriously difficult. It just got super 
weighted to nearly twice some of the other roles. The guy did like three funding applications 
and he also had less courses. He just did three funding applications. He’s now got a grant, 
which will help him get promoted. 
Many academics found it difficult to speak up on these matters. The existence of a workload model 
was seen from their organisation’s perspective to have already created transparency and fairness. 
This is part of the performance of a ‘transparent’ system, as explored in Chapter 6. Therefore, to 
question what one is being asked to do, suggests a problem with the individual. To question the 
functioning of the workload model where one has been established is difficult for individual staff 
members. Once a system is established, institutions are reluctant to entertain questions of the 
system that an institution perceives as transparent. When some of the academics in my study tried 
to question their workload allocation after it had been established, they suffered retribution from 
authority and this taught them to cease complaining and to remain silent, at least in the face of 
authority. This retribution came in the form of more work, not less, after expressing concern about 
their workload. A Beta white female academic described a female professor who felt that supporting 
the department’s Athena SWAN application was hindering her ability to advance her personal 
research. Athena SWAN is supposed to recognise good gender equality employment practice in HE. 
The woman described her colleague’s effort to question her workload with their HoD, noting that: 
She was deeply unhappy because while she was lumbered with Athena SWAN work, she went 
and said, ‘But I’m a professor. I’m a researcher. I need to do my research.’ Her perception was 
she got more work.  
The same academic described similar perceived treatment of another female academic colleague:  
She came back from maternity leave only to find herself doing more than before maternity 
leave. So, when she raised the question, she was given even more work. Not less. So, 
basically, what people are learning is that if they complain, they get a worse outcome, and 
therefore, people are being conditioned not to complain. 
Ahmed (2018b) cautioned that actions that cause fatigue as a response to complaint, can 
themselves be a form of management control, writing “You tire people out so they are too tired to 
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address what makes them too tired.” Fatigue was evident in several interviewees who sought to 
redress their perceived unfair treatment.  
Clear evidence that women and BAME academics experienced this ‘helpfulness trap’ arose in both 
institutions. However, inspiration for the term stemmed from a white male professor at University 
Alpha, who observed that this phenomenon harmed colleagues because the promotion system 
yielded ‘managed inaction’ (Clegg et al., 2016) from those with decision-making power. The 
professor felt that the promotion policy prevented decision-makers from awarding promotions to 
those who were clearly harmed by this ‘helpfulness trap.’ The hazards of expending too much effort 
on ‘helpfulness’ that would not be rewarded were clearly apparent to him, although he framed this 
as a choice that his female colleagues were making. He advised women to make better choices so 
that the decision-makers would be able to help them. Thinking about professorial banding and 
academic promotion criteria in particular, the professor felt that women tended to veer from 
research activities in favour of pastoral support to students. He noted: 
I try to make sure with young women I talk to…to sort of say to them be careful of all these 
various traps. So, there are all these…gendered traps that women fall into, which is, you 
know, not publishing research, being the person students go to all the time. 
While the professor acknowledged that pastoral support was notionally recognised in the promotion 
criteria matrix, he believed that it was not rewarded “as much as writing your monograph.” He went 
on to describe a female colleague in his department, whom he admired. He was concerned that she 
was falling into this ‘helpfulness trap.’ He noted that “you can see that she’s being loaded with more 
pastoral things that are not, they are not the things that are going to get her rewarded.” An Alpha 
white female academic observed such overloading as a trend throughout her department as well. 
She noted:  
Mid-career women are basically running the department; whereas, senior-career men are 
not, and they should be. So, there are a lot of people who are getting paid, the people who 
are getting paid the most aren’t doing the most work. 
This further underscores the point that academic promotion rewards prior achievement, yet it 
impacts pay regardless of future work.  
However, academics in both institutions experienced ‘taught helplessness’ (Clegg et al., 2016) to 
remedy the ‘helpfulness trap’ problem, even as they realised they were trapped. An Alpha BAME 
male academic described the pressure he felt to undertake work of little value to his own 
promotion, in order to avoid being perceived as difficult: 
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You know, there are things that we do to signal that we’re not problematic but actually then 
themselves become problematic…So, if you asked an academic, academics are notoriously 
independent, so if you asked an academic to do some task which is institutionally important 
but has no positive impact on your career, or it is difficult to evidence a positive impact on 
your career… So, you’re asked to be an admissions tutor. You don’t really want to do it. If 
you’re sort of white, middle class male, you’d probably say you don’t want to do it and 
you’re unlikely to get forced to do it. If you’re, and I would describe this, as, if you’re from 
certain protected characteristics, if you’re minority ethnic, if you’re female, yeah, maybe 
even if you’re disabled, any of these things, they are more likely to make you want to show 
that you are a good corporate citizen and so, you say yes…The problem is it may take up a 
lot of your time, some of which is not abated for, and therefore, you do less research and 
that means that at some point, someone’s going to say your research performance is not up 
to scratch. Or you can’t get promoted even if you’re sacrificing.  
The academic that felt this way in his own workplace was perceived as a minority ethnic man by 
colleagues. When asked about the pressure of this ‘helpfulness trap’ to be a good corporate citizen, 
a BAME female academic agreed that the concept also resonated with her, particularly as a woman. 
It was something she had discussed with fellow female academics who had observed themselves 
and many other colleagues stuck as a senior lecturer for around a decade. She said of this pressure: 
I think that comes through in this department in terms of gender as well, to be honest, 
those kinds of, yeah, corporate citizenship roles, as you’ve called them, are mostly done by 
women, and that was again a conversation that was being had while people were staying on 
the SL band forever and ever and ever, and it was like, so, we’re doing all the kind of work, 
while the men are off writing books and it’s the books that are counting for the promotion. 
Yeah. I don’t know that I felt it particularly as a black woman, personally…it is as a woman.  
Related illustrations of the ‘taught helplessness’ of being caught in the ‘helpfulness trap’ emerged in 
University Beta. For example, a BAME female professor recalled that earlier in her career, 
understanding the stated importance of the workload model to ensure the fair distribution of tasks, 
she had dared to question her HoD when she was asked her to take on additional work. Although 
she ended up doing the additional work anyway, the fact that she had questioned was referenced as 
a mark against her when she sought support for promotion from the same HoD later on: 
He said he doesn’t believe I make a contribution to the [department]. So, I showed him my 
CV and I told him don’t you think this is a contribution? Then he said, yeah, but you know, I 
asked you to do two things and you questioned it, and I said, what do you mean? You know, 
at the end I did it because I was told off, so I had to do it. I was just wondering why the 
additional work was given to me. What is the logic behind it? But obviously, you are not 
supposed to question this. 
Following on from this experience, although she admitted she had on-going concerns about the 
fairness of her pay and workload allocation, she conceded:  
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I don’t talk about it to HR or senior management because I don’t think they will listen 
because they will just think that I am unpleasant. Nothing will come out of it, so I don’t 
even attempt to do that, which is really sad, actually. 
When academics are taught by managers that to question their treatment when they feel it hinders 
their promotion is punishable, then managerial control over employees to comply with existing 
inequalities is damaging. Academics learn that to complain is to become visible and vulnerable to 
retribution, but carrying on doing the excessive administrative, pastoral, and diversity work hurts 
their career progression. Academics can see the ‘helpfulness trap’ they face, but have limited power 
to remedy their treatment, because the Kafkaesque bureaucracy of the promotions process 
engenders feelings of meaninglessness about the workload model and taught helplessness in 
academics, while the transparent promotion criteria provides cover for managed inaction by 
promotion-deciders to avoid recognising when academics experience this undue burden. 
8.3 Bureaucratic Reward Processes and Policy: Processes that Produce 
Organisational Inequality (OSE Theme Four) 
Turning to the second area of thematic analysis for this chapter, the operation of bureaucratic 
processes and policies, which appear to create transparency around pay setting mechanisms and 
progression decisions at both institutions, demands analysis through the lens of Acker’s (2006b, 
2006a) inequality regime component: processes that produce inequality. Although individuals at the 
centre of both institutions drew a clear distinction between pay and promotion, the two processes 
are linked. Academic promotion unlocks access to higher placement on the pay scale or above it. 
Processes, including the initial placement on the pay scale at the time of recruitment, pay rises 
associated with promotion, and professorial pay determination all ultimately impact on an 
academic’s remuneration. In addition to pay, promotion also helps academics accrue what an Alpha 
male professor referred to as kudos, indicating a sort of intangible degree of respect and esteem in 
the field. Kudos, however, does not save for a mortgage down payment or grow a pension pot for 
retirement. These were both real-life struggles that several female academics in this study 
experienced as a result of being unable to achieve promotion and the tangible pay rises that ought 
to go with it. This section will reveal how social pay comparison can help staff to reveal the extent to 
which ‘transparent’ bureaucratic processes reinforce inequality in these workplaces.      
8.3.1 Recruitment Pay Offers 
Although employment relationships are inherently asymmetrical with the power tipped in favour of 
employers (Sisson, 2016), the point just before accepting a new job typically opens the strongest 
window of power for employees. This is the point at which it is most possible to negotiate one’s 
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salary. Recognition of this has spawned a body of victim-blaming research that suggests that men 
are more likely to negotiate their salary than women and that this partially explains the persistent 
GPG. If true, this could be linked to the different social expectations placed on men and women 
(Babcock, Engberg and Greenbaum, 2005; Babcock and Laschever, 2009; Blau and Kahn, 2017). 
However, the validity of this gendered distinction has been questioned. McGovern et al.’s (2007) 
analysis of the Working in Britain survey found some gendered differences in hiring salary 
negotiation, but not in later pay rise negotiation. Artz et al.’s (2018) more recent analysis of the 
Australian Workplace Relations Survey, found that women ask for pay rises and promotions at 
similar rates to men but that women are less likely to get them. This finding chimes with the 
experiences of several white and BAME female academics that were described earlier in this chapter 
who tried to say no to excessive, unrewarded work and were made to do that work anyway.  
Policy shapers at both institutions readily acknowledged that they used a recruitment practice that 
undermines the window of strength potentially enjoyed by new hires. They asked applicants to 
reveal their current salary before they come to the negotiating table. This strengthens the 
employer’s hand because they then precisely know the applicant’s leveraging ability. This 
knowledge/power imbalance is problematic because it allows employers to hire candidates, who 
may have faced discriminatory salary depression elsewhere, at lower rates than they might have 
done without access to their salary history. The candidate equally may accept the offer as an 
improvement on their previous earnings, without knowing that more could have been on the table. 
This practice allows employers to turn prior pay discrimination into market justification to pay 
women and minorities less (Monopoli, 2016). The practice is rapidly attracting condemnation by US 
equality advocates, who have succeeded in enacting legislation that bans this practice for some 
employers in 17 states, along with Washington, DC and Puerto Rico, as of 28 February 2020 
(Herzfeld, 2019; HR Dive, 2020). This policy concept has begun to attract endorsements from 
advocacy groups in the UK, such as the Young Women’s Trust (Clarke, 2018). However, university 
employers appear to prize maintaining the imbalance, having full knowledge of pay at their 
institution, while those potentially recruited to the institution do not. In late 2017, the Russell Group 
issued a response to plans by the Office for Students to require universities to publish full 
remuneration details of all staff earning £150,000 or more annually. The prestigious university 
network argued that showing their hand in this way would “risk undermining the ability of 
institutions to compete in an international market for academic and professional services talent” 
(Russell Group, 2017, p. 12).  
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A policy shaper made Alpha’s interest in maintaining power over new recruits through this practice 
clear, by explaining that recruits were free to refuse to provide their current salary if they were 
willing to forgo using their current salary as a bargaining chip. The shaper recalled that a recent 
appointee had refused to provide their current salary, so the institution had worked out an offer and 
the appointee had then asked for more. The shaper said that the institution was then unwilling to 
negotiate, yet indicated that had the same candidate originally complied with the reporting exercise, 
they would likely have been given a larger offer:  
So, if you don’t know what somebody’s salary is and you make an offer that you think is a 
reasonable one for what they’re worth because you’ve gone through a process of judging 
them, that’s fine. Ok. But they have to take the consequences of that. If you say, well, I think 
you’re only worth so much and it happens to be less than you’re being paid at the moment 
that presents a challenge to the person wanting to move. I think, there’s a sort of be careful 
what you wish for there. On the other hand, if you do know and you’re going to make an 
offer that’s a bit below what they’re currently getting, I suspect most managers would try 
and find a reason for paying at least what they’re getting.  
By contrast, policy shapers and many academics spoke about pay decisions, particularly for lecturer 
through readers, as something concrete. There is a pay scale. It is publicly available online. However, 
suggestions of slippage at the recruitment stage emerged. A white female academic characterised 
the reality of Alpha pay thus: 
It’s quite fair and transparent, but then when you start to dig a bit deeper, you see that 
different people are treated differently. That’s quite surprising, especially because there is, 
then, when it comes to that, there is very little transparency about this and usually when 
these things are found out, so to speak, that creates friction.  
A union representative recalled that engaging in social comparison of pay had helped a female 
professor learn of apparent inconsistency between recruitment pay offers. The woman had been 
hired at University Alpha as a professor. A couple of years later, a man, who had unsuccessfully 
applied for the same post she had filled, successfully applied for another professorial vacancy in her 
same department. The representative described the incident: 
She discovered he was being paid more than her. So, then, she complained to management. 
She asked for an explanation as to why she would be appointed in preference to him and 
yet be paid less than him when he’s appointed two years’ later. They went into a scurry and 
upped her pay to match his. One could have argued it ought to be more than his, but I don’t 
think that occurred to anybody at the time. So, occasionally, people do exchange 
information and you could see why management wouldn’t want them to do that. 
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Another Alpha white woman, a recently hired lecturer, was alerted to the starting salary of a new 
lecturer in her department by a female colleague who had unsuccessfully applied. Her friend 
mentioned the advertised range for the job. Although the title was exactly the same as the title the 
lecturer had acquired in the department a year prior, the bottom of the advertised range then was 
£5-6,000 more than what she was paid. She remarked that “I just wondered why it’s so much more 
than when we were being hired? Beyond that, I didn’t ask anyone.” A further Alpha white female 
academic learned of another anomaly from another female colleague, the primary person with 
whom she said she discussed pay. Her friend had been on the recruitment panel for four new 
lecturers. She said the recruitment panel would not normally know about the pay of the candidates, 
but her friend heard somehow. Although all four were hired as lecturers, two were being paid as 
senior lecturers. She recalled that “the two that had gotten it were male and at least one of the ones 
that hadn’t gotten it was a woman. And we were saying if she ever finds out, she must be so pissed 
off because she probably never asked and therefore didn’t get.” This comment again blames the 
woman by assuming that the woman had not attempted to negotiate, rather than considering that 
the woman might have tried to negotiate unsuccessfully. 
Inconsistencies in the placement on the pay scale at the time of hiring can have a detrimental effect 
on an academic’s pay and superannuation. Yet, when academics try to discuss these problems, they 
can be met with a brick wall by institutional actors who are unwilling to acknowledge that any prior 
mistreatment has taken place. This will be discussed further in the next sub-section, where 
promotion is presented as a remedy for acknowledged past underpayment. Academics can also be 
met with intransigence at the recruitment stage. A Beta BAME female professor recounted her 
experience of pay secrecy when she was being recruited to Beta as a professor. She had tried to do 
everything right to prepare for negotiations, including seeking knowledge about pay from other 
professors in her field. She knew previous job adverts were another way to learn what employers 
were offering for similar roles, although “the difficulty will always be that people are offering a 
grade range. You don’t know where eventually people get appointed.” She had also looked at 
figures for University Beta in the Times Higher Education (THE) pay survey to help calibrate her 
initial request. Of course, the THE does not break down data by discipline, so she had directly asked 
a colleague in a similar role what he was earning, but she was frustrated that he refused to answer 
directly. She recalled that “the only thing he revealed was the size of the step up from his past salary 
without mentioning any numbers.” Armed with the information that she had been able to collect, 
and having considered what minimum pay rise would make the move worth it, she initially found no 
traction when discussing her case with HR. She revealed: 
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The minute the negotiation started and the job offer was made to me via phone, the person 
concerned actually said to me ‘Women tend to do themselves down in these deals, so we’ll 
try and be fair, shall we?’ But as soon as I said what I wanted to earn, they said no. So, there 
was no negotiation. Actually, the whole process stalled for about two weeks. There was no 
negotiating. It was, ‘This is our offer. This is where we are.’ So, having started the process 
saying women aren’t very good at this, they weren’t willing to budge, for a woman, anyway.  
The HR employee would only tell her that the offer was based on market data. Policy shapers at 
both institutions had described this market data that was leveraged against her, as well as its 
confidential nature, in the interviews for this thesis. Universities procure access to this data by 
providing their own data to their employer’s association. The Universities and Colleges Employers 
Association (2019) (UCEA) conducts the UCEA Senior Staff Survey, which covers professor and other 
senior staff remuneration and commissions the XpertHR (2019) Higher Education Salary Survey, 
which includes remuneration for academics below the professoriate and other non-academic staff. 
These surveys provide the market data that is used by member institutions to make remuneration 
decisions. They did not explain this to her, although she would not have been able to access this 
proprietary data if they had. She was concerned that the data they were referring to did not 
acknowledge her specific sub-field, which she believed was a difficult to recruit area, but they would 
not clarify. She said of HR: 
They were claiming that they had market data on what people earned, and I didn’t know 
what the market data was. I didn’t know what data they used, because [they] were claiming 
that they had information that they had pitched their offer against. It was all very difficult 
because I didn’t know what that information was. I didn’t have any idea what anybody else 
earned. It’s like, right, you’re operating in a black hole and you don’t know what’s 
reasonable or not reasonable really.  
Facing this black hole, she nearly turned down the job because the sole offer on the table was not 
worth it. She recalled that “when I spoke to the person who was actually going to employ me to tell 
[them] that, they just said ‘Well, let me see what I can do’ and within a day, there was another offer 
on the table.” She accepted that offer, the minimum she had calculated that could make the move 
worth it for her, but it never would have come without substantial advocacy from her future HoD. 
This advocacy was successful even though HR had characterised the initial offer as non-negotiable 
when the BAME woman tried to negotiate directly. Without the intervention of a HoD who made 
the effort to try to remedy the situation, HR’s apparent effort to cap payroll spending would have 
cost University Beta a valuable hire.  
Another BAME female professor had also learned the hard lesson that if you do not ask, you do not 
get at Beta. Her first permanent job at University Beta had been as a lecturer. She had felt grateful 
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for the permanent contract, which was her first since completing her PhD, and so she had accepted 
the initial pay offer without negotiating. She remembered the reaction this elicited from her HoD. 
“{They] said, ‘Oh, wow, this has gone much easier than I expected.’ So, obviously, [they were] 
expecting some sort of negotiation.” She did not have a HoD advocating for her pay, like the above-
described Beta BAME female professor whose future HoD advocated for her when HR refused to 
negotiate on pay or like the Alpha white female described in Chapter 6 whose HoD actively pushed 
her to negotiate harder when she was joining the institution as a new lecturer. Suspecting that she 
had left money at the table, this Beta BAME female academic had asked around about the 
experiences of several other new lecturers who were hired by her department at the same time. She 
recalled that “when I talked to them, I actually learned that all of them had negotiated. The ones I 
talked to had negotiated and they had got much better pay than I did because I got the minimum 
possible. They couldn’t give me any less.”  
This section has revealed numerous details about the process of reward decisions, which contrast 
markedly with the presentation of recruitment pay setting as a transparent and impartial process. 
The universities have shown how they prioritise maintaining their advantage over applicants by 
using pay information and market data, and they even expressed a willingness to refuse to negotiate 
with applicants who failed to hand over their prior salary history from the outset. Social pay 
comparison and other social interactions were shown to reveal several instances of men being hired 
after women in the same role but at higher pay, and also unexplained, unquestioned shifts in the 
advertised range for similar roles in a short span of time. The power of HoDs to shift (or not) pay 
decisions from the default position was also revealed. These experiences revealed that inconsistent 
recruitment pay decisions sometimes leave new hires at the mercy of HoDs who may or may not 
champion them and whose decision to do so, or not, appears to risk little scrutiny.  
8.3.2 Pay Rises Associated with Promotion 
Concerning inconsistency of pay decisions continues in the workplace. Blackaby et al. (2005, p. F89) 
wrote that “in the UK, there are wage scales for each rank (Lecturer, Senior Lecturer, and Reader) 
other than Professor (which has a minimum salary level and is then subject to negotiation).” It 
should be clear what pay rise would be associated with a given promotion. Surprisingly, opacity and 
greyness around pay rises associated with promotion, which was often discovered through 
incidental conversations with colleagues, also emerged prominently in both institutions. This may be 
more easily accepted as legitimate given, for instance, that a white female academic perceived 
promotion in University Alpha to be an intellectual achievement, rather than a step to unlocking 
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higher pay. Recalling the promotions briefing that she received as part of her probation process, she 
reflected: 
The whole thing seems as if promotion is much more about the kind of promotion itself, 
rather than the money…It’s presented as though, actually, the whole sector is very much 
presented as people are here not for the money but for the intellect…When they were 
talking about promotion, the money was not mentioned.  
Similarly, a Beta policy shaper emphasised that the promotion policy is about the promotion 
decision only and not about pay, although they also asserted that all promotions come with at least 
one spinal point of a pay rise. A particular grey area appeared at the stage of promotion from senior 
lecturer to reader. These job ranks were assigned the same pay grade in both institutions, which 
appeared to yield a variety of starting reader pay, somewhat depending on how long the academic 
had been a senior lecturer prior to promotion. 
An Alpha white male academic explained his understanding of the loose link between promotion 
and pay rises, noting that “every year there is a round of promotions. Some of them are, they lead 
to a salary increase, but some areas are just the same salary, no? For instance, between the senior 
lecturer and reader, there is no salary difference.” His understanding was reinforced by formal 
advice he received from a senior professor following his decision in 2016/17 not to apply for 
promotion because he did not feel he had time. Already a senior lecturer, he recalled that the 
professor advised him that “you better apply for a professorship next time you decide to apply 
because that’s going to be an increase of salary.” 
A frustration expressed by several female academics was that although their seemingly unfair pay 
was acknowledged, there was reluctance from authority figures to take any action. Openly 
acknowledged problems were left to fester for months and even years. In some cases, problems 
with pay were discussed candidly amongst colleagues and with management, yet nothing was done, 
short of encouraging the academic to apply for promotion. An Alpha white female professor learned 
that she was paid much less when she had become a reader than two other readers, who had been 
promoted at the same time in the same department. She believed this was due to the shared senior 
lecturer/reader pay band and the convention that Alpha moved academics two spinal points up on 
promotion to reader. She had only been a senior lecturer for a year, while her two colleagues had 
been only two spinal points away from the top of their pay grade on promotion. As the gaps 
between spinal points on Alpha’s pay scale were not consistent in that grade, not only did her 
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colleagues receive higher pay, but a larger percentage raise for the same promotion. She learned of 
the discrepancy through a conversation with her friend: 
It came about because [my female friend] and I…were going ‘Oh my God, we are going to 
get more money if we get promoted,’ and then she did get more money and I got like 800 
pounds a year more money for being promoted to reader. So, I was like ‘oh my God, the pay 
rise was really rubbish,’ and she was like ‘No it wasn’t.’ And I’m like ‘What do you mean?’ 
So, then we kind of, I kind of realised this and I went to see my [HoD], and I was like ‘Look, 
this is absolutely ludicrous. Was there some judgement process whereby I was judged to be 
less, not worth the money?’  
Her HoD agreed that the situation was unfair and promised to speak to HR. The woman also went to 
HR, assuming that this was a simple case of the rules not being followed properly. However, she 
acknowledged that “it hasn’t been really simple. It’s still going on two years later.” She soon 
received an email from someone in senior management, agreeing that her situation was unfair and 
promising to sort it out. Her HoD planned to put her forward for a performance-related pay award 
instead to resolve the issue but missed the deadline. The HoD pressed for a resolution anyway but 
was told by HR that there was nothing that could be done until the next year’s award cycle. The 
professor felt defeated by the continual lack of progress, despite having had her problem 
acknowledged at high levels. She explained that “I found it difficult to continue to raise it with my 
[HoD], so I wasn’t on it as much as I should have been…I sent an email like once every couple of 
months, rather than badgering because I felt difficult.” 
In the next promotion cycle, she was promoted to professor, following a successful appeal of an 
initial rejection. Her HoD had assured her beforehand that they would still apply for the previously 
missed performance award regardless of the promotion outcome, to resolve the prior 
acknowledged promotion pay rise unfairness. Her HoD followed through but the effort was rejected 
by HR on the grounds that the woman had recently been promoted. She said: 
[My HoD] said ‘Oh, well, I need to talk to them about this but I’m not going to because HR 
are a mess. So, I’m going to talk to them when we get new HR people.’ New HR people come 
along. I spent the entire summer emailing them once every three weeks to try and get this 
sorted out and they are still not answering.  
The promotion, of course, did not resolve the pay and pension contributions that the woman had 
lost in the years waiting for the acknowledged promotion pay rise inconsistency to be remedied. A 
Beta white female academic experienced similar frustration with the promotion pay rise being 
presented as a solution to acknowledged prior unfairness. The academic had originally been hired 
on a fixed-term teaching-only contract. She suspected her original salary had drawn on someone’s 
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research funds and was set based on what was left, rather than based on her role. Her contract had 
been extended several times and she was approaching the four-year mark.92 
It was common knowledge in her department that she was the lowest paid lecturer, despite doing 
more work, especially teaching work, than many of her colleagues and often spending weekends 
fixing the work of others. After she consulted the UCU, her department head, and HR, their 
responses led her to conclude that, barring legal action, she would have to apply for promotion (and 
ignore the previous four years of underpayment). The message seemed to be that past 
underpayment resides within a Pandora’s Box, resting on a pedestal of a ‘transparent’ pay system. 
What may be discussed formally is only how to improve one’s circumstances in the future. She 
explained that “I don’t know if it’s just a can of worms and they’re just like, shit, if we deal with you, 
what will happen with everyone else? But it’s like, you know, that’s your problem.” Placing the onus 
of remedy on her to increase her pay through the promotion process, despite her underpayment 
having been widely acknowledged within her department, did not sit well with the academic, who 
described her situation: 
It’s a lot of work…I’m just like, hold on a minute. You’re telling me I’m not being paid enough 
money and it’s really, really unfair. But now what you want me to do, and you’re also telling 
me I’m doing too much work and my workload is a lot higher than everybody else’s and 
that’s not fair, and now you want me to fill out a load more fucking forms? When have I got 
time to do that?…Hold on, you fucked up, lots of times. You’ve acknowledged you’ve fucked 
up and my position is not what it should be, and actually, what’s your solution to it? Fill out 
more forms! Beg for something that you say I’m deserving of!  
Surely the process of promotion is meant to be a tool to reward professional growth, not an 
instrument to remedy and absolve the institution of responsibility for acknowledged unfairness?  
The pay rise grey area for senior lecturer to reader promotion was also apparent in Beta. Equalities 
concerns arising from the placement of senior lecturer and reader in the same pay band at both 
case study universities is not surprising. Guidance from the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC) (2019) on equal pay and job grading cautions against the potentially indefensible pay 
differentials that even over lapping pay grades can create. Although Beta’s academic promotion 
guidance document provided a date at which all promotion decisions take effect, including any 
relevant pay rises, the document was notably silent on how the rises were calculated. A white 
 
92 After four years, UK employers must make fixed-term employees permanent, barring an objective business 
reason not to (Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service, 2018). 
234 
 
female academic recalled her experience of promotion to reader and her surprise when she was told 
she would receive no pay rise at all: 
When I started here, I was a senior lecturer, but I accepted a new job and I said actually in 
[my home country], if I got a job, I’d actually be a professor based on my experience. [The 
HoD] said then at the time, no, we can’t do that because I think the position was 
advertised…as lecturer/senior lecturer…so initially they offered me lecturer and I said no. It 
should be senior lecturer at least, if not a reader. Then they said no, we can’t hire you as a 
reader, but you can apply, I mean, once you are here, then you can obviously apply for 
promotion. So, I got a major grant shortly after I came here…I applied then immediately for 
promotion and got it actually…So then I asked how much more do I get? And I was told you 
don’t get any more. It’s just a title…Up to this day, I don’t know if that is really true or if 
other people who were promoted got more. I have no idea.  
Although the incident described was prior to 2016/17, it is interesting to consider this in contrast to 
the earlier assertion made by a Beta policy maker that all promotions come with at least a one 
spinal point pay rise. A BAME female professor reported that she had known she was at the top of 
the automatic increments within the senior lecturer pay band when she was finally promoted to 
reader. She had applied and been rejected before, so she had been stuck at senior lecturer for many 
years. However, unlike the previous academic, she reported that she had still received a pay rise on 
promotion to reader, although it was a modest sum of about £1,000 per year. Reflecting on the 
benefit that would come from greater transparency of the promotion pay rise process, another Beta 
BAME female professor observed that, while achieving promotion is openly celebrated “whether 
promotion is associated with a pay rise, that’s not revealed ever.” 
8.3.3 Professorial Banding 
The contrasting professorial pay structures in University Alpha, which had professorial pay banding, 
and University Beta, which did not, were described in Chapter 6. While Alpha’s aggregate 
professorial GPG was widening leading up to 2016/17, Alpha policy shapers used the robustness of 
their transparent banding process as a defence against criticism of the GPG of the full professoriate, 
whilst sharply resisting the idea of communicating the band placement of individual professors. 
Their regular equal pay audits did not report the number of staff within each band of the GPG 
analysis, beyond noting that the gap in the top band could not be reported due to data protection 
because of insufficient numbers of women. The case was the same for the ethnicity pay gap. 
Employer communication around professorial pay banding appeared to create a post-hoc 
justification—grounded in the performance of transparent accountability—for the existing pay 
disparity within the professoriate due to vertical gender and ethnic segregation. These difficulties 
are unsurprising. As guidance from the EHRC (2019) on equal pay and job grading notes, having 
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multiple scales or too many grades presents an inequality risk. It seems that in the case of University 
Alpha’s professorial pay banding, they may have created more bands than they have distinct roles, 
potentially risking these post-hoc justification concerns. 
A University Alpha white female professor agreed that while the professorial banding criteria matrix 
is transparent, what band individual professors are on is not. When she became a professor, she was 
invited to a celebratory reception where she recalled the VC proudly announcing that for the first 
time the same number of men and women had been promoted to professor. This led to further 
conversation with members of senior management. She recalled hearing someone explain:  
The main pay gap is in the professorial banding. There’s hardly any women in the higher 
bands. And, you know, we talked about this with [senior management]. This was like freely 
talked about. There was no hush-hush about it. 
This led to an external recruitment-based explanation by a remuneration policy shaper, who 
explained that while men hired externally as professors tended to be on higher bands, women 
tended to be on the lower bands, following internal promotion to professor, as they did not yet fulfil 
the criteria of the higher bands. The shaper went on to explain that the university was “really trying 
to recruit women but one of the problems is that women are less mobile than men.” The 
conversation indicates a lack of institutional self-criticism, similar to that suggested by women-only 
promotion schemes. University Alpha had a mentoring scheme that was designed to help women 
through the promotion process, but such schemes risk the appearance of blaming the victim. The 
assumption is that individuals who are struggling to progress through the system need to be 
improved, rather than casting reflective scrutiny on why the system is producing inequality of 
outcomes (Devos, 2008; Morley, 2013; Dashper, 2019). 
An Alpha UCU representative suggested that the professorial banding criteria are written in such a 
way to further enable the individualisation of inequality experiences: 
We’ve got these criteria which look very, very nice, but you could interpret them in almost 
any way. Like I think the first criteria for [the bottom professor band] for research is 
something like a significant and sustained output of, I don’t know, world leading or 
whatever, or something research, you know? What is significant and sustained? What’s the 
quantity?’ They don’t want to say that because they want that flexibility to promote who 
they want really, which is what happens.  
Unpublished analysis (Frank, 2019) of professorial banding and re-banding exercises at two UK 
research-intensive universities demonstrated that the exercises had virtually no impact on the 
professorial GPG, even slightly exacerbating it. This was partly attributed to vertical segregation 
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across the bands, as has been described in University Alpha. Frank (2019) modelled how banding 
procedures may actually amplify a taste for discrimination in those who assess the professors, 
relative to previous practices of annual individual pay awards. He concluded by advising 
organisations to mainstream equality by linking equality outcomes to managers’ appraisals, like 
other managerial objectives. Following an analysis of the failure of leading public health universities 
to improve gender and ethnic disparities, Khan et al. (2019) argued for a similar alignment of 
equality outcomes with business incentives. They suggested that staff diversity statistics ought to be 
included in university rankings, such as those produced by the THE.  
University Beta had individual pay awards, not professorial banding. While Beta’s aggregate 
professorial GPG was diminishing in the years preceding 2016/17, a policy shaper expressed concern 
about the active promotion of pay communication secrecy during a several year effort to narrow 
this gap (Chapter 6). Arguably, this review and correction could occur—although in silence—
precisely because Beta did not have a structured professorial banding system. However, the 
achievement was dependent on the will of those with power over the university at the time. 
Furthermore, nothing was evident to suggest that the review process led to changes in the 
processes that created the initial gap. Indeed, it would be surprising to locate such evidence since 
the only open acknowledgement that the review even occurred was a few brief retrospective words 
in Beta’s institutional Athena SWAN application. 
A Beta policy shaper characterised professorial pay as aligning with some sort of pay scale, although 
an essentially open-ended one. However, the academic perspective indicated that the existence of 
this ‘scale’ was unclear. A Beta HoD observed: 
Once you get to the professorial level, then you’re in an off-scale world and even though I’m 
[HoD], I still haven’t actually seen the professorial salary scale. That’s something I have to 
ask specific information from HR, if I’m negotiating a professor’s salary, I have to say, you 
know, something in this range and then they come back to me with points…I’ve never 
actually seen the professorial salary range. 
This reinforces the point made in Chapter 6 that the radical pay transparency afforded to HoDs over 
the pay of their immediate colleagues, was not crafted with the intent to empower HoDs to become 
equality change agents. However, HoDs were expected to recommend a pay rise as part of their role 
to evaluate professors in an annual review process. Despite the extensive, although hidden, efforts 
to remedy the Beta professorial GPG, when asked whether HoDs received guidance from the centre 
for making these recommendations, a Beta HoD unequivocally explained: 
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No, absolutely not. No guidance. So, I put down for more and then, you know, there are 
many more requests. Then it all gets cut. There seems to be a ceremonial aspect to this that 
you just ask for more than you know you’re going to get and then you get less. At least 
that’s how I play it for bonuses and professorial review.  
The handling of professorial pay banding in Alpha and individual professorial pay awards in Beta and 
associated communication by these employers suggests a common thread running through 
professorial pay setting practices. That is, a strong inclination by employers to defend the existing 
reward systems and individualise the problems that professors face, even if remedies were being 
applied behind closed doors in Beta. Even still these remedies did not appear to alter the processes 
that led to the gap that was being narrowed. Yet again, we see the silence of transparency in 
university bureaucratic processes on pay and related policy and procedures—revealed through the 
interaction of professors with senior management in Alpha and HoDs with HR in Beta—rather than 
open, institutionally self-reflective transparency.  
8.4 Summary 
This chapter has sought to answer the research question: How does the pay ‘transparency agenda’ 
within UK universities influence awareness of pay (and related progression) inequality by academics, 
particularly women and BAME academics? The answer appears to be, not very effectively. In 
answering this question, this chapter has further explored the pay ‘transparency paradox’ that was 
revealed in Chapter 6. Figure 8-1 summarises the concepts that emerged through this analysis as the 
key theoretical contributions, including the functioning of the income-talk taboo and employee 
social pay comparison behaviour (and other social interactions) as the two remaining components of 
the OSE.   
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Figure 8-1: Operationalising Organisational Salary Environment: The Income-Talk Taboo and 
Employee Social Pay Comparison Behaviour (& Social Interaction) 
 
The primary concepts along the informal pay secrecy norms theme of Row C in Figure 8-1 led to the 
emergence of the mechanisms through which the income-talk taboo strengthened managerial 
control over employee compliance with inequalities. These mechanisms included i) indirect 
managerial control, particularly driven by HoD and HR professional behaviour; ii) internalised 
managerial control, particularly driven by the pressure to trust bureaucratic systems, the norm that 
academia is ‘beyond pay’ and the fear of repercussions; and iii) the ‘helpfulness trap,’ which creates 
unspoken barriers to progression, especially faced by BAME and female academics. These forms of 
control were reinforced by the societal income-talk taboo to discourage open discussion of pay and 
progression.  
Although there was some variation in behaviour, HoDs could be seen to exert a considerable degree 
of indirect managerial control to reinforce the pay secrecy norm. This was evidenced through 
conversations that seemed to be intended to discourage academics from discussing their pay 
openly. This control may be driven by HoDs’ awareness that actual pay diverged some from stated 
pay structures, their lack of power (or perceived lack of power) to resolve pay inequality, or their 
lack of willingness to try, which may itself be driven by HoDs’ awareness of the income-talk taboo.  
A number of aspects of internalised managerial control also emerged from the reflections of 
academics on their workplace experiences. Internalised managerial controls included an expectation 
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of implicit trust in bureaucratic systems of pay setting and associated progression, the pay secrecy 
norm as an organising process, individualising responsibility for problems experienced rather than 
acknowledging their structural causes, taking pleasure from work (and the idea that academia is a 
calling and therefore exempt from ‘minor’ concerns like pay), and the fear of being seen as a 
troublemaker or stirring resentment.  
A particularly damaging example of internalised managerial control, drawing on the fear of being 
seen as a troublemaker or sparking resentment, was also the unspoken norm of the ‘helpfulness 
trap’ (Padilla, 1994; Turner, 2002; Joseph and Hirshfield, 2011; Hirshfield and Joseph, 2012) within 
the universities’ ‘Kafkaesque’ power and bureaucracy (Clegg et al., 2016). From the perspective of 
BAME academics, women, and especially BAME women academics, there was a double bind to go 
above and beyond to support pastoral, administrative, and diversity work inside their departments, 
but also to remain silent when this work was not rewarded by career progression. Some academics 
could see the ‘helpfulness trap’ that they faced, but they had limited power to remedy their 
treatment, because the ‘Kafkaesque’ (Clegg et al., 2016) promotions process engendered feelings of 
meaninglessness about the workload model and taught helplessness in academics, while the 
transparent promotion criteria provided cover for managed inaction by decision-makers, who might 
otherwise choose to recognise BAME women academics for their undue burden. 
Along Row D of  Figure 8-1, this chapter has illustrated how social pay comparison and other social 
interactions where pay setting practices are discussed, help to reveal how ‘transparent’ bureaucratic 
processes reproduced inequality in these workplaces. The discussion of recruitment pay offers 
revealed several details about the process that contrast with its presentation as a transparent, 
impartial process. The universities were shown to prioritise maintaining their advantage over 
applicants in respect of pay information and market data, even expressing a willingness to punish 
applicants who failed to hand over their prior salary history. Social pay comparison and other social 
interactions revealed several instances of men hired after women, in the same role but at higher 
pay, as well as unexplained, unquestioned shifts even in the advertised range for similar roles in a 
short span of time. Finally, the power of HR and HoDs to shift (or not) pay decisions from the default 
position was revealed. These experiences revealed inconsistency, sometimes leaving new hires at 
the mercy of HoDs who may (or may not) choose to champion them, with little risk of scrutiny of 
those decisions. Despite a common understanding of there being pay ranges for different academic 
roles, communication at both institutions distanced the promotion process from the remuneration-
setting process. Opacity and greyness around pay rises associated with promotion, often discovered 
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through incidental conversations with colleagues, also emerged prominently, particularly with the 
promotion from senior lecture to reader. Promotion was presented in both universities as an 
individual solution to openly acknowledged past unfairness in the pay setting processes. Finally, 
even though University Alpha had professorial pay banding and Beta did not, a consistent thread ran 
through professorial pay setting practices, which yet again revealed a strong inclination on the part 
of employers to publicly defend the system and individualise problems faced by professors, even if 
systematic remedies were being applied behind closed doors in Beta. Even these systematic 
remedies did not appear to seek to redress the system that led to the gaps being narrowed. The 
silence of transparency flowing from university bureaucratic processes on pay and related policy and 
procedures was revealed through the interaction of professors with senior management in Alpha 




Chapter 9 Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction  
The silence of transparency functions as an organisational lubricant to maintain the functioning of 
the hierarchical power structures in academia. The purpose of this thesis has been to provide a 
novel approach to explaining the gender pay gap (GPG) and gender/ethnic pay gap (G/EPG) by 
interrogating accepted practices and settled social norms. This purpose has been fulfilled by 
developing a nuanced understanding of the role of organisational pay secrecy/transparency through 
critical analysis of the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ within two UK universities, 
paying particular attention to the role of the income-talk taboo. This thesis has developed a multi-
layered and nuanced illumination of the silence of transparency. This silence refers to the role that 
workplace pay transparency policies may serve to legitimise practices and factors that maintain or 
reinforce pay inequality and to individualise pay inequality concerns as anomalies because 
‘transparent’ pay structures are in place. An original theoretical framework—the organisational 
salary environment (OSE)—has emerged from the empirical analysis of this thesis. The OSE provides 
an analytical framework to assess the mutually constitutive influence of employer strategies, social 
norms, and employee behaviour on the practical impact of organisational pay transparency efforts 
to reduce pay inequality.   
This chapter will first present the theoretical and empirical contributions of this thesis through the 
primary and three sub-research questions. Secondly, the methodological contribution will be 
presented, which demonstrates the importance of a multi-layered, multi-strategy approach to 
analysing why UK higher education (HE) continues to struggle with a GPG and G/EPG. Next, the 
research limitations will be acknowledged. Additionally, updates to the research context since the 
2016/17 academic year when the fieldwork was concentrated will be discussed. Importantly, key 
policy implications for pay transparency, pay inequality, and pay setting systems for both national 
governments and HE employers and plans to develop impact from this thesis will be reflected upon 
and asserted. Finally, recommendations for future research will be proposed.  
9.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions  
This section presents the key theoretical and empirical contributions of this thesis to the literature 
on the GPG and G/EPG, pay secrecy/transparency at work, and the UK HE sector. The primary 
theoretical contribution is an original and novel concept encapsulated in the OSE framework. The 
theoretical foundations of the OSE were constructed through a synthesis of existing academic 
literature (Chapters 2-4), and components of the framework and their interrelationship emerged 
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through empirical inquiry (Chapters 6-8). The OSE has three mutually-constitutive components; 
employer ‘pay communication’ policies (Marasi and Bennett, 2016), the income-talk taboo (Fox, 
2014) and employee social pay comparison behaviours (and other social interactions) (Burchell and 
Yagil, 1997). The interlocking pressures from employers, the society in which an organisation is 
situated, and employees themselves serve to influence employee awareness of pay in their 
organisation. In this way, the OSE provides a feminist sociological explanation for organisational 
gender and ethnicity-based pay inequality, thus strengthening earlier critiques of human capital 
theory’s inability to explain the GPG (Olsen and Walby, 2004; Blau and Kahn, 2007). The OSE also 
contrasts with the largely-US focused93 industrial relations and labour law tendency to present a 
homogenous and uncritical acceptance of the income-talk taboo (Levine and Stanchi, 2001; Bierman 
and Gely, 2004; Edwards, 2005; Colella et al., 2007; Lyons, 2012; Kulow, 2013; Kim, 2015). The OSE 
finally showcases the importance of critically assessing pay transparency in the context of increasing 
calls by government, employee rights advocates, and academics for transparency to combat the 
GPG (European Commission, 2014b; Kim, 2015; Trades Union Congress, 2015b). It is against this 
context of the growing global focus on the importance of pay transparency that this novel OSE 
framework offers promise as a tool to critically assess the effectiveness of pay transparency to 
narrow the GPG as it is actually practised—not only as it is preached.  
It was never the aim of this thesis to suggest that pay transparency/secrecy alone could account for 
trends in pay inequality inside academia (or in other organisational contexts). Rather, the intention 
has always been to illuminate the relevance of pay transparency as an insufficiently researched 
contributing factor, which also intersects with other forces, such as those reviewed at the general 
level in Chapter 2, and applied to the HE context in Chapters 4 and 6. Through the development of a 
novel OSE framework, this thesis has met this aim. While this thesis has developed and applied the 
framework in the HE context, the OSE may be used in any organisational or sectoral context where 
the battle against pay inequality proves to be elusive. In that sense, the OSE is also aligned with its 
inequality regimes foundation by providing a framework that is appropriate to drive analysis in 
multiple contexts. Thus, this thesis both pays tribute to Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes 
approach and builds upon it.  
The overarching empirical contribution of this thesis is the demonstration of a ‘pay transparency’ 
paradox, which emerged through developing the OSE framework and analysing the OSE within two 
university case studies. Universities Alpha and Beta are part of an industry with a persistent GPG and 
 
93 Acker’s (2006b, p. 452) revelation of pay secrecy among Swedish bankers is an exception. 
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growing acknowledgement of a worse intersectional G/EPG, despite considerable pressure on 
universities to perform the pay ‘transparency agenda’ for a decade before the 2016/17 academic 
year. Paradoxically, the performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’, through data publication, 
external recognition for equality progress, and reward and promotion policies, creates tools to 
silence questions about the transparency of pay, especially when concerns about fairness arise that 
criticise the function of the ‘transparent’ systems.  
Therefore, this thesis yields conclusions of relevance to policy-making in the context of growing 
support for the pay ‘transparency agenda’ as a tool to narrow pay inequality in the UK and around 
the world. This thesis contributes and demonstrates the importance of the OSE to understanding 
the success or failure of such an agenda. Legislated transparency may struggle if it does not 
comprehensively account for the interlocking OSE components, including employer ‘pay 
communication’ policy, the income-talk taboo, and social pay comparison behaviour (and social 
interactions). Answers to the primary and three sub-research questions of this thesis expand upon 
these contributions.  
9.2.1 Why hasn’t the pay ‘transparency agenda’ closed the gender and gender-ethnic pay gap in 
UK higher education? 
Answering the primary research question of this thesis has generated my key theoretical 
contribution. The result of developing the OSE theoretical concept throughout Chapters 2-4 and 
analysing the OSE inside Universities Alpha and Beta throughout Chapters 6-8 is shown in Figure 9-1. 
Whilst the OSE prioritises the employees’ perspective, it is shaped by mutually constitutive 
employer and employee actions and social norms. Pay secrecy/transparency is shaped by employer 
‘pay communication’ policies, which may be reinforced by the income-talk taboo, whilst social pay 
comparison by individual employees may create pockets of radical pay transparency between 
individuals. In answer to the primary research question, this framework provides a nuanced 
sociological contribution to the GPG literature. The silence of transparency, in respect of pay and 
related progression processes inside universities, partly explains the persistence of pay inequality 
because it obscures disparities and makes challenging disparities difficult, particularly when those 
challenges question existing hierarchical power relations that are embedded into workplace 
structures.   
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Row A of Figure 9-1 illustrates how transparency pressure encouraged employers to provide a 
veneer of greater visibility of inequality. To do so, employers lowered organisational restrictions on 
pay information by committing to generate greater data transparency by regularly publishing 
diversity and pay statistics, but these commitments were not always met. This commitment was 
linked to compliance with the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED). Additionally, heads of department 
(HoDs) could access and analyse their staff’s pay and sometimes act to remedy inequality, although 
HoDs’ interest and perceived power to do so, varied. Row B of Figure 9-1 demonstrates that 
university employers sought to increase the legitimacy of existing inequality by communicating their 
success of achieving external recognition for equality, diversity, and inclusion (EDI) practices through 
the Athena SWAN charter. However, this employer communication was, in practise, weak, with 
many staff having little understanding of the award or holding deeply cynical views of the ‘tick-box 
exercise.’ From this analysis of the visibility and legitimacy of inequality in the universities thus 
emerged the important function of employer ‘pay communication’ policy as the first component of 
the OSE.  
The extent to which the promised visibility materialises demands a critical assessment. In both 
institutions, the actual visibility of inequality was low, due to the presentation of data that 
downplayed systemic responsibility for the revealed vertical segregation or failure to present the 
promised data. Alongside low actual visibility of inequality, Athena SWAN engagement portrayed 
high legitimacy of existing circumstances. Acker (2006b) argues that high visibility and low legitimacy 
of inequality inside organisations presents the greatest opportunity for reforming inequality 
regimes. In contrast, low visibility of inequality in practise and high levels of communication to 
suggest the legitimacy of existing arrangements explain the hostile environment to suggestions 
about reform that was observed in these universities. The arrow returning to the beginning of the 
figure indicates that employer ‘pay communication’ policy, in these institutions, reinforced low 
actual visibility of inequality and high alleged legitimacy of existing arrangements.  
Row C of Figure 9-1 documents how management’s control over employee compliance with 
inequalities was exercised by employee restriction that was exerted through informal 
communication to discourage employees from discussing their pay. This communication particularly 
occurred in discussion with HoDs, who were seen as organisational actors with authority, although 
some may avoid or be unclear about their responsibility for matters of pay. Informal pay secrecy 
norms emerged through these conversations. Indirect managerial control was exerted by some 
HoDs to reinforce the pay secrecy norm by discouraging academics from discussing pay openly. 
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Academics also expressed having internalised some managerial controls, such as the expectation of 
implicit trust in bureaucratic systems, the pay secrecy norm as an organising process, individualising 
responsibility for problems experienced rather than indicting structures, taking pleasure from work 
as a ‘calling’ and therefore exempt from ‘minor’ concerns such as pay, and fear of being seen as a 
troublemaker. A damaging example of internalised managerial control was in the unspoken norms 
of the ‘helpfulness trap’ (Padilla, 1994; Turner, 2002; Joseph and Hirshfield, 2011; Hirshfield and 
Joseph, 2012) inside ‘Kafkaesque’ systems of power and bureaucracy (Clegg et al., 2016). Women 
and BAME academics and particularly BAME women academics felt a Catch-22 pressure to 
extensively support pastoral, administrative, and diversity work inside their departments but also to 
remain silent when this work was not rewarded by career progression. These emergent concepts 
reinforce the income-talk taboo social norm inside the organisation, even whilst some individuals 
violate the taboo. This social norm in turn reinforces management control over employee 
compliance with inequalities.  
Row D of Figure 9-1 shows how processes reproduced organisational inequality as a result of 
‘transparent’ procedural communication about bureaucratic reward process and policy. Despite 
public job adverts providing salary ranges for posts and published academic promotion criteria 
(including for professors at University Alpha), inconsistencies with recruitment starting pay, 
promotion pay rises and professorial pay were reported by academics, and slippage from published 
policy was acknowledged by remuneration policy shapers. Due to these experiences, individual 
academics engaged in social pay comparison with trusted friends, which created pockets of radical 
pay transparency. These recalled conversations help to account for the original empirical finding in 
this thesis that academics were more likely than not to report having engaged in social pay 
comparison (see 9.2.3). However, the knowledge obtained from social pay comparison was often 
met with enormous frustration when certain HoDs or HR professionals strongly defended the 
‘transparent’ systems and individualised pay inequality problems, often blaming the victim. Whilst 
social pay comparison created some individual transparency, in contrast to the first two OSE 
components, it was not strong enough to generate reform of the hierarchical power structures that 
produced the organisational inequality, which was revealed. 
9.2.2 To what effect has the pay ‘transparency agenda’ been performed in the two university case 
studies? 
This first sub-research question was answered in Chapter 6. Analysis drew on Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) 
inequality regime components: visibility and legitimacy of inequality. In terms of the multi-strategy, 
multi-layered methodology (Layder, 1993, 1998, 2006, 2013), analysis was at the level of the setting 
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inside Universities Alpha and Beta. Thematic policy analysis conducted to answer this question 
illustrated more formalised performance of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ in Alpha than Beta. This 
was surprising as both institutions had similarly slightly wider-than-average overall academic GPGs, 
while Alpha had a wider-than-average, worsening professorial GPG and Beta’s was narrower-than-
average and improving. However, when compared against each other in terms of regulative and 
voluntary compliance pressure on UK universities to perform the pay ‘transparency agenda’, a 
similarly concerning picture emerged. This picture was developed using the first two analytical OSE 
themes: data transparency and external recognition (Figure 6-7).   
The PSED created regulative compliance pressure on both institutions to perform with respect to 
the data transparency theme. While both institutions published equality and diversity strategy 
documents that exhorted their commitment to transparent equality reporting, clear deficits in terms 
of the degree of visibility of inequality were highlighted by UCU representatives. In Alpha, the 
implementation of professorial banding, which could help to narrow pay inequality, led to visibility 
created by equal pay audits, but these audits became a tool to legitimate vertical segregation by 
gender within the professoriate. Although it was not raised by policy makers or the union, these 
audits reported an even worse picture for ethnicity, with no BAME staff in the top professorial band. 
In Beta, despite similar commitments to publishing equalities data, actual reporting was so delayed 
that the UCU committee launched a public campaign. When the data was released, it was in a 
format that made historical comparison or trend analysis impossible. This chapter also 
demonstrated the clear limitations of radical pay transparency, when afforded to only those with 
hierarchical privilege, HoDs, and in a format that did not make analysing gender or ethnic pay 
inequality straightforward. The revelation of hidden information about pay is not ‘self-actuating,’ 
especially when the transparency is not constructed to be useful to challenging inequality 
(Alexander, 2015).  
The voluntary compliance pressure that emerged under the external recognition theme came from 
the Athena SWAN charter, which provides universities with public kudos. The voluntary award 
encouraged universities to publish analysis of gender-based inequality in their organisations, 
although very little specifically on pay, and to reflect on potential remedies. Financial pressure has 
further motivated universities to acquire this award, as several key funding bodies have begun to 
require Athena SWAN accreditation to be eligible to apply for their grants. Both universities held 
Athena SWAN awards, which arguably legitimate existing arrangements. The award signals that an 
organisation opposes gender-based inequality and is serious about reform. However, academics and 
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the union representatives expressed significant concern that this legitimacy was superficial. The 
‘right’ narratives were written for the applications, but these were not matched with changes to 
practices. This may be further explained by the initial absence of pay analysis on the Athena SWAN 
checklist, even though a reasonable person would expect that pay equality would be part of such an 
assessment.  
Answering this sub-research question has led to a critique of the current performance of the pay 
‘transparency agenda’ in HE pay and progression, rather than a simple argument for more 
transparency. The analysis demonstrated a ‘pay transparency’ paradox – the silencing effect of 
performing transparency inside organisations. A cynical observer might think that this ‘agenda’ had 
been ‘performed’ to strategically ‘minimise’ rather than narrow pay inequality by presenting data 
that obscures more than it reveals. Whether that is by benign neglect or malicious design, this thesis 
cannot confirm, but to the extent that my research seeks structural explanations for persistent pay 
inequality, individual intent is irrelevant. Recalling that Acker (2006b, p. 443) defined organisational 
inequality as “systematic disparities between participants in power and control over goals, 
resources, and outcomes”, how universities actually generate ‘pay transparency’ is paramount.   
Union representatives in both institutions presented a clear impression that improving EDI data 
capacity was given low priority by senior management. In both institutions, a strong commitment to 
visibility of inequality was presented, but actual visibility of inequality was low. For example, the 
data presentation downplayed the problem of professorial vertical segregation in University Alpha, 
and the data presentation in University Beta was delayed and inconsistent. Alongside low practical 
visibility of inequality, engagement with Athena SWAN in both institutions presented high legitimacy 
of existing arrangements to non-expert university staff. Acker (2006b) argued that high visibility and 
low legitimacy of inequality inside organisations presents the greatest opportunity for reforming 
inequality regimes. By contrast, low genuine visibility of inequality and high communicated 
legitimacy of existing arrangements created a hostile environment to change in these two 
institutions. Similar institutionally self-defensive employer ‘pay communication’ policy was found in 
both universities. This served to silence inequality complaints where they challenged hierarchical 
power structures, such as the robust professorial banding process that had been established or pay 
setting processes that were questioned in the context of Athena SWAN. Whilst transparency was 
the stated intention of both institutions’ employer ‘pay communication’ policy, the impression of 
high legitimacy of existing arrangements was emphasised, while the actual visibility of inequality 
was reduced by difficulties reporting consistent data. Answering this sub-research question showed 
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that institutionally self-reflexive transparency was necessary, but institutionally self-defensive 
transparency abounded.  
9.2.3 Do academics in the two university case studies violate the ‘income-talk’ taboo, and if so, 
how might observed social pay comparison behaviour patterns be explained? 
This second sub-research question was answered in Chapter 7. The chapter drew on Acker’s (2006a, 
2006b) inequality regime component: visibility of inequality within the HE sector using social pay 
comparison behaviour. In terms of the multi-strategy, multi-layered methodology (Layder, 1993, 
1998, 2006, 2013), analysis was at the level of situated activity at the micro level in order to 
illustrate and analyse social pay comparison between UK-based academics. The analysis used 
primary data on the social pay comparison component of the OSE inside Universities Alpha and 
Beta. Social pay comparison violates the income-talk taboo (Fox, 2014). My original survey revisited 
Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) early attempts to identify demographic and labour market factors 
associated with the propensity to engage in social pay comparison, using a web-based 
organisational survey that was distributed to all accessible academics at Universities Alpha and Beta 
in late 2016.  
My survey’s original empirical contribution was illustrating the hidden pay discussion behaviour of 
UK academics. More than half of respondents (54.7%) reported discussing their pay with colleagues. 
However, there was statistically significant variation in this behaviour. Fourteen independent 
variables were collected through this survey in order to translate Burchell and Yagil’s (1997) analysis 
into the UK HE employment context. A binomial logistic regression model of social pay comparison 
behaviour was constructed using these variables. Within this model, only being a professor, having a 
doctorate, being a UCU member, and being a Liberal Democrat or Labour voter (relative to being a 
Conservative voter) were significantly and positively correlated with discussing pay. Hierarchical 
status was the most important factor in predicting pay discussion behaviour; professors were 3.6 
times more likely to discuss their pay than their junior colleagues, ceteris paribus. These results 
support my earlier critiques of the often uncritical presentation of the income-talk taboo in 
academic literature (Chapter 3).  
Some variation in compliance with the income-talk taboo might be expected. As anthropology tells 
us, social taboos do not have agency; individuals living under them have the “freedom to do 
otherwise” (Fischer and Ravizza, 1993, p. 6). Nevertheless, it is important to recall the critical 
admonishment of the income-talk taboo by Fox (2014, p. 290), in which she noted that “it is 
important to understand why people do these things.” My survey demonstrates that, despite the so-
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called income-talk taboo, academics are more likely than not to discuss pay with each other, at least 
in some contexts. This is even though 85.6% of the respondents agreed with the statement that 
‘British people have a strong aversion to talking about their salary and related matters.’ What these 
results most strikingly illustrate is a stark difference between the pay discussion behaviour of junior 
and senior academics. The most influential factor explaining the propensity to discuss pay was 
having reached the professoriate, a point at which academics would feel the most secure in their 
academic career. Professors may feel able to risk having conversations about pay that violate the 
income-talk taboo. A tendency to discuss pay when the risk of doing so is perceived as lower 
because of having a more established career is also consistent with a broader interpretation that the 
tendency to discuss pay grows with the feeling of greater job security and the finding that union 
members (who would have access to union support) are more likely to discuss pay than non-union 
members. Equally, professors stand to gain the most potential reward from social pay comparison, 
in the context of their pay being above the academic pay scale and therefore higher and more 
individualised than the pay of other academics. 
However, the most parsimonious explanation of this result is structural and founded on an 
understanding that pay and pay inequality results from power imbalances between institutional 
employment relations actors, including the government, trade unions, and employers. Trades 
unions are often essential actors in the efforts to narrow the GPG, as Conley et al. (2019) explore in 
the UK, Italian and Polish contexts. Acker’s (1989) analysis of comparable worth efforts in the US 
state of Oregon demonstrated the role of trade unions in the context of horizontal occupational 
segregation. Considering this union perspective, non-professors are covered by sectoral collective 
bargaining, which is linked to the national Framework Agreement (JNCHES 2004); the UCU (2016a) 
negotiates a pay uplift every year on their behalf. Professorial pay is not covered by these sectoral 
collective negotiations94, and the equal pay risks of secretive professorial pay has received judicial 
criticism (Lewis, 2011). Therefore, it may simply be that professors are more likely to have pay 
conversations with colleagues because there is little transparency of their pay. Without a pay scale, 
there is no other way for professors to learn what their colleagues earn. A key distinction, however, 
is that University Alpha had established institutional professorial pay banding prior to 2016/17, and 
University Beta had not. Nevertheless, professorial pay discussion behaviour was not statistically 
different between the two institutions. Importantly, these findings may call into question the extent 
 
94 Universities Alpha and Beta voluntarily gave professors pay rises in line with the annual uplift. 
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of the transparency that has been produced by the institution-managed professorial banding 
procedures at Alpha. 
Given the gender and ethnicity-based intersectional focus of this thesis, it was somewhat surprising 
that pay discussion behaviour was not statistically different between men and women or BAME and 
white academics. However, a growing likelihood to discuss pay as one becomes more secure in 
one’s job could help to explain some of the persistent inequality in terms of pay and vertical 
segregation faced by women academics, particularly BAME women, if talking about pay and related 
matters, especially promotion, with colleagues helped academics to improve their circumstances. To 
build a more nuanced picture of the OSE in these institutions, my survey findings were 
supplemented by semi-structured interviews with employment relations actors from the two case 
study universities in order to answer the remaining sub-research question. 
9.2.4 How does the pay ‘transparency agenda’ within UK universities influence awareness of pay 
(and related progression) inequality by academics, particularly women and BAME academics?  
Seeking to scrutinise further the ‘pay transparency’ paradox that was unveiled by answering the first 
sub-research question at the level of the setting, the final sub-research question was answered in 
Chapter 8 at the level of the self. The chapter drew on Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regime 
components: management control and processes that produce inequality. In terms of the multi-
strategy, multi-layered methodology (Layder, 1993, 1998, 2006, 2013), this analysis was conducted 
at the level of the self and with a focus on the experiences and interactions of academics in 
Universities Alpha and Beta. This research question was explored through the remaining two 
analytical framework themes of this thesis: informal pay secrecy norms and bureaucratic reward 
process and policy (Figure 8-1). The pay ‘transparency agenda’ within these two universities did not 
effectively influence awareness of pay (and related progression) inequality by academics due to the 
‘pay transparency’ paradox.  
Through the analysis aligned with the first theme, informal pay secrecy norms, an illustration 
emerged of the mutually constitutive relationship between managerial controls and the societal 
income-talk taboo. Forms of managerial controls included indirect managerial control, internalised 
managerial control, and the ‘helpfulness trap’, which created barriers to progression especially for 
BAME and female academics. These forms of control were reinforced by the income-talk taboo that 
discourages open discussion of pay and progression. The income-talk taboo can be seen to amplify 
the strength of the informal discouragement from discussing pay and progression concerns that 
were experienced by academic staff in conversations with HoDs and the controls internalised by the 
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academic staff. Conversely, the norm may be pressuring HoDs to send these informal cues in the 
first place, in order to prevent what may feel like awkward conversations, particularly given the 
sometimes unclear ability of HoDs to remedy problems when pay outcomes diverge from 
transparent pay systems.  
Through the second theme, an illustration emerged of how social pay comparison and other social 
interactions, revealed to staff how ‘transparent’ bureaucracy reproduces inequality at work, but did 
not readily lead to remedies of the problems that were revealed. The discussions of recruitment pay 
offers exposed details about the pay setting process, which contradicted its presentation as 
‘transparent.’ Universities were shown to prioritise maintaining their advantage over applicants in 
respect of pay information and market data. Social pay comparison also revealed instances of men 
hired after women in the same role but at higher pay and unexplained shifts in the advertised pay 
range of similar roles in a short span of time. Finally, the power of HR and HoDs to increase pay 
offers (or not) if they chose was revealed, sometimes leaving new hires at the mercy of HoDs who 
may, or may not, choose to champion them, with little scrutiny of those decisions. Despite a 
common understanding that there were pay ranges for different academic roles, remuneration 
policy shapers from both institutions distanced promotion from the remuneration-setting process. 
Opacity and greyness around pay rises associated with promotion emerged prominently, particularly 
for promotion from senior lecture to reader. Promotion was often presented in both universities as 
a solution to acknowledged previous pay unfairness. This individualises problems and leaves staff 
disadvantaged in pension terms, exemplifying the cumulative and enduring impact of pay 
discrimination, which Justice Ginsburg raised in her dissenting opinion in Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire 
and Rubber Co, Inc. (2007). Even though University Alpha had professorial pay banding and Beta did 
not, a consistent thread ran through their professorial pay setting practices, which yet again 
revealed a strong inclination by employers to publicly defend their systems and individualise 
problems faced by professors, even if remedies were being applied behind closed doors in Beta.  
Reinforcing the setting level findings from the first sub-research question (Section 9.2.2), 
consideration of this final question strengthened an understanding of the ‘pay transparency’ 
paradox from the individual self level perspective. The silencing effect of transparency was 
experienced by individual academics through indirect and internalised managerial control. Women 
and BAME academics, and especially BAME women academics experienced the double-bind of being 
aware of the ‘helpfulness trap’ barrier to promotion, whilst also aware that the ‘Kafkaesque’ 
promotions process meant that there was little they could do to escape. These forms of managerial 
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control were strengthened by a mutually constitutive relationship with the income-talk taboo. 
Additionally, staff concerns about the ‘transparent’ bureaucratic reward process and policy led to 
revelations of inconsistencies in starting pay and promotion pay rises through social pay 
comparison. Professorial pay banding, or lack thereof, led to social interactions between professors 
and senior management and HoDs with HR that revealed institutional self-defensiveness, leading to 
victim-blaming or problem solving behind closed doors. Thus, while employee social pay comparison 
worked against the first two components of the OSE to create pockets of transparency, it was not 
strong enough to shift the processes producing the organisational inequality, which was revealed.95 
9.3 Methodological Contribution 
The primary methodological contribution of this thesis has been to demonstrate the value of using a 
multi-layered, multi-strategy approach to generate a novel explanation for GPGs by interrogating 
accepted practices and settled social norms. While headline pay inequality figures can be reported 
over time and decomposition can be employed to explain them (Chapter 2), pure quantitative 
analysis lacks the sociological perspective that accounts for social interaction and structural power 
explanations of the reconstruction of inequality, despite some accompanying progress. Additionally, 
quantitative data to measure the three OSE components that emerged from the analysis in this 
thesis: employer ‘pay communication’ policy, the income-talk taboo, and employee social pay 
comparison behaviour (and social interaction) is limited. It was not available in the most reliable 
academic pay dataset, HESA (Chapter 5). Multi-layered, multi-strategy analysis of why efforts to 
narrow the GPG and the G/EPG have been difficult has revealed a paradox that ‘pay transparency’ 
performance has created justification to silence questions of inequality. 
This revelation is consistent with Amery et al.’s (2019) argument that contextual history and the 
feudal-like hierarchical structure of UK universities account for the continued reproduction of 
gender and ethnic-based inequality. Multi-layered, multi-method analysis using Acker’s (2006a, 
2006b) inequality regime approach helps to explain the reproduction of this inequality. Hence, it is 
unsurprising that Amery et al. (2019) found that following the second wave of mandatory GPG 
reporting by universities, neither the VC’s gender, the Athena SWAN status, nor the proportion of 
women within governance structures had a statistically significant impact on institutional GPGs or 
 
95 Few positive first-hand examples of successful starting salary or promotion negotiation came through in 
these interviews, beyond the Alpha white female professor whose HoD gave her higher pay without having to 
negotiate, jokingly advising her to get an agent and the HoD who looked at salaries from an equality 
perspective and argued for uplifts (Chapter 8). The overwhelming impression was of frustration and 
inconsistency; this may stem from respondent bias. Academics who experienced comfortable negotiations and 
pay rises may have been less drawn by my topic and thus less likely to engage with my research.  
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the proportion of women in their top pay quartile (Amery et al., 2019). Transparency that protects 
hierarchical power structures does not resolve organisational inequality. 
9.4 Limitations 
However, limitations to both secondary and primary analysis should be acknowledged. Access to 
HESA data enabled sector-wide descriptive analysis in Chapter 4 and 6. However, HESA usage terms 
meant that I could not analyse Universities Alpha and Beta’s pay separately in Chapter 6, despite 
their data being contained in the dataset. Therefore, analysis of pay inequality inside my case 
studies could only use the THE’s public analysis of HESA data, and still with only a general 
characterisation of the professorial GPG trends, to preserve institutional anonymity. This sufficiently 
revealed the ‘typical’ nature of the academic GPG inside both institutions. However, original analysis 
of the HESA data may have enabled more finely grained comparison between the two, with controls 
as discussed in Chapter 2. This may have been especially interesting given the sharp difference in 
their aggregate professorial GPGs.  
Generalisability of my original survey in Chapter 7 is limited by logistical barriers to conducting 
random sampling. In order to conduct random sampling of a population, a complete listing of that 
population is needed (Bourque and Fielder, 2003). However, a public listing of all UK academics, 
including their electronic addresses, does not exist. A-Mail Academic, a UK-based marketing 
company, sells a listing of academics for web-based surveys (Housewright, Schonfeld and Wulfson, 
2013), but they do not contract with independent researchers. Previous teams of researchers have 
manually collected these details from departmental directories of all UK university public websites 
(Abreu et al., 2009; Lawson, Kitson and Hughes, 2016). However, they have not made their collated 
directory public or easily updateable. Re-creation of this considerable manual task across the whole 
UK without a supporting team would have made poor use of my capacity as an individual 
researcher. Attempts to scrape email addresses with macros proved untenable, due partly to 
inconsistent formatting of online departmental directories within and across universities. Therefore, 
to balance between usefulness and feasibility, I opted to employ the manual email directory 
construction method of previous researchers, whilst limiting the scope of my survey to my two case 
study organisations.  
 
Finally, confidentiality and anonymity limits detail in some analysis of my interview transcripts. 
There are some facets of the institutional structure and history of the case studies that cannot be 
disclosed, although they helped to inform the case study selection and could strengthen the analysis 
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of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ performance. Disclosure would identify the institutions, each of 
which was assured of institutional confidentiality, and could compromise participant anonymity. I 
could also not quote directly from policy documents, as these could easily be found online using a 
search engine. As with any qualitative research endeavour, intellectual intrigue and ethics must be 
balanced.  
 
9.5 Post-2016/17 Developments 
My fieldwork for this thesis was concentrated during the 2016/17 academic year. Since then, several 
key developments have emerged that provide additional context for framing the policy implications 
of this thesis and recommended directions for future research. First, three years of mandatory GPG 
reporting deadlines have now passed since my fieldwork was conducted, creating further 
opportunity to assess the impact of the pay ‘transparency agenda’ pressure inside UK HE. Secondly, 
concern about the ethnic-based pay inequality in HE has continued to grow. Finally, active 
promotion of secrecy within HE employment relationships has emerged as problematic and 
widespread through recent reporting on the use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in settlement 
agreements.  
First, it has been three years since mandatory GPG reporting began. In the lead up to my 2016/17 
fieldwork period, the UK was in the process of putting in place mandatory GPG reporting regulations 
for all large employers, including universities (Miller and Swinson, 2012; HM Parliament, 2017b). 
This timing meant this thesis could not assess the impact of these reports, although universities 
were aware of the imminent policy.96 The reputational dangers of revealing pay inequality without 
full institutional consideration of the problems, and their remedies, were made evident by the 
prominent equal pay complaint brought by the BBC journalist Carrie Gracie, subsequent to the BBC’s 
transparency of top-earner pay during the 2017/18 academic year (BBC News, 2018; Weaver, 2018). 
In an interview for the Fawcett Society (2018), Gracie observed that “the fight for equal pay often 
pits a lone woman against a very powerful employer…Many women in other workplaces have since 
told me about their feelings of loneliness and helplessness in confronting pay discrimination.” 
Following the first round of reporting in 2018, AdvanceHE analysed narratives by English universities 
that accompanied their GPG figures. Of universities that voluntarily provided narratives, 122 of the 
132 that were required to report data, vertical occupational segregation was the most common 
explanation of their GPG (Dawkins, 2018). However, the most commonly proposed remedies 
 
96 See Appendix K for discussion of forthcoming analysis of GPG reporting. 
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pertained to flexible working, followed closely by Aurora leadership training, which is a programme 
to help academic and professional services women develop their leadership skills (Dawkins and 
Aldercotte, 2018). Developing these women-focused programmes suggests that if only women knew 
how to lead, vertical segregation would diminish. This raises similar victim-blaming concerns to 
those highlighted by the literature that attributes some of the GPG to women’s poor or reluctant 
pay negotiation efforts (Babcock, Engberg and Greenbaum, 2005; Babcock and Laschever, 2009). 
The focus is on fixing women—their negotiation skills, their leadership styles—rather than 
interrogating why organisational systems are not paying or promoting women equally to men. 
Following the second mandatory GPG reporting deadline in the spring of 2019, the Times Higher 
Education (THE) reported on the persistence of the GPG within UK universities. The publication 
noted that HE’s mean GPG fell only from 15.9 to 15.1%, while the median GPG rose from 14 to 
14.8% from the first to the second reporting period (Pells, 2019). Median GPGs are less skewed by 
extreme high or low pay, so this suggests that the gap between typical academic men and women 
widened (Chapter 2). The trend was linked to a worsening gap in 46 universities, more than 20% of 
the 228 institutions that reported GPG data. Helen Carr, UCU Head of Equality, said in an interview 
with Pells (2019):  
Simply reporting on the gap is not enough. The terribly slow pace of change will only be sped 
up when universities publish action plans that set out how and when they will reduce the 
gap…For years we have heard enlightened rhetoric in higher education about the issue of 
unfair pay for women. What we really need are clear commitments on how institutions will 
reduce the gap and when. 
Not only are action plans required but they must also be followed with relevant action.97 The 
reporting mandate was lifted for the spring 2020 deadline due to the Coronavirus crisis, although 
employers were still allowed to report (Government Equalities Office, 2020). For instance, by 4 July 
2020, all but one Russell Group university had reported voluntarily (Gov.uk, 2020). Queen Mary 
University of London had not reported, although it had publicly promised to report (Parr, 2020). 
Secondly, concern about the ethnicity pay gap (EPG) within HE has grown. The UCU’s 2019/20 pay 
equality claim included the EPG for the first time. The UCU had called for a national framework to 
address the GPG, and equal pay audits, disaggregating by gender, race and disability status, for 
several years prior (University and College Union, 2015b). The 2019/20 claim newly demanded that 
 
97 The THE reported that Falmouth University achieved largest narrowing of their GPG from the first to second 
reporting deadline, followed by Queen Mary University of London. See Appendix L for an explanation of why 
this may not indicate reform of hierarchical power structures creating equality.  
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employers “work on closing the ethnic pay gap, taking account of the ways in which intersectionality 
affects pay and grading” (University and College Union, 2019). Rollock’s (2019) ground-breaking 
investigation into the experiences of most of the UK’s black female professors for the UCU revealed 
their experiences of being paid less than white comparators. The BBC also published articles about 
the academic EPG and G/EPG, using pay data from 22 of the UK’s 24 Russell Group universities 
(Croxford, 2018, 2019). Apart from revealing the scale of ethnic pay inequality, one article also 
provided telling illustrations of how universities implicitly and directly silence questions of the 
consistent functioning of the ‘transparent’ pay scale (Croxford, 2019). The experiences echoed many 
from this thesis, particularly the tendency to shut down inequality concerns with the expectation 
that the individual should resolve the institution’s wrong.  
One account by Croxford (2019) was strikingly similar to the white female academic who saw her 
same job title advertised a year after joining University Alpha but with a pay range starting at several 
thousand more than her salary (Chapter 8). A BAME female “was on a grade just below professor 
when she discovered she was being paid about £8,000 less than white male lecturers on lower 
grades in the same department” (Croxford, 2019). The woman achieved this glimpse of radical pay 
transparency from costings reports for a group funding bid, but she did not feel able to query the 
situation. She expressed fear of becoming viewed as a troublemaker if she voiced her concerns. 
Individualising her problem, she worried that it reflected her weak achievements. Another BAME 
woman described by Croxford (2019) learned of her inequality while having coffee with three white 
colleagues. All four had completed their PhDs about the same time and accrued similar levels of 
teaching experience, yet the BAME woman was paid much less. She spoke to her HoD, who offered 
to raise her pay but not enough to remedy the gap. Her HoD cautioned her not to press for more to 
avoid being “seen as an angry black woman” (Croxford, 2019) and—as happened to a white woman 
academic in Chapter 8—her HoD advised her to seek remedy for the acknowledged years of 
underpayment by applying for promotion. Promotion was also presented as a resolution for a BAME 
woman with six years of university teaching experience, according to Croxford (2019). She 
overheard junior colleagues that had recently completed their PhDs discussing their pay, which was 
thousands more than hers. Her enquiries were similarly met with individualising blame, asserting 
that she had failed to negotiate and that she should apply for a small performance bonus or 
promotion to remedy her acknowledged pay inequality. A BAME male reported a similar experience. 
When he queried the issue, he was told that if he was unhappy, to “go elsewhere” (Croxford, 2019). 
Even the University and College Employer’s Association (UCEA) released intersectional pay analysis 
in November 2018, motivated by the expected future EPG reporting regulations. The report found 
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that black men and women experienced a significant pay penalty relative to white men and women, 
which was strongly explained by vertical segregation. The picture was more mixed for Asian staff, so 
the authors recommended that universities should include at least broad ethnicity categories in 
future pay analyses (Hopkins and Salvestrini, 2018). 
Finally, the active promotion of secrecy within HE employment relationships has emerged as 
problematic and widespread in the context of NDAs in university settlement agreements. In April of 
2019, the THE reported the results of an FOI request about NDA use. The request revealed that the 
98 responding UK universities issued nearly 11,000 NDAs from 2014/15 through most of 2018/19. 
The FOI responses did not give any explanation of the context of the NDAs, but the figures raised 
concern that the legal clauses can cover up bullying and harassment (Stokel-Walker, 2019). 
Prominent campaigner against sexual harassment in HE, Dr Emma Chapman argued in an interview 
with Stokel-Walker (2019) that “this level of NDA use shows how universities have long prioritised 
reputation management above the safety and well-being of their students and staff." 
9.6 Policy Implications and Impact 
The primary implication of this thesis for both government and employer policy is that pay 
transparency is not ‘self-actuating’ (Alexander, 2015). To be a tool to help narrow pay inequality, 
pay transparency must reveal pay inequality where it exists and possess the capacity to generate 
reform. Where transparency becomes an exercise to validate the status quo, rather than to shift the 
imbalance of power between employers and employees, it will struggle to perform. Performing pay 
transparency successfully requires organisational self-criticality and vulnerability by employers, or, 
barring that, external scrutiny to a degree that it matters to employers. Although legislative reform 
and pay setting principles were not the focus of my empirical analysis on pay transparency, the 
findings from my case studies do raise important implications for both. Therefore, this section will 
first discuss the nuanced lessons for how the UK’s pay ‘transparency agenda’ may be improved to 
better promote gender pay equality. Secondly, the challenges that this thesis presents to settled pay 
setting systems, both nationally and within the HE sector, will be explored. Finally, avenues that 
have been strategised to generate impact from the implications of this thesis with relevant actors 
will be briefly summarised.  
The revealed complexity of pay transparency in this thesis provides nuanced lessons for how the 
UK’s pay ‘transparency agenda’ may be improved to better promote gender pay equality. This thesis 
has demonstrated practical shortcomings in the performance of pay transparency inside two 
publicly funded organisations that operate within a sector that had already experienced a decade of 
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multi-layered forces pressing for greater pay transparency (Chapter 4). Most notably, this thesis 
elucidated a pay ‘transparency paradox’ inside the university case studies (Chapter 6 & 8). Although 
transparent pay and related progression policies are presented, academic staff do not always 
experience these policies as consistent, particularly when it comes to initial pay setting and 
promotion decisions. In many instances, when women who raised concerns that their treatment 
contrasted with the transparent systems, their interventions were met by those holding 
organisational power with disbelief or shock. At worst, they felt that they experienced retribution, 
such as when they questioned their workload allocations. At best, their problems were 
acknowledged individually, and the women were encouraged to resolve them themselves, for 
instance, by seeking promotion. The presentation of a transparent system was used to defend 
against criticisms of that system when they arose (Chapter 8).  
The messiness of the lived experience of pay transparency (or secrecy) inside these universities 
provides support for the comprehensive approach to pay transparency that was advised by the 
European Commission (2014a) in their 2014 Commission Recommendation on strengthening the 
principle of equal pay between men and women through transparency, an approach that the UK’s 
GPG reporting regulations only begin to address. In an April 2019 parliamentary debate on the GPG, 
Victoria Atkins MP, the Minister for Women, acknowledged that the UK’s regulations were only an 
initial monitoring step and must be followed up by further actions by both employers and 
government (Brown 2019). Following a review of case-study research into company policies and 
practices that were intended to narrow the GPG, Brown (2019) argued for the importance of a 
multi-pronged strategy to engage both formal and informal tactics. 
Several European Union (EU) nations had begun to legislate to promote pay transparency by 
protecting employees’ rights to discuss their pay (Bierman and Gely, 2004; Colella et al., 2007) or by 
mandating employers to report company GPGs, throughout the early 2000s (Chapter 1). 
Scandinavian countries, including Norway, Sweden, and Finland, also have an established culture of 
radical pay transparency due to their publicly accessible databases of all individual’s tax returns 
(Chapter 3). These databases were made even more accessible when they were placed online in 
recent years, although this has been followed by some restrictions to access (Fernandez, 2010; 
Brancaccio, 2012; Swift, 2012; Kulow, 2013; Marcal, 2017). Kulow (2013) has made a promising 
observation that Norway’s GPG has narrowed since the nation made individual level pay information 
publicly available online in the early 2000s; unfortunately, the basis for her claim lacked peer-
reviewed analysis. No systematic testing of the relationship between these natural experiments in 
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radical pay transparency and national GPGs could be identified. Furthermore, although Scandinavian 
nations are often painted as models in terms of gender equality (World Economic Forum, 2019), 
significant research has demonstrated that their progress remains variable (Seierstad and Healy, 
2012; Grönlund, Halldén and Magnusson, 2017). That even nations with levels of pay transparency 
significantly beyond what has been achieved in the UK continue to struggle with inequality concerns, 
underscores the complexity of the problem.  
In 2014, the European Commission (2014a) issued the Commission Recommendation on 
strengthening the principle of equal pay between men and women through transparency. The 
Recommendation encouraged member states to better leverage pay transparency along four 
dimensions as part of a comprehensive strategy to narrow the GPG. These dimensions included (i) 
the right of individual employees to request information about pay that is disaggregated by gender 
and work of equal value; (ii) a duty on employers to report the average pay of men and women by 
job category; (iii) a duty on employers to conduct equal pay audits, and (iv) a measure to include 
equal pay, including equal pay audits, in collective bargaining (Chapter 1). Veldman and Timmer’s 
(2017) analysis for the European Commission found that by September 2016, implementation of 
these four dimensions was limited for most member states. The UK’s protection of the right to 
discuss pay was presented as partial fulfilment of the individual right of employees to request 
information about pay. However, the UK also revoked the statutory equal pay questionnaire, which 
had previously enabled women to do precisely as the 2014 Recommendation advised (Trades Union 
Congress, 2015b). The then-planned GPG reporting regulations were also discussed by Veldman and 
Timmer (2017) as an expected future implementation of the recommended duty on employers to 
report on pay. Slow uptake of the Recommendation left the door open for an EU directive to require 
member states to promote pay transparency through binding measures and enforcement. The 
dismally low employer uptake of the UK’s Think, Act, Report measure to encourage GPG reporting 
(Government Equalities Office, 2016a) similarly illustrated the limitation of voluntary equality 
measures to drive employer engagement (Chapter 3). Seierstad et al. (2020) found comparable 
limitations to voluntary compliance with women on corporate board quotas in Norway. Compliance 
was high for companies that were bound by the mandate with significant sanctions for non-
compliance, but there was little voluntary compliance amongst other companies. Indeed, some 
companies even changed their legal status in a seeming bid to avoid having to comply with the 
quota, which raises important lessons for enforcement design. Therefore, it will be important to 
monitor the strength with which enforcement is ultimately applied to companies through 
transposed national legislation of the EU’s forthcoming pay transparency directive. This directive 
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may also contain measures to increase the transparency of pay systems and strengthen public 
awareness of key rights and legal concepts. Feedback on the proposal for such a directive was 
elicited during January-February 2020, and a public consultation was held from March-May 2020. 
The directive is expected to be adopted by the end of 2020 (European Commission, 2020).   
In the longer term, the UK should more fully adopt the Commission’s Recommendation or transpose 
the future EU directive on pay transparency into domestic law. However, the UK’s EU withdrawal 
completion may complicate this process (Boffey and Rankin, 2020). Fuller adoption of a more 
comprehensive pay ‘transparency agenda’ would require the government to recognise that the 
individualised UK equalities legal framework is overly reliant on employees having to actively seek 
protection from employment discrimination. This does not substantially produce organisational 
change; it often only secures limited remedy for a few individuals (Dickens, 2000). Employers like 
University Alpha and Beta were reluctant to acknowledge informal complaints as evidence of any 
sort of systemic problem. Those universities function within the same industry that has been sharply 
criticised for its over-zealous imposition of NDAs in out-of-court settlements (Stokel-Walker, 2019). 
In the rare instances where an employee manages a successful anti-discrimination claim against 
their employer, one can hardly expect more transparent receptiveness, except perhaps where 
required by law. However, getting a successful employment tribunal judgement requires employees 
to surmount significant challenges to obtain multiple types of workplace information (Alexander, 
2015), to secure sufficient resources to bring a claim, and—to some degree—to be lucky. Professor 
Schafer (2011) made clear the extent of the effort it took to bring her partially successful claim 
against Royal Holloway; this was only made possible by substantial legal support from the UCU, who 
were seeking a test case to challenge professorial pay secrecy (Chapter 4). As demonstrated in this 
thesis, the intractability of organisational inequality regimes in the face of significant pay 
transparency exercises strengthens calls to move beyond individual rights-based anti-discrimination 
protection. As concluded by the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee (2019, p. 3) 
in a recent inquiry report:  
The individual approach to enforcement of the Equality Act 2010, and its predecessors going 
back to the 1960s and 70s, is not fit for purpose…We want to see a model than can act as a 
sustainable deterrent to achieve system-wide change that tackles institutional and systemic 
discrimination. 
The report explains that such a model would require making explicit obligations on employers, such 
as GPG reporting, more directly enforceable and empowering the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) to engage in bolder enforcement action, within the limitations of its currently 
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reduced budget. The report also recommends that the EHRC should publicly report on its 
enforcement action to serve as an amplified deterrent to bad behaviour by employers (House of 
Commons Women and Equalities Committee, 2019). 
In the medium term, the employer practice of basing recruitment pay offers on applicants’ salary 
history ought to be banned. A 2018 YouGov survey commissioned by the Young Women’s Trust 
indicated that nearly half of UK employers ask job applicants for their salary history (Clarke, 2018). 
Policy shapers at both case studies readily acknowledged the use of this practice. An Alpha policy 
shaper openly explained that salary history may be used to justify an increased pay offer to what 
might have been offered otherwise, but only if the candidate had revealed their salary history 
before negotiations began (Chapter 8). Recruitment pay negotiations present a unique moment in 
which the potential employee’s power vis-à-vis the potential employer is at its greatest. Basing 
recruitment pay offers on salary history allows employers to turn prior pay discrimination into 
market justification to pay women and minorities less (Monopoli, 2016). The practice is rapidly 
attracting condemnation by US equality advocates; as a result, legislation that bans this practice for 
at least some employers has been enacted in 17 states, along with Washington, DC and Puerto Rico, 
as of 28 February 2020 (Herzfeld, 2019; HR Dive, 2020). The ban has begun to attract support in the 
UK, including from the Young Women’s Trust (Clarke, 2018). 
This thesis also raises immediate practical implications for the most prominent policy that is 
currently driving the pay ‘transparency agenda’ in the UK, mandatory GPG reporting regulations. 
These regulations address only one of the four dimensions of the European Commission’s 
recommendations for pay transparency. An inquiry by the House of Commons’ Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy Committee’s (2018), after the first annual GPG reporting deadline, identified a 
range of tactics that companies had taken to remedy their pay gap, but the Committee was 
reluctant to call on government to mandate a particular mix of measures. The report left open the 
possibility that more direct government intervention could be required in the future, but initially 
argued:  
Organisations cannot rely on excuses about societal attitudes and trends to avoid examining 
their own contribution, conscious or otherwise, to their gender pay gaps and the effectiveness 
of their measures to address them. They must take responsibility for closing these gaps by 
taking effective action. (House of Commons Business Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Committee, 2018, p. 28)  
However, Brown (2019, p. 145) observed that the House of Commons’ Women and Equalities 
Committee has gone further, criticising “the narrow scope and lack of enforcement of the new 
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regulations.” Weak enforcement of these regulations presents a particular concern given the 
individualised nature of anti-discrimination law (Dickens, 2000). Employees are already in a weaker 
position than their employer when seeking information about pay in their company. Early 
assessment of the reporting regulations may validate concerns about their strength. Following the 
second year of reporting, Amery et al. (2019) found that neither Athena SWAN status nor presence 
of women in senior management roles were significantly related to a narrowed GPG or reduced 
vertical segregation. If ‘pay transparency’ performance protects hierarchical power structures, it 
cannot resolve organisational inequality. Brown (2019) also reported that of the 100 largest 
companies who published narratives to accompany their 2019 GPG reporting, only four proposed an 
action to review company policies. Concerning the need for transparency to substantively challenge 
existing hierarchical power structures, this thesis strengthens advocacy for several reforms to the 
mandatory GPG reporting regulations. 
The UK government ought to reduce the employer reporting threshold from 250 employees to 50. 
The current threshold only covers about half the workforce (Government Equalities Office, 2016b). 
As discussed previously, research indicates that voluntary spill over equalities compliance by 
employers who are not bound by mandates, cannot be relied upon (Seierstad et al., 2020). Reducing 
the reporting mandate threshold would also align with European Commission recommendations for 
employer GPG reporting (House of Commons Business Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 
2018).  
These employers also ought to be required to publish narratives alongside their data in order to 
provide evidence-based explanations and propose actions to address key causes of pay gaps, as 
argued by the Trades Union Congress in their 2015 submission to the Government Equalities Office 
consultation on these regulations (Trades Union Congress, 2015b). The Labour Party’s shadow 
Minister for Women and Equalities, Dawn Butler MP, renewed this call in an April 2019 
parliamentary debate on the GPG (Brown 2019). Narratives may be of limited value if employees 
cannot understand them, and so these narratives must be written in a way that is accessible for 
general audiences, with varying degrees of numeracy. These narratives would also provide a written 
record to which employees or the local union could hold employers accountable if the actions did 
not substantively materialise. The narratives, along with the annual nature of the reporting 
requirement, may generate scope for further mandates to require either improvement over time or 
targets below which to keep the reported gaps.  
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The UK government also ought to produce and maintain a public listing of the employers that are 
required to report their GPG. This seems to be an obvious action to enable public scrutiny of 
compliance, particularly given that the government significantly underestimated the reporting 
mandate prior to the first reporting deadline. The government initially estimated that about 8,000 
employers would have to report, which increased to about 9,000 shortly before the first deadline. 
The final figure was 10,528. Despite entreaties by the House of Commons Business, Energy, and 
Industrial Strategy Committee (2018), this listing has not materialised.  
As an additional lever to encourage substantive compliance, the government ought to introduce a 
clear threat of sanctions, not only for failure to report but also for inaccuracy. Tax filings with 
erroneous figures may accrue at least a financial penalty, yet the accuracy of GPG reporting seems 
to be under relatively weak scrutiny as long as something is submitted by the deadline. A recent 
report by the House of Commons Women and Equalities Committee (2019) found that the EHRC’s 
enforcement of the existing mandate preceded quickly because it was binary; companies reported 
or they did not. A report by the House of Commons Business Energy and Industrial Strategy 
Committee (2018) expressed concern that the EHRC’s ability to impose fines for either non-
compliance or inaccurate reporting is legally insecure and cumbersome. Healy and Ahamed’s (2019) 
analysis of the persistent GPG in the UK finance sector suggested that mandatory regulations 
requiring GPG reporting without clear financial sanctions for non-compliance are unlikely to 
generate significant narrowing of the GPG. Without empowering and resourcing the EHRC to 
conduct analysis, not only of reporting but of the validity of reporting, employers will remain under 
limited pressure to shift structural inequality.98  
Lastly, the UK government ought to continue what it has slowly begun, by introducing a requirement 
to also report the EPG to create more comprehensive transparency of pay inequality (Department 
for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2018). In recognition of the intersectional nature of pay 
inequality, this reporting should ideally intersect with gender, at least using broad ethnic categories 
(Hopkins and Salvestrini, 2018). The UK government proposed enacting mandatory EPG reporting, 
which could be somewhat analogous to GPG reporting. However, the shape of these requirements 
and whether they may require intersectional calculations remains unknown. A public consultation 
on the proposed requirement ran from October 2018 to January 2019. By 13 June 2020, the 
 
98 For example, Queen Mary University of London asserted in their 2019 filing that their 2018 filing had been 
wrong and the method was corrected. They did not clearly explain the correction, provide revised figures for 
their 2018 filing using their 2019 method, or face any apparent repercussions from the EHRC (Queen Mary 
University of London, 2019). 
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government had not responded (Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2018; 
Gov.uk, 2019). 
The revealed complexity of pay transparency in this thesis also presents challenges to settled pay 
setting systems and principles, both nationally and within the HE sector, with a view to what may be 
more conducive to reducing gender and gender/ethnic pay equality. The previous discussion of 
implications for the UK’s pay ‘transparency agenda’ has suggested shorter and longer-term 
strategies to reform pay transparency practices to combat pay inequality more effectively. The 
following section now proposes the practical changes to wage setting systems and principles that 
the findings of this thesis infers. 
On the national level, this thesis strengthens the case for rolling back anti-union legislation to enable 
stronger unionisation and collective bargaining of wage setting systems. Although this research has 
been conducted inside a sector with strong unionisation by UK standards, it is, nevertheless, against 
a backdrop of declining unionisation across the nation. The decline of trade unions and sectoral 
collective bargaining in the UK has been driven in part by harsh anti-union legislation, and this 
decline partly accounts for the rise in individualised employment litigation (Deakin et al., 2015), as 
well as allowing for more individualised pay systems without the level of union-pushback that has 
been discussed in the HE sector against the use of market-supplements (Chapter 6). The most recent 
legislative attack on trade unions came through the Trade Unions Act (TUA) 2016, which, amongst 
other things, placed onerous requirements on industrial action ballots that make it significantly 
harder for unions to wield their strongest tool of last resort in disputes: 
The combined effect of the measures is to make the TUA probably the most significant trade 
union legislation since the Employment Act 1980, representing a sudden acceleration in the 
incremental legislative controls subsequently introduced by Conservative governments. (Ford 
and Novitz, 2016, p. 277) 
The decline of unions is concerning because they are also integral actors with the potential 
motivation and power to use the transparency of GPG reporting as leverage for reform inside 
organisations. To repeat Alexander’s (2015) point, pay transparency is not ‘self-actuating.’ With 
currently weak enforcement of the regulations, great responsibility rests on unions to use the 
regulations to press for change where it is needed (Conley and Torbus, 2019). It is perhaps against 
this context of declining trade union power in the UK that the UCU has continued to countenance a 
Framework Agreement that contains flaws, which may be presenting significant barriers to 
eliminating the GPG, as will be explored below.   
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Within the HE sector, this thesis presents a challenge to the sector’s self-presentation as one that 
embodies pay transparency. Although both case study universities aligned the pay of their academic 
staff (excluding professors) with the Framework Agreement-derived sectoral pay spine, deviations 
emerged from that pay scale through pay grade drift that was enabled in part by market and 
retention supplements. Some apparent starting pay negotiation discrepancies also became 
apparent. A key structural problem emerged with respect to professorial pay, which is outside of the 
sectoral collective bargaining that led to the present Framework Agreement (Chapter 4). Already 
subject to less transparency than other academic pay, the UK’s professoriate also remains 
consistently male-dominated through vertical segregation; professorial pay is also where the largest 
proportion of the GPG amongst academic staff remains unexplained (Bandiera, Rana and Xu, 2016; 
Mumford and Sechel, 2019). In Chapter 6, this thesis also demonstrated a consistently wider range 
of pay for the professoriate than for all other academic staff combined. These outcomes are enabled 
by the disparate pay systems between academic staff below the professoriate and professors.  
At the same time, universities maintain an understandable reliance on their use of job evaluation 
techniques to assert that pay is both transparent and fair. Job evaluation schemes have been 
portrayed as a valuable tool to reduce discretion and promote gender equality in pay systems. Acker 
(1989, p. 43) characterised the job evaluation exercise that she studied in the US state of Oregon as 
one with an objective of “true comparable worth”, which she defined as “a wage setting system in 
which wages are pegged to unbiased, sex‐neutral evaluated points, with some flexibility to respond 
to market forces, but with controls to keep inequities from creeping back over time.” The key, 
however, is that job evaluation is meant to evaluate the ‘job’ not the person holding the job. The 
problem in the case of academic staff working in UK HE, as has been raised at several points in this 
thesis, is that academic promotions are based largely upon a somewhat subjective assessment of 
past performance of the person holding the job. 
In her submission to the House of Common’s Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee’s 
(2018, p. 27) inquiry following the first round of GPG reporting, Sheila Wild, founder of the Equal Pay 
Portal, encouraged simplicity and transparency principles for pay setting, noting that “as a rule of 
thumb, the simpler the pay system, the less likely you are to get a gender pay gap.” Deviations from 
the published pay scale, which occur as pay grade drift and that are enabled by market and 
retention supplements and inconsistencies with starting pay negotiations (or lack thereof), breed 
complication. This complication is exacerbated by the bifurcation of HE pay setting systems, with a 
collectively bargained sectoral pay scale for most academic pay but not for professors.  
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The UK’s HE sector needs a re-negotiated Framework Agreement to reduce the slippage and 
deviation from published policy and practice that has been highlighted by this thesis. The current 
Framework Agreement excludes professors from sectoral collective bargaining. A re-negotiated 
agreement should address this internal logical conflict of the academic pay system by bringing the 
professoriate, a known source of significant unexplained GPG, under the sectoral collective 
bargaining agreement. This may be unpopular with some of those extreme outliers indicated by the 
academic pay range analysis in Chapter 6. However, if achieved, it would create transparency over 
professorial pay where presently there is little. It would also most likely lead to the compression of 
the range of pay for academic staff. Research across many national contexts indicates that wage 
compression, which is often achieved through trade union collective bargaining or minimum wage 
laws that raise the floor of low pay, is associated with a narrowing of the GPG (Blau and Kahn, 1996; 
Kahn, 2015). Tying the pay of all academic staff more closely together may also serve to strengthen 
the UCU’s control over academic pay to achieve more reasonable pay uplifts for all academic staff 
because it would generate stronger incentives for professors to remain in the union and so 
therefore may boost both membership and the activist solidarity that is important to maintain 
organising strength. The UCU’s (2019) 2019/20 pay claim reported that continual sub-inflation pay 
awards have meant that real academic pay has declined by 20.8% from 2009 to 2018 using RPI. 
Although relatively strong in the UK industrial relations context, the UCU has not been able to 
prevent this significant real decline in pay.   
The current Framework Agreement also allows for ‘attraction and retention premia’ (also referred 
to as market and retention supplements) so long as the policies are agreed with local union 
branches inside each institution. Such fragmentation creates a risk of inconsistent or hidden 
practices. Based on his experience supporting UK employers at the Institute for Employment 
Studies, Brown (2019) advised that companies seeking to harness the power of transparency to 
reduce the GPG ought to reduce individualised and discretionary pay. A re-negotiated agreement 
should also bring these exceptional payments into nationally agreed policy if they could not move 
employers to drop them altogether.  
Finally, following its implementation, the current Framework Agreement encouraged employers to 
engage in equalities monitoring through equal pay audits. However, the case studies’ findings 
indicate that this ‘encouragement’ is not sufficient to yield full compliance. University Alpha 
conducted equal pay audits that made comparison with other universities impossible and obscured 
the impact of vertical segregation within the professoriate by reporting only within-professorial 
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band gaps. Additionally, by the 2016/17 academic year, University Beta had failed to ever conduct a 
full audit, having only completed one partial audit, which excluded professors, and they released 
only a short summary of the results (Chapter 6). In order to remedy these inconsistencies, and also 
in recognition of the European Commission’s (2014a) recommendations on pay transparency, a re-
negotiated and properly enforced mandate to conduct equal pay audits of all staff employed by the 
universities, from the lowest paid cleaners to the vice-chancellor and senior management team, 
ought to be agreed (Association of University Teachers, 2004; JNCHES, 2004; University and College 
Union, 2016b). 
It is important to recognise that the legislative and collective bargaining reforms that have been 
recommended here are unlikely to be comprehensively realised in the near-term, as has already 
been somewhat indicated. Collectively, they are likely to meet with considerable political and 
economic barriers. Transposition of the forthcoming EU pay transparency directive is unlikely to be 
required, because of the UK’s exit from the EU. Furthermore, there is a strong preference, at least 
by the current Conservative government, for voluntary equality measures. Relatedly, banning the 
use of salary history in recruitment pay decisions may be considered a heavy-handed intrusion on 
business decisions. The same government has also shown the extent to which it considers the GPG 
reporting mandate to be contingent. Amidst the recent Covid-19 crisis, the government did not just 
delay the reporting deadlines of Spring 2020; they removed the years’ reporting requirement 
altogether ostensibly to reduce the burden on struggling businesses (Milne, 2020). This justification 
is weakened by the proximity of the cancellation to the normal deadline (within two weeks) and the 
fact that the snapshot date for the reporting was nearly a year prior (HM Parliament, 2017a). Most 
companies should have already completed or nearly completed the analysis, even if they had not 
yet officially reported. Thus, significant strengthening of the GPG mandate, which they have already 
presented as a cost and administrative burden on business, may be unlikely. Furthermore, the same 
party that brought in “the most significant trade union legislation since the Employment Act 1980” 
(as well as said 1980 Act) is unlikely to reverse its course (Ford and Novitz, 2016, p. 277). A rolling 
back of anti-trade union legislation is unlikely without a shift back to a Labour Party government. 
Given the recent breakdown of employment relations within the HE sector, which led to 22 days of 
strike action during the 2019/20 academic year in a complex dispute that remained unresolved as 
the exam season approached, amidst a global pandemic, significant re-negotiation of the 
Framework Agreement is also aspirational. However, in a diverse society full of complex 
organisations, eliminating the GPG and G/EPG is also aspirational. Continuing to press for even 
gradual changes towards comprehensive reform of the sort advised in this thesis remains important. 
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What is certain is that the nuanced picture presented by the development and implementation of an 
OSE analysis in this thesis means that reliance on improved legislation or written employer policies 
alone is insufficient. Future progress to narrow pay inequality will require buy-in from those with 
power in government and the organisations in which people work to acknowledge that ‘business as 
usual' is insufficient. Organisational leaders must - perhaps bravely - be ready to acknowledge that 
for equalities monitoring to mean anything it must have the capacity to reform organisational 
practices, including those systems responsible for setting pay.  
An intersectional approach has been adopted in this thesis to critically analyse the problematic 
social processes inside universities and transform academic analysis into practical change (Cho, 
Crenshaw and McCall, 2013). My goals have been to contribute and demonstrate the importance of 
the OSE as a tool to understand the organisational processes that contribute to the persistence of 
gender and ethnic-based pay inequality and to report these findings within larger academic and 
policy communities to foster change by encouraging organisational self-criticality. As activist groups 
like the UK’s Women’s Equality Party (2017) and the Fawcett Society (2019) have already argued: 
perfunctory pay transparency is insufficient to address deeply embedded workplace inequality. In 
order to lay the groundwork to generate practical impact flowing from the policy implications of this 
thesis, I have curated numerous key contacts through networking and outreach activities. During my 
PhD, I have contributed to an Australian legislative inquiry on pay transparency, BBC news’ GPG 
coverage, a documentary scrutinising implementation of the UK’s mandatory GPG regulations, and a 
UCU ‘Equalities Tea(ch)-in.’ I have developed plans to engage with the THE, a network of academics 
who are engaged with EDI activities, the BBC’s Carrie Gracie, and AdvanceHE.99   
9.7 Recommendations for Future Research 
This thesis has raised a number of opportunities for further research that would require additional 
fieldwork or data access.100 Chapter 7 found that identifying with the UK cultural context was not 
significantly related to social pay comparison. This was somewhat surprising given the tendency of 
scholars and politicians to attribute the income-talk taboo uncritically to national culture. Further 
research into whether/how the income-talk taboo and social pay comparison does/does not vary by 
country is needed. Potential questions for international comparative research may include:  
• How consistent is the ‘income-talk taboo’ and its determining factors across different 
national contexts?   
 
99 See Appendix M for details of research impact and future plans. 
100 See Appendix N for details of my publication plan. 
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• Do stronger national policy narratives in support of pay transparency weaken income-talk 
taboos? 
• Do more gender equal nations have weaker income-talk taboos?  
Considering this thesis’s intersectional approach, Chapter 7 also found the somewhat surprising 
result that pay discussion was not statistically different between men and women or BAME and 
white academics. Further analysis of this outcome in a randomised sample of academics across the 
UK would be a useful next step. This would require obtaining institutional affiliation and funding to 
enable purchasing a pre-fabricated list from the UK-based marketing company, A-Mail Academic, or 
creating a research team to manually collect these details from departmental directories of all UK 
university websites (Chapter 5). An additional approach could be to survey a representative sample 
of the UK labour force to yield generalisable conclusions about social pay comparison in the UK, 
rather than in UK HE. A representative sample could be achieved with Qualtrics panel services 
(Heen, Lieberman and Miethe, 2014).  
Chapters 6 and 8 analysed the OSE inside Universities Alpha and Beta from the perspective of 
remuneration policy shapers, UCU representatives and academics. The lecturers through professors 
who were interviewed for this research largely reflect core staff, in the vernacular of Atkinson’s 
(1985) flexible firm model. However, that overlooks the considerable and growing practice of hiring 
periphery casualised teaching and research staff in HE as a form of indirect control in universities 
(Atkins et al., 2018; Jones and Oakley, 2018). The trend illustrates Standing’s (2011, 2014b, 2014a) 
precariat. Hiring staff from relatively powerless demographics is a known form of indirect 
managerial control (Acker and Van Houten, 1974; Acker, 2006b). The precarity of casualised staff 
puts them in a position of powerlessness relative to core permanent academic staff. Recent analysis 
of HESA data by the UCU (2020b) has also shown that women and BAME staff are more likely than 
men and white staff to be casually employed in the HE sector. It is reasonable to expect that the 
silencing experiences faced by core academics in this thesis, like fear of being framed as a 
troublemaker, greedy, or ungrateful, already exacerbated by gender and ethnicity, would be yet 
more acute for casualised academics. 
The OSE inside organisations might look considerably more secretive than presented in this thesis 
when focusing on casualised staff, even though the pay gap between male and female and white 
and BAME staff may be lessened due to the generally smaller range of pay available to them than to 
core academics. Casualisation keeps everyone’s pay down, even as some demographic groups may 
experience silencing pressures more acutely, possibly resulting in higher barriers to escape precarity. 
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This thesis has focused on core academics to develop a new theoretical concept, without the 
confounding complexities of the experience of being a casualised employee in HE. With the OSE now 
proposed, it would be instructive to apply it to casualised staff in HE. 
9.8 Concluding Thoughts 
This thesis has delivered original theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions. The key 
theoretical contribution has been the development of the OSE, which builds upon and pays tribute 
to Acker’s (2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes approach. The OSE provides an analytical framework to 
practically assess organisational pay transparency efforts to reduce pay inequality in the light of the 
interrelated influence of employer strategies, social norms, and employee behaviour. This thesis has 
made an original empirical contribution by illustrating the hidden pay discussion behaviour of UK 
academics, as well as by demonstrating how the ‘pay transparency’ paradox helps to reproduce 
inequality inside two UK universities. The latter was made possible through thematic analysis from 
which the completed OSE emerged. The primary methodological contribution of this thesis has been 
to demonstrate the value of using a multi-layered, multi-strategy analysis incorporating Acker’s 
(2006a, 2006b) inequality regimes to thereby generate a novel approach for gender and gender-
ethnic based pay inequality research through the critical interrogation of accepted practices and 
settled social norms. Analysis across all four social domains has been essential to this end, 
illustrating Layder’s (1998, 2006) insight that power relations within one domain impacts the other 
domains.  
This thesis has revealed that the silence of transparency serves as an organisational lubricant to 
maintain the functioning of hierarchical power structures in academia. The silence of transparency 
refers to the role that workplace pay ‘transparency performance’ plays to legitimise existing pay and 
progression systems, to maintain or reinforce pay inequality, and to individualise pay inequality 
concerns as anomalies because ‘transparent’ pay structures have been established. University 
leaders are aware of the persistent GPG and are increasingly made aware of the worse G/EPG. The 
sector must reflect, in cooperation with unions, upon the equalities implications of the competing 
and conflicting imperatives of university pay setting principles. Academic pay, on the one hand, 
follows a transparent, collectively bargained pay scale that has become established across the 
sector. On the other hand, it is increasingly becoming responsive to market forces. Intensifying 
competitive forces from the Research Excellence Framework (REF) are likely only to exacerbate the 
pay grade drift that was acknowledged by policy shapers in Chapter 8 (Munir et al., 2013; Morrish, 
2016). Consistent with this expectation, unpublished analysis of Higher Education Statistics Agency 
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data (Healy, Pfefer and Sevilla, 2020) demonstrated a peak in the unexplained portion of the GPG in 
UK business schools, coinciding with the REF 2014 submission. While these structural forces enable 
the reproduction of inequalities, it was noteworthy that this thesis found university leaders who 
used their power resources to enable change at least within their realms of their institution. It is 
hoped that this thesis will also encourage greater awareness of the ‘pay transparency’ paradox and 
encourage deeper and wider reform within academia.  
Nevertheless, this thesis also finds that organisational ‘pay transparency’ performance instils a belief 
in the fairness of pay systems, which means that people tacitly accept their pay most of the time, 
suggesting that those who do question their pay are the deviants. That professors were 3.6 times 
more likely to discuss their pay than the academic staff below the professoriate, where pay is 
covered by collective bargaining and set by institutional pay scales, is likely to be related to this 
implicit trust in reward systems. Yet, individuals sometimes face problems that prompt them to 
question their circumstances. Complex questions about pay (and related progression) are often met 
with silence, delay, or a negative response—rarely clarity. Many employees will seek to avoid being 
labelled as troublemakers or feel uncomfortable speaking candidly about pay and so they will not 
press for pay equality even if they suspect there may be a problem. After all, these moments of 
questioning are kept isolated, treated as individual problems. Without considerable effort, such as 
the process underpinning the intersectional feminist analysis of this thesis, the scale of cumulative 
disadvantage for women, BAME academics, and BAME women is difficult to see. 
Where a remedy is proffered, individuals are often expected to solve their own problem, for 
instance, by applying for a bonus or a promotion. Systems of pay are defended as ‘transparent’, so 
criticism of those systems is met with scepticism. Silence from those with power over pay is the 
easiest response when employees without power question their pay. Ahmed’s (2017, 2018a, 2019) 
research on complaint illustrates the fatigue experienced by those inside UK HE who dare to 
complain. Ahmed (2017) writes that “stories of complaint are often stories about the exhaustion of 
a process…When the processes have been exhausted a person probably has been too.” Many will 
cease questioning, get on with their work, or leave. This is what Acker (2006b) meant by the 
employee compliance with inequalities that is achieved through managerial control. ‘Transparent’ 
pay systems are accepted, and silencing criticism of them becomes normalised because the income-
talk taboo means pay is a private matter, a data protection concern, something we do not discuss in 
polite company. For academics experiencing inconsistency in their remuneration, this thesis shows 
how institutional silence brings the pay ‘transparency paradox’ to life. 
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Does the implication of the pay ‘transparency paradox’ mean that this thesis argues that pay 
transparency projects should be abandoned? Certainly not, but this thesis has established that pay 
transparency is not ‘self-actuating’ (Alexander, 2015), particularly whilst individual rights-based anti-
discrimination protection remains the legal norm. Whilst the thesis sheds light on the conditions 
inside two case studies, the experiences therein are likely to reflect similar practices across the 
sector. It is my hope that this thesis provides both an impetus and a guide for university leadership--
from department heads to vice-chancellors—to become more aware of the struggles through which 
their staff seek to advance their careers. In terms of theoretical development, the OSE analytical 
framework has broad applicability as a means to critically assess the transparency of policies and 
practices in other universities, as well as organisational contexts beyond the HE sector. The pay 
‘transparency agenda’ is unfinished. However, through the collective efforts of supranational and 
national legislative reform, trade union collective-bargaining, and organisational openness to 
equalities data-driven change that have been recommended by this thesis, the pay transparency 
‘agenda’ must continually and reflexively be nurtured at multiple levels both inside and beyond 
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Appendix A: Acronyms and Glossary 
Acronyms 
• AAUW: American Association of University Women 
• ASHE: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
• BAME: Black, Asian and minority ethnic 
• ECU: Equality Challenge Unit 
• EDI: equality, diversity, and inclusion 
• EHRC: Equality and Human Rights Commission 
• EPA: Equal Pay Act 
• EPG: ethnic pay gap (see glossary entry) 
• ET: employment tribunal  
• EU: European Union 
• GEO: Government Equalities Office 
• G/EPG: gender/ethnic pay gap (see glossary entry) 
• GPG: gender pay gap (see glossary entry) 
• HE: higher education 
• HEI: higher education institution 
• HESA: Higher Education Statistics Agency 
• HoD: Head of Department (see glossary entry) 
• ILO: International Labour Organization 
• IWPR: Institute for Women’s Policy Research 
• JNCHES: Joint Negotiating Committee for Higher Education Staff  
• LFS: Labour Force Survey 
• N-BIAS: nonresponse bias impact assessment  
• NIHR: National Institute for Health Research 
• NEW JNCHES: New Joint Negotiating Committee for Higher Education Staff  
• ONS: Office for National Statistics 
• OSE: organisational salary environment 
• PSC: pay secrecy clause 
• PSED: Public Sector Equality Duty 
• RAE: Research Assessment Exercise 
• REF: Research Excellence Framework  
• STEMM: science, technology, engineering, maths, and medicine 
• SET: science, engineering, and technology 
• SOC: Standard Occupational Classification 
• THE: Times Higher Education 
• TUC: Trades Union Congress 
• UCEA: Universities and Colleges Employers Association 
• UCU: University and College Union 
• VC: vice-chancellor (see glossary entry) 




• Academic: Academic in this thesis is used in the broadest sense in this thesis in discussion of 
survey respondents, where it refers to anyone working in HE who engages in paid teaching, 
research or teaching and research activity. Academic is used in discussion of interviewees in 
this thesis to refer to lecturers, senior lecturers, and readers, unless essential it is essential 
to the analytical point being made to use the specific job title. This is to further anonymise 
experiences recounted by avoiding attaching specific job titles to interviewees. Academics in 
this sense are those whose pay is subject to UK national collective bargaining between the 
UCU and UCEA. Where academic interviewee respondents are not being discussed in 
contrast with professors, academic may also be used to denote the broader usage, which 
also includes professors as defined below.  
• Department: The term department is used in this thesis to describe organisationally and 
disciplinary grouped academics within a higher education institution, whether that grouping 
is in institutional parlance referred to as a department or something else. To obscure any 
use of alternative language by interviewees, thus, to preserve anonymity, all instances of 
department used in quotations appear in [square brackets] regardless of which term the 
speaker used. 
• EPG: The ethnic pay gap refers to the difference in pay between BAME and white academics 
(broader usage unless otherwise specified).  
• G/EPG: The gender/ethnic pay gap refers to the difference in pay between BAME male and 
White male and BAME female and White male academics (broader usage of academic 
unless otherwise specified). 
• GPG: The gender pay gap refers to the difference in pay between male and female 
academics (broader usage unless otherwise specified).  
• Head of Department: The term head of department (or head/HoD) is used in this thesis to 
describe all academics with managerial oversight over a grouping of academic staff, whether 
that grouping is in institutional parlance referred to as a department or something else. To 
obscure any use of alternative language by interviewees, thus, to preserve anonymity, all 
instances of the head of department (or head/HOD) used in quotations appear in [square 
brackets] regardless of which term the speaker used. 
• Kafkaesque: The term Kafkaesque is used in this thesis as a literary metaphor to 
characterise the feeling by academic staff of being trapped in a bureaucratic web where pay 
and related career progression policies and processes are seemingly transparent and yet 
inconsistencies emerge and persist without remedy. 
• Radical Pay Transparency: The term radical pay transparency is used in this thesis to denote 
the (somewhat unusual) instances where individuals’ actual pay levels are made known. This 
is in contrast to more common forms of aggregate pay transparency, where only 
information describing the pay of categories of individuals is revealed, such as the pay of 
women in a certain company, industry, or country.  
• Professor: Professor is used in this thesis only to refer to the members of academic staff at 
the top level of the standard profession, whose pay is not subject to UK national collective 
bargaining between the UCU and UCEA. 
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• Vice-Chancellor: The term vice-chancellor (or VC) is used in this thesis to describe the most 
senior member of academic and administrative staff of a university, whether that role is in 
institutional parlance referred to as vice-chancellor or something else. To obscure any use of 
alternative language by interviewees, thus, to preserve anonymity, all instances of vice-
chancellor (or VC) used in quotations appear in [square brackets] regardless of what term 





Appendix B: Consent Information for Social Pay Comparison Survey Respondents 
 
Research study: The Cloak of Silence: A Critical Analysis of the Relationship between Pay Secrecy Culture 
and the Gender Pay Gap within UK Higher Education 
I would like to invite you to be part of this research project, which aims to capture the often-hidden behaviour 
of discussing pay (or not). You should only agree to take part if you want to; it is entirely up to you. If you 
choose not to take part there won’t be any disadvantages for you and you will hear no more about it. Please 
read the following information carefully before you decide to take part; this will tell you why the research is 
being done and what you will be asked to do if you take part. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or 
if you would like more information. If you decide to take part you will be asked to tick the below consent box 
to say that you agree and begin the survey. You remain free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. 
 
About the research: 
The research 
Pay is an important element of most people’s working lives. I am interested to hear about the circumstances 
under which academics working in UK higher education choose to discuss their own pay or avoid this topic 
when engaging with their colleagues. This independent research is part of a PhD thesis that I am undertaking 
at Queen Mary University of London. This is not a survey issued by Queen Mary University of London or any 
other university or institution. 
Taking part 
This survey should take less than 10 minutes to complete. If during the course of the survey there are any 
questions you do not wish to answer, you may skip them or withdraw from the survey entirely. If you 
complete the survey but skip questions, your data may still be used. If you withdraw from the survey, your 
data will not be used. The identity of those completing the survey will be kept confidential and anonymous at 
all further stages of the research. However, the university at which he/she is employed may be associated 
with the response data for analytical purposes. This means that any reference to these survey responses in my 
PhD thesis or published articles will not unveil the specific identity of any respondents. This is in line with 
Queen Mary University of London’s ethical guidance, which has awarded ethical approval to this research. 
Two participants will be drawn at random to receive a £20 Pret a Manger gift voucher as a thank you for 
participation following the conclusion of the study. If you wish to be considered in this draw, you will be 
able to provide contact details at the end of the survey. All survey responses will remain anonymous and 
confidential. 
Emily Pfefer, PhD Researcher 
Queen Mary University of London  
School of Business and Management 
Mobile: +44 (0)7447563693 
Email: e.d.pfefer@qmul.ac.uk 
Note: It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will be asked 
tick the below consent box in order to advance to the survey. 
If you have any questions or concerns about the manner in which the study was conducted please, in the first 
instance, contact the researcher responsible for the study.  If this is unsuccessful, or not appropriate, please 
contact the Secretary at the Queen Mary Ethics of Research Committee, Room W117, Queen’s Building, Mile 
End Campus Mile End Road, London or research-ethics@qmul.ac.uk.  
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Appendix C: Consent Information sheet for Interview participants  
 
Research study: The Cloak of Silence: A Critical Analysis of the Relationship between Pay Secrecy 
Culture and the Gender Pay Gap within UK Higher Education 
 
We would like to invite you to be part of this research project, if you would like to. You should only 
agree to take part if you want to; it is entirely up to you. If you choose not to take part, there won’t 
be any disadvantages for you, and you will hear no more about it. Please read the following 
information carefully before you decide to take part; this will tell you why the research is being done 
and what you will be asked to do if you take part. Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information. If you decide to take part, you will be asked to sign the attached 
consent form to say that you agree. You are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. 
 
About the research: 
 
The research  
I am interested to hear about the circumstances under which academics working in UK higher 
education choose to discuss their own pay or avoid this topic when engaging with their colleagues 
and the motivations those employees feel influence that behaviour. This research is part of a PhD 
thesis that I am undertaking at Queen Mary University of London. 
Taking part 
Interviews will take place in person at the location and time agreed by the interviewee. That means, 
the researcher will secure an interview location off the campus of the interviewees’ employer if 
he/she so desires. Interviews will ideally take place between April 2017 and September 2017. The 
identity of the interviewee will be kept confidential and anonymous at all further stages of the 
research. The person will be referred to only in regard to relevant demographic categories, such as 
gender, ethnicity/race, seniority/job level, and union association, for analytical purposes. This 
means that any reference to the content of these interviews in my PhD thesis or published articles 
will not reveal the identity of any interviewees. This is in line with Queen Mary University of 
London’s ethical guidance. The Ethics of Research Committee has approved this research. 
Emily Pfefer, PhD Researcher 
Queen Mary University of London  
School of Business and Management 
Mobile: +44 (0)7447563693 
Email: e.d.pfefer@qmul.ac.uk 
Note: It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part, you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. 
If you have any questions or concerns about the manner in which the study was conducted please, 
in the first instance, contact the researcher responsible for the study.  If this is unsuccessful, or not 
appropriate, please contact the Secretary at the Queen Mary Ethics of Research Committee, Room 





Consent form for Interviewees 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an 
explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: The Cloak of Silence: A Critical Analysis of the Relationship between Pay Secrecy 
Culture and the Gender Pay Gap within UK Higher Education  
Queen Mary Ethics of Research Committee Ref: _QMERC2016/51 _______________ 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organizing the research must 
explain the project to you before you agree to take part. 
If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, 
please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this 
Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time. 
I understand that if I decide at any other time during the research that I no longer wish to participate 
in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be withdrawn from it immediately. 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I 
understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance 
with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. 
Participant’s Statement: 
I ___________________________________________ agree that the research project named 
above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have 
read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the project and understand 
what the research study involves. 
 




I ___________________________________________ confirm that I have carefully explained the 






Appendix D: Pay Inequality in UK HE: Higher Education Statistics Agency 
 
Dataset: Higher Education Statistics Agency Annual Data from 2003/04 through 2015/16 
Not Directly Used in the Analysis  
• salary16: created by the researcher; inflated f_xsalr01 into real 2016 value using the 
Consumer Price Index from the UK’s Office for National Statistics 
o scale data: individual annual gross income in 2016 terms     
 
• F_year: academic year (2003/04 through 2015/16) 
o String data: academic year  
 
• Ethnic: ethnic background of respondents 
o W: White 
o O: Other (including mixed) 
o U: Unknown 
o 21: Black or Black British - Caribbean 
o 22: Black or Black British - African 
o 29: Other Black background 
o 31: Asian or Asian British - Indian 
o 32: Asian or Asian British - Pakistani 
o 33: Asian or Asian British - Bangladeshi 
o 34: Chinese 
o 39: Other Asian Background 
Directly Used in the Analysis: 
• Year: created by researcher, re-coded from F_year in original data files such that the 
academic year 2003/04 became 2004, 2004/05 became 2005, etc.; used to disaggregate 
data by year 
o 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 
 
• f_acempfun: academic function; analysis based on values 1-3 only 
o 1: Teaching only 
o 2: Research only 
o 3: Teaching and research 
o 9: Not teaching and/or research 
 
• f_moemp: mode of employment (analysis based only value 1: full-time employees) 
o 1: full-time 
o 2: full-time, term-time only 
o 3: part-time 
o 4: part-time, term time only 
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o 5: atypical 
 
• f_xsalr01: annual gross salary in GBP 
o scale data: individual annual gross income in nominal terms 
 
• f_sex: sex of the respondent 
o 1: Male 
o 2: Female 
 
• BAME: created by the researcher; recoded from Ethnic in two stages, such that all ethnicity 
responses other than white became BAME (original values:  O, 21, 22, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 
39), white remained white and unknown became missing data) 
o 1: BAME (Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic) 




Appendix E: Social Pay Comparison Survey Instrument 
 
Eligibility Questions 
0.) Are you currently employed by [HEI provider] to engage in research and/or teaching? 
• Yes 
• No 
If no, text displayed: Thank you for your interest. Unfortunately, you are not qualified to complete 
this survey. Thank you for your time. 
If yes, text displayed: Thank you for your interest. You are eligible to complete this survey. Please 
answer any questions about your employment with regards to your employment at [HEI Provider] 
even if you are also employed elsewhere. Please proceed by clicking the red advance arrow below to 
begin with a few demographic questions about yourself. These will be followed by four further sets of 
questions about your: position within the academic labour market, work and educational experience, 
experience discussing pay (or not), and your income. All answers will remain anonymous and 
confidential. 
 
Section 1: Demographic Factors 
The next few questions will help provide some demographic information about you. 
 
1. What is your sex? 
• Dichotomous response: Male/Female 
 
2. How old are you (in years)? 
• Interval data response 
 
3. What is your ethnicity? 
• White (all white ethnic groups including white British) 
• Black (black Caribbean, black African, black British and black other) 
• Asian (Asian Indian, Asian Pakistani, Asian Bangladeshi, Asian British and Asian other) 
• Chinese 
• Mixed 
• Other ethnic background 
 
4. Some research has suggested that national cultures may have differing pay secrecy norms. With 
what country do you most strongly identify (please select only one; this does not need to reflect 
your current citizenship or residence)? 
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5. Some research has suggested that people with different political affiliations may exhibit 
different pay comparison behaviour. If a new general election were held tomorrow, which 
political party would you support (please select your desired option irrespective of whether you 
are actually eligible to vote in the UK)? 
• (drop down list) 
• Conservative Party 
• Democrat Unionist Party 
• Green Party 
• Labour Party 
• Liberal Democrat Party 
• Plaid Cymru 
• Scottish National Party 
• Sinn Fein 
• Social Democrat & Labour Party 
• UK Independence Party 
• Ulster Unionist Party 
• Other 
• I would not vote 
 
6. Are you a parent? 
• Yes (continue to question 7) 
• No (skip to question 10) 
 
7. How many children do you have? 
• Interval data response 
 




9. Have you taken any parental leave (including maternity, paternity, or adoption leave) following 




10. How many months of parental leave (including maternity, paternity, or adoption leave) have you 
taken in total (where less than one month, please record 0)? 




Section 2: Labour Market Factors.  
The next few questions will help identify your position within the academic labour market. 
 
11. Are you a University and College Union member? 
• Dichotomous response: Yes/No 
 
12. On what type of contract are you currently employed by [HEI provider]? 
• Fixed Term 
• Open Ended/Permanent 
 
13. Have you applied for any other jobs in the past 12 months? 
• Dichotomous response: Yes/No 
 
 
14. (IF YES) For what reason(s) did you apply for any other jobs (please select all that apply)? 
• To secure a pay rise in new employment 
• To secure more senior employment elsewhere 
• To secure employment in a new geographic location 
• To seek a career change (for example – to leave academia) 
• To secure an additional job 
• My current contract ended or was ending 
• I was made redundant 
• To secure a counter offer as leverage for a pay rise in my current employment 
 
15. If there are any reasons you applied for any other jobs that were not listed in the previous 
question, please write them in the space below. 
• Qualitative response box  
 
Section 3: Human Capital Factors 
The next few questions will help characterise your education and work experience.  
 
16. What is your highest educational qualification held? 
• Doctorate (includes doctorate degrees) 
• Other higher degree (includes other higher degrees including master’s degrees) 
• Other postgraduate qualification (includes other postgraduate qualifications including 
professional qualifications and Postgraduate and Professional Graduate Certificates in 
Education (PGCE)). 
• First degree (includes first degrees including those with Qualified Teacher Status (QTS)) 
• Other undergraduate qualification (includes other qualifications at first-degree level 
including professional qualifications, Diploma of Higher Education (DipHE), Higher 
National Diploma (HND), Higher National Certificate (HNC) and all other undergraduate 
qualifications (including professional qualifications). 
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• Other (includes A level, Scottish Higher or equivalent (NVQ/SVQ Level 3); O level/GCSE or 
equivalent (NVQ/SVQ Level 2); other qualifications and no qualifications) 
 
17. What best describes your job title within the university?  
 
• (make as a dropdown) 
• Professor 
• Senior Lecturer 
• Reader 
• Principal Research Fellow 
• Lecturer 
• Senior Research Fellow 
• Research Fellow 
• Researcher 
• Senior Research Assistant 
• Teaching Fellow 
• Research Assistant 
• Teaching Assistant 
 
18. Which best describes your job function within the university? 
• Teaching and Research 
• Teaching Only 
• Research Only 
 
19. How many years have you worked as an academic at your current university? 
• Interval data response 
 
20. How many years have your worked as an academic at any institution, inclusive of your time at 
your current institution, since completion of your previously reported highest educational 
qualification? 
• Interval data response 
 
21. Within which subject area does your current academic role best lie? 
• (select from drop down menu) 
• Agriculture, forestry, and food science 
• Anatomy and physiology 
• Anthropology and development studies 
• Archaeology 
• Architecture, built environment and planning 
• Area Studies 




• Business and Management Studies 
• Catering and Hospitality Management 
• Chemical Engineering 
• Chemistry 
• Civil Engineering 
• Classics 
• Clinical Dentistry 
• Clinical Medicine 
• Continuing Education 
• Earth, marine and environmental sciences 
• Economics and Econometrics 
• Education 
• Electrical, electronic and computer engineering 
• English Language and Literature 
• General Engineering 
• Geography and environmental studies 
• Health and Community Studies 
• History 
• IT, systems sciences, and computer software engineering 
• Law 
• Mathematics 
• Mechanical, aero and production engineering 
• Media Studies 
• Mineral, metallurgy, and materials engineering 
• Modern Languages 
• Music, dance, drama and performing arts 
• Nursing and allied health professions 
• Pharmacy and pharmacology 
• Philosophy 
• Physics 
• Politics and international studies 
• Psychology and behavioural sciences 
• Social work and social policy 
• Sociology 
• Sports Science and leisure studies 
• Theology and religious studies 
• Veterinary Sciences 
Section 4: Pay Discussion Behaviour 
The following questions are about your experience discussing pay with your co-workers (or not). 
Please be assured that all responses to this survey will remain anonymous and confidential. 
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22. This research specifically concerns conversations you may have about your pay level relative 
to the pay level of others. Do you ever talk about pay with your co-workers? 
• Yes (continue to question 19) 
• No (skip to question 20) 
 
23. With whom do you most frequently engage in pay discussions? Please select one response 
from each set of option clusters (sex, ethnicity, age, job category, union membership). 
SEX 
• Employees mainly of the same sex 
• Employees mainly of a different sex to me 
• No specific tendency 
ETHNICITY 
• Employees mainly who are of a similar ethnic background as myself 
• Employees mainly who are of a different ethnic background to myself 
• No specific tendency 
AGE 
• Employees mainly who are younger than me 
• Employees mainly who are near my age 
• Employees mainly who are older than me 
• No specific tendency 
JOB CATEGORY 
• Employees working at a junior level to myself 
• Employees working at a similar job level to myself 
• Employees working at a senior job level to myself 
• No specific tendency 
UNION MEMBERSHIP 
• Employees who belong to the University and College Union 
• Employees who do not belong to the University and College Union 
• No specific tendency 
• I am not generally aware who does or does not belong to the University and College Union 
 
24. Please share any comments you may have regarding why you feel your pay discussions 
follow the patterns you have just reported. 
• Qualitative Response Box 
 
25. How—if at all—do you feel the following parties encourage pay discussion among 
employees of your workplace? 
• My Management 
• My UCU Branch 
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• My Co-Workers 
• UK Employment Law 
o (for each of the above: Generally Encourages Pay Discussion Among 
Employees 
o Generally Does Not Encourage or Discourage Pay Discussion Among 
Employees 
o Generally Discourages Pay Discussion Among Employees 
 
26. Please select the option that best reflects your opinion regarding the following sentiments: 
• British people have a strong aversion to talking about their salary and related 
matters. 
• Discussing pay with one’s colleagues helps one to determine whether one is being 
paid fairly or not 
• If I learned someone with a similar job to me was paid more than I am, I would feel 
inadequate. 
• If I learned someone with a similar job to me was paid more than I am, I would take 
some action to attempt to remedy the imbalance. 
• I am satisfied with my current level of income from my university. 
• People who discuss pay are generally being pushy or overbearing 
o (for each of the above: Strongly agree 
o Agree 
o Somewhat agree 
o Neither agree nor disagree 
o Somewhat disagree 
o Disagree 
o Strongly Disagree 
 
27. In practise, how—if at all—do you think that the following sentiments influence your 
decision to discuss pay or not at your current workplace? 
• British people have a strong aversion to talking about their salary and related matters. 
• Discussing pay with one’s colleagues helps one to determine whether one is being paid 
fairly or not. 
• If I learned someone with a similar job to me was paid more than I am, I would feel 
inadequate. 
• People who discuss pay are generally being pushy or overbearing. 
o (for each of the above: Generally Encourages Me to Discuss My Pay With Other 
Employees 
o Generally Does Not Encourage or Discourage Me to Discuss My Pay With Other 
Employees 




28. Regardless of your conversations with co-workers, you may have conversations about your 
pay level relative to the pay level of others outside of your current institution. Do you ever 




29. New websites, such as Glassdoor and Emolument, have developed to allow people to share 
their wages and other information about their employers anonymously. Have you ever used 




30. The University and College Union has also created a web tool called Rate for the Job, which 
allows users to assess their pay against the pay of those with similar jobs across several 




31. The Times Higher Education (THE) has published the wage gap for academic staff and 
professors at higher education providers across the UK annually since at least 2007. Do you 
feel the THE Pay Survey has had any impact on awareness or transparency about pay in your 
workplace? 
• I feel it has had no impact on awareness or transparency about pay in my workplace. 
(continue to question 37) 
• I feel it has had moderate impact on awareness or transparency about pay in my 
workplace. (continue to question 37) 
• I feel it has had significant impact on awareness or transparency about pay in my 
workplace. (continue to question 37) 
• I was not aware of the Times Higher Education Pay Survey (skip to question 38) 
 
32. Please describe why you feel the Times Higher Education Pay Survey has had the impact you 
just reported on awareness or transparency about pay in your workplace? 
• Qualitative response box 
 
33. The Athena SWAN Charter was established to encourage and recognise commitment to 
advancing the careers of women working in higher education and research. Has your 
department applied for an Athena SWAN award (or the formerly awarded Gender Equality 
Mark)? 
• Yes (proceed to question 39) 
• No (skip to question 41) 




34. Do you feel the application process has had any impact on awareness or transparency about 
pay in your department? 
• I feel it has had no impact on awareness or transparency about pay within my department. 
• I feel it has had moderate impact on awareness or transparency about pay in my 
department. 
• I feel it has had significant impact on awareness or transparency about pay in my 
department. 
• I don’t know 
 
35. Please describe why the Athena Swan award (or the formerly awarded Gender Equality 
Mark) application process has had the impact you just reported on awareness or 
transparency of pay in your department. 
• Qualitative response box 
 
Section 5: Income Details 
We want to understand whether someone’s level of pay may influence the decision to discuss pay 
with co-workers. These final few questions will provide details about your earnings. Please be 
assured that all responses to this survey will remain anonymous and confidential. 
INCOME FACTORS 
36. What is your approximate gross annual income from [HEI provider] in GBP (£)? 
• Interval data response. 
 
37. (If previous question left blank only): What income band reflects your approximate gross 














• £130,001 or more 
 
38. Is this annual income you have just reported based on year-round employment (allowing for 
any normal holidays, sick leave, etc)? 
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• Yes (skip to question 44) 
• No (continue to question 43) 
 
39. On how many weeks employment per year is this annual income based? 
• Interval response 
 
40. Is the annual income you have just reported based on full-time employment? 
• Yes (skip to question 47) 
• No (continue to question 45) 
 
41. As your reported annual income is not based on full-time employment, are you employed 
on an hourly or a fractional contract? 
• Hourly (skip to question 47) 
• Fractional (continue to question 46) 
 
42. What fraction of full-time employment are you contracted to work (for instance, a 70% 
contract would be reported 0.7 below)? 
• Interval response (if empty and if not empty, skip to question 48) 
 
43. How many hours per week are you contracted to work? 
• Interval response 
 
44. Is the annual income you have been reporting in the previous few questions determined 




45. Have you received any bonus pay from [HEI provider] for the past three academic years 
(2013/14; 2014/15, or 2015-2016)? 
• Yes (continue to question 50) 
• No (skip to question 52) 
 
46. What was the approximate gross value in GBP (£) of that bonus (where more than one 
bonus has been awarded to you during the past three academic years, please report the 
value of the largest year’s bonus)? 
• Interval response 
 
47. For what was this bonus awarded (select as many as apply)? 
• Exceptional Teaching/Student Engagement 
• Exceptional Publications/Research 
• Exceptional Contribution to Management/Administration 





48. Please elaborate on what this bonus was awarded for below if you would like. 
• Qualitative response box 
 
49. Do you hold any extra titles, duties, or responsibilities within your department, which 
involve work beyond your main academic title, such as director of a research centre or a 
programme, head of a department, etc.? 
• Yes (continue to question 53) 
• No (skip to question 55) 
 
50. Please record any extra titles, duties, or responsibilities within your department, which 
involve work beyond your main academic title, such as director of a research centre or a 
programme, head of a department, etc., which you hold below. 
• Qualitative response box 
 




52. Have you ever been promoted since beginning work at your current employer? 
• Yes (continue to question 56) 
• No (skip to question 57)  
 
53. How many years did you work at your current employer before you received your first 
promotion? 
• Interval response 
 
54. Research has suggested that the proportion of men and women within an occupation can 
have an influence on men and women’s pay levels. Thinking of your own department, which 
best describes its gender composition of the academic staff? 
• Male-Dominated (70%+ male) 
• Female-Dominated (70%+ female) 
• Integrated (<70% male and <70% female) 
 
55. The researcher may be conducting further research at your university through qualitative 
interviews to discuss your pay comparison behaviour and the culture around pay as you 
experience it. If you are willing to volunteer to be interviewed for this purpose, please put 
your email address in the box below. Your responses to this survey will remain anonymous 
and confidential. Your details will never be used in connection with your previous responses. 
• Qualitative response 
 
56. Two participants will be drawn at random to receive a £20 Pret a Manger gift voucher as a 
thank you for participation following the conclusion of the study. All survey responses will 
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remain anonymous and confidential whether you choose to enter the draw or not. If you 
wish to be entered in the draw, please provide your email address below. Your details will 
never be used in connection with your previous responses. 
• Qualitative response 
 
We thank you for your time spent taking this survey.  




Appendix F: Survey Respondent Demographics 
 
*Includes respondents with missing data in denominator  
**All respondents reporting anything other than white  





*Includes respondents with missing data in denominator  
**All respondents reporting anything other than white  
*** Based on (Equality Challenge Unit, 2015b) 
332 
 
*Includes respondents with missing data in denominator  
**All respondents reporting anything other than white  
*** Based on (Equality Challenge Unit, 2015b)  
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Appendix G: Semi-Structured Interview Schedules 
 
Remuneration Policy Shapers Interview Schedule 
Expository: Thanks very much for agreeing to speak with me today. Before we begin, may I just 
confirm as discussed via email that you do/do not consent for me to record this interview? The 
purpose of recording is only to allow me to conduct a complete analysis on the information you 
share with me.…Thank you. I am now/not recording. 
As discussed, I am researching the pay discussion culture faced by academics working in UK higher 
education. Please be assured that your identity and employer will remain anonymous and 
confidential on all materials produced from this interview and throughout my research process. 
The specific purpose of this interview is to discuss the role you feel that remuneration policies at this 
university play in shaping the pay discussion culture faced by academics working here. 
I will ask reasonably broad questions at first and provide occasional follow up questions to 
understand your perspective more comprehensively. You may ask me for clarification at any time 
and may of course decline to answer any question. Today’s interview should take approximately one 
hour, and again I truly appreciate your time! 
Topic 1: Icebreaker into the Realm of the Income-talk taboo 
1. Before we get into specifics, I’d like you to consider a hypothetical situation. Imagine that 
tomorrow a colleague comes to your office with pleasant news. They have been offered a new 
academic post, and they want your advice on whether the salary figure on the table is a good 
deal. How would you respond? 
Probe: How does this situation make you feel? 
Probe: Does it make a difference if the person is junior, at a comparable level or senior to you?  
Probe: Does it make a difference whether this is a promotion here or a post elsewhere? 
Probe: Has anything like this ever actually happened to you? 
Probe: If no questions about pay, what about promotion? 
Probe: Are their certain types of people you would be more or less likely to provide advice? 
Probe: Do you think this kind of thing occurs frequently here? 
Topic 2: University Pay Transparency Policies and Pay Secrecy Culture 
2. A female academic recently told me that her department head and HR officers have reacted 
with shock on several occasions when she tried to question specific pay disparities that she 
had learned of, which appeared to affect her. She told me was made to feel like she had done 
something wrong by discussing pay with others. Would you be surprised if an academic had 
this experience here?  
 
Prompt: Does this university have any formal policy regarding academic staff discussions of pay 
internally; or externally?   
334 
 
Prompt: Does the university encourage pay discussion it? Discourage it? Silent on the issue? 
Prompt: What about for elements of pay beyond basic pay? Exceptional duty allowances, market 
supplements, other incentives for moving to a new university? 
Prompt: Are there informal policy or ‘professional’ expectations around pay discussion? 
Prompt: Do you think academics discuss pay with each other at this university? 
Prompt: What sort of pay transparency does the university actively create here? Internally? 
Externally? Equal Pay Audit/Review? 
Prompt: Does this transparency extend to the bonus scheme? Promotions? Professorial review 
outcomes by gender and ethnicity? 
3. Thinking about any policies (or lack of policies) on pay transparency here, can you describe 
any policy reforms that this university has made in recent years? 
Prompt: Have UK statutory changes spurred any related reforms here? 
Prompt: This might involve reporting of pay gaps by protected characteristics, like sex or race? 
Prompt: In April 2011, the Public Sector Equality Duty went into effect, replacing previous specific 
equality duties. Part of compliance requires transparency and publication of evidence that duty is 
being upheld. Has the university’s response to the PSED had an impact on pay transparency here?  
Prompt: In October 2010, a clause in the Equality Act 2010 made enforcing pay secrecy clauses 
unenforceable if employees suspect illegal discrimination. This university probably did not have pay 
secrecy clauses in contracts anyway, but do you think the university may have taken any action to 
promote awareness of this new right among academic staff? 
Prompt: Have legal actions spurred any related reforms here? 
Prompt: Has this reform been achieved?  
Prompt: Was there a concern for fairness related to this reform? In what way? What did that look 
like? (For women? BAME people? Junior staff?) 
4. Has the process of gaining and maintaining an institutional Athena SWAN award led to any 
changes in the university’s pay transparency environment? 
Prompt: In terms of reporting?  
Prompt: In terms of policy? 
Prompt: How does the university report Athena SWAN activity to academic staff? 
5. How does this university engage with or respond to the Times Higher Education pay survey 
publication of institutional level gender pay gap data? 
Prompt: Reference the relevant university charts of their GPG against UK wide GPG [University GPG 
Comparison Charts against UK GPG). 
Prompt: Does the university communicate anything about the THE pay survey to staff? How? Why 
not? 
Prompt: Can you describe other ways the university communicates about trends in the gender pay 
gap among academic staff here? 
Prompt: Do you think the university plans to take further action to narrow the gender pay gap, as 
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discussed in the 2016/17 national pay settlement? 
Prompt: What about pay disparities between BAME and white academic staff? 
6. Thinking about the culture around pay transparency here, would you describe any culture 
shift that you think has taken place at this university in recent years? 
 
Prompt: This is about informal practices. Do you think academic staff are more open with each 
other about pay than they used to be? 
Prompt: Why do you think the culture has shifted or not? 
Prompt: Is this shift (or lack of one) good for the university? 
Prompt: Do you think there may be some groups of academic staff who would feel differently to 
you? What groups? 
Topic 3: University Pay Policy (Pay Scale, Market/Retention Supplements, Bonuses/Performance 
Awards, Allowances, Promotions, Professorial Review) 
 
7. Do you believe that knowledge of colleagues’ pay could help a member of academic staff here 
ensure they are being remunerated fairly? 
 
Prompt: Can you elaborate on that answer? 
Prompt: Would your answer change if you were comparing professors and academics who had not 
yet become professors? 
Prompt: Would your answer change if you were comparing research only staff, teaching only staff 
and teaching and research staff? 
Prompt: Do you think function of remuneration policies here make knowledge of colleagues’ pay 
particularly useful or useless? These policies might refer to the pay scale itself, market and retention 
supplements, bonuses or performance awards or special allowances. 
Prompt: Does the university have any sense of distribution of things like market supplements, 
bonuses/performance rewards, or particularly acting up or additional duties allowances? (by 
discipline, gender, ethnic background, seniority) 
Prompt: Do you think academic staff here are clear about what type of work attracts an acting up or 
additional duties allowance? 
Prompt: On a related note, do you know if departments typically request applicants prior salary 
history? Why or why not? What happens to that information? 
 
8. Do you believe that knowledge of colleagues’ promotion experiences could help a member of 
academic staff here ensure they are being advanced fairly? 
 
Prompt: Would your answer change if you were comparing professors and academics who had not 
yet become professors? 
Prompt: Would your answer change if you were comparing research only staff, teaching only staff 
and teaching and research staff? 
Prompt: Do you think the function of promotion policies here make knowledge of colleagues 
promotion experiences particularly useful or useless? These policies might refer to academic 
promotion or the professorial review process. 
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Prompt: Does this university facilitate any mentorship programmes in order to encourage certain 
groups toward promotion? 
 
UCU Committee Members Interview Schedule 
Expository: Thanks very much for agreeing to speak with me today. Before we begin, may I just 
confirm as discussed via email that you do/do not consent for me to record this interview? The 
purpose of recording is only to allow me to conduct a complete analysis on the information you 
share with me.…Thank you. I am now/not recording. 
As discussed, I am researching the pay discussion culture faced by academics working in UK higher 
education. Please be assured that your identity and employer will remain anonymous and 
confidential on all materials produced from this interview and throughout my research process. 
The specific purpose of this interview is to discuss the trade union perspective on the role that 
management and remuneration policies at this university place in shaping pay discussion culture 
faced by academics working here. 
I will ask reasonably broad questions at first and provide occasional follow up questions to 
understand your perspective more comprehensively. You may ask me for clarification at any time 
and may of course decline to answer any question. Today’s interview should take approximately one 
hour, and again I truly appreciate your time! 
Topic 1: Icebreaker into the Realm of the Income-talk taboo 
1. Before we get into specifics, I’d like you to consider a hypothetical situation. Imagine that 
tomorrow a colleague comes to your office with pleasant news. They have been offered anew 
academic post, and they want your advice on whether the salary figure on the table is a good 
deal. How would you respond? 
Probe: How does this situation make you feel? 
Probe: Does it make a difference if the person is junior, at a comparable level or senior to you?  
Probe: Does it make a difference whether this is a promotion here or a post elsewhere? 
Probe: Has anything like this ever actually happened to you? 
Probe: Are their certain types of people you would be more or less likely to provide advice? 
Probe: Do you think this kind of thing occurs frequently here? 
Topic 2: University Pay Transparency Policies and Pay Secrecy Culture 
2. A female academic recently told me that her department head and HR officers have reacted 
with shock on several occasions when she tried to question specific pay disparities she had 
learned of that appeared to affect her. She said she was made to feel like she had done 
something bad by discussing pay with others. As a UCU committee member, would you be 




Prompt: Are you aware if this university has any formal policy regarding academic staff discussions 
of pay internally; or externally?  
Prompt: Does the university encourage pay discussion? Discourage it? Silent on the issue? 
Prompt: Do you perceive any informal policy or ‘professional’ expectations around pay discussion? 
Prompt: Do you think other academics discuss pay with each other at this university? 
Prompt: Are you aware of active creation of pay transparency by this university? Internally? 
Externally? 
 
3. Thinking about any policies (or lack of policies) on pay transparency here, can you describe 
any policy reform campaigns that this UCU branch has led here recent years? 
 
Prompt: Have legal actions spurred any related UCU campaigns? 
Prompt: Have UK statutory changes spurred any related UCU campaigns? 
Prompt: In April 2011, the Public Sector Equality Duty went into effect, replacing previous specific 
equality duties. Part of compliance requires transparency and publication of evidence that duty is 
being upheld. Does the UCU feel the university’s response to the PSED had an impact on pay 
transparency here? 
Prompt: In October 2010, a clause in the Equality Act 2010 made enforcing pay secrecy clauses 
unenforceable if employees suspect illegal discrimination. This university probably did not have pay 
secrecy clauses in contracts anyway, but has the UCU taken any action to promote awareness of this 
new right among academic staff? 
Prompt: Was there a concern for fairness related to this campaign? In what way? What did that look 
like?  (For women? BAME people? Junior staff?) 
Prompt: Has the university been responsive to these campaigns? 
Prompt: Have these campaigns been successful? 
 
4. As you may know, this university was awarded an institutional Athena SWAN award in 
2008/2010. Does the UCU feel that the process of gaining and maintaining an institutional 
Athena SWAN award has led to any changes in the university’s pay transparency 
environment? 
 
Prompt: In terms of reporting? 
Prompt: In terms of policy? 
Prompt: How does the university report Athena SWAN activity to academic staff? 
Prompt: Does UCU communicate with members about Athena SWAN activity? 
 
5. What (if anything) has this UCU branch has done to engage with or respond to the Times 
Higher Education pay survey publication of institutional level gender pay gap data? 
 
Prompt: Reference the relevant university charts of their GPG against UK wide GPG (University GPG 
Comparison Charts against UK GPG). 




Prompt: Can you describe other ways this UCU branch communicates about trends in the gender 
pay gap among academic staff here?  
Prompt: Do you think the university plans to take further action to narrow the gender pay gap, as 
offered in the 2016/17 national pay settlement talks? 
Prompt: Rate for Pay website? 
Prompt: What about pay disparities between BAME and white academic staff? 
 
6. Thinking about the culture around pay transparency here, would you describe any culture 
shift that the UCU feels has taken place here in recent years? 
 
Prompt: This is about informal practices. Do you think academic staff are more open with each 
other about pay than they used to be? 
Prompt: Why do you think the culture has shifted or not? 
Prompt: Is this shift (or lack of one) good for the university? 
Prompt: Do you think there may be some groups of academic staff who would feel differently about 
this? What groups? 
Topic 3: University Pay Policy (Pay Scale, Market/Retention Supplements, Bonuses/Performance 
Awards, Allowances, Promotions, Professorial Review) 
7. Do you believe that knowledge of colleagues’ pay could help a member of academic staff here 
ensure they are being remunerated fairly?  
 
Prompt: Can you elaborate on that answer? 
Prompt: Would your answer change if you were comparing professors and academics who had not 
yet become professors? 
Prompt: Would your answer change if you were comparing research only staff, teaching only staff 
and teaching and research staff? 
Prompt: Do you think function of remuneration policies here make knowledge of colleagues’ pay 
particularly useful or useless? These policies might refer to the pay scale itself, market and retention 
supplements, bonuses or performance awards or special allowances. 
Prompt: Does the university have any sense of distribution of things like market supplements, 
bonuses/performance rewards, or particularly acting up or additional duties allowances? (by 
discipline, gender, ethnic background, seniority) 
Prompt: Do you think academic staff here are clear about what type of work attracts an acting up or 
additional duties allowance? 
Prompt: On a related note, do you know if departments typically request applicants prior salary 
history? Why or why not? What happens to that information? 
 
8. Do you believe that knowledge of colleagues’ promotion experiences could help a member of 
academic staff here ensure they are being advanced fairly? 
 
Prompt: Would your answer change if you were comparing professors and academics who had not 
yet become professors? 
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Prompt: Would your answer change if you were comparing research only staff, teaching only staff 
and teaching and research staff? 
Prompt: Do you think the function of promotion policies here make knowledge of colleagues’ 
promotion experiences particularly useful or useless? These policies might refer to academic 
promotion or the professorial review process. 
Prompt: Does this university facilitate any mentorship programmes in order to encourage certain 
groups toward promotion? 
Academic Staff Interview Schedule 
Expository: Thanks very much for agreeing to speak with me today. Before we begin, may I just 
confirm as discussed via email that you do/do not consent for me to record this interview? The 
purpose of recording is only to allow me to conduct a complete analysis on the information you 
share with me.…Thank you. I am now/not recording. 
As discussed, I am researching the pay discussion culture faced by academics working in UK higher 
education. Please be assured that your identity and employer will remain anonymous and 
confidential on all materials produced from this interview and throughout my research process. 
The specific purpose of this interview is to help me gain a better sense of how you feel about 
discussing pay with your colleagues (or not), what those behaviours look like, what factors you feel 
shape your behaviour, and what impact they may have for you. If you feel there is a taboo against 
discussing pay in your workplace, why do you think that is? 
I will ask reasonably broad questions at first and provide occasional follow up questions to 
understand your perspective more comprehensively. You may ask me for clarification at any time 
and may of course decline to answer any question. Today’s interview should take approximately one 
hour, and again I truly appreciate your time! 
Individual Details: (Get these from survey response unless interviewee did not complete survey or 
anything is unclear. In that case, ask these questions quickly before start of interview. Always 
confirm current job title of all respondents before beginning interview) 
 
Confirm: 
• job title: 
• contract status (FT/PT): 
• contract type (FTC/OE): 
• job function (research and/or teaching): 
• UCU member (y/n): 
• highest degree: 
• length of service at this university and in HE as an academic (years): 
• gender (f/m): 
• ethnicity (white/BAME): 
• parent (y/n): 
• Applied for a job in the past 12 months (y/n): 
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• intended vote party if GE tomorrow: 
Topic 1: Icebreaker into the Realm of the Income-talk taboo 
1. Before we get into specifics, I’d like you to consider a hypothetical situation. Imagine that 
tomorrow a colleague comes to your office with pleasant news. They have been offered a new 
academic post, and they want your advice on whether the salary figure on the table is a good 
deal. How would you respond? 
Probe: How does this situation make you feel? 
Probe: Does it make a difference if the person is junior, at a comparable level or senior to you? 
Probe: Does it make a difference whether this is a promotion here or a post elsewhere? 
Probe: Has anything like this ever actually happened to you? 
Probe: Are their certain types of people you would be more or less likely to provide advice? 
Probe: Do you think this kind of thing occurs frequently here? 
Topic 2: University Pay Secrecy Policies and Pay Secrecy Culture 
2. (IF HEAD OF SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT): As department head, I suspect you may have a unique 
perspective on pay across this department at least. When you became the head and gained 
knowledge of the pay of all the academics in your department, did anything surprise you? 
Prompt: Were pay levels of your colleagues pretty similar to what you were expecting? 
Prompt: Do you remember noticing any colleagues whose pay was much higher or lower than you 
thought it would have been? 
Prompt: Did the pay data you received make it possible for you to easily connect colleagues’ pay 
with their demographic data, like gender or ethnicity? 
 
3. A female academic recently told me that her department head and HR officers have reacted 
with shock on several occasions when she tried to question specific pay disparities that she 
had learned of, which appeared to affect her negatively. She told me she was made to feel like 
she had done something wrong by discussing pay with others. Would you be surprised if an 
academic from your department had this experience? 
Prompt: (IF HEAD OF SCHOOL/DEPARTMENT): Do you ever try to evaluate or take action to correct 
pay disparities within your department in your capacity as head? Have you had any contact with the 
remuneration committee about pay disparities in your department? 
Prompt: This particularly female was also white. Do you think there may be a different experience 
for a BME academic, or a BME female academic at this university? 
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Prompt: Do you think someone from another department at this university might feel differently? 
Prompt: Are you aware if this university has any formal policy regarding academic staff discussions 
of pay internally; or externally? Or your department? 
Prompt: Do you perceive any informal policy or ‘professional’ expectations around pay discussion? 
Prompt: What messages do you get from the university leadership? From your head of school? 
Prompt: Do you think other academics discuss pay with each other in your department? Beyond 
your department? 
Prompt: Are you aware of active creation of pay transparency by this university or your 
department? Internally? Externally? 
Prompt: What about the UCU? Does the UCU present a different expectation than the university or 
your department? How so? 
4. Can you tell me about a time you have discussed pay with one of your colleagues here? 
Prompt: If this has never happened, has there been a time you considered discussing pay but felt 
you couldn’t, or a time someone wanted to discuss pay with you and you didn’t want to engage? 
Prompt: What do you feel motivated your behaviour? 
Prompt: What did you hope to gain or protect? 
 
Prompt: What were the other people involved like? Close friends? junior/senior colleagues? 
same/different gender? ethnicity? 
Prompt: Would you consult the UCU for support with these type of conversations? 
Prompt: Did anything change because of your conversation? 
Prompt: What about discussing pay with colleagues from other institutions? 
5. Can you describe for me the sort of people you think you would most be willing to discuss pay 
with, if ever? 
Prompt: This can be beyond this university. 
Prompt: Sex, ethnicity, job level of these individuals? 
Prompt: (IF A UCU MEMBER): Other UCU members, officers? 
Prompt: Or the sort of situations where you would be most comfortable discussing pay? 
 
Prompt: (IF A PARENT): Does being a parent affect these decisions in any way? 
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6. Can you describe for me the sort of people you think you would be least willing or never 
willing to discuss pay with? 
Prompt: This can be beyond this university. 
Prompt: Sex, ethnicity, job level of these individuals? 
Prompt: Or the sort of situations where you would be least comfortable discussing pay? 
Prompt: (IF A PARENT): Does being a parent affect these decisions in any way? 
7. How would you describe the fairness of pay in this department? 
Prompt: What makes you feel this way? 
Prompt: What sort of people do would you compare yourself with to determine this? 
Prompt: Does information shared or withheld by the university or your department affect your 
opinion? How? 
 
Prompt: There are websites that allow you to benchmark your own pay against others in similar jobs 
to you (Glassdoor, Emolument, UCU Rate for Job). Have you ever heard of these? Used them? 
Prompt: What would you do if you learned that your pay appeared to be unfair? 
Prompt: Do you ever have concerns about compliance with legal employment anti-discrimination 
policies here? 
Prompt: Have you considered leaving this university due to this issue? 
8. Does the Times Higher Education Pay Survey ever come into conversations here? 
Prompt: If no, briefly explain and continue. These bar charts show the GPG for all full-time academic 
staff and professors here and across all UK universities based on that survey [Show relevant 
university graphs from [University GPG Comparison Charts against UK GPG]. 
Prompt: Can you imagine people around here being interested in this sort of report? 
Prompt: Why/why not? 
9. Do you feel that the process of gaining and maintaining an institutional Athena SWAN award 
led to any changes in pay transparency here? 
Prompt: Do you feel the university addresses pay transparency through the Athena SWAN process? 
Prompt: How so?/Why not? 
Prompt: (If department holds Athena SWAN accreditation or has/is applied/ying): Do you feel the 
processes of gaining and maintaining a departmental Athena SWAN award has led to any changes in 
your department’s pay transparency environment? 
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Topic 3: University Pay Policy (Pay Scale, Market/Retention Supplements, Bonuses/Performance 
Awards, Allowances, Promotions, Professorial Review)  
 
10. Do you believe that knowledge of colleagues’ pay could help you ensure that you are being 
remunerated fairly here? 
Prompt: Has this ever happened to you? 
Prompt: Can knowledge of colleagues’ pay from other institutions help you here? 
Prompt: Do you think function of remuneration policies here make knowledge of colleagues’ pay 
particularly useful or useless? These policies might refer to the pay scale itself, market and retention 
supplements, bonuses or performance awards or special allowances. 
Prompt: Have you discussed pay in the context of some of these processes? 
Prompt: Do you feel you know what type of work attracts an acting up or additional duties 
allowance? 
Prompt: Is the guidance you receive to understand remuneration policies clear and easily 
accessible? 
Prompt: Who does this guidance come from? The UCU? Line manager? HR? 
Prompt: Can this lack of transparency be fixed? 
Prompt: On a related note, did you have to provide your prior salary history or level when applying 
to this university? What do you think happens to that information? 
 
11. Do you believe that knowledge of colleagues’ promotion experiences could help you ensure 
that you are being advanced fairly here? 
Prompt: Has this ever happened to you? 
Prompt: Can knowledge of promotion experiences of colleagues from other institutions help you 
here? 
Prompt: Do you think the function of promotion policies here make knowledge of colleagues’ 
promotion experiences particularly useful or useless? These policies might refer to academic 
promotion or the professorial review process. 
Prompt: What gets people promoted around here? 
Prompt: Is the guidance you receive to understand promotion policies clear and easily accessible? 
Prompt: Who does this guidance come from? The UCU? Line manager? HR? 
Prompt: Can this lack of transparency be fixed? 
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Appendix H: Qualitative Coding Tree 
• THEME 1: Data Transparency  
o CONCEPT: Visibility of Organisational Inequality and Organisational Restriction 
▪ CATEGORY: Equal Pay Audit 
• CHARACTERISATION: Leads to Substantive Change 
• CHARACTERISATION: Does Not Lead to Substantive Change 
▪ CATEGORY: PSED Compliance 
• CHARACTERISATION: Leads to Substantive Change 
• CHARACTERISATION: Does Not Lead to Substantive Change 
▪ CATEGORY: Staff Diversity Data 
• CHARACTERISATION: Leads to Substantive Change 
• CHARACTERISATION: Does Not Lead to Substantive Change 
 
• THEME 2: External Recognition 
o CONCEPT: Legitimacy of Inequality and External Communication  
▪ CATEGORY: Branding/Public Image 
• CHARACTERISATION: Leads to Substantive Change 
• CHARACTERISATION: Does Not Lead to Substantive Change 
▪ CATEGORY: Athena SWAN 
• CHARACTERISATION: Leads to Substantive Change 
• CHARACTERISATION: Does Not Lead to Substantive Change 
▪ CATEGORY: Race Equality Charter 
• CHARACTERISATION: Leads to Substantive Change 
• CHARACTERISATION: Does Not Lead to Substantive Change 
 
• THEME 3: Informal Pay Secrecy Norms  
o CONCEPT: Management’s Control over Employee Compliance with Inequalities and 
Employee Restriction 
▪ CATEGORY: Perception of Pay Secrecy Norm 
• CHARACTERISATION: Open 
• CHARACTERISATION: Closed 
▪ CATEGORY: Experience of Pay Secrecy Norm 
• CHARACTERISATION: Open 
• CHARACTERISATION: Closed 
 
• THEME 4: Bureaucratic Processes and Policy  
o CONCEPT: Processes that Produce Inequality and Procedural Communication 
▪ CATEGORY: Professorial Pay 
• CHARACTERISATION: Clear 
• CHARACTERISATION: Unclear 
▪ CATEGORY: Pay Rise for Promotion 
• CHARACTERISATION: Clear 
• CHARACTERISATION: Unclear 
▪ CATEGORY: Recruitment Pay Levels 
• CHARACTERISATION: Clear 
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• CHARACTERISATION: Unclear 
▪ CATEGORY: Promotion Process 
• CHARACTERISATION: Clear 
• CHARACTERISATION: Unclear 
▪ CATEGORY: Unspoken Norms 
• CHARACTERISATION: Clear 
• CHARACTERISATION: Unclear 
 
• FREE NODES: UCU Activity 








Appendix I: HESA Analysis Tables 
 
GENDER PAY GAP and BAME PAY GAP 
Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 
Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 
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Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 




INTERSECTIONAL GENDER/BAME PAY GAP 
Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 
Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 
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Source: Author’s analysis of HESA Staff Record 2003/04-2015/16 




Appendix J: Binomial Logistic Regression Results for Reported Pay Discussion 
Behaviour (with University Beta Dummy Variable) 
NB: Table reports the odds ratios, which are reported as Exp[B] (standard errors in parentheses). 






Appendix K: Forthcoming GPG Reporting Analysis 
Dr Aneeta Rattan presented unpublished content coding analysis of GPG report narratives published 
by 241 of the FTSE 350 companies at the Global Institute for Women’s Leadership event in London—
Gender Pay Gap Reporting Year 1: What have we learned?—in April 2019. Based on narratives 
released along with the first year of reporting, her analysis of problem identification and action 
plans exhibited by these large private-sector companies suggested that while the most common 
explanation for the GPG was vertical segregation, most of the solutions did not aim to address the 
senior staffing problem. In other words, despite identifying that a lot of the GPG was attributable to 
hierarchical power imbalances within the organisations, most of the solutions (not surprisingly) did 
not seek to challenge and re-align power within the organisations. Publication of this analysis is 




Appendix L: Problematic GPG Narratives by Universities with Narrowed Gaps  
Among institutions highlighted by the THE as having made the most progress in narrowing their gap, 
University of Falmouth and Queen Mary University of London (Pells, 2019), it is not entirely clear 
from reading their second year GPG reporting narratives that anything about the hierarchical power 
imbalances or structures supporting them have changed. Although further explanations are given, 
the justifications that both institutions placed first in their narratives suggest no change or a 
worsening structural reform.  
Falmouth’s first explanation also simply pertained to calculation changes. The institution had 
outsourced a number of non-academic staffing so was no longer required to include them in their 
calculation: 
Falmouth University has established a joint venture with the University of Exeter to deliver a 
wide range of services including residences, estates, facilities, library services, IT, and 
student services. As a result, a significant number of critical staff are reported independently 
as Falmouth Exeter Plus, and aren’t included in Falmouth University's statistics.” (Falmouth 
University, 2019)  
This could suggest a worsening of conditions for staff excluded from the figures. A joint statement 
by the UCU and GMB unions roundly condemned the creation of this venture—Falmouth Exeter Plus 
(FX Plus) when it was initially being considered. They expressed concern that it would result in 
degradation of pay, including removing alignment with the Framework Agreement (Chapter 4), and 
conditions, such as annual leave (Grove, 2013b, 2015a).101   
Queen Mary explained that they have since determined that the data they reported under their 
statutory duty in 2018 was inaccurate: 
In preparing for the 2018 gender pay gap data, we have put in place a more robust process 
for improved data quality for reporting. Interrogation of the gender pay gap data from 2017 
highlighted some anomalies which resulted in overinflated figures being reported last year. 
The outcome of this is a significant drop in the size of the pay gap for 2018 compared with 
2017. We are confident that the figures extracted this year are an accurate reflection of our 
gender pay gap as at 31 March 2018. (Queen Mary University of London, 2019, p. 4) 
 
101 Although again beyond the scope of this thesis, an aspect of casualisation is also raised in Falmouth’s 
narrative. The report notes: “Offering employment opportunities to our student population is important to us 
and in order to facilitate this we have established Falmouth Agency Ltd as the vehicle through which we 
manage this employment relationship. Whilst there is no requirement to publish results for this entity we have 
analysed the data and this shows a 0% gender pay gap on a mean and median basis alongside no bonuses 
being paid to any individual within the group,” (Falmouth University, 2019). However, in the absence of 
reporting on the pay levels, this, even if accurate, does not assuage the unions’ concern about creating 
second-tier employment with lower pay, weaker benefits, and lack of access to collective bargaining. 
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Whilst improving data accuracy is useful, it does not indicate action to reform organisational 
inequality. If nothing else, these reports highlight a considerable problem of comparability. If the 
data cannot be calculated on the same basis year-on-year due to frequent changes made by the 
university, trends cannot be meaningfully interpreted in order to understand changing experiences. 
Furthermore, Queen Mary’s result chimes with the considerable frustration about access to reliable 
data expressed by UCU representatives in both case studies of this thesis (Chapter 8), which is 
surprising given the pressure under which UK universities have been placed for years to perform the 
pay ‘transparency agenda’ (Chapter 4).    
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Appendix M: Research Impact Record and Future Plans 
During the first year of my PhD, I contributed to international legislative dialogue by supporting the 
development of the Women and Work Research Group of the Business School at Sydney University’s 
submission to an Australian Senate inquiry into proposed legislation the Fair Work Amendment 
(Gender Pay Gap) Bill 2015. The bill would have protected the right of Australian employees to 
discuss their pay without fear of employer retaliation, with similar but stronger language than 
section 77 of the UK’s Equality Act 2010. I provided insights on the income-talk taboo and policy 
knowledge about the limitations of UK legislation on pay transparency (Baird, Heron and Women, 
2016).102 
During the third year of my PhD, I contributed to a BBC newsbeat article encouraging young people 
to negotiate their pay at work. I raised an important counter narrative to victim-blaming rhetoric 
suggesting that the GPG is partly due to women’s flawed negotiating tactics, the societal barriers 
and stereotypes women face when they engage in similar negotiating behaviour (BBC Newsbeat, 
2018). This was generated from my engagement with recent pay negotiation literature (Babcock and 
Laschever, 2009; Artz, Goodall and Oswald, 2018).  
In the same year, I also provided voluntary advice and networking connections to support an 
investigative critique by Screenhouse Productions, Ltd. of the UK’s current mandatory GPG reporting 
regulations (Equality Act 2010) for an episode of Dispatches, Channel 4’s award-winning 
investigative current affairs programme, which corresponded with the April 2018 reporting deadline 
of these regulations. The show demonstrated the risk that the pay ‘transparency agenda’ could fail 
to deliver genuine transparency. By creating a fake company that posed to newly developed 
consultants advising companies on the new regulations, the programme revealed indications that 
some companies were seeking out technically legally loopholes to evade intended scrutiny of the 
reporting, such as restructuring the company into smaller chunks to evade the 250 employee 
reporting threshold altogether (Burge, 2018).  
During the final year of my PhD, I was invited by the Royal Holloway University and College Union’s 
branch committee to speak about my PhD research findings at an ‘Equalities Tea(ch)-in’ in July 2019. 
The diverse audience included a mixture of academics, students, an Equality, Diversity & Inclusion 
professional and several members of the institution’s council. Therefore, this provided an 
 
102 Unfortunately, the bill has not become law, having lapsed at the end of the Parliament in July 2019 
(Parliament of Australia, 2019). Impact, like research, is often an iterative process. 
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opportunity to illustrate the real experiences of the silence of transparency to a relevant audience, 
drawing on materials from one of my two case studies that were used in Chapters 8 and 9.  
I plan to engage in at least three future actions, along with developing the work of this thesis into 
published materials. First, I plan to seek effective coverage of my work in the THE. To confirm that 
the THE Pay Survey has been published since at least 2007, I corresponded with THE journalist who 
has written some of the associated articles, John Morgan. In addition to confirming facts with him, I 
was able to secure his interest in the subject of my research. He encouraged me to get in touch 
when I publish my research, as it would be relevant for THE coverage. In order to maximise impact 
from THE coverage of my research, I would like to work with a journalist to distribute publication of 
my research (whether in article or monograph form) to a number of UK VCs for comment to be 
included in a THE article. Apart from the value of a THE article in disseminating my findings in an 
easily digestible way to the industry, this would also create a cohort of powerful university leaders 
who might begin to consider my work and their comments might create something to which union 
branches could hold them accountable to generate positive reform in their respective institutions.  
Secondly, I plan to reach out to existing networks of academics and other relevant actors beyond 
academia with an interest in the reforms suggested by my research. My supervisor, Professor 
Rainbow Murray, who has been deeply involved with Queen Mary University of London EDI work, 
has informed me that Professor Kate Malleson, QMUL’s Senior Academic Lead for Diversity, is part 
of a UK-wide network of academics with similar positions. I plan to contact Professor Malleson to 
ask for her support to share my publications flowing from this research with this network. In 
addition, during my PhD, I have collated a number of contacts of professionals working across many 
sectors who have expressed an interest in seeing the results of my work. Most prominent and 
recent among this list includes former BBC journalist Carrie Gracie (2019), who launched a book 
Equal, inspired by her experience of pay inequality and secrecy around pay inside the media giant in 
September 2019 (Cowdrey, 2018). I plan to disseminate my research publications from this thesis to 
this compiled personal network and to my participants who provided contact details for this 
purpose.    
Finally, I plan to reach out to AdvanceHE to highlight that while the Athena SWAN charter is 
admirable in intent, significant problems in implementation should be considered. While I was 
supporting my own departments initial forays into the Athena SWAN process, I learned of advice 
applicants are given that they should ideally have their application read by several ‘critical friends’ 
before submission. I would like to prepare a ‘critical friend’ report for AdvanceHE that summaries in 
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Appendix N: Future Article Plans 
This thesis has also generated my ambitious plan to turn my extensive PhD data collection 
into an array of peer-reviewed publications and develop two existing collaborations under 
my existing HESA data access agreement. I would like to turn this thesis into a monograph, 
but for that to be financially feasible, I will need to secure a permanent academic job. To 
improve my chances of that achievement, I must first publish articles derived from central 
threads of this thesis.  
Articles drawing on thesis chapters: 
• Social Pay Discussion Behaviour: An Analysis of Two English Universities 
This article would draw on analysis of my original Qualtrics survey on social pay comparison 
behaviour using binomial logistic regression as presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis. I plan to 
submit it to Work, Employment and Society. 
 
• Paradoxical Pay Transparency: A Weapon in the Battle against Pay Inequality or Against 
Discussing It? 
This article would be based on the first half of thematic analysis presented in Chapter 8 of 
this thesis. I would like to submit it to the Human Resource Management Journal.  
 
• Social Pay Comparison: A Tool of Collective Resistance to ‘Transparent’ Bureaucracy  
This article would be based on the second half of the thematic analysis presented in Chapter 
9 of this thesis. I would like to submit it to the British Journal of Industrial Relations.  
Research notes re-visiting cut thesis material:  
• A Second Look at Social Pay Comparison: Relationship with Salary 
This would be a research note drawing again on my Qualtrics survey data but seeking to 
incorporate income data. Income questions were included in the survey to enable this 
analysis, but the response to these questions was much lower, hence it was excluded from 
focus on this thesis. It merits further exploration, however, to identify potential trends, 
which is why I would like to explore this in a research note to be submitted to Work, 




• Income Non-Response in National Surveys: An Alternative Measure of the Income-Talk 
Taboo 
This research note would revisit work conducted for but not included in this thesis. It would 
seek to suggest a potential alternative way of measuring the extent of the income-talk 
taboo using non-response to income questions in existing surveys as a proxy measure. This 
note would be submitted to Work, Employment and Society.  
 
Articles using HESA data access  
• The Gender Pay Gap In Academia: A Case Study of UK Business Schools  
This article will use existing HESA data procured to conduct a number of detailed analyses 
on the GPG (and G/EPG) inside UK business schools, including OLS and Fixed Effects 
regression and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. This piece is a collaboration with Professors 
Geraldine Healy (QMUL) and Almudena Sevilla (UCL) already nearly drafted. We plan to 
submit it to the British Journal of Industrial Relations.  
• The Gender Pay Gap in UK Higher Education: Does the Public Sector Equality Duty Matter? 
This article would also use the existing HESA data procured to explore the impact of 
regulative pay transparency force, the Public Sector Equality Duty, on the GPG in UK HE. This 
paper would employ the difference-in-difference method and would be a collaboration with 
Danula Gamage (QMUL). We would plan to submit this article to the Industrial Relations: A 
Journal of Economy and Society. 
 
